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Abstract 
 
This dissertation, focusing on religion, law, and socio-legal storytelling, is a 
comprehensive, qualitative study of Jewish divorce (get) refusal and the first comparative study 
between Toronto and New York, cities with the largest and most diverse Jewish populations in 
their respective countries. Since the 1980s and early 1990s, there have been slow socio-legal 
developments around get refusal in New York and Canada as well as heightened awareness and 
advocacy in New York, coupled with denial of the persistence of the phenomenon in Toronto.  
Sally Falk Moore noted of a different legal pluralist context, “Innovative legislation and 
other attempts to direct change often fail to achieve their intended purposes…new laws are thrust 
upon going social arrangements in which there are complexes of binding obligations...” (Moore, 
744). Despite the increased visibility of get refusal in the media, much of the work being done, 
both social and legal, continues to perpetuate a gap between legal and social realities within 
Jewish communities as well as silences, particularly in Toronto. At least in part, this is due to 
unforeseen forces, specifically the power of normative cultural practices. 
Drawing on interviews inspired by oral history and ethnography, and archival sources to 
get a ‘thick description’, this dissertation contributes to women’s historiography of marriage and 
examines the overlapping legal norms of Jewish and civil laws, making some key contributions. I 
incorporate socio-legal literatures dealing with religion, law, and multiculturalism, as well as 
gender and storytelling (by talking to broad and diverse stakeholders) and thus I bring literatures 
of social theory, religious feminism and legal pluralism together in an innovative way to examine 
women’s narratives of being “chained” to a marriage. I shift the parameters of studying get 
refusal by placing women’s narratives and experiences of being refused a get by their recalcitrant 
spouses at the centre of this analysis, developing a critical legal pluralist approach. With 
empirical support from interviews I illustrate that get refusal is not necessarily a function of 
one’s piety. It may impact all types of women, and religious observance is not in and of itself the 
cause (thus abandoning religious observance is not the solution). Furthermore, I demonstrate the 
deep connection between domestic abuse and get refusal. 
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Prayer for Agunot 
Creator of heaven and earth, may it be Your will to free the captive wives of Israel when love 
and sanctity have fled the home, but their husbands bind them in the tatters of their ketubot. 
Remove the bitter burden from these agunot and soften the hearts of their misguided captors. 
Liberate Your faithful daughters from their anguish. Enable them to establish new homes and 
raise up children in peace. 
 
Grant wisdom to the judges of Israel; teach them to recognize oppression and rule against it. 
Infuse our rabbis with the courage to use their power for good alone. 
Blessed are you, Creator of heaven and earth, who frees the captives. 
 
 
English by Shelley Frier List  
Hebrew Translation by Devorah Ross and Esther Israel 
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Shelley Frier List composed this prayer in 1991. Despite attempts to garner more 
information regarding the prayer and its author further details have been elusive. I also wonder 
about the motivation for writing the prayer, particularly since get laws had already been 
established in Toronto and New York by 1991. Despite lacking details regarding what 
precipitated its creation, this prayer, composed by a Jewish woman, is a fitting way to begin a 
socio-legal analysis of get refusal which embraces a religious feminist approach and gives 
women a platform to illustrate their roles as social and legal actors. 
This personal prayer has deeper meaning as well. Using the language of captivity and 
liberation, oppression and freedom signals both the significant toll get refusal has on women and 
an emerging theme of this project, that refusal of a get is abusive behaviour. Moreover, this 
language echoes language used by the women themselves, as well as Alan Dershowitz, and 
others, who go so far as to compare agunot to slaves. This theme will be revisited in chapters six 
and seven. The language used throughout the prayer is noteworthy in that it signals the ubiquity 
of the phenomenon of get refusal and also that the remedy, like the cause, is ultimately within the 
hands of individuals. 
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Chapter One- Introduction 
In this preliminary chapter I set up the in depth, socio-legal, religious feminist and 
qualitative primary research that is to follow by contextualizing my entry point and sharing a 
story. I then elucidate my research questions and arguments, and I begin to unravel the multiple 
threads running through this project. Finally, I discuss my deliberate choices regarding my sites 
of analysis, participants, and language and I lay out the design of the coming chapters, weaving 
these multiple strands together. 
I often get asked why I became involved with the issue of get (Jewish divorce) refusal 
particularly since some see me only as a ‘not-yet-married, nice, devout Jewish girl’. 
Consequently, it has been assumed (by both religious and academic communities at times) that 
either I, or someone close to me must be an aguna (a woman anchored to her unwanted 
marriage), as if that would be the only rationale for ‘someone like me’ showing interest in a 
‘topic like this’. I also get branded with the ‘F’ word very often. Some (in religious communities) 
assume that the only reason I might be passionate about the issue of get refusal is because I am a 
raging, liberal Feminist (yes, that ‘F’ word), constructing feminism as bad and contradictory to 
my belief system (of course, neither is the case but this does speak to the context in which this 
research and I might be read).The truth is, I have not been personally affected by get refusal but I 
do take get refusal personally. And though I did not consider myself a feminist before I 
embarked on this project, I have grown in to my feminism as a result. I have also come to 
understand however, that the issue of siruv get (get refusal) is not just a feminist one and it is not 
just a human one, it is both, and thus one with which we should all be concerned. 
I first applied to graduate school with a different project in mind. However, everything 
changed in a course on Legal Pluralism. The nexus of women, religion, and law emerged in our 
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discussion around Muslim marriage, divorce and Mahr (a sum of money paid by grooms to 
brides in Muslim marriages), and Muslim women suing for their Mahr payment upon divorce. I 
quickly became curious about similar challenges facing Jewish women attempting to secure a 
get. In Judaism, Husbands are the ones who must grant a get by physically placing the document 
in the wife’s waiting, open hands. Even if the wife is the one who initiates the proceedings, he is 
the primary physical actor. The get must be given of his free will and must be accepted of her 
free will; he cannot be compelled to execute a divorce
1
 and reciprocally she cannot be compelled 
to accept one. A get that is coerced or which is given or accepted under duress is invalid, known 
as a get meuseh or forced or tainted get. If a husband refuses to give a get, a wife becomes 
anchored to a dead marriage against her will, an aguna
2
. Such is the structure of Jewish religious 
divorce which may place women in a predicament, making them agunot and this study will 
explore such instances. 
Despite a couple of attempts to dissuade me from within my community, I began to 
research the realities post the civil reforms to the Divorce Act and Family Law Act here in 
Toronto, and in New York as well I looked at the realities after the civil reforms to the Domestic 
Relations Law, the state legal amendments that would try to remedy get refusal. I quickly 
discovered that get refusal persists despite the civil remedies and despite the claims of their 
success
3
. Get refusal also persists despite the numerous halakhic (Jewish-legal) remedies 
available. This reality made me deeply distressed. You see, the (Orthodox) Judaism I was raised 
with (and in which I still partake) is one where questioning was welcome and one where answers 
or solutions to queries and problems could be and were found. However, as I began to ask 
                                                          
1
 Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yevamot 112b. 
2
 The reciprocal may also occur. I will elaborate on the differences in chapter two 
3
 Yael C.B. Machtinger, “Sounds of Silence: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Siruv Get and Iggun in Toronto” (Major 
Research Paper, York University, 2009). 
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questions about get refusal’s persistence, I could find no answers, I could find no solutions. So, 
my connection to get refusal was not familial, nor was it in the name of a liberal-feminist agenda, 
it was far bigger. I became interested not because it was my problem or because it was a 
women’s problem, but because the phenomenon of get refusal is a moral, human problem about 
a basic freedom and right, a phenomenon which has persisted across time and place. 
As I began speaking to mesuravot get (women refused a get), their narratives illustrated 
that there is a deep and persistent gap between legal regulation (law on the books) and social 
behaviour (law in action), as well as distinct resistance to manage and even acknowledge get 
refusal in Toronto, with these realities impacting the mesuravot get in a myriad of previously 
unrecognized and silenced ways. Women are fighting to balancing their multiple value systems 
when seeking both their right to religion and their right to divorce free from abuse. In other 
words, and based on my primary research, I argue that get refusal persists despite the civil legal 
remedies, indicating that the ongoing interactions between the civil and halakhic legal systems 
have unintended consequences at times. For example, the narratives of mesuravot get 
demonstrated that culture is still more potent than some might believe and in fact all types of 
Jewish women are holding out for a Jewish divorce regardless of the state, civil law and 
regardless of their degree of observance or affiliation. The narratives further reveal that even 
today, all types of Jewish women are silenced, alone, and abused in the context of get refusal, 
and this is particularly manifest in Toronto. It is untenable that we allow this to persist. And that 
is why I, a ‘not-yet-married, nice, Jewish observant girl’ became passionate about ‘a topic like 
this’. And why I believe you should be too. 
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A Story 
I purposefully begin here with a narrative because narratives anchor this study as its 
methodological foundation from which our analyses spring, stemming (in part) from critical 
legal pluralism which understands women as legal actors, innovators and mobilizers. Of the 
dozens of narratives I could have chosen to open with, I did not choose the most evocative or the 
least egregious for I refuse to rank the narratives, creating a hierarchy of maltreatment. I simply 
hope to create a process of inclusion. 
Before we met over coffee, S.L.
4
  said, “I’m not sure I’m worth your time” because she thought 
“her story wasn’t really bad enough or sexy enough”, concerns expressed by a number of the 
women I interviewed. I assured S.L. that every story is significant. She was the ‘expert in this 
field’; she, and her story were worthy. 
S.L. is in her mid 30s. She is not religious. She is very well educated, with 2 MAs, and an NYU 
alumna. 
S.L. was married for five years and has 2 daughters who love gymnastics. (She shows me 
pictures from their meets). 
She described, “My ex is not religious. I refer to my ex-husband as my ex because I finally 
received my get. I’m still happily civilly married. (Laughs; sarcastically) 
We are still civilly married and I have the Coalition Against Abuse on my side in court working 
for me pro bono since I experienced significant domestic violence.  
The civil route is not the answer and it’s not any better than Beit Din5. You are still just a 
number, it’s just a day at work and that’s all. Civil lawyers or judges are even less invested than 
rabbis… the laws don’t matter. Also, civil law had no upper hand; it can NOT influence religious 
traditions and should not. (Emphasis by participant) 
Our marriage appeared so strong from the outside. No one would believe me if I hadn’t gone to 
the hospital after being beaten over and over again. 
I was so badly abused. 
                                                          
4
 Pseudonyms are used throughout.  
S.L., interview with author, October 23, 2013, Starbucks, Great Neck, New York. 
5
 Beit Din is ‘house of law’ or rabbinic court or tribunal, where matters are adjudicated. Batei din is the plural. 
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Fighting for my get gave me a sense of control, when I had none. …Getting the get was like 
getting my life back … it freed me…I refused to be victimized any longer. 
You have to self-advocate, because otherwise you are just a number. 
I’m not religious, nor do I ever want to be religious but the get became so important to me.  I felt 
it was my legal right. I fought for it for 5 years. 
I want to spread the message to women- ‘Don’t accept that you don’t need a get even if you are 
reform’…it’s my freedom and my power and a get is my right regardless of my non-observance.  
There should be NO ‘alternate’ International Beit Din. Why should I accept an alternative 
simply because I’m not religious. I deserve the get according to the most stringent of standards, 
NOT an alternative remedy from an alternative beit din. (Emphasis by participant) 
 Throughout the process I felt like a slave. I’m not putting rabbis down. It’s not their fault- my 
husband had power over them. He abused and manipulated them and the religion, just as he did 
me. We were trapped.  
He had no ties to community and is a criminal.  How can you embarrass someone who is not 
already embarrassed about who he really is, an abuser, a bad parent and spouse, and a 
criminal. None of that embarrassed him so why would not giving a get embarrass him? 
Especially since he really had no ties to any community being that he is non-religious. 
Even though all rabbis, dayanim
6
 supported me- I still felt separate from them. 
I was all alone … but ORA was amazing in their support.7 
I definitely feel like it was gendered but I don’t want to say that I wasn’t supported…it’s just that 
if you walk into the room with all one gender… you do feel that… At the end of the day, as a 
Mom I’m willing to do whatever it takes to protect my girls. Like a brown bear protecting her 
cubs. 
Withholding a get is the ultimate control because you can’t run from it like you can from 
physical or emotional abuse. 
 I smiled a million times more than I did on my wedding day when he finally dropped my get into 
my waiting hands. 
It will give you something you didn’t know you needed (the get) 
                                                          
6
 Dayanim is judges, plural; dayan is a judge, singular.  
7
 ORA is an acronym for Organization for the Resolution of Agunot, the main non-profit organization working on 
get refusal in the United States. 
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Even though it took a year of mourning, I’m back to myself now, even stronger than before. 
Every time I talk about it I get stronger and I want to speak out more and more because I am the 
proof- people need to know it’s NOT a frum problem”.8 
I chose this narrative for its teller’s matter-of-factness and because this narrative weaves 
together multiple threads of the coming analyses. The narrative highlights that get refusal’s 
persistence is itself an unintended consequence arising despite state, civil intervention which 
intended to remedy get refusal. It illustrates another unintended consequence as well; the 
importance and even dominance of culture, or religion (more accurately), which drives diverse 
Jewish women to continue to demand a get, challenging the notion that women are passive and 
framing them instead as active agents, shaping unanticipated legal norms. The narrative also 
exemplifies the reality that all types of Jewish women may be mesuravot get, silenced, 
abandoned, and abused, although they may simultaneously be their own legal advocates or 
agents affecting law and legal change just as much as they are affected by law and legal change. 
It is not only an Orthodox phenomenon. The connection to domestic violence, the tensions 
between state and religious orders and the gendered nature of get refusal are also all underscored.  
 
Research Questions: 
My doctoral research is driven by these interrelated and nuanced set of questions, among 
others: Do changes to state legal systems elicit changes to religious/Jewish legal orders? Do they 
impact changes to religious (or ritual) social norms or behaviours? What are the consequences of 
this, if any? Why are gaps between law reform and social behaviour in Toronto regarding get 
refusal different from similar legally plural communities (such as New York)? What are the 
socio-legal impacts of those differences? How are these messy entanglements experienced and 
                                                          
8
 Frum is a Yiddish adjective used to describe someone committed to the observance of Jewish religious law. 
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navigated by women from within the religious culture and how are they perceived by the culture 
and communities, and are there distinctions between Toronto and New York?  
This study of get refusal is a primary, comprehensive study with the most breadth and 
depth in the Canadian context to date, and the only comparative study between New York and 
Toronto - the largest and most diverse Jewish populations in their respective countries. At its 
most fundamental level, this enquiry will explore get refusal in Toronto and New York. I wanted 
to explore a classic socio-legal quandary- the gap between the law on the books and the law in 
action - but in so doing, to place the narratives and experiences of those at the centre of the case 
study, also at the centre of the scholarly analysis in a way that has not previously been achieved 
and in the tradition of some seminal socio-legal authors, such as Engel and Munger, and Engle 
Merry, among others. 
 I argue that there is a gap between legal regulation and normative religious and/or social 
behaviour (between law on the books and law in action) regarding get refusal and despite state 
regulation or civil legal remedies to solve get refusal, the phenomenon persists, and in Toronto 
particularly, there have been further unintended consequences. Perhaps unexpectedly, culture (or 
religion) continues to be a dominant force in the lives of women and they insist on a get even 
when they do not observe other religious aspects and rabbis often resist foreign legal remedies to 
internal problems, although they supported certain foreign remedies initially. Thus, while legal 
pluralist solutions are the most promising, to date they have not had their intended result
9
. 
Concentrating on the narratives of women in the tradition of feminist legal research and using 
elements of oral history, ethnography to achieve a ‘thick descriptions10 of the realities of get 
                                                          
9
 Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of 
Study,” Law and Society Review 7, no. 1 (1973): 719-750, 744. 
10
 Carol Weisbrod, Butterfly, The Bride: Essays on Law, Narrative, and the Family (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999); Susan Sage Heinzelman and Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, Representing Women: Law, 
10 
 
refusal, I will explore this and the other multiple layers of analysis weaving the plural threads of 
the goals and objectives together, making this study distinctive. Some of these threads run deeper 
than others, are more complex and entwined.   
In this research I bring together methodologies such as feminist oral history inspired by 
Horowitz, Reinharz, Leavy and others, and facets of ethnography to capture elements of Geertz’s 
‘thick descriptions’ of the realities of get refusal, as well as archival and even media and 
representational analyses stemming from Kurasawa’s work in the context of slavery. I also bring 
together literatures and theoretical debates that had not previously been in conversation including 
Jewish law
11
 and Jewish feminist
12
, in addition to socio-legal scholarship, with particular focus 
on legal pluralism
13
 and law and religion
14
. To date, Jewish studies and Socio-Legal Studies 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Literature, and Feminism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30. 
11
 Among others, Rabbi David J. Bleich, “A Suggested Antenuptial Agreement: A Proposal in Wake of Avitzur,” 
Journal of Halakha and Contemporary Society 7, (1984): 25-41; Rabbi David J. Bleich, “Jewish Divorce: Judicial 
Misconceptions and Possible Means of Civil Enforcement,” Connecticut Law Review 16, no. 2 (1984): 201-290; 
Rabbi Irving A. Breitowitz, Between Civil and Religious Law: The Plight of the Agunah in American Society 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
12
Among others, Susan Aranoff and Rivka Haut, The Wed-Locked Agunot: Orthodox Jewish Women Chained to 
Dead Marriages (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co. Inc, 2015); Rivka Haut, “A Factor in Preventing Cases of 
Agunah,” JOFA Journal 1, no. 3 (1999); Susan M. Weiss, and Netty C. Gross-Horowitz, Marriage and Divorce in 
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scholars have not engaged with each other
15
. Thus, what this analysis offers, is a bridging or 
combining of these literatures. Within the existing, limited/emergent scholarship on this 
important area of research, Jewish scholars have approached get refusal from two general 
perspectives: 1) traditional/conservative analyses by rabbis posing Jewish-law solutions
16
; and 2) 
alternative/liberal, feminist analyses (at times by non-Orthodox) women (though not solely), 
abandoning Jewish law
17
. There is virtually no middle ground
18
.  
Simultaneously, socio-legal literatures concerning the nexus of law and religion debate 
accommodation of religious norms and centre most often on the “casting out”19  of religion, to 
borrow Razack’s term. In particular, its place in public schools20 and on the veiling practices of 
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Muslim women
21
 (at least in Canada). In fact, often socio-legal studies does not even employ the 
language of ‘religion’, favouring instead the language of ‘culture’, thus using the word ‘culture’ 
when actually referring to ‘religion’22. There is a concentration on ‘tolerating’ religion23 so far as 
it does not disturb the Christo-normative assumptions
24
  regarding the unthreatening ‘ideal’ of 
the ‘neutral state’. I include these discussions as context to my contention that religion itself and 
Judaism in particular is not bad or that which must be regulated. Indeed, get refusal is one site of 
interrogating the pretense of law’s secularism/neutrality25. I come to argue that nuanced socio-
legal inquiries which acknowledge the mutual constitution of law and religion
26
 are more 
suitable
27
. Consequently, legal pluralism, a method of inquiry and analysis concerning 
overlapping normative orders in specific social fields, per Engle Merry, Falk Moore and 
Griffiths
28
, and commensurability of vying legalities, per Glenn,
29
 inspire my study. They allow 
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for the interaction and plurality of legal systems - religious and state, and these approaches give 
space for religion as a valid iteration of identity and valid legal system (contrary to other 
approaches). In particular, I build on and contribute to critical legal pluralism, based on 
Macdonald and Fournier’s work, at times more implicitly than explicitly in this study, which is 
tied more closely to first person accounts of law and legal experiences, norms and knowledges, 
in this case, the stories of mesuravot get, framing them as law makers and mobilizers impacting 
and transforming social and legal norms
30
. In conducting this research, I embrace a new, 
interdisciplinary ‘religious feminist’ paradigm building on the work of Levmore and Greenberg 
Kobrin
31
, enabling engagement with Jewish law while embracing socio-legal methods and 
accepting a plurality of legal orders and remedies in line with similar methodological and 
theoretical projects in different contexts such as those by Bunting and Hirsch
32
. Additionally, this 
paradigm enables critical analysis of get refusal using feminist methods and methodologies
33
 
placing women’s experiences at the centre, in the socio-legal tradition of gendered storytelling 
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inspired by Brooks and Gewirtz and Weisbrod, to name but two
34
. As a result get refusal is 
revealed to be a form of domestic abuse some Jewish women may face and women refused a get 
are accurately exposed as active agents fighting for their right to religion and their right to 
divorce, rather than solely understood to be chained victims through a critical legal pluralist 
approach. 
Here I would like to expand a bit further on three key aspects: get refusal as domestic 
abuse, critical legal pluralism, and the centrality of women’s narratives. I make different claims 
about the connections between abuse and get refusal throughout the study, taking my cue from 
the women’s own narratives and experiences. I examine and critique the intra-marriage dynamic 
as well as the marriage-community-state dynamic, including how community structures may 
contribute to the invisibility and/or persistence of domestic abuse, all of which provide the 
theoretical and methodological basis for exploring get refusal as a form of domestic abuse. In 
these contexts, I analyze the effectiveness and gaps of both state and religious formal legal 
norms. In particular, and although get refusal is understood as domestic abuse in variegated 
pockets, I highlight the detrimental disregard given to get refusal as a form of domestic abuse in 
the collective consciousness of Jewish communities at large and its leadership more broadly, 
including, in some cases, rabbis, and women’s support groups particularly in the Toronto 
context. 
Critical legal pluralism generally tends to focus on how individuals or groups treat law 
rather than focusing (exclusively) on how law treats them. Thus building on a critical legal 
pluralist approach might examine ways in which people decide whether particular laws or norms 
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are relevant to them and to what extent they will determine their behaviours. In the context of 
this analysis, I suggest throughout this study that the individual is a site of law creation- that she, 
the individual mesurevet get, is an agent in writing and applying ‘law’ herself- drawing on the 
interaction of formal and informal normative systems relevant to her experience and position. 
Critical legal pluralism also then highlights sites of interaction such as the need for lawyers and 
judges to understand Jewish law and its nuances as well as the brilliant tactic by one participant 
who turned a doorstop into a demand for the get at her synagogue, to name but two examples 
elaborated in the coming study. Individual women emerge as legal innovators and mobilizers 
who can (re)shape and produce law, legal, and social norms. 
It is natural then that an approach contributing to the growing scholarship on critical legal 
pluralism might also embrace a methodological approach to research which takes seriously 
women’s experiences and narratives. The narratives woven throughout this study demonstrate 
the role of mesuravot get in changing norms; for example, in their legal demands for the right to 
religion and the right to divorce. In fact there are narratives opening each chapter indicating their 
centrality, but also enmeshed within each chapter which illuminate the lived realities of women 
refused a get while also bolstering the contentions made about a diversity of best solutions, the 
similarities and differences between New York and Toronto, and the heterogeneity of women 
who might be refused a get, among other things. Incorporating narratives based on primary 
interviews into socio-legal scholarship brings together feminist research methods and 
methodologies and critical legal pluralism in a way that elicits a form of disruptive storytelling. 
My arguments echo Sally Falk Moore’s words, peppered throughout this study that legal 
change may not always result in social or behavioural change despite the fact that it is precisely 
such social and behavioural changes that are in fact the intended consequences of the legal 
16 
 
change. The reason for this is largely due to unexpected or unforeseen circumstances which pre-
exist, but which are not anticipated. In other words, although the legal amendments or get laws 
intended to remedy get refusal and thus lead to normative social and behavioural changes, in 
reality, get refusal persists and existing social and legal dynamics within communities
35
 are more 
forceful and potent than some (particularly those who argued for reform) would have. 
Thus, through a critical analysis both from ‘outside in’ and from ‘inside out’,  my 
findings include that legal remedies -both religious/halakhic and state- are not working as 
intended, including the get laws. In other words, get refusal continues as a phenomenon in New 
York and Toronto, and is not easily ‘corrected’ in a straightforward way by legislative initiatives. 
In addition, the dynamic or relationship between state and religious law in a particular 
jurisdiction can be fruitfully examined to understand why religious legal mechanisms might 
resist, or provide a counterweight to, state intervention in religious communities. For example 
the women’s narratives will illustrate that particularly in Toronto, batei din do not work for 
women. I have also found that pre-nuptial agreements have great potential to remedy get refusal 
and change the social consciousness around get refusal as abuse and extortion (although they will 
never be an exhaustive solution), but they too have some problems, particularly in Toronto (both 
legal/external and social/internal). Community reactions and activism can work and has worked 
in many cases (particularly when adapted to include ‘e-shaming’) and this remedy is the most 
traditional and least controversial but again, there is a void in Toronto (perhaps ironically since 
this is a remedy that would be very effective).  
The narratives of women refused a get not only lead to the aforementioned findings 
regarding the existing remedies, they also highlighted a number of findings regarding the women 
themselves. In particular, individual women’s narratives are rich sources for real insight and 
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innovative action and, by extension, collective action by women and their supporters can have 
significant impact on individual and institutional behaviour and attitudes within religious 
communities (for example, their legal demands for their right to religion and their right to 
divorce). The women also illustrated that get refusal impacts all types of Jewish women, at all 
levels of religious observance, and not just Orthodox. Coupled with that, all types of women, at 
all level of religious observance want a halakhic/ Jewish legal divorce- a get- and not 
alternatives. Thus there must be an understanding that alternative solutions will never be the 
viable solutions, they may work for some, but will never work for all
36
. There are two final key 
findings emerging from this research I would like to highlight here: the centrality of domestic 
violence in the lives of mesuravot get (in fact, get refusal is symptomatic of a pattern of other 
abuses). Moreover, the intra-marriage dynamic of power imbalance and abuse is as important to 
understanding the persistence of get refusal as are the actions of religious authorities and 
institutions.  I also want to reiterate that religion or women’s piety is not the cause of the abuse 
of get refusal; and the latter is a theoretical outcome that can be applied more broadly in other 
contexts. 
The foremost policy outcome that is driven by my findings is that there needs to be a 
plurality of options available to women who are mesuravot get who are now in the shadows. 
Certainly there are limitations with this diversity, but ultimately, women will benefit with this 
approach, asserting their right to religion and to divorce simultaneously. 
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Drawing on Mnookin and Kornhauser’s celebrated contribution, “Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Law: The Case of Divorce”37, I build on and develop a broad theoretical frame for the 
entire project. Mnookin and Kornhauser illustrated that state legal mechanisms are always 
factoring into divorce cases, even when individuals attempt to escape drawing on the law by 
avoiding courts and attempting instead to invoke alternative means of mediating marital 
breakdowns. So too, I build on their findings and illustrate in the context of get refusal that there 
is more to family law experience than legislation notwithstanding the persistent impact both state 
and religious legislation has on individuals (particularly women, in this case). I demonstrate this 
throughout the study in different ways and the women’s narratives interspersed throughout the 
study reflect and confirm this claim. As a result, I come to the conclusion that women refused a 
get are in the shadows of legal pluralism, always impacted by family law legislation stemming 
from both spheres, and yet at times unable to employ remedies in one or both of those regulating 
jurisdictions. As a result, mesuravot get strategically and purposefully navigate between legal 
orders attempting to exact the most favourable outcomes, in particular, the get. 
 
Deliberate Decisions - Sites of Analysis, Participants, Language 
 I must address here, early on, my deliberate choices regarding my sites of analysis, my 
focus on certain participants, and my insistence on particular language. These selections are not 
made without consideration; they are calculated. I chose Toronto and New York as my sites of 
analysis for a plurality of reasons; the most expedient of which is that I live in Toronto and have 
many professional and personal contacts by way of family, friends, scholars, and activists in 
New York. Of course, those networks of affiliation helped with the research project significantly. 
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However, upon closer reflection, New York and Toronto have more meaningful albeit more 
nuanced connections which make them appropriate comparators. This introductory assessment 
will highlight the comparative nature of this project, and more importantly it will underscore 
aspects surrounding get refusal that have been successful and that ought to be celebrated and 
proliferated (as well as shortcomings and malfunctions that ought to be acknowledged and 
corrected).   
 
Sites of Analysis: Similarities, Parallels & Scale, Diversity, Reciprocity    
One of the first Jews in Canada, Lieutenant Aaron Hart, arrived from New York in 
1760
38
. The evidence of the earliest Jewish settlement in the Toronto area was in York in 1817, 
when a Jewish marriage was recorded
39
. The 1846 census had twelve Jews living in the area. By 
1849 a Jewish cemetery was established, and synagogues followed in the 1850s
40
. By the turn of 
the century there were three thousand Jews in the Toronto area. Jewish life in New York began 
about one hundred years prior to that of Toronto, in the mid 1600s
41
. Jewish life grew more 
rapidly there and by the turn of the century, there were approximately 400,000 Jews living in the 
New York area with numerous synagogues and other Jewish institutions
42
. 
43
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Today, New York and Toronto are the largest and most diverse Jewish centres in their 
respective countries. The Greater New York Area has the largest concentration of Jews in the 
United States with over two million of the roughly five million Jews living throughout the 
country
44
. The most recent numbers place the Jewish population of the Greater Toronto Area at 
approximately 200,000 and the Jewish population of all of Canada at about 390,000. This means, 
there are more Jews in the Greater Toronto Area than there are Jews in all of the rest of Canada 
combined
45
. While the Greater Toronto Area has the most significant Jewish population in 
Canada, and in this way is similar to the Greater New York area, it is nonetheless approximately 
one tenth of the size of the Jewish population of New York. I will revisit this point later in this 
project, when I elaborate on some of the differences between the two hubs. That said both New 
York and Toronto are the centre of the Jewish world in their respective countries (and some 
would go so far as to argue that New York is the centre of the Jewish world in the Diaspora, 
outside of Israel). There is a rich and significant diversity within each of these Jewish 
populations which is less common in many other locations where Jews live and which is thereby 
reflected in my participant pool. 
While the demographics are noteworthy, this study looks beyond numbers. The 
significance of the comparison between these two centres is more important than size alone. 
Toronto and New York are also cities with great diversity both beyond and within Jewish 
communities and this is expressed not only by the level of Jewish halakhic observance, but in 
Jewish ritual observance, sexual orientation, languages spoken, ethnicity, national origin, among 
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other identity markers. For example, Toronto and New York also each have large South African, 
South America, Russian, Bukharian, Middle Eastern (Persian, Syrian, Spanish Moroccan, French 
Moroccan), and Israeli Jewish populations. The diversity within these communities is evident 
also through schools, synagogues, and batei din which exist across all denominations. The size 
and diversity of Greater Toronto and Greater New York are indicative of the broader trends in 
both locales, beyond Jewish communities. The culture and diversity of each of these large and 
vibrant metropolises echoes the diversity that exists within their Jewish communities.  
New York and Toronto share more similarities than their large and diverse Jewish 
populations. In fact there has been significant exchange of ideas and movement of bodies across 
borders between these two hubs for well over two hundred and fifty years
46
. Consequently, there 
is a deeper and sustained historical relationship between these two metropolises which endures to 
this day. I want to emphasize that by choosing these two cities as comparators I am contributing 
this longstanding tradition of reciprocity of ideas. 
In 1909, New York boasted a Jewish Arbitration Court known as the Kehillah (Hebrew 
for congregation)
47
. It was not a beit din and it was not religious, but nor was it secular (it did not 
refer to the Talmud, or to Civil Codes or jurisprudence)
48
. The Court existed parallel to the Beit 
Din and there was extensive overlap, with many family law matters arising at Kehillah
49
. The 
arbitration panels most often consisted of one rabbi, one lawyer, and one layman, all volunteers, 
and decisions were often announced in Yiddish and often reported in (Yiddish) newspapers or 
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even aired live on the radio. By 1914, influenced by New York, Toronto had established its own 
version of the New York Jewish Arbitration Court. The Jewish Arbitration Court of Toronto 
decided 135 cases in its first nine months
50
. Thus the arbitration courts already signalled the 
complex and nuanced ways in which Jews navigated overlapping social and legal orders and 
expectations which in turn informs today’s strategic and purposeful navigation of legal systems 
by women refused a get, illustrated throughout this study.  
Moreover, as the largest Jewish city in the world throughout the 20th century, New York 
was the capital of Jewish culture in North America and its Yiddish-language newspapers, which 
reported on the Kehillah and the cases that flowed through the New York Jewish courts, were 
read widely by Torontonian Jewish immigrants
51
. While today, the exchange of ideas occurs 
largely over the internet and social media, historically the Jewish communities of New York and 
Toronto shared ideas through the popular press. Particularly during the early 20
th
 century, many 
Yiddish papers were published both in the New York and Toronto areas. Some papers published 
the same or similar editions in both locations, such as Der Forverts or The Jewish Daily 
Forward, while others swapped and reprinted features and stories under different banners such as 
the Keneder Adler or Odler, or The Canadian Eagle or The Jewish Daily Eagle (which went to 
press beginning in 1906)
52
. Picking up on earlier discussions about media representations of 
agunot in chapter six, both the New York and Toronto papers exchanged and reprinted features 
about missing/deserting husbands from each city, known as Galeriye der Farshvundene Mener, 
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(or A Gallery of Vanished Husbands) well into the mid 20
th
 century. In fact, even today The 
Jewish Press (the largest independent Jewish newspaper in the United States), which is published 
in New York prints a seruv listing
53
 including men from Toronto.  
Today much of the rabbinic leadership in Toronto across all denominations has come 
through New York. The Union of Reform Judaism (URF), Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS), 
and Yeshiva University (YU) are leading institutions which ordain Reform/Reconstructionist, 
Conservative, and Orthodox rabbis, respectively
54
. There are also numerous Ultra Orthodox 
yeshivot which ordain Ultra Orthodox rabbis, some of which opened kollels, or institutional 
gatherings of Talmudic learning in Toronto. Canadian students often travel to these educational 
and religious institutions and American graduates of these institutions often come to lead 
Canadian congregations after graduating. In fact, each of these American institutions based in 
New York has their Canadian offices in Toronto. Moreover, governing bodies of rabbis, such as 
the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA) (Orthodox) and The Rabbinical Assembly 
(Conservative) both of which include numerous Toronto rabbis are also located in New York. 
Thus there is exchange not only of information; there is reciprocity among rabbinic leadership 
and organizations as well
55
. Again, this is a sustained, historical tradition. For example, in 1933, 
in the shadows of the stock market crash and the Great Depression, principal, Rabbi Treiger, of 
the Brunswick Talmud Torah (located on Brunswick Street, in Toronto), informed his board that 
the school’s teachers had not been paid in 24 weeks and were threatening to quit. When the 
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school was finally forced to temporarily close in 1935, an emergency campaign was launched by 
board member and businessman, Samuel Godfrey, and with the help of a professional fundraiser 
the school was saved with money raised in New York City. This endeavor was the predecessor 
for the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Toronto.
56
 
 Jewish services, cultural and ritual goods, as well as kosher products are also in constant 
exchange between these two centres
57
. In fact, Artscroll, the largest printing/publishing house of 
Jewish prayer books and materials in the Diaspora is located in the Greater New York Area. 
These books fill most, if not all, of the Toronto synagogues. There are even chartered Jewish bus 
services that make the New York-Toronto, cross-border trip a few times per week. Moreover, 
among the Orthodox and Ultra Orthodox, the New York-Toronto relationship is also a central 
factor in match-making (and thus perpetuating this connection for future generations). 
On the particular issue of get refusal, New York and Toronto share one significant commonality: 
both have the potential to benefit from the get laws on the books in each respective jurisdiction 
(at least from the perspective of the women) and yet are not able to necessarily rely on state 
regulation to protect them from being refused or extorted a get. In other words, both Toronto and 
New York have seen state legal regulation attempting to remedy a Jewish legal phenomenon, 
both of which were enacted at roughly the same time and both of which have had unintended 
consequences result. Although the legislation’s enactment is noteworthy and teaches us much 
about regulating religious pluralism or differences, it has not served as the impactful remedy it 
was originally hoped to be (perhaps unexpectedly). As I establish in chapter two and explore 
throughout the study, the get laws directly targeted and attempted to remedy siruv get, or get 
refusal, by lessening a recalcitrant husband’s bargaining power in civil courts when refusing to 
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grant a wife her get. The first New York Get Law (NYGL1), as it has come to be known, came 
into force in 1983 with an amendment to the Domestic Relations Law where as the second New 
York Get Law (NYGL2) was an amendment to New York State’s equitable distribution laws in 
1992
58
. Around the same time, amendments were made to laws in Canada both federally to the 
Divorce Act in 1985, and provincially in Ontario to the Family Law Act in 1990
59
. To date, these 
are the only get laws in North America. The civil amendments to the state laws in New York and 
Toronto occurred around the same time because women’s support and advocacy groups were 
strong, active and united at that time. The International Coalition for Aguna Rights, ICAR, was 
founded by 1990
60
 by Canadian activist, Norma Joseph, American activist, Rivka Haut, as well 
as others. Indeed both in New York and Toronto women’s organizations played a key role in 
lobbying governments and organizing communal, grassroots initiatives which included 
community/pulpit rabbis and laypeople from across all denominations and even significant 
representation from other religions that might benefit from the amendments, such as Muslim 
leaders. The Ontario Jewish Archives made reams of meeting notes, event proceedings and 
internal memos available to me from various women’s groups in Toronto, who were working 
with women’s groups in New York, including B’nai Brith Women, Jewish Women International 
Canada, and others, who each had dedicated committees to addressing the aguna issue at the 
time in Toronto Thus, the establishment of get laws in New York and Toronto is another way in 
which there was, and continues to be exchange between these two hubs of Jewish life. 
 As this analysis progresses, I argue that to some degree, the impacts of the state remedies 
have been similar in both locales, and yet in some distinct ways they have also been quite 
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different. The similarity is that women - both American and Canadian- are not able to necessarily 
rely on state regulation to protect them from being refused a get or extorted for a get in either 
New York or Toronto. In other words, though the legislation’s enactment is noteworthy and 
teaches us much about regulating religious pluralism or differences, and about the positive 
interactions that can occur when state and religious law meet, it has not served as the impactful 
remedy it was originally hoped to be. This is an unexpected outcome of the regulation. As well, 
the narratives illustrate that many women -both American and Canadian- do not feel the state 
legal system is any more beneficial or detrimental than the Jewish legal system; neither system 
can adequately protect them, despite best efforts
61
.  One mesurevet get explained, “It became 
clear that secular family courts in Nassau County are extremely unsympathetic to the plight of 
aguna even despite the prominence of Jews in the area …or perhaps because of that”62. This 
participant was networked with a group of mesuravot get on Long Island in various communities 
and at various level of observance. Another woman expressed, “a religious right is not one of the 
things you deal with in court. Court is for 1) custody and 2) assets. Courts aren’t equipped to 
deal with religious issues and rabbinic courts aren’t equipped to deal with court issues”63. She 
reiterated later in our interview, “there is always a risk with a civil judge who doesn’t know 
religion and its nuances... (and so) it’s all too easy for a civil judge to view this right for a 
woman as a man’s asset and enable the negotiation/ extortion of a get for other legitimate civil 
matters in return, like custody and other assets
64
.  Echoing these sentiments, I also heard things 
like, “If you ask me, it wasn’t the secular court that got me my get in the end; it was a miracle. 
                                                          
61
 To clarify women in the United States and Canada expressed that neither the state and Jewish legal systems/courts 
help women secure a get nor do they adequately protect women when they are not committed to each of those 
objectives. One is not necessarily more favourable or beneficial than the other. 
62
 D.D.  October 24, 2013. 
63
 S.H. October 29, 2013. 
64
 Ibid. 
27 
 
People have to sit with secular court and explain the issue, especially when it’s only the women 
who want a get. Secular courts and judges don’t always get it”65. 
However, one impact of state regulation that has been divergent between the two locales 
is the ways in which get refusal was dealt with subsequent to the state intervention. In Toronto, 
as will be established, complacency, indifference, denial, and silence were principally the 
reaction of communities, rabbis, the Jewish media, and the rabbinic court. This has not been the 
case in New York. In New York it seems the difficulties surrounding the legislation are accepted 
and acknowledged by some communities (including the modern Orthodox and pockets of ultra 
Orthodox as well), some rabbis, the Jewish media, and some courts including the Beth Din of 
America, whereas that is not the case in Toronto. In fact often there exists the perception that the 
regulation was so successful it ‘solved the aguna problem’66. 
I have illustrated here that the relationship between New York and Toronto is well-
established and in many ways, it endures and upholds a long-standing tradition of reciprocity. 
While there are lasting connections between the two locales that run deep, there are nonetheless 
some important points at which they diverge (at times significantly) and these will be explored in 
the coming chapters. Nonetheless the rich and enduring relationship between these two locales 
supports my deliberate decision to choose them as comparative sites of analysis
67
. 
 
Participants 
 Along with the purposeful decision to explore get refusal in New York and Toronto, I 
also made the decision to focus on the narratives of the mesuravot get themselves- the women 
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experiencing the phenomenon. Over the course of my research I did interview broad and 
inclusive stakeholders such as rabbis, dayanim, activists, feminists, academics and lawyers 
however, these were to buttress the centrality of  the ‘true experts’’ narratives- that is the women 
who have been refused a get themselves. From time to time I have been asked at conferences and 
among communities ‘why did I not interview men?’ This is of course, a loaded question. At this 
point, the narratives of men are beyond the scope of this study for a number of reasons. Men who 
perpetrate this type of domestic violence do not need another platform to attempt to rationalize 
their abuse, they are already centre stage in much of the existing literature (particularly the 
Jewish law and even to an extent, the early Jewish feminist literature), and certainly they are 
centre stage in communities and in courts. In other words, men have generally benefitted from 
having a voice that is heard and having legal agency. Yet, the women who are refused a get have 
been on the margins rather than the main stage, and I am attempting to rectify that. This is my 
small way by creating an inclusive space. There exists the rare occasion where a wife refuses to 
accept the husband’s issued get but men have alternative ways out of Jewish marriage and far 
lesser social and legal ramifications (regarding stigmas and mamzerut
68
) and so they are not in 
need of a stage in the same way as women. Moreover, get refusal is overwhelmingly gendered, 
impacting women significantly more than men and hence my mindful choice to focus on them. I 
also decided against interviewing children impacted by get refusal. That was beyond the scope of 
this study, but that would be a rich analysis worth examination in future work. Again, while I did 
interview others in the field of get refusal, such as rabbis, dayanim, activists, scholars, and 
lawyers, their narratives serve only to buttress the central narratives of the women and the 
arguments herein.  
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Language 
I also made deliberate decisions regarding language. Early on I discovered that the term 
aguna encapsulated both too much and too little. An aguna is someone who is anchored to an 
unwanted marriage, tied down, or delayed from remarrying
69
  either because of a husband’s 
disappearance, his mental incapacity to give a get, or simply his recalcitrance (as was explained 
above); this definition was too broad for this study. Simultaneously, women may only get the 
legal designation of becoming an ‘aguna’ after a period of time during which a beit din must 
issue hazmanot, and ultimately a seruv
70
; this was too narrow because batei din do not always 
issue seruvim and yet women may still be refused a get, and stuck in limbo status. Consequently, 
I determined that calling the women ‘mesuravot get’ or women refused a get was both more 
direct in reflecting the true status of those women but also an activist statement in opposition to 
the co-opting of the term aguna. To be clear and for example, there may not necessarily be 
women legally designated as ‘agunot’ in Toronto, and yet, there are women who have been 
refused a get. I refuse to continue to undercut and silence these women and so I use the term 
mesuravot get throughout the study to reflect the reality that there are women refused a get, tied 
to an unwanted marriage, even if there is no seruv and they are not technically, halakhically 
designated as an aguna. 
My language is also decisive regarding the term ‘victim’. Being that women have been 
silenced and abused, the term is fitting and yet it is an inadequate representation of the multitude 
of women I met who were refused a get. The women I met were active agents juggling numerous 
responsibilities and vigorously attempting to exact a get. They are not passive, submissive, or 
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powerless as the term often connotes and therefore I avoid it altogether. The women are 
powerful, and labelling them as victims (only) conceals their agency and strength. 
 
Chapter Breakdown 
Chapter two lays out the necessary background to be equipped to engage thoroughly with 
the subsequent analyses. The chapter sets up a primer to the Jewish laws around marriage and 
divorce, incorporating some legal history and legal precedents in order to establish a working 
understanding of halakhic, or Jewish, legal development and its objectives. Thus, the chapter 
will outline some of the advancements made in halakha which empowered women as well as 
outlining the persisting phenomenon of Jewish divorce, or get refusal. Along with historical 
background, the chapter incorporates legal background and contextualizes the proposed and 
contemporary remedies, both the proposed ‘external’ or state legal remedies as well as the 
proposed ‘internal’, halakhic legal remedies such as get laws and halakhic prenuptial 
agreements, to name but two. 
Chapter three sets up the theoretical and socio-legal context, focusing on law, religion, 
and culture, exploring debates in socio-legal literatures and existing studies of get refusal, thus 
situating this study of get refusal in a specific, socio-legal, legal-pluralist context. There I begin 
to consider questions about the dynamic relationship between law and religion as I reflect on the 
extent to which legal regulation impacts religious social norms and the extent to which religious 
social norms impacts legal regulation in the case of Jewish divorce in Toronto and New York 
and/or in what ways. The historical tradition of Judaism interacting with the state legal systems 
with which it was in contact comes to bear on these considerations and will also be considered. 
In particular, my discussions there illustrate the messy nexus of law and religion in the context of 
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get refusal and the legal pluralist remedies that have emerged. This analysis situates my study 
squarely within the field of Socio-Legal Studies. I come to legal pluralism as the socio-legal 
approach that takes religion seriously as a valid iteration of identity and parallel legal system. In 
other words, the eschewing or “casting out” of religion71 has created a tension or gap in the 
socio-legal field, and in shifting the field’s understanding of religion by considering legal 
pluralism enriches our understanding of law and religion in socio-legal studies
72
. Consequently, 
framing this research around the principles of legal pluralism will be elucidated. In addition, (and 
as an extension or development stemming from legal pluralism,) I will elaborate here on the 
central role of critical legal pluralism in the study, which supports the feminist and socio-legal 
approaches of storytelling and placing the subjects at the centre of the legal phenomena, also at 
the centre of the scholarly analysis, accurately reflecting their roles as active socio-legal agents 
who impact law just as it impacts them. I must also situate the study among the existing 
discourses within the literatures discussing get refusal, exploring some of the key contributions 
of these literatures, at the nexus of law, religion, gender, and storytelling. As a result, the benefits 
and lessons of the existing research will emerge, including those contributions made by John 
Syrtash, Pascale Fournier, and Susan Weiss. I will utilize the existing contributions, particularly 
the adaptation of critical legal pluralism, as a springboard for this study. 
In chapters four-six, using both interviews
73
 and archival sources
74
, I create a space of 
inclusion for women’s historiography of marriage, focusing primarily on voicing the void of the 
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women refused a get
75
, while examining the overlapping messiness of social norms confronted 
with Jewish and state laws. In discussing the distinct methodological and epistemological 
considerations arising from the research design, chapter four will describe the ‘religious, feminist 
approach’ taken in this analysis, it will probe the consequences of my own membership in an 
Orthodox Jewish community illustrating the potential risks as well as benefits of my positionality 
as an ‘insider’76, and it will consider the challenges with the push to quantify agunot.  Chapter 
four will also address more fundamental considerations regarding research methods such as: how 
many participants were included in the study, how I found them, where and when we met, 
among other considerations. In chapter five I ask particularly how these muddled entanglements 
are experienced and navigated by women from within the religious culture and how they are 
perceived by the Jewish culture and communities at large. This chapter takes a closer look at 
narrative excerpts from mesuravot get’s stories, picking up on key words and themes and 
analyzing the gendered stories of siruv get. The greater part of this chapter will highlight the 
lived realities of mesuravot get, revealing what is most often invisible in the mainstream 
discourses. Placing the women’s voices at the centre of our analysis, this chapter explores the 
questions driving this study explicitly through the women’s own perspectives and experiences. 
Using the method of milot manchot or ‘leitworts’ (used in the study of Biblical narratives) and 
the patchwork quilt metaphor (used by Deleuze and Guattari) allows us to explore both the 
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exceptionality and the generalizability of particular narratives. It is based on these narratives that 
I come to much of the analyses that follow, informing both the comparisons and the conclusions 
reached in this study.  
In chapter six, I make a point of  exposing aspects of get  refusal which have heretofore 
been hidden from view such as the correlation between domestic violence and get refusal, “e-
shaming” as activism and agency, and an analysis of the (at times, troubling) imagery associated 
with get refusal. The use of social media by mesuravot get to assert their agency and in 
galvanizing an updated version of kherem or ‘e-shaming’ will be investigated, inspired by Rae 
Anderson’s piece “Three Voices”, Fuyuki Kurasawa’s model of iconography (originally used in 
the context of contemporary forms of slavery), and Roman Williams and Kyle Whitehouse’s 
“visual sociology of religion”. Get refusal as a distinct site of inimitable and dishonorable 
domestic abuse will be examined relying on analyses that explore the nexus of religion and 
domestic violence, such as the work of Nancy Nason-Clark, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Rabbi Dr. 
Abraham Twerski, and others. Finally, this chapter explores the culture of ‘get giving’ that has 
developed into an acceptable bargaining tactic to exact civil concessions. (There is a collection 
of images to be read in tandem with the first section of this chapter).  
In chapters seven and eight, building off of the lessons emerging from the narratives of 
mesuravot get, I address the significance of my findings, highlighting the similarities and 
differences between my sites of analysis and I propose some explanations for the disparities, as I 
interweave the plural strands of analysis together. Comparing and contextualizing the sites, using 
the narratives as the grounding enables us to consider the (socio-legal) gaps between the 
perceptions and the realities existing within communities and in existing literatures, considering 
the over-arching question, how have legal regulation and social norms impacted one another and 
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how have women refused a get experienced the consequences. I elaborate on the perceptions 
versus the realities, reiterate my conclusions, and reflect on where we might go from here. 
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Chapter Two - Contextualizing: Jewish Family Law Past and Present 
I was married at the age of 21. I was married more than 25 years. Then I was an aguna for close 
to five years. My husband was a drug addict and alcoholic and had been through many rehabs. 
 
In retrospect, I don’t think it’s about money or extortion; rather it’s all about control. 
 
The get law here in New York did nothing to protect me because I was the plaintiff. ..This was 
not explained to me- that you have to be the defendant for the law to be effective. Anyway, 
because I had to go to civil court first, because I needed order of protection, I became the 
plaintiff. 
 
The secular judge was resistant to putting my husband in contempt of court …until 3-4 years 
later… In the mean time, ORA picketed but even that didn’t help. Ours was a well-known case at 
the time but he wasn’t embarrassed in Boro Park with ORA posters everywhere. 
Although come to think of it, maybe that is what finally did it? I’m not sure why he finally gave 
the get. 
 
There were no prenuptial agreements being signed in religious communities at the time of our 
marriage. And what do I think about it now?... well, it’s ok but who really enforces it? Beit Din 
has no power to enforce the money owed as maintenance so that gives power to secular court, 
away from halakha/rabbis. Even if people are okay with this, it is still more time and costly to the 
wife and so I don’t think they’ll help. Although both my daughters signed them when they got 
married but not my sons… 
 
If you ask me about the possibility of state remedies, I do think it should be possible for secular 
remedy to solve iggun. We should be able to go there for help like I thought the get law could 
do… But, I also think that Beit Din should issue a psak that if a guy gives a get because of 
contempt of court, it IS still halakhically acceptable! 
 
What’s the solution? I’m frum…but….Rabbi Rackman’s court makes sense- I went there while I 
was an aguna and got an annulment because of the drugs and non-support of wife as per ketuba. 
I believe these behaviours should be viewed as breach of (ketuba) contract because a woman 
should be allowed, not right away, but after some number of years to go to Beit Din for these 
types of issues – fraud and remedies like hafka’ot or mekach taut should be permitted. But, 
“alternate Beit Din” is dangerous because as it is, in the communities, women are made to feel 
like chopped liver. I had a 10 year old son- no one offered to go to shul with him, or to kiddush… 
 
I still needed a get, but it felt good to do something. 
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Because a lot of rabbis have their heads in the clouds- if it doesn’t touch them or it if wasn’t 
their daughters than they aren’t aware- they need to be made aware and do whatever it takes to 
modify halakha to change things. Women are losing their child-bearing years and we need to 
replenish our population after the Holocaust. I’m in support of anything short of violence 
(although some friends sponsored kiddush in honour of Mendel Epstein the week he was 
arrested). 
 
Beit Din was made aware of the situation and were happy to be vehicle to help me, but it left 
bitter taste in my mouth…I’ve lost tremendous respect for the word ‘rabbi’. I can’t give respect 
to a title that was uncaring and disappointing. I don’t stand up for them anymore when they 
enter a room. They kept saying, “what more can you give him”. I was my own advocate and the 
rabbis can do more. 
  
That said, there must have been a reason that Hashem kept the get from me for that exact 
number of years until the point when I was meant to get it. It strengthened my emuna because 
logically it makes no sense, so you have to look higher or deeper; there must be some reason 
Hashem is doing this, there must be a plan but you just don’t know it at the time. 
 
~~~ 
 
We were married in 1986. We had 5 kids and in 2007 I filed for divorce and then spoke to a beit 
din. 
 
I originally come from a very Orthodox family, they were mostly Chasidic, though my husband 
was more modern, not really affiliated. I consider myself to be Modern Orthodox. 
 
After the 2
nd
 hazmana from Rabbinical Council of America he agreed to go to badatz of 
Lakewood, a very stringent beit din. He said he’d give the get for the civil, but schlepped on for 6 
years. I just got my get this past spring, but technically I was not considered an aguna… 
He outsmarted batei din. It bothered me that he was able to one up them- by requesting changes 
in batei din, like a change of venue, he basically successfully halted the hazmana and seruv 
process- because this way I was not even deemed an aguna and his name couldn’t even be in the 
press- but I was still without a get for years. 
 
The New York Get Law had no effect because I was the plaintiff but I only found out about this 
catch once it was too late, once I was already in court. 
 
My mother-in-law also paid my father-in-law for her get, by the way. 
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Are bottom up approaches ever going to change someone who knows they have something over 
you? It’s power. Beit din should have power to issue a get with/if you have enough reason. I also 
think that secular solutions are good, they can’t hurt. But secular remedies won’t change 
religious behaviours. After seeing this though, it puts religion in a negative light. It makes 
religion seem negative because it’s my children’s father who is not religious, yet able to do this- 
to manipulate religion…  
 
I would have done anything for the get it separates your neshama from each other and that is 
what I wanted - to be finished in that sense. I didn’t want to date or remarry at that time. It made 
me question my religion at the time but I have no bad feeling toward rabbis. My kids also 
questioned. 
 
It is so frustrating that nothing can be done when they can come up with solution if they wanted 
to. Who’s gaining by not doing this?  
 
 
In this set of narratives, both women discuss the potential successes of civil and religious 
remedies including get legislation, prenuptial agreements, annulments, as well as their own 
suggestions for best practices. Although both these narratives are from women in the Greater 
New York area, they similarly reflect the sentiments of Torontonian women, their frustrations 
and their inability to rely on the consistency and efficacy of the proposed remedies to date- both 
civil and religious. These narratives foreshadow and give specific examples of some of the 
proposed remedies on which I elaborate in the coming chapter and are tangible examples of 
Jewish and civil divorce law in action. 
In addition to picking up on many aspects of Jewish family law and state law discussed in 
the coming chapter, the narratives also highlight some important facets which I develop further 
throughout the study. For example, the women are reflecting the need for a ‘grab-bag’ or 
plurality of remedies indicating that different women will be comfortable with different 
mechanisms or legal orders, rather than a uniform, ‘one-size-fits-all-approach’. The narratives 
also illustrate that women tend to have complex relationships with their faith and religious 
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leaders rather than blaming them for their husbands’ abusive refusal of a get. Ultimately, these 
narratives, like all those included in this study, and particularly those in between chapters, which 
are given space rather excerpted, highlight the importance of women’s socio-legal storytelling 
which is in keeping with feminist principles of research as well as principles of critical legal 
pluralism; both of which seek to place women at the centre of the analysis, accurately reflecting 
them as active participants who have an impact on both social and legal changes. 
 
 
In this chapter I begin to untangle the intricate system of Jewish law regarding marriage 
and divorce by way of background. I briefly establish the historical context by inserting 
samplings of the well-established interconnectedness or reciprocity between Jewish and state 
legal systems regarding family law throughout the chapter and shedding light on their modern-
day application. I also introduce and contextualize the contemporary remedies to get refusal, 
including the get laws in New York and Toronto
77
, and the movement toward prenuptial 
agreements, all of which are legal-pluralist solutions aiming to remedy a Jewish legal 
phenomenon. Thus this chapter is meant to equip the readers with the necessary framework, via 
historical and legal background, to readily engage with the subsequent analyses, arguments, and 
primary research in a meaningful and thorough way. 
 
Jewish Family Law Primer  
While this subsection may be dense for those unfamiliar with the evolution of Jewish 
family law, for an in-depth understanding of the significance of the issue of get refusal, its 
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impact on women in contemporary times, and its interplay with legal pluralism in Toronto and 
New York, it is imperative to first (briefly) examine the Jewish legal system and its functions, as 
they have developed over many centuries. Indeed, for thousands of years Jews have been 
adjudicating with their own court system composed of batei din and in accordance with 
halakha
78
. Halakha means law but its literal translation is ‘the way on which one goes’ and beit 
din, is ‘house of law’ or rabbinic court or tribunal, where matters are adjudicated. Halakha is an 
entire legal framework that, depending on how observant one is, governs every aspect of one’s 
life and behaviour. Halakha is based on the written law of the Bible or Old Testament given by 
G-d to Moses on Mount Sinai, and the oral law which was written, developed, and eventually, 
compiled and codified, by rabbinical authorities in the Mishna (200 C.E.) and Talmud (400 C.E.- 
Talmud Yerushalmi; 500 C.E. Talmud Bavli) . The Code of Jewish Law includes numerous other 
sources of halakha which are slightly more contemporary including the Shulkhan Arukh (written 
in Tzefat, Israel and published in Venice in 1500 C.E.) and works by Maimonides (1135 Spain-
1204 Egypt) and which offer interpretation and explanation of the written, Biblical law and oral 
law preceding. 
The doctrine that was to become the basis for defining ‘church-state’ relations in Jewish 
law, outlining the instances in which there was deference to secular law, is dina d’malkhuta 
dina
79
. The Talmud attributes the principle dina d’malkhuta dina, ‘the law of the land (kingdom) 
is the law’ to the Babylonian sage Samuel, of the 3rd century to the Common Era. Even from the 
Talmudic era there were debates on how and to what extent this principle should be followed
80
. 
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Questions arose about the principle outside of Israel, in Diaspora, as well as inside Israel, and 
questions arose regarding foreign and Jewish kings, among other difficulties.  As the principle 
developed, and largely until today, it is said to only apply to mamona, or civil and fiscal 
matters
81
. Thus it is only on these matters where the principle can legitimately supersede even 
Torah law. The principle does not apply to isura, or forbidden or religious matters so that the 
state (secular) laws ought not to be followed in such cases
82
. 
In other words, Jewish law accords halakhic recognition to the validity of enacted laws of 
the state jurisdiction as they pertain (primarily) to business, property, and commercial affairs. 
While the principle of dina d’malkhuta dina assigns state law more authority, it forbids Jews 
from allowing the state law to supersede the requirements of Jewish ritual law such as Sabbath 
and kosher, nor are Jews permitted to follow the principle when the state law imposes on issues 
of ‘personal status’ that have to do with the requirements of marriage and divorce83. 
Additionally, in order for the principle to have validity in placing secular law above religious law 
for its observers, the state law in question must be “non-discriminatory, serve a valid public 
purpose, not contravene religious practice, and be the enactment of a legitimate government”84. 
Of course, this is how the principle is understood in modernity; it may have had alternative 
meanings in the 3
rd
 century, for example. 
During the history of Jewish dispersion following the Biblical period, the state generally 
did not interfere with the observance of the Jewish religion. During the Persian period (roughly 
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539 B.C.E-400 B.C.E), the religious authority over the Jews was vested in high priests while in 
the Hellenistic period (roughly 322 B.C.E- 1
st
 century B.C.E) the priests largely remained the 
spiritual leaders of the Jews. Similarly, when the Romans annexed Judea (1
st
 century B.C.E), 
they appointed ‘procurators’, civil authorities, who most often did not interfere with the religious 
life of the Jewish people
85
. However, after the year 70 when the Second Temple was destroyed, 
and particularly after the collapse of the Bar Kochba Revolt in 135, Jews regarded the Romans as 
conquerors who ruled by force and not by right. Thus, the principle of Dina d’Malkhuta Dina 
was not applicable to the Roman rule. From this time, the application of the principle is 
variegated
86. Consequently, understanding the principle’s application is exceedingly complex, 
especially during the subsequent historical periods.  
The practice of self-adjudication has endured - although perhaps slightly differently 
among various communities and within certain legal centralist
87
 vacuums - and was originally 
established due to Talmudic bans on Jews voluntarily presenting their cases to courts governed 
by idolatrous peoples, initially being the courts of Akkum or courts governed by idolatrous 
peoples
 88
. Accordingly, while the state legal centralist adjudication of today, whether in the 
United States or Canada, may be just and democratic, and no longer governed by ‘idolatrous 
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peoples’, interpretation of the Talmud suggests “an obligation to utilize a Jewish forum to 
adjudicate disputes still exists”89.  
Furthermore, there are additional halakhic reasons for adjudication in rabbinic courts or 
batei din. The concept of chillul Hashem
90
, which will be addressed at length in chapter six, may 
occur when a Jew accuses another Jew in a state, civil court by bringing a dispute between Jews 
outside of the Jewish community and within the public eye. The idea is that this unnecessarily 
publicizes the wrongdoing, and additionally degrades G-d’s law by exposing a Jew in violation 
of it. In order to avoid this, many Jews feel (regardless of their level of observance), Jewish 
adjudication is the preferred route for many matters, private law in particular. That said, the 
general ban from the state courts is not absolute. The Talmudic ban only prohibits state centralist 
courts from being the courts of first resort
91
. Moreover, the ban does not apply when a Jew is 
summoned to appear in courts or if they appear there because their profession necessitates 
them
92
. In fact despite the bans, at times batei din might encourage, recommend, or give 
permission for individuals to go to state courts
93
. Despite the ambiguity that surrounds the 
principle’s application, I include the principle dina d’malchuta dina here as an introductory 
concept signaling an issue at the centre of our analysis- the interactions, and at times the tensions 
between Jewish and state law and their courts. Some of these interactions will be further 
elaborated in the coming chapters. 
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Jewish Marriage  
Jewish marriage is regulated by Jewish law, or halakha; it has a legal framework. Thus 
Jewish weddings entail a religious ceremony that has its own set of laws and rituals. Jewish 
marriage entails two steps: eirusin or kiddushin commonly translated as engagement or betrothal, 
but actually separates or sanctifies the bride and groom for each other alone; and nisuin, the 
actual marriage ceremony. In Talmudic times, the two were conducted as separate ceremonies, 
often a year apart, but since roughly the 12
th
 century, the two steps are done successively, 
beneath the khupa, or marriage canopy
94
. There are three ways to betroth a woman: 1) through a 
financial transaction whereby a man gives a woman money or an object of value, known as kesef, 
2) sexual intercourse with the intention that it consummates the marriage
95
, known as biah, and 
3) a document whereby the man states his intention to marry a woman, known as shtar
96
.  
Kiddushin reserves the woman’s sexual (and other) capacities for the husband alone. Although 
each betrothal method is initiated by the male, the Talmud specifies that in all cases a woman can 
only be betrothed with her consent
97; she has the right to refuse or accept, although a man’s 
potential power in marriage is certainly signaled here, at its inception. 
  A Jewish wedding is sealed with a ketuba, a legal marriage contract, binding the marriage 
and ensuring maintenance and protection for the woman in case of mistreatment, neglect, or 
refusal of rights, such as the right to adequate sustenance and the right to be sexually satisfied by 
her husband
98
. In fact, over the course of centuries there has been significant development to 
halakha whereby the rabbis have attempted to limit the man’s unilateral power in divorce99 
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(similar to today’s prenuptial agreements, which will be elaborated below) and instituting the 
ketuba is a prime example of this. The ketuba includes a marriage payment guaranteed to the 
wife upon divorce or the ‘husband’s demise’100. A specific amount, 200 zekukim kesef tzaruf, 
200 pure silver coins as well as a lien on all the possessions of a husband, even after his death are 
guaranteed in the ketuba, similar to a maintenance payment. Effectively these stipulations make 
divorce more difficult and unappealing for husbands (which protected the wives for whom 
divorce was akin to death in these times)
101
, and they prevented men from abusing their power to 
simply dismiss their wives or not provide for them
102
. Judaism was the first religion to produce a 
document (thousands of years ago) that held the woman’s rights in any esteem and it is still used 
widely today in the original Aramaic in Orthodox circles and beyond. The rabbis were so intent 
on protecting the rights of Jewish women that they prohibited a man to live with his wife for 
even one hour without a ketuba
103
. To seal the marriage two kosher witnesses or eidim are also 
required. There are, as well, many ritual practices which have become normative in Jewish 
weddings such as khupa, mentioned above, and breaking a glass to signify the destruction of the 
Temple, among others. 
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Michael Satlow, in Reconsidering the Ketuba Payment, takes a look at the ketuba and 
makes the claim that the marriage contract was not known in Jewish communities before the 1st- 
2nd centuries
104
. He states,  
Around the time of the first century BCE, because it was easy for the husband to divorce 
his wife, Simeon ben Shetakh changed the primary Jewish marriage payment to a 
marriage settlement which became known as the rabbinic ‘ketuba’….105  
 
Studying a series of texts before this era, Satlow concluded that the ketuba was not known in 
Jewish communities before this period (Simeon ben Shetakh lived from 120-40 BCE). Although 
there had been verbal agreements in use before this time, rabbis determined they no longer 
sufficed to adequately protect women. The Talmud in describing the need for a ketuba enactment 
uses the phrase shakdu chachamim al takanot bnot yisrael, sages had a sense of urgent concern 
regarding legal enactments or amendments for the daughters of Israel, because men were starting 
to break their verbal contracts and the rabbis foresaw the possible abuse to the women in 
marriage
106
. Ben Shetakh found that in the Biblical literature and in literature from the Second 
Temple “not a single reference to anything similar to the ketuba payment” existed107 and 
concluded that the institution of the ketuba may likely have been a “rabbinic innovation” of the 
time. Yet he also noted that other legal systems of the ancient Near East “required payments very 
similar to the ketuba,” citing the Code of Hammurabi and similarities to the Demotic marriage 
documents from Egypt
108
.  
Thus, Simeon ben Shetakh was either a ‘precedent-setting’ rabbinic figure who changed 
the nature of marriage with his institution of a settlement known as the ketuba, or the change in 
                                                          
104
 Michael Satlow, “Reconsidering the Rabbinic Ketuba Payment”; Also noted by Stanley R. Brav, “Marriage With 
a History,” 92. 
105
 Michael Satlow, The Jewish Family in Antiquity, 134.  
106
 Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Ketubot 7a. 
107
 Michael Satlow, The Jewish Family in Antiquity, 136  
108
 Ibid. 
46 
 
the settlement of Jewish marriages emerged out of, or was influenced by the marriage 
settlements that were used in the legal traditions of their non-Jewish neighbours. In fact both of 
these processes may have been occurring in the Talmudic era. Moreover, remnants of these two 
approaches are echoed in the proposed solutions to get refusal emerging in the 21
st
 century such 
as a ‘rabbinic reboot’ of the Rackman beit din or the International Beit Din (IBD) which uses 
halakhic innovations to ‘solve’ get refusal, and the influence of prenuptial agreements creatively 
borrowed from the secular sphere to expressly prevent the Jewish issue of get refusal, both of 
which will be explored in greater detail later in this chapter.  While it is unclear which factor 
more likely led to the evolution of the ketuba payment, it is a significant example indicating the 
commensurability and even reciprocal relationship the legal orders shared throughout history 
regarding Jewish marriage and divorce, persisting today. 
Again, sometime around 960-1028 C.E., we see another example of instituting a new 
legal norm impacting marriage which would come to influence other legal systems. Rabbeinu 
Gershom
109
  instituted a takana, a new legal precedent or amendment (for what we now 
understand applies only to Ashkenazic Jews)
110
 which came to be known as the criminalization 
of polygamy due to his concern that the phenomenon is making women’s status in marriage too 
precarious. Rabbeinu Gershom merely removed the heter, or permission, to marry more than one 
wife, rather than technically prohibiting it. Yet because of his widespread influence and 
reverence as the leading rabbinic scholar of the time that made this, and other of his decrees, so 
powerful, and indeed a lasting precedent impacting Jewish family law. He not only served to 
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protect women through this amendment, but in so doing, he also established a legal precedent 
benefiting women from which other legal orders would come to learn. 
 
Jewish Divorce 
 
Jewish divorce law emerges from the Bible, “…he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands 
it to her, and sends her away…”111. Thus G-d, the religion itself, and the leadership permit 
divorce when necessary. However, individuals who were married in accordance with halakha 
must obtain a divorce in accordance with halakha, in contemporary times, most-often executed 
with the aid of a rabbinical court
112
. A get is needed to sever or dissolve the institution of 
marriage
113
and being that a ketuba is a legal marriage contract, the get (since the incorporation of 
the ketuba) also serves to legally dissolve it, being a Jewish bill of divorcement. A get is the legal 
way of releasing the husband from his ketuba contract and kiddushin entitlements; it is a 
contractual release. The get is a written document that must be composed by a sofer (scribe) in 
the presence of a beit din (court of Jewish law), after a man has requested that it be written. The 
get consists of roughly twelve lines wherein there is no mention of rabbis or G-d and did not 
used to require rabbinic supervision as it is not necessarily considered a religious document, but 
a legal one
114
. A beit din cannot authorize the writing of a get without the will of the husband or 
at a wife’s request alone. Moreover, a civil divorce alone is immaterial if the individual parties 
want or choose to remarry within their faith and remain in their communities. A husband 
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refusing to give a get to his wife, even while divorced under state law, remains married to his 
wife under Jewish law.  
Further, it is important to note that while other benefits of using batei din include their 
speed and cost-effectiveness
115
, particularly as opposed to legal centralist adjudication, according 
to (Orthodox) halakha, batei din have exclusive jurisdiction in the divorce process and 
consequently in these instances individuals may be compelled to use the batei din for this reason 
alone. A beit din is most often composed of three rabbis who sit as dayanim or judges of halakha 
along with two qualified eidim or witnesses and one sofer or scribe
116
. Parties can bring their 
litigation to an existing beit din or alternatively they can create a zabla beit din. Zabla is an 
acronym for zeh borer lo echad, which means each party is able to choose one of the dayyanim 
from a pool of rabbis with expertise in various fields of Jewish law and then the two together 
choose a third to complete the beit din. When using a zabla both parties must agree to be bound 
by the decision the beit din reaches. Proceedings have traditionally begun with the signing of an 
arbitration agreement by which both parties agree to be bound. Nonetheless, rabbis often turn 
proceedings into negotiations leading to a voluntary settlement as opposed to issuing rulings
117
. 
In Ontario, this process has been disturbed by the ban on religious arbitration since 2006 (which 
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will be explored in the coming chapters). Despite movements to form alternative and non-
Orthodox courts, the majority of batei din are still Orthodox
118
. 
 Husbands are the ones who must grant a get by physically placing the document in the 
wife’s waiting, open hands “according to the laws of Moses and Israel”, the same verse used to 
formalize a marriage. Even if the wife is the one who initiates the proceedings; he is the primary 
physical actor. The get must be given of his free will and must be accepted of her free will; he 
cannot be compelled to execute a divorce
119
 and reciprocally, (since the medieval period as I note 
below,) she cannot be compelled to accept one. Judaism permits one or both parties to be absent 
from the proceedings, appointing a representative, or shaliakh in their place.  However, a get that 
is coerced or which is given or accepted under duress is invalid, known as a get meuseh or forced 
or tainted get. Mutual consent is the preferred method of dissolving a marriage, and is the most 
common since rabbinic law established that there need be no grounds for divorce other than 
mutual consent (another move on behalf of rabbis to aide women). In instances of mutual 
consent, divorce is simple and fast
120
. The divorced man may remarry immediately (although if 
he is a cohen, a descendant of the priestly class he cannot marry a divorcée) while the divorced 
woman must wait 90 days to ensure she is not pregnant (and cannot marry a cohen). 
Historically in Judaism, in order to protect the status of women in divorce, another 
significant precedent emerged from Rabbeinu Gershom in the medieval period (the first of which 
was noted above). Rabbenu Gershom’s takana, or precedent, sometime around 960-1028 B.C.E., 
prohibited a Jewish (Ashkenazi) husband from divorcing a wife against her will, ensuring 
marriage and divorce are contractual, and necessitating the consent of both parties, unlike in 
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neighbouring regions and cultures, particularly those practicing Islam, where some types of 
divorce are unilateral until today
121
 (and which had previously also been the case permitted under 
biblical law).  
Thus, at first glance, it might seem as though a husband’s and wife’s positions are 
equivalent. This process has the guise of equality, addressing key components of marriage that 
had previously been unequal. However, in practice, the position of the husband and wife are 
different in a crucial way. That a husband must first physically drop the get document into a 
wife’s waiting hand gives him, and indeed all men, the absolute right in divorce. Although a wife 
must also accept the divorce, a significant equalizing force, the initial step, and thus the power to 
potentially take advantage of the legal structure, is literally in the hands of men. Moreover, “the 
necessity for the man’s consent to give the get, the Jewish writ of divorce, is biblically ordained, 
d'oraita, while the woman’s consent is necessary by rabbinic decree, d'rabbanan122. This 
difference facilitates resolving of the situation when a man is a victim of get refusal”123 more 
easily, while a woman remains without the same opportunity for dissolution
124
. This has led to a 
phenomenon whereby women (disproportionately
125
) become agunot or “chained women” or 
more accurately, mesuravot get, women refused a get. Instances of siruv get occur principally 
due to the husband’s refusal of issuance deemed as the absence of his free will. The husband 
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cannot be compelled to execute a divorce as it is believed to be coerced or under duress, and thus 
becomes nullified. It is at this point, where a spouse refuses to cooperate, when Jewish divorce 
becomes difficult and messy. 
 
Get Refusal 
Iggun in Hebrew literally means an anchor so an aguna is a woman who is chained, 
bound, or anchored to her marriage; agunot is the plural
126
. Generally, there are three instances 
when a woman might become an aguna. However, it has become an umbrella term including 
various reasons historically and geographically sensitive. The first and historically most common 
reason is that a woman’s husband goes missing or deserts her (literally, or is kidnapped as is 
common with Israeli soldiers, or due to other tragedies like September 11
th127
, or the death camps 
of Nazi Germany
128
). The whereabouts of the husband are unknown and hence he is unable to 
grant his wife a get and she remains trapped in the marriage, or his death was not witnessed and 
hence a wife cannot be deemed a widow. Historically, the conversion of the husband to another 
religion may have made him unable to issue a get and thus also made the wife an aguna. Second, 
a woman’s husband may be mentally ill and incapable of issuing a get, and third, and relevant to 
us, is when the whereabouts of the husband are known, he is psychologically capable of issuing 
a get and yet the husband simply refuses to grant the get. In this case, she is more accurately 
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known as a mesurevet get, literally meaning ‘one who is refused a get’ and the refusing husband 
is recalcitrant and labelled a sarvan, or refuser. 
To clarify, the get terminates the husband’s obligation to provide sustenance as per the 
ketuba, and nullifies his kiddushin entitlements from her (including her sexual capacity,) 
allowing her to move on with her life freely. Notwithstanding Rabbeinu Gershom’s takana, or 
precedent banning polygamy, marriage requires a woman’s sexual fidelity to her husband, but 
not the reciprocal. So that even if he cannot take a second wife while married, he is not deemed 
an adulterer if he has relations with another woman
129
. Hence get refusal has a disproportionate 
impact on women’s lives (in a way that is unequal to men). She remains bound literally, 
figuratively and sexually without a get. Consequently, it is predominantly husbands who trap 
their wives without issuing gets (rather than the reverse)
130
 making it “primarily a disability 
women face”131. Most often get extortion exists as well, where women are compelled to forgo 
financial payments, custody or access in exchange for a get because their husbands are using the 
religious divorce as leverage to exact greater rewards in civil court, understanding that the get as 
a legitimate bargaining chip. 
In instances where a spouse (the husband more commonly) refuses to appear at the beit 
din in order to begin the divorce process, there is a protocol batei din follow (although the 
workings of each beit din differ slightly according to the nuances of the community and the 
rabbis who serves as dayanim, or judges)
132
. Initially the beit din will call or send a hazmana, a 
letter or summons, via certified and regular mail asking the reluctant spouse to contact the beit 
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din for an appointment within fourteen days. Should there be no response, the beit din will send a 
second hazmana and if necessary a third hazmana as well. After three summonses have been 
issued without appropriate response from the reluctant spouse, the beit din will issue a hatra’at 
seruv, a letter of warning of the forthcoming issuance of a contempt order. If a satisfactory 
response is still not received from the spouse, the beit din may issue a seruv, a contempt order, 
that declares the spouse to be (officially) ‘recalcitrant’ and subject to public ostracism and 
condemnation, calling upon the community to take appropriate action
133
. This is noteworthy as 
well because women may only get the legal designation of becoming an ‘aguna’ after a specific 
period of time wherein she is refused a get (ranging from nine months to two years, depending 
on the stringency of the particular beit din) and during which time a beit din must issue 
hazmanot, and ultimately a seruv. Without the seruv, a woman is does not legally ‘merit’ the 
aguna designation. An essential caveat however is that while the recalcitrant may be ‘subject’ to 
sanctions due to his contempt, they are not necessarily arranged by the beit din and they are not 
employed in sanctioning all recalcitrants. The sanctions are largely case and community 
specific.
134
 Kherem and modern-day versions of this traditional tool, such as ‘e-shaming’, will be 
explored at length in chapter six. 
135
  
According to halakha, unless a husband freely gives a get and a wife freely accepts it, the 
couple is not divorced and neither party is free to re-marry. A woman who does not receive a get 
is deemed to be an adulteress if she cohabits with another man, being that she is still married to 
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someone else according to Jewish law
136
. Indeed, she can not engage in any form of sexual 
relationship without committing adultery. Of greater concern however is that any child born from 
her subsequent union then bears the burden of her decision halakhically, as well as in the form of 
a social stigma. Any children she has from her subsequent marriage are considered mamzerim; 
they are considered to be illegitimate offspring, a status which bears severe consequences. 
Mamzer is the singular of mamzerim, meaning illegitimate in Hebrew. The reason this status is 
so significant and detrimental is because there is no remedy to reverse this status. Furthermore, 
mamzerim and their progeny are restricted as to whom they can marry. A mamzer can only marry 
another mamzer, not any another Jew, and this status is checked and even researched, often by a 
rabbi before a marriage. As well, this status lasts for ten generations and affects certain rights in 
Israel, “no mamzer shall enter the assembly of the Lord; even to the tenth generation, none of his 
descendants shall enter the assembly of the Lord”137. Some authorities even interpret that ten 
generations implies that offspring are deemed mamzerim until the end of time. This issue is all 
the more salient in Israel where only Orthodox marriages are recognized as legal for Jews under 
state law. It does make sense then, that some women, in order to unlock the chains of aginut and 
move forward with their lives, will yield to extortionate demands and pay huge sums of money 
to their husbands in order to procure a get.  The get is “critical, not only to one’s spiritual and 
social future, but also to one’s children and grandchildren and generations to come”138. This 
explains the enduring entanglement of legal systems coupled with the enduring desire for the get. 
In contrast though, the husband, while remaining married to his wife according to Jewish 
law, is able to cohabit and have sexual relationships even to the point of having children without 
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the same stigma and/or halakhic ramifications of mamzerut on his subsequent children. This 
would be the same case if there was a reversal, where a wife would not voluntarily accept the 
divorce, thereby trapping her husband and making him an ‘agun’. The asymmetry is clear. He 
can move on with fewer religious and social barriers, she cannot. Clearly, this disparity places an 
undue burden on women, without being onerous on men in the same gravity. This asymmetry in 
Jewish divorce law has created tragic consequences for women whose husbands refuse to grant 
them a get (and despite some attempts by rabbis to remedy the asymmetry, as I elaborate below). 
Husbands who refuse to grant their wives a get are known as recalcitrant husbands, or 
sarvanim, refusers, (sarvan is the singular) and most frequently, when women are faced with 
recalcitrant husbands they are “forced to relinquish various financial or custodial rights as the 
price for obtaining a get”139. Men are deemed to be ‘recalcitrant’ when they “use power to 
withhold a get as a bargaining chip in negotiations over property, money, or child custody”140; in 
other words, when they attempt to extort the get. Outside of Israel, where religious law does not 
have the state backing it, there are greater challenges regarding the handling of recalcitrant 
husbands and discussions regarding the actions or inactions of the New York and Toronto batei 
din will follow throughout to some extent, and will be developed further in chapter seven. 
Rabbinic law does permit some sanctions designed to induce the husband to execute a divorce 
and protect women although the sanctions must not be so severe as to constitute an overpowering 
of the husband’s will. The Talmud states that, “in order to prevent the woman from becoming 
and aguna, the rabbis were lenient”141 and Talmudic commentator, Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel 
(1250-1327) goes even further stating, “One must investigate all possible avenues in order to 
                                                          
139
 Suzanne Last Stone, “The Intervention of American Law in Jewish Divorce: A Pluralist Analysis,” Israel Law 
Review 34, no. 2 (2000): 170-210, 171. Interview with women and lawyers confirmed this; see firsthand narratives 
in chapter five and throughout. 
140
 Ibid, 175. 
141
 Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Yevamot 99a. 
56 
 
release and aguna”142. In fact, the Mishna set out grounds for which a husband could be 
compelled to grant a get, even physically “forced”, and upon which Rambam (Maimonidies, 
1135-1204) famously commented
143
. “Kofin oto ad she-yomar rotzeh ani” refers to whipping the 
recalcitrant husband until he says “I want to [give a get]”, also known as compelling a husband 
to want to give a get, or to recognize that giving a get and ‘doing the right thing’ was in fact deep 
down, what the husband had always wanted and intended to do before his evil impulse took 
over
144
. This was not viewed by rabbis as coercion since the physical acts were simply to reveal 
the latent positive impulse.  Rabbis were often creative and open in their interpretation of 
halakha and attempted to protect women from becoming agunot and from otherwise having 
inferior positions or lack of safety in marriage and divorce.  
Historically, in Judaism, in order to protect that status of women in divorce, precedents 
emerged from rabbis’ decrees. From the “twelfth century onward, the view of Rabbeinu Tam 
(another famous medieval rabbinic figure, 1100-1171,) who was against forced divorce, emerged 
in contradiction to Rambam’s approach: a court could apply pressure upon a husband, but not 
actually compel a divorce”145. This was meant initially simply to discourage divorce altogether, 
because he felt divorce was becoming too frequent, to the detriment of women who were left 
bereft. However, this decree has had significant and long-standing effects on the aguna issue 
until present day. Rabbeinu Tam felt very strongly that the get procured by coercion is improper 
and places in doubt the very validity of the document
146
. Furthermore, Rabbeinu Tam also felt 
that those rabbis who supported compelling a divorce, including Rambam (discussed above), 
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erred in their decision to permit coercion on the matter of divorce (particularly due to the 
illegitimacy of children produced subsequent to said coerced divorces). Thus, although the some 
rabbis dating back to Mishnaic times through Rambam, intended for the torture to merely reveal 
the husband’s true desire to issue a get to his wife, subsequent rulings of other rabbis such as 
Rabbeinu Tam, forbade such torture because of concerns that such a get could be viewed as a get 
me’useh – a forced or coerced get, and therefore a halakhically invalid divorce. Thus, an edict 
soon followed, limiting the Mishnaic law and virtually nullifying this rabbinic legal innovation.  
While Rabbeinu Tam’s decree may have left women in a less powerful position with regard to 
divorce, particularly in light of get refusal (indeed even until present day), Jewish women did 
maintain protection from one of the other key decrees around the same era which came from 
Rabbeinu Gershom, discussed above and indeed, there are some modern-day techniques that are 
used to help convince recalcitrant husbands to grant gets. 
In Israel today there are some siruv get cases before the rabbinic court where there is 
power to invoke sanctions such as jail, revoking passports and driver’s licenses, and removing 
job certifications
147
 of recalcitrant husbands. In a directive on November 15
th
, 2016, the state 
prosecutor authorized criminal charges against husbands refusing a get once the Israeli 
Rabbinical Court orders a get to be given which could bring a man to trial for “ignoring a legal 
order, under section 287 of the penal code”148. Criminalizing divorce refusal itself, as opposed to 
imposing sanctions, means that the husband can be jailed even if he subsequently agrees to grant 
the divorce. These intersections of Jewish and state, civil laws are possible because the rabbinic 
court rulings on the matter of get refusal are fully backed by the civil powers of the state. Most 
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recently there have also been cases where Israeli courts have forced the get refuser’s family to 
pay support when the refuser absconded
149
 and in March 2016, for the first time in history an 
Israeli rabbinical court in Tel-Aviv sentenced a man (who happens to be a “Jewish-American 
tycoon”) to prison because his son will not grant his wife a get150. The court discovered that the 
son, at the encouragement of his father, was refusing a get to his wife even though he had 
abandoned his wife and kids ten years prior when she suffered a stroke and was disabled. “When 
the husband’s parents visited from the United States the Tel-Aviv Rabbinic Court summoned his 
parents to testify and even issued a restraining order preventing them from leaving the country 
until they do so, itself an unprecedented decision”151 . The wealthy parents attempted to put 
much pressure on the courts in an attempt to obstruct justice and consequently the Tel Aviv 
Rabbinical Court decided to jail the husband’s father;  
expressing the deep and unequivocal obligation of the rabbinical courts to help agunot 
and prevent refusals to divorce…the court appropriately used the halakhic and legal 
means at its disposal in order to expose the support that the recalcitrant husband’s 
parents- illegally- give him, and so it took the appropriate action against the 
accomplices…This is an important message to women.. The court works to implement 
rulings and to find a true solution to recalcitrant husbands
152
.  
 
Furthermore, in February 2016 another precedent-setting decree was established by the Beit Din 
of the Rabbanut Ha’Rashit (the central beit din) of Israel, headed by Chief Rabbi, Dovid Lau, 
asserting for the first time, “In a ground breaking decision, that it is not permitted to make any 
conditions or combine the giving of the get to the division of property. Only after the get is given 
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may division of property take place”153. This powerful halakhic statement by leading rabbinic 
judges continues the historical tradition of rabbinic rulings with the intent to mediate the 
asymmetries innate to the Jewish divorce laws and is thus also a significant step in empowering 
women and preventing men from using the get as a tool for extortionate abuse by separating the 
assets from the get
154
. Consequently, while siruv get in Israel is complex, and beyond the scope 
of this study, it is notable that there are current examples of rabbinic innovations attempting to 
give women more protection and power while simultaneously discouraging abusive men from 
using the get as a weapon, preserving the long-standing tradition
155
. 
 However, to women outside of Israel, harmful “repercussions are exacerbated in the 
modern West by the loss of Jewish juridical autonomy…Juridical autonomy-at least in theory- 
provides a mechanism for alleviating (although not eliminating) imbalances in Jewish divorce 
law”156. However, outside of Israel, in the United States and Canada, rabbinic courts have no 
authority to revoke licenses, passports, or to jail recalcitrants as a means to help convince 
husbands to grant gets in line with the harkhakot of Rabbenu Tam, or the distancing from the 
permitted use of force by Rambam/Maimonides, which was outlawed by Rabbi Tam.  In fact, in 
one extreme example in New York, a team of rabbis, led by rabbi Mendel Epstein, who often 
advocated for women’s rights in divorce (despite charging them a fee for services executed in 
exacting a get), were recently arrested in a costly FBI sting operation while attempting to aid 
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women in need of a get
157
.  Desperate women refused a get, who felt they had no alternatives 
means by which to secure a get, and with nowhere left to turn, would seek out Epstein to help 
convince their unwilling spouses to give gets. On occasion Epstein and his team (described by a 
sensationalized story in Gentlemen’s Quarterly as “uncivilized and barbaric vigilantes” and 
“violent crime gangs”) would even track down men who disappeared to remote villages in South 
America and at times would go so far as to employ cattle prods in order to aid in the 
‘convincing’ of husbands to grant their wives gittin158. While it is true that at times Epstein 
charged women tens of thousand dollars for his services (between $10,000-60,000) , which 
included mild convincing, threats, and occasionally physical harm as well, I should note that two 
women I interviewed were adamant that Epstein was a hero and in fact only charged for his 
services when women had the means to pay. But, because of the separation between church and 
state, and during what would be their final attempt to help an aguna: 
The FBI set out to lure rabbis who would actively-perhaps over-zealously- try to have a 
recalcitrant husband (who in this case did not exist) authorize the writing and delivery of 
a get to a weeping aguna (who, in this case, was in reality and FBI agent). The agent’s 
acting talent persuaded the trusting rabbis that she was authentic, particularly because she 
brandished a forged, but legitimate looking ketuba and a seruv signed by the presiding 
dayan of the Beth Din of America, which the FBI fraudulently secured
159
. 
 
As a result of the FBI sting, the rabbis were eventually sentenced to terms ranging from three to 
ten years despite the fact that the FBI agents fraudulently obtained rabbinic court documents 
(hazmanot and seruvim) in attempting to also catch the Beth Din of America and ORA in 
wrongdoing. Furthermore the defense was not permitted to present any evidence of religious 
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motivation and intent, which would have indicated that husbands often agree to issue a get with 
the fear of immanent physical harm. Rabbis did not intend to actually harm the (fictional) 
husband, and the motivation for their behaviour was to protect women, performing a mitzvah (a 
good deed done from religious duty) in helping to free an aguna
160
. As opposed to the state 
outside of Israel enabling religious courts to use mild-mannered pressure tactics (though this is 
an extreme case), state regulation works against the rabbinic courts (and thus by default against 
women refused a get). Women, having nowhere else to turn, enable and support a market for 
rabbis (or vigilantes) such as Mendel Epstein supplying get-getting services. Although this is a 
radical example, and physical violence is never condoned or encouraged, it does speak to the 
persisting gap between the state and religious legal norms and the lengths women will go to in 
order to achieve a get rather than an alternative remedy. 
Outside of Israel, although there are some ways in which men can be pressured, there is 
no state law backing the rabbinical courts as in Israel. Moreover, we can imagine how 
insignificant ostracism or banishment from a community is in these digital times and with our 
work lives very rarely intersecting with our home or religious lives, and with the ease of 
movement in the era of globalization. Ostracism and social pressure, based on the harkhakot of 
Rabbenu Tam, creates a way to compel a husband to grant a get, removing the physical 
element
161
. These include primarily ostracism and banishment from synagogues and/or prayer 
services which prevent the recalcitrant spouse from saying kaddish and from getting aliyot 
la’Torah - a required prayer for the deceased, and an honourary prayer on the anniversary of the 
death of a relative or one’s bar mitzvah, respectively. Additionally, other sanctions outside of 
Israel may include picketing in front of the recalcitrant husband’s place of work and residence, as 
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well as those of family members, as well as picketing in front of any other communal 
organization or individual not supporting the ostracism or banishment. In some cases there may 
be flyers posted around the city in which the recalcitrant spouse lives and works, in one case 
there were even subway ads with the recalcitrant’s image162. The Jewish Press, a well-known and 
widely read American publication prints the names of some recalcitrant spouses in each 
publication - a phenomenon that is slowly spreading throughout Jewish communities worldwide, 
although it has not yet reached Toronto. Discussions around these phenomena are elaborated at 
length in chapter six. Encouraging the recalcitrant husband to grant the divorce using such 
mechanisms is complex and multi-faceted as the narratives will show. Briefly, in instances where 
there are children of the couple living in the same city as the recalcitrant, or in cases where the 
wife has been abused, and in some cities like Toronto, where there are no organizations that will 
arrange for continuous picketing, mesuravot get may actually oppose or reject the option of 
publicly sanctioning or may be unable to employ the few sanctions to which they have access 
outside of Israel simply because the city in which they reside is not equipped or willing to enable 
them
163
. 
Before moving on to explore proposed remedies to the phenomenon of get refusal within 
the realms of Jewish law and state law, there are three additional points I want to emphasize. 
 In the vast majority of divorce cases, the legal asymmetry that exists within the halakha 
of divorce is simply a processual and banal legal step, and most women going through divorce 
are granted a get (despite the inherent asymmetry); there is no get refusal. Consequently, and 
notwithstanding the abuse that individual men might perpetrate taking advantage of the halakhic 
asymmetry, all rabbis, individual men, and particularly all of Orthodox Judaism and Halakha 
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must not be branded as misogynist, discriminatory or segregationist, as some critics have 
claimed
164
. In fact, although mesuravot get are at the mercy of their recalcitrant husbands who 
hold the absolute right in divorce
165
, many interviewed revealed that women refused a get 
themselves oppose such characterizations. The women themselves felt strongly that 
overstatements and inaccurate generalizations are offensive despite the actions of individual 
recalcitrant men, rabbis, batei din, and communities who do support a husband’s get refusal (and 
thus his domestic abuse). Interviews with women refused a get have illustrated that women 
overwhelmingly believe that Judaism and halakha in and of themselves are not ‘bad’, but there 
are Jewish men who do bad things in the name of religion
166
. These perspectives will be 
elaborated in chapters throughout the exploration. 
Moreover, the get itself consists of roughly twelve lines wherein there is no mention of 
rabbis or G-d and the writing and granting of the get did not use to require rabbinic 
supervision
167
. It was simply a legal exchange. Thus, it is noteworthy that the issue is with 
interpretation or manipulation of Jewish law, not with Jewish law, Judaism, or Jewish faith (in 
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G-d) writ large. Thus, get refusal may affect Jewish women (and men) of various and all 
observance levels, not only Ultra or Modern Orthodox
168
. To be clear, my discussion is situated 
within the religious spectrum of Judaism pertaining predominantly to the Orthodox and 
Conservative. There are however, a range of Jewish denominations and practices. The 
Conservative movement has its own set of responsa on divorce, its own batei din and poskim, or 
rabbinical arbiters, some of whom are women (which is not yet true of Orthodox Judaism).  
Reform Judaism has its own practices and ideas about what constitutes a religiously binding or 
sanctioned marriage and divorce. For example, Reform responses believe a civil divorce suffices 
to undo a religious marriage
169
. That said, the vital point to elucidate is that many Jewish women 
who do not self-define as Orthodox (or even observant in any capacity, falling within any 
denomination) may well want, or feel they are owed as a right, an Orthodox get and wish to 
satisfy Orthodox halakhic requirements
170
 and as such, siruv get definitively has an inter-
denominational impact. 
To be clear, that while not all Jews feel these religious divorce proceedings are necessary, a 
significant number do, no matter to which sector of Judaism they adhere, as women have 
illustrated and as will be demonstrated throughout the women’s narratives in this study.  
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Contextualizing Proposed and Contemporary Remedies 
I would like to shift to introduce and contextualize the proposed and contemporary 
remedies to the phenomenon of get refusal within the realms of Jewish law and state law. First I 
will review the Jewish law remedies including the entrenched and customary, and then those 
which had fallen into disuse but which are attempting to be revived by the International Beit din 
(IBD). I will then review the state/civil law remedies, which were amendments to existing state 
laws. These legal pluralist efforts attempting to remedy get refusal are at the intersection of dual 
legal systems empowered by the superior authority of the state. Subsequently, I will assess the 
movement toward prenuptial agreements as the best inoculation against get refusal. Each of these 
proposed remedies has its supporters and detractors, its benefits and its detriments. To date, no 
infallible remedy exists and no consensus as to which remedies are ideal and effective has been 
achieved. 
 
Jewish Law Remedies 
The remedies that are incorporated into halakha are hazmanot, seruvim, and kherem 
(explained above, and kherem elaborated at length in chapter six). These tools are built in to the 
structure of divorce law in Judaism and are meant to deter and dissuade men from abusing the 
imbalance in the law itself. The threat of an order of contempt or seruv combined with the 
impending public shaming (rallying, picketing, etcetera) that follows with kherem was thought to 
be enough to discourage men from abusing their power. Today, kherem has taken on a modern 
reincarnation in ‘E-shaming’171, using social media and globalization which serves as a powerful 
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remedy in many cases of get refusal (this thorough analysis can be found in chapter six as well). 
Along with kherem and e-shaming, Rabbinic law does permit some sanctions designed to induce 
the husband to execute a divorce and protect women although the sanctions must not be so 
severe as to constitute an overpowering of the husband’s will. The Rambam’s permission to 
‘convince’ husbands to willingly grant gets in more creative ways is seldom used outside of 
Israel (where there is no Jewish juridical autonomy). In Israel there are state-backed legal 
strategies that rely on the ruling of  ‘kofin oto’172 and the approval of a rabbinic court, such as jail 
time, revoking passports and driver’s licenses, and removing job certifications173 of recalcitrant 
husbands. 
I must note here, that while there are cases where these ancient antidotes suffice, for them 
to work, there exists the prerequisite that they actually be employed. And yet, the research 
illustrates just the opposite, making these traditional mechanisms ineffective. In fact, every 
single Torontonian mesurevet get I spoke with in conducting this research
174
 emphasized that the 
Toronto Beit Din does not follow this ancient and standard protocol which is utilized the world 
over by never issuing hazmanot and/or seruvim.  
“They had never even issued any hazmanot, and no seruvim.”175 
“This beit din is at least 50% of the problem in getting a woman her get in Toronto, and that’s a 
very modest estimate”. 176 
“The beit din refused to do anything even after calling them for more than a year”177 
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This disturbing assertion was confirmed by Rabbi Asher Vale, Director of the Toronto Beit Din 
who, at a large community event in 2012, acknowledged and defended the continued inaction of 
the court
178
. This revelation supports my contention that Toronto may be distinct when it comes 
to get refusal, moreover the inaction certainly perpetuates domestic violence, and it delegitimizes 
the power of the beit din itself.  
 
 International Beit Din 
A number of commentators (including feminist activists and rabbis) at the 2013 Agunah 
Summit suggested that an independent (alternative) international beit din, the International Beit 
din, IBD, be established (noted briefly above)
179
. This court would, once again, attempt to 
supervise divorces using historic rabbinic mechanisms, some established up to 3000 years ago. 
These mechanisms are exceedingly controversial to some, in that they have been unused for 
years by Orthodox Judaism and there has been great resistance to their reintegration to the 
mainstream Jewish legal practice by the vast majority of Orthodox and Ultra Orthodox rabbis. 
These solutions include but are not limited to: hafka’ot, kiddushei ta’ut or mekach ta’ut, get al 
t’nai/kiddushin al t’nai, or get zikui (annulments, mistaken or fraudulent marriage which are 
transactions entered into with a flawed understanding/without full disclosure or marriage 
nullification, conditional marriage, or get with the presumption of consent
180
). This new court, 
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the IBD, is reminiscent of Rabbi Emmanuel Rackman’s beit din, Beit Din L’Inyanei Agunot, 
established in 1997, which issued divorces on the basis of kiddushei ta’ut181, a Talmudic concept 
for mistaken marriage whereby a beit din declares that a woman would never have married her 
husband had she known he would act in an abusive manner during the marriage (caused by 
mental health problems, addictions, etcetera). This remedy is similar to hafka’at kiddushin, an 
approach that abrogates the marriage retroactively, annulling the kiddushim and thus obviating 
the need for a get, also found in the Talmud. Rabbi Rackman, though initially a respected 
Orthodox rabbi, faced immense criticism for his willingness to employ kiddushei ta’ut and many 
rabbis refused to officiate at the subsequent wedding of women who had been freed by 
Rackman’s ‘liberal’ beit din, some going so far as to label children born to these subsequent 
marriages, mamzerim because their mothers were indeed still considered to be married, despite 
their annulments. “I asked my rabbi what’s wrong with Rackman or this new court and he said 
Rackman was viewed as a pariah, he can’t align with this because he too would be viewed as a 
pariah and same with me”182, said one of my participants. 
Headed by Rabbis Simcha Krauss, Ronald Warburg, and Yosef Blau (three “mainstream 
modern Orthodox talmedai chachamim, or well-versed Torah scholar, with long admirable 
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records of Torah service”183) along with support from Blu Greenberg (Orthodox feminist and 
founder of JOFA, Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance) and others, the IBD has started 
adjudicating difficult cases in 2013-2014. They have ensured transparency to guarantee that 
gittin granted will be halakhic but their rulings had not been made public as of winter 2015 and 
subsequently have been “inadequate”184.The IBD focuses on the legal remedy known as get 
zikui, that is, annulling the marriage based on what is best for both parties, operating on the 
premise that divorce will benefit both wife and husband, whether he agrees or not. That said, the 
IBD will employ other legal mechanisms as well. “A number of tools can be used…each case 
will be evaluated on its own merit. The goal is to free women in a way that the decision will be 
accepted by the broader community”185. This beit din is said to also officiate at the remarriages 
of these women, attempting to avoid the fallout of the Rackman beit din, wherein the released 
women were nonetheless viewed by many rabbis as married and thus unable to marry again.  
Some social activists
186
 feel that these mechanisms, which already exist in the legal 
tradition, must be revisited and embraced as the IBD is doing, rather than relying (solely) on 
kherem, shaming, e-shaming, or even prenuptial agreements (discussed below). Yet a significant 
schism persists wherein many moderate Orthodox rabbis, and thus by extension, their 
congregations, and thus mesuravot get as well, remain skeptical, even critical of these 
‘alternative’ remedies.  Women I interviewed- including non-Orthodox -shared this sentiment, 
insisting on holding out for “the real deal, no ‘alternate’ beit din”187, insisting that there’s “no 
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point to annulment if I can’t move on within my community”188. One woman shared, “I 
considered an alternative court with an alternative remedy but my rabbis asked me ‘do you want a 
kosher get’? so I changed my mind.”189 
What is important to consider regarding the IBD is not the impact of the cases they are 
adjudicating, nor the efficacy of the controversial court, both of which are quite variegated and 
beyond the scope here. What is significant, is the court’s creation and existence which in and of 
itself indicates willingness of some rabbis to help women, continuing in the tradition of 
Rabbeinu Gershom, and others. A couple of women shared that “Rabbi Rackman’s court makes 
sense in some cases… things my husband did like drug abuse and non-support of wife as per 
ketuba should be viewed as breach of (ketuba) contract and annulments should be permitted”190; 
and “A woman should not be allowed right away, but it’s crazy that after 10, 20 years hafka’ot, 
mekach taut, or other old loopholes should still not be permitted”191. Thus some may view the 
establishment of this court, like the institution of the ketuba, the ban on unilateral divorce and 
polygamy, and countless other halakhic innovations- as attempts to level the playing field by 
giving women alternatives rather than relying on the absolute right of recalcitrant husbands to 
give a get willingly. It is also an illustration of one set of proposed remedies in contemporary 
times. 
 
State Law Remedies 
Before elaborating on the legal amendments of state law, I include here historical 
samplings or examples of this tradition- both to show the potential beauty and efficacy of legal 
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pluralist solutions and also to illustrate that these solutions are not novel or radical. On the 
contrary, the pluralist approach which sees the enmeshing, interwovenness of the legal orders is a 
customary strategy, steeped in our tradition from well-established Diasporic Jewish 
communities. 
In the 14
th
 and 15
th
 centuries, the works of Fra Angelico and Lorenzo Costa depicted 
popular images of marriage.  Historian Kenneth Stow compares them to the almost identical 
images of Jewish marriages from the same period, and through analysis, demonstrates that the 
matrimonial practices of Jews and Romans were more similar than different during this period
192
. 
Stow gives a detailed description and comparison of the marriage customs stemming from both 
the Roman as well as Jewish legal systems. He illustrates that already in the Medieval Period 
there are a number of emancipatory shifts for women regarding matrimonial arrangements both 
from within Jewish family law and state law respectively and likely reciprocally, particularly 
regarding the notion of patria potestas, a father’s right to choose his daughter’s husband, a 
popular legal rights concept which both Roman and Jewish law had embraced until this period. 
This example should signal to us, in the post-modern period, that there have been models 
throughout our history of positive integration amongst legal orders. But let us explore two more 
examples dealing with divorce from the Modern Period drive this point further. 
In late eighteenth century Trieste, Rachele Morschene, a twenty-five-year-old Jewish 
woman was attempting to divorce her husband, Lucio Luzzato
193
. Initially Morschene sought a 
civil divorce because according to the law in Trieste at the time, which was under the jurisdiction 
of the Habsburg Empire, the state court had exclusive jurisdiction for resolving marital issues for 
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all citizens (although they were ‘culturally and religiously’ sensitive)194. The Habsburg Empire 
included tolerance and recognition of confessional differences, and adjustments were made to the 
civil law which outlined civil procedure for divorce for Jews (and Protestants) since their 
religious laws permitted it
195. Consequently, “the civil-religious hybrid and the respect for 
denominational differences made the system, and Morschene’s case in particular, extremely 
complicated”196. Yet, despite the challenges, the civil court ultimately ruled in Morschene’s 
favour, asking a rabbi to declare whether the marriage was religiously dissoluble so that 
ultimately, “all the proper civil and religious steps would be taken”197. This historical example is 
effective in illustrating the tradition of entanglement of Jewish and state legal orders in matters 
of marriage and divorce. Indeed, Morschene’s legal arguments simultaneously addressed 
Habsburg and Jewish laws. The divorce proceedings in this case indicate, as H. Patrick Glenn 
notes, that the boundaries between legal orders are ambiguous and porous
198
. By allowing Jews 
to divorce because Jewish religious law permitted it, Habsburg law partially incorporated Jewish 
divorce within a civil framework. 
In a different context, a similar precedent emerged. In Imperial Russia a state- run 
Rabbinic Commission was established, composed of ‘state rabbis’ well versed in state law and 
Jewish law and there existed simultaneously non-state ‘spiritual rabbis’ with no ties to the state. 
Both types of rabbis worked together in dissolving contentious divorces and those unique to the 
Russian context. For example, what to do with a woman who becomes an aguna because her 
husband was sent to Siberian exile and his whereabouts and condition are unknown. This, like 
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the Morschene case, is similar to women refused a get in contemporary times who intentionally 
navigate and straddle both the internal, Jewish legal system and the external, official state system 
simultaneously and strategically. I highlight these brief historical examples to demonstrate that 
there has always been an interesting duality and to some degree even acceptance of multiple 
legal systems for Jews in Diasporic communities- whether the Roman Empire, Imperial Russia 
or the Habsburg Empire. Thus advocating a pluralist approach in 21
st
 century North America is 
not novel or revolutionary, it is simply perpetuating a traditional “logic of fuzziness” because in 
the real world boundaries are never sharp”199.There are also examples of contemporary proposed 
remedies to get refusal which are based in state law, or implement state and religious legal 
orders, they are legal pluralist, maintaining the tradition.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, amendments were made to the Family Law Act provincially, in 
Ontario, and the Divorce Act federally in Canada, and twice to the Domestic Relations Law in 
New York. These amendments were secular legal changes that, although state enacted, directly 
impacted and attempted to remedy siruv get by lessening a recalcitrant husband’s bargaining 
power when refusing to grant a wife her get. There are cases where invoking the amendments in 
order to aid in the giving of a get may be viewed as coercive, and thus invalid by a beit din, 
known as a get meuseh, a coerced get . This is especially true in Toronto, where the amendments 
were initially supported by beit din, but are now most often resisted by them
200
.  Nonetheless, 
willingness to use these legal pluralist get laws would support mesuravot get. 
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 New York Get Laws 
 The first New York Get Law (NYGL1), as it has come to be known, came into force in 1983 
with an amendment to the Domestic Relations Law where as the second New York Get Law 
(NYGL2) was an amendment to New York State’s equitable distribution laws in 1992201. 
NYGL1 had broad rabbinic support, including the support of the ultra Orthodox/ conservative 
group Agudath Yisrael of America. This is significant in that it indicates that the ultra Orthodox 
did not take issue with state involvement nor did they find the amendment coercive in any way, 
leading to a get meuseh. NYGL1 stipulates that when a civil divorce is sought in New York 
State, the plaintiff, the party initiating the divorce must file an affidavit stating that 'to the best of 
my knowledge all steps have been taken solely within my power to remove all barriers to the 
other party's remarriage’202. As we will see below, this is similar to the current get law in 
Canada. 
 In 1992, and as a result of the infamous Schwartz v. Schwartz case
203
, NYGL2 opened the 
door for a judge to take into account an aguna’s inability to move on with her life and remarry 
when deciding on division of assets and financial support. In the case, the mesurevet get was the 
daughter of the owner of The Jewish Press, Rabbi Sholom Klassen. The recalcitrant husband was 
a columnist. He withheld the get, attempting to exchange it for large ownership of the paper. 
After years of litigation, Justice William Rigler determined that withholding a get should be 
taken into consideration by a judge when determining support and dividing assets. In other 
words, a judge should be able to grant more support, than would be otherwise entitled and more 
than 50% of assets. Rigler’s precedent became law when New York State legislature 
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unanimously passed the NYGL2. Having a potentially harsh penalty for the refuser, NYGL2 was 
interpreted by rabbis as far more controversial than NYGL1 and did not benefit from the 
unanimous support as did its predecessor. Agudath Yisrael and other Orthodox rabbis felt the 
reach was too far, NYGL2 did constitute coercion, making the free will (of a husband) 
impossible. Thus, they sought to have the law repealed (and still do)
204
. Young Israel and the 
Orthodox Union, more moderate or ‘modern Orthodox’ factions, strongly supported the NYGL2 
at the time, but in another similarity to the Canadian scenario (to be discussed below), they since 
have distanced themselves and reneged their support of NYGL2. Agudah eventually went so far 
as to maintain that the threat of financial loss as issued by a state judge for withholding a get was 
so coercive that it negated the husband's free will and made it halakhically impossible for men to 
give a kosher get . They concluded by default that NYGL2 made it impossible for women to 
obtain a get in New York State since one must assume that all men who are faced with divorce 
may have been coerced by NYGL2’s existence on the books, so to speak205.  
 
 Canadian Get Laws 
The movement toward legislative amendments began in the 1980s with intense lobbying 
by various Jewish organizations such as the Vaad Harabonim of Toronto
206, B’nai Brith Canada, 
The Canadian Jewish Congress, Women on Get of Montreal, and was notably spearheaded by a 
few Toronto women, who inundated the Ontario government with vast amounts of mail, phone 
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calls, and visits to politicians
207
. One of these women ran an aguna hotline single-handedly out 
of her home
208
.  As well, a Get Committee was formed including members of all branches of 
Judaism
209
. The significant contributions of women, who propelled the advocacy is especially 
noteworthy in light of the critical legal approach this study embraces, which sees women as law-
makers, and sees law (both state and halakha) as arising from, belonging to, and responding to 
individuals, in this case, women.  After the lobbying efforts were concluded, “in a scant three 
months”210, and after consultation with various secular associations and leaders of “50 religious 
groups of every stripe” including all the branches of Judaism, Buddhists, Islamic groups, and 
with the specific agreements of the Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and Anglican churches, the 
Canadian government was “urged to cooperate with Orthodox rabbis so as to get a get law 
passed in Canada”211. Here too, like in New York, the Orthodox rabbinate was on board and did 
not find the language of the state to be coercive, invalidating a get that might result from the 
encroachment of state law. In 1990, the then Minister of Justice, Doug Lewis, introduced 
amendments to the Divorce Act, Bill C-61
212. At the Bill’s second reading, the Minister outlined 
some of the motivations for these amendments. He interestingly explained: 
The bill before us today is an amendment to the Divorce Act which would provide a court 
with discretionary powers to preclude a spouse from obtaining relief or proceeding under 
the Divorce Act where that spouse refuses to remove a barrier to religious remarriage 
and where the power to remove the barrier to religious remarriage lies solely with that 
person. . . 
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. . . A spouse should not be able to refuse to participate in a Jewish religious divorce — 
called a Get — in order to obtain concessions in a civil divorce.  The Get should not be 
used as a bargaining tool for child custody and access or monetary support. 
. . . I am concerned about protecting the integrity of the Divorce Act and preventing 
persons from avoiding the application of the principles contained in the act. For 
example, a wife may feel compelled to agree to custody arrangements which are not truly 
in the best interests of a couple’s child in order to obtain a Get. 
  
I want to take a few minutes to describe briefly the dilemma certain Jewish persons face 
because of their divorce procedures. …While difficult, remarriage within the Jewish faith 
for a man in the same circumstances is not impossible.. . . the government is moving 
where it can and where it is brought to the government’s attention to eliminate gender 
bias in the law. . . 
213
 
 
It is clear from Lewis’ remarks that the legislation would seek to balance the integrity of both 
halakha as well as the civil law while simultaneously implementing the civil law to aide a 
problem that occasionally arises from within halakha. A delicate balance is sought whereby state 
law simultaneously must protect women from abuses that may result from their religious 
affiliation- or their right to divorce- whilst still promoting their right to practice their religion. 
Furthermore, the amendment continues the legal pluralist tradition of a multiplicity of 
overlapping and (at times even reciprocal) legal orders. In 1991, at third and final reading of 
these amendments, Kim Campbell, who succeeded Mr. Lewis as Minister of Justice spoke about 
the need for get legislation. Campbell “confirmed the policy rationale for this legislative 
initiative”214 in her remarks affirming that: 
The purpose of this bill is to assist Jewish citizens whose spouses are withholding a 
religious divorce, which is called a get, in order to obtain concessions in a civil divorce. 
                                                                     . . . 
The consequences to women deprived of a get and loyal to their faith are severe. They 
may not remarry within their faith, even though civilly divorced…The vast majority of 
adherents to the Jewish faith condemn as unfair this practice of bargaining with the get 
yet . . . Persuasion by rabbis has often proved ineffective. Since the dispersion of the Jews 
                                                          
213
 House of Commons Debates, vol. VI, 2nd Sess., 34th Parl., February 15, 1990, at pages 8375-77. 
214
 Bruker v. Markovitz [2007] SCC 54. Docket No. 31212. Para 8. 
78 
 
there is no central Jewish authority to amend the Jewish legal code . . . which governs the 
get. Nor is there any modern-day authority within rabbinical courts to enforce the offer 
and receipt of gets. Full support for Bill C-61 was expressed by major Jewish 
organizations who attended the hearings before the legislative committee. 
Representatives of the three Parties praised the bill and quickly passed two minor 
technical amendments… As well, the Toronto Board of Orthodox Rabbis . . . endorsed 
the legislation and the two amendments. 
  
Bill C-61 will enable Canada’s Jewish community to preserve its traditions without 
destabilizing models of family life. It also ensures that the principles of the Divorce Act 
with respect to alimony and custody are applied equally to all Canadians. 
215
 
 
Minister Campbell then proclaimed, “the Get law is Canada’s gift to the Jewish people”216 and 
since it happened to be a Friday afternoon, she then concluded by wishing them a “Good 
Shabbat”217.  Indeed Campbell’s remarks were noteworthy because they highlight the exchange 
and interaction between halakha and Canadian law. Both Ministers Lewis and Campbell 
displayed a thorough understanding of the complexity of the issue and Campbell explicitly notes 
that the amendments were endorsed by the Toronto Board of Orthodox Rabbis - a key point and 
one that will be further discussed throughout the study, particularly chapters five and seven.  
The two major legal amendments enacted with the hope of remedying iggun in Canada 
were section 21.1 of Canada’s federal Divorce Act (DA) and section 2(4)-(6) of Ontario’s 
provincial Family Law Act (FLA). These legal amendments (the contents of which may be found 
in appendix G) allow the courts discretion to dismiss any matrimonial claim or a defence to any 
matrimonial claim and strike out any pleadings filed by any spouse who fails to remove all 
barriers to his or her spouse’s religious remarriage within his or her spouse’s faith within 15 days 
after receiving an affidavit requesting that he or she do so. The matrimonial claim that such a 
recalcitrant spouse could risk having dismissed across Canada, under the DA, if he (in cases of 
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siruv get where women are agunot as opposed to men, which is infrequent) refuses or fails to 
consent to a get within fifteen days may include claims for a civil divorce, spousal support, child 
support, child custody, access to children and court costs. Additionally, in Ontario, where the 
FLA applies, a recalcitrant who refuses to consent to a get can also lose the benefit of having his 
claims determined by the court in his favour if they pertain to matrimonial property rights. 
Similarly, if the recalcitrant would merely be defending a property rights claim his defence 
would also be dismissed if he refuses to provide a get thereby removing all barriers to religious 
remarriage within the allotted time
218
. The recalcitrant is no longer a party since his claim or 
defence has been dismissed and the wife - the remaining party wins by default such that there is 
no consideration whatsoever to the recalcitrant’s position or conduct219.  
As I noted above, invoking the get laws may be (and often is) viewed by rabbis and the 
Toronto Beit Din as coercive- an unkosher get meuseh. Although  the amendments were initially 
supported by beit din, numerous Torontonian women as well as Orthodox attorneys within the 
community have all affirmed that they have reneged and strongly dissuade use of the 
amendments, leaving agunot vulnerable and trapped between her religious will and her marital 
will. (My analysis as to why the beit din has changed their stance can be found in chapter seven, 
though briefly- I suspect it is largely connected to the removal of religious arbitration in Ontario 
and the beit din’s attempt to hold on to what little power remains in their control). I should note 
that often just the threat of invoking the get laws has been an effective strategy in some cases and 
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the threat alone has resulted in the issuance of a get despite the fact that the beit din precludes its 
actual use
220
. 
 
 Civil legislation alone can provide limited relief. The get laws are beneficial in that they may 
help some women some of the time. They are ‘religion-neutral’, meaning they can have a 
positive impact outside of Judaism, and they are gender neutral. They use language of “removal 
of barriers to remarriage”, not specifically stipulating a get, so other religions can (and do) make 
use of the amendments which is a fine example of (regulated) religious/legal pluralism which I 
will elaborate on in the next chapter. Yet, the amendments do have significant detriments as well. 
For example, these civil laws are useful only when there was a civil marriage and in fact many 
ultra Orthodox unions leave out this civil component, marrying halakhically only, thereby 
missing out on the potential protection from civil remedies. This is true for any jurisdiction and I 
saw this phenomenon in both Toronto and New York. There is also a significant problem with 
NYGL1- women are most always the plaintiffs. It has no leverage against a recalcitrant husband 
who is not the plaintiff, which is most if not all recalcitrant husbands in New York. Under this 
law, she can get her civil divorce, but remain without her get, which is in fact the most harmful 
for a woman being that she loses her leverage, and so the get law is largely ineffective
221
. 
Moreover, NYGL 2 is only effective when a husband has declared income or assets that can be 
garnished for the wife (which does not always occur), and looming large, the question of 
constitutionality of both the NYGLs remain and can be challenged at any point
222
.  
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In theory, get laws are a powerful tool. These state enacted legal changes directly impact 
and attempt to remedy the aguna issue by lessening a recalcitrant husband’s bargaining power 
when refusing to grant a wife her get. Nonetheless, despite much work being done, both social 
and legal, the gap between legal realities and social realities continues within Jewish 
communities, particularly Toronto. The legal remedies have not changed the social norms and 
behaviours ‘on the ground’ and in Toronto have lead to the problematic misconception that siruv 
get has been ‘solved’ by these amendments. The legal approaches have managed get refusal 
largely as an issue of religious pluralism (as a question of religious freedom and the rights of 
communities), while local communities have taken a variegated approach. To put it bluntly, 
although these amendments were initially intended to act as remedies, there are often cases 
where the amendments lead to an invalid get. Consequently, the potential success of the get 
legislation has not been an infallible solution and the issue of divorce refusal persists.  
  
 Prenuptial Agreements 
The most popular contemporary remedy to get refusal proposed to date has been 
prenuptial (and postnuptial) agreements. In the United States, the popularity of these agreements 
is at least in part due to the Avitzur v. Avitzur [1983] case wherein a civil court upheld the 
obligations under a Conservative (Jewish) marriage contract by “relying solely upon the 
application of neutral principles of contract law, without reference to any religious principle”223. 
Thus, Avitzur set the stage for couples to draft agreements regarding aspects of Jewish divorce, 
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which would be upheld by civil courts, like necessitating appearance before a rabbinical court to 
begin arbitration for a get, which is in effect precisely what prenups now necessitate. In fact, 
courts not only upheld these agreements but also found men to be in contempt, even going so far 
as to order incarceration in one case (similar to Israel) when recalcitrant husbands attempted to 
renege on their contracts
224
. It was clearly the antecedent of the modern-day prenuptial 
agreement.  
I should note that similar to the evolution of get laws in both the New York and Canadian 
contexts, the prenuptial movement (‘prenups’) also emerged, at least in part due to women’s 
demands for both their right to religion and their right to divorce. The widespread and normative 
use of prenups (particularly in the New York context) and the growing acceptance of prenups in 
other contexts has largely been precipitated by the activism and legal mobilization of women, 
both those at the helm of the aguna movement, such as Rachel Levmore and Susan Weiss, but 
also individual women (such as Stephanie Markovitz, Mrs. Avitzur, Rachel Light, and many 
others). These women, through their legal agency, gradually changed legal and social norms 
because of their legal demands and as a result of their experiences being impacted by, but also 
impacting the legal systems in which they find themselves- both state, and halakhic. 
Today, there are a variety of prenuptial agreements available, from a variety of 
denominations including perhaps the most widely accepted, Halakhic Prenuptial Agreement 
(HPA). The HPA is a binding arbitration agreement endorsed by the Rabbinic Council of 
America (RCA) and Beth Din of America (BDA) respectively
225
, and was created by the BDA 
back in 1993. The RCA passed motions in 1993 and 1998 encouraging the use of prenups 
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although it has only gained real traction in the last number of years. In 2006, the RCA passed a 
resolution declaring that rabbis should not officiate at a wedding where a proper prenuptial 
agreement has not been executed
226
. In fact, up to 33 percent of RCA members said they refuse 
to officiate weddings unless a prenuptial agreement was signed
227
. Most recently, in September 
2016, the RCA came out with its strongest mandate yet, requiring “each of its members [to] 
utilize, in any wedding at which he is the officiant (mesader kiddushin), in addition to a ketuba, a 
rabbinically-sanctioned prenuptial agreement, where available, that aids in our community's 
efforts to ensure the timely and unconditional issuance of a get”228. In Israel too, the Agreement 
for Mutual Respect or Heskem L’Kavod Hadadi created by Dr. Rachel Levmore and a new 
version of the prenuptial agreement created by the modern Orthodox group Tzohar in 
conjunction with the Israeli Bar Association, which meets both rabbinical requirements and 
demands of the Israeli court system, are both endorsed by many halakhic authorities and gaining 
traction. In the United States, Rabbi Dr. Michael Broyde has also authored the Tripartite 
Agreement which while potentially very effective, and likely the agreement of the future 
(according to Jeremy Stern), is too controversial for mainstream Orthodoxy at this point and 
Broyde himself has clearly asserted, it is “shelo l’halakha”, or not to be taken seriously as 
halakha or halakhically permissible at this time.
229
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The RCA prenup is an agreement signed before the marriage wherein a couple accepts 
binding arbitration regarding the get and occasionally other matters arising from divorce (such as 
division of property, child support and custody, etcetera), by a specific, named beit din, most 
often a member court of the umbrella organization, the BDA
230
. In the contract, the husband 
assumes liability for support payments to the wife from the date of separation until the 
termination of the marriage by the issuance of a get, as per the ketuba requirement for a husband 
to ‘maintain’ his wife, make parnasa or earn a living. The wife loses her right to the continued 
maintenance if she is the one who refuses to appear before beit din when summoned or if she 
refuses to accept the get once issued, in essence making the prenuptial agreement gender neutral 
to some degree. The current version of the prenup has the maintenance payment set at $150 per 
day, though this rate may be negotiated and adjusted for inflation. This would amount to $55,000 
per annum and it cannot be offset by a wife’s assets or earnings. What is further noteworthy 
about the prenup is that the payment is framed deliberately as maintenance, in line with a prior 
ketuba obligation, rather than a penalty for not issuing a get. This is significant because, if the 
payment would be framed as a penalty for not issuing a get, the get would then be meuseh, 
coerced or given under duress, thus making it invalid. This is an important distinction and 
despite being framed in this way, this is often the single reason some rabbis approve or 
disapprove of the use of prenups.
231
 
 In 2012, a state court officially affirmed the constitutionality of the halakhic prenup in a 
Connecticut judge’s ruling that the mesurevet get in Light v. Light, Rachel Light, was eligible to 
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demand more than $100,000 from her husband under the terms of their halakhic prenup, which 
had stipulated that her husband Eben Light, had to pay $100 (maintenance) for each day the 
couple remained married
232
.  The husband was never asked to grant the get, or even to appear at 
beit din, she asked only for the maintenance payment or daily damages which were set in the 
prenup. “The husband had objected, arguing that enforcing the prenup would violate the First 
Amendment prohibition against judicial entanglement in religion, in violation of the 
Establishment Clause”233. However, the court saw it differently and found that the prenup could 
be upheld using the neutral principles of Connecticut contract law, requiring no religious belief 
or observance on the part of the court, or the husband. This decision was seen as a victory for 
women, get refusal activists, and the RCA and BDA composed of rabbis, all of whom were 
reassured that the prenuptial agreements were in fact enforceable in civil courts
234
.  The ruling 
also touched on the comments of one of my participants, who said, “Men may not be afraid of 
rabbis, but they are afraid of courts and so a prenuptial agreement is the best solution 
available”235.  
Related to the prenuptial agreement movement, some lawyers and advocates have 
recommended suing for damages in civil court, which has worked in a variety of jurisdictions. 
For example, and similar to the Light case, in the 2007 Canadian Supreme Court case, Bruker v. 
Marcovitz, Justice Rosalie Abella for the majority insisted the Court was not wading into in the 
“religious thicket” in their decision to award Stephanie Bruker $47,500 in damages for Jason 
Marcovitz’s breach of contract despite the breach having to do with a religious undertaking 
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(giving the get)
236
. In their separation agreement, he had agreed to give his wife a get upon 
finalizing their civil divorce, yet 15 years later, he had not done so. Though the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision did not compel Marcovitz to grant a get (and in fact, he had done so well 
before the ruling came down), the decision was nonetheless touted as a victory for get refusal 
activists. Furthermore, already in 2001, Susan Weiss of the Center for Women’s Justice began 
suing husbands in civil courts for damages in tort suits in Israel. In 2004, she won her first award 
for approximately $125,000, “reflecting that get withholding constitutes actual damages”237. 
The success of the tested, contracts, primarily the Halakhic Prenuptial Agreement, which 
has been upheld in civil court as justiciable, has made it a viable, legal pluralist remedy, being 
accepted in both the religious and state realms alike
238
. Nonetheless, prenuptial agreements are 
precluded in the largest Jewish community in Canada, Toronto. In fact, the reason the existing 
prenuptial agreements are precluded in Toronto is twofold. They are disallowed due to legal and 
hashkafic (religious- halakhic worldview) reasons. To clarify the legal reason, in 2003, Syed 
Mumtaz Ali announced on that The Islamic Institute of Civil Justice would start offering 
arbitration which met both Islamic and Canadian law standards
239
. A heated debate ensued due to 
a moral panic that arose regarding Sharia law and perceived honour killings and because some 
groups such as the Canadian Council of Muslim Women and International Campaign against 
Sharia Court in Canada led by Iranian feminist Homa Arjmand expressed concern for women’s 
rights under the existing faith based arbitration regimes
240
. “The question of whether religious 
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arbitration ought to be accommodated was broached indirectly through the more general issue of 
how multiculturalism prioritized the distinctive values held by different Canadian religious 
groups”241. Indeed, as I argued above, in the end, the reason for the ban was largely due to a 
moral panic around Sharia law generally, and ‘honour killings’ in particular242. Despite the 
former attorney general Marion Boyd’s recommendation in her report, Dispute Resolution in 
Family law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion, not to ban religious arbitration for 
numerous reasons, including protecting women from inequalities they may face in navigating 
conflicting rights- like their rights to divorce and religion
243
- the Ontario government on 
direction of Liberal Premier, Dalton McGuinty, nonetheless passed an amendment to the 1991 
Ontario Arbitration Act on September 11,  2005
244
. In February 2006, the provincial Parliament 
passed the amendment to the 1991 Arbitration Act, excluding arbitration based on Jewish (and 
all other religious) principles
245
.  
The character of the public debate in Ontario and beyond meant that no sustained 
discussion or description of the principles of Sharia or the role and importance of 
religious arbitration to devout Muslims (or any other religious group, including Jews) 
occurred in the public debate or in the Boyd Report […] this kind of discussion did not fit 
the primary terms of the debate, about the nature and limits of multicultural principles
246
. 
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This ban essentially went ahead with the goal to contain the threat of religion (and despite the 
entrenched multicultural policies)
247
. Thus, legally, the halakhic prenuptial agreements are not 
viable because they necessitate arbitration and, due to the ban on “foreign laws”248 or the 
removal of religious arbitration for family law matters in Ontario, the prenuptial agreements are 
impracticable. (Canadian courts will also not permit monetary sums such as those set up in the 
prenup, to be enforced by rabbis or rabbinic courts). Additionally, (and even if the matter of 
arbitration was moot) rabbis and the beit din of Toronto would have to support the initiative 
hashkafically. Currently, some of Toronto rabbis and the beit din do not, in principle, support 
prenuptial agreements, viewing them as a coercive tool and a subject inappropriate at a time of 
marriage (planning for divorce before marriage)
249
, despite the fact that leading rabbinic figures 
in New York and Israel have supported prenuptial agreements, including some rabbinic figures 
who are considered kharedi, or ultra-Orthodox
250
. Yet, rabbi Shochet, of the Toronto Beit Din, 
was quoted saying, “the last thing couples want to hear about when getting married is about a 
divorce…it’s one of the solutions we don’t use in Toronto for technical reasons as well as certain 
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hashkafic reasons according to some rabbis”251. He also noted that prenuptial agreements are 
redundant because we have ketubot which already are a written requirement that a husband 
support his wife and it is enforced in Jewish religious court, not secular court, though Shochet 
fails to acknowledge that the beit din never enforces the ketuba maintenance payment in cases of 
get refusal and a beit din has little enforceability in a secular framework. He also fails to 
acknowledge that per Canadian law, a ketuba is not considered a neutral contract and is not 
justiciable in civil courts
252
. In fact, this is precisely part of the motivation for the creative use of 
prenuptial agreements.  
Rabbi Michael Whitman of Montreal recently proposed a prenuptial agreement which he 
claims bypasses the legal challenges raised above (Appendix H). His document is said not to be 
an arbitration agreement, though it looks and acts like one, and there are no financial payments 
(of maintenance) attached. It does include a provision requiring the couple to each get 
independent legal and rabbinic advice. Yet, without the essential financial inducement imposing 
the maintenance obligation, some feel the prenup is “toothless”253. The document also directs 
Canadian couples, to the BDA, to adjudicate disputes and maintains that the parties comply with 
its orders. It does not refer Canadians to a Canadian rabbinic tribunal, bypassing them altogether, 
which would pose challenges for local communities- both its laypeople, and its rabbinic 
leadership. Whitman says, “the prenup would function by a Canadian court being asked to look 
at a legally-binding document that obliges the parties to appear before the Beth Din of America, 
or another rabbinic court that the BDA designates, for the purpose of following the direction of 
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that beit din concerning giving/receiving a get [religious divorce] only”254. Whitman has said 
there are legal endorsements (including one from a Supreme Court Justice) and halakhic 
endorsements, but unfortunately, neither has been made public to allay legitimate concerns, 
raising significant questions regarding the utility of his noteworthy efforts.  
Furthermore, in addition to the legal challenges, the Canadian prenup is still faced with 
considerable hashkafic challenge. To clarify, the local rabbinate in Toronto would have to ‘get 
on board’ for any prenuptial remedy to be viable, and they simply are not. Rabbi Shochet from 
the Toronto Beit Din has also recently said on record, “The prenup is not acceptable. I don’t 
think it will pass the beit din of Toronto or of Montreal. In my opinion, it’s not correct. There are 
positions stated there that are not halakhically correct…This is a discussion for rabbis and 
rabbinic discussions do not have a place in newspapers”255. This is the official stance of the 
Toronto Beit Din despite the successes of prenuptial agreements elsewhere. Thus I argue, “until a 
civil court rules on the prenup’s validity and a rabbinic court endorses it, it is unclear whether it’s 
enforceable or effective although on its face, it is important that this document exists, whether it 
is legally valid or not. It creates a social movement, a social conversation”256. Again in 2017, the 
Canadian Jewish News asked me to set the record straight on the potential validity and 
effectiveness of Whitman’s Canadian prenuptial agreement and I reiterated the arguments I make 
here; while an important step to raise social consciousness, we must be wary when claims are 
made that this remedy will protect women if faced with divorce refusal
257
 (which is precisely the 
claim Whitman makes).
258
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I must note that there are some mixed reviews about the effectiveness of prenuptial 
agreements in remedying get refusal even outside Toronto. At the most basic level, it only works 
if you use it and there are not enough people who are signing these contracts at the beginning of 
their marriages. Progress is slow and incremental, and cannot work in existing cases of get 
refusal (although postnups are available in some jurisdictions). Some see prenups as the best 
solution available, effective in the vast majority of cases and comparing it to inoculation. Just as 
inoculation is only effective when the majority of people do it, the more who do it, the more will 
be spared from the danger of the disease, so too, the more who sign halakhic prenups, the more 
will be safe from the abuse of get refusal. While most of the women who participated in this 
study had not signed prenups, most affirmed, “I would insist that my children sign a prenuptial 
agreement”; “Will I get the prenuptial agreement if I ever get married again? Definitely! And I 
wouldn’t let my daughter get married without one!”; “My children will 100% sign a prenuptial 
agreement”259. ORA and the BDA go so far as to say that the halakhic prenup is 100% effective 
when it is signed properly, and in such cases, a get is granted unconditionally and in a timely 
fashion (six months or less)
260
. On the converse, it certainly has its critics
261
 claiming that some 
of the prenups do not empower or protect women enough, and indeed very often women end up 
forgoing their financial rewards in exchange for a get
262
 when in fact they should be keeping the 
financial settlements which they often need to survive and accept the get. There is also a critique 
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that prenups continue to empower men and rabbinic courts, among other claims. Indeed even 
Rabbi Shlomo Weissmann, director of the BDA acknowledges that he does not believe the 
“halakhic prenup solves all of our problems. There is still room for abuse, by women or men 
with a halakhic prenup, although instead of hundreds of agunot we would be down to dozens”263. 
Indeed the reliance on and shift toward prenups as the solution to get refusal is not foolproof. An 
abusive husband could perpetuate his wife’s suffering for $150 a day without any consequence, 
should he have the desire and means to do so. And yet, despite the flaws with the shift toward 
prenups, my primary research comes down on the side of ‘it is better to embrace prenups than 
ignore or avoid them’. In fact, women echoed the sentiment throughout my interviews, saying 
things such as, “prenuptial agreements are a must- they have to be as natural as ketuba”264; 
“prenuptial agreements have to be like genetic testing; it needs to be a safety requirement we all 
just have to do”265. 
The bottom line is, the prenup movement further illustrates the innovative willingness of 
some rabbis to embrace solutions, at times even legal pluralist ones, to attempt to help protect 
women from husbands who may abuse halakha. The use of prenups is a way to navigate the state 
legal system to empower religious communities to achieve results which balance a woman’s 
right to divorce and her right to religion without abuse. One woman explicitly noted that the 
“prenuptial agreement was enormously helpful; it put beit din into action”266. Indeed for 
prenuptial agreements to be a viable solution in Toronto, it is the beit din and the local rabbis 
who would have to change their stance and support this remedy. Individual rabbis would have to 
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encourage couples to sign prenuptial agreements at each wedding over which they preside. This 
approach would include insisting the agreement be read or displayed at weddings – just like the 
ketuba, and most significantly, rabbis not officiating at weddings where couples refuse to sign a 
prenuptial agreement. 
 
So What? 
I argue that changes to legal orders (state or religious), while in principle symbolizing 
positive steps toward pluralist remedies, in reality do not always elicit the intended result. In 
other words, despite the best efforts of activists and legal scholars- state legal and halakhic 
innovators alike- changes to the state and halakhic legal systems, including to some extent the 
adaptation of prenuptial agreements, has not resulted in the eradication of get refusal, although 
there are marked differences between New York and Toronto, which I began to highlight in this 
chapter and which I will further explore herein. On the contrary, the phenomenon continuously 
persists and recalcitrance has developed into a valid negotiating tactic to extract civil concessions 
from abused women. Neither the state civil amendments nor the proposed alternative remedies 
accepted in some Jewish communities have suppressed it. This classic socio-legal quandary, that 
is- a deep and persistent gap between legal regulation and social behaviour, as well as distinct 
resistance in Toronto- impacts mesuravot get in a myriad of previously unrecognized and 
silenced ways. As Sally Falk Moore notes: 
Innovative legislation and other attempts to direct change often fail to achieve their 
intended purposes; and even when they succeed wholly or partially, they frequently carry 
with them unplanned or unexpected consequences. This is partly because new laws are 
thrust upon ongoing social arrangements in which there are complexes of binding 
obligations already in existence
267
. 
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Indeed, there are unplanned, unexpected consequences that have emerged from the well-
intentioned remedies proposed this far. To name a few: batei din and at times individual rabbis 
have appeared to be unjust by enabling individual men to take advantage of an oft banal legal 
asymmetry; batei din have had to struggle for autonomy in the face of foreign law bans, and 
individually and collectively Jewish women have been silenced. The suppressing has dovetailed 
into the concealment of significant domestic abuse, and get refusal’s interdenominational impact 
has been overlooked. I maintain that the gaps between law reform and social behaviour persist 
and that the consequences, or socio-legal impacts, result in an undue onus on women, despite the 
distinctions between New York and Toronto, which I tease out throughout the progression of this 
analysis. In the course of my investigation of a range of entanglements, drawing heavily on the 
narratives of the women themselves, I conclude that a layered approach taking multiple 
discourses into account is ideal. Thus, there have to be multiple options available to women, a 
grab-bag of remedies at their disposal in order to ensure their right to religion without abuse and 
their right to divorce without abuse both remain intact. There cannot be just one approach, for 
that contributes only to sustained failures.  
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Chapter Three - Contextualizing: State Law and Socio-Legal Approaches   
We were married just a few years when he started to go to a lot of appointments and never let me 
go along with him. We were desperately trying to have kids and I also kept going to doctor’s 
appointments and for tests, but I kept checking out to be okay. Years later I found out he had 
testicular cancer, but he never told me. He led me to believe his doctors said he was also healthy 
and that it was not his fault we couldn’t have kids. 
 
The marriage deteriorated over the course of many years. And finally my friends intervened and 
told me I had to leave. It was an abusive marriage. I remember being petrified when I snuck into 
the house knowing it was the last time I would be there. I only wanted my candlesticks and I 
remember feeling like I barely got out with those. 
 
I was refused a get for 10 years after a long, abusive marriage. But what finally broke him? I’ll 
tell you. A few of my friends flew in some rabbis from New York and took my husband for a drive 
for a few days. They hiked up some mountains and on the high peaks he was finally convinced to 
write the get, which they did, right there on the mountain but only on condition that they would 
include in the standard text that the reason for the divorce was because I didn’t bear him any 
children.  
 
When the get was later delivered into my hand and when the beit din cut an ‘X’ into our ketuba I 
was hysterical, even though I wanted the get so badly. Some people say the procedure is 
demeaning, but that’s totally contrary to my experience. I felt much more connected, and that the 
ceremony was much more meaningful than my chuppa, years earlier. 
 
Do you know what it’s like to live as an aguna? 
I was young. I wanted children. I wanted a family.  
I was married 18 years. I was an aguna for 10 years. It took me 7 years until I found somebody 
new.  
Those were the best years of my life. He took the best years of my life. I took the blame. 
 
 ~~~ 
My husband, Naftali and I got married a little bit later in life, in our 30s and we couldn’t have 
children. Nonetheless, we had a great life together. We loved each other, we travelled… 
Then, one day, my husband, Naftali collapsed, on April 24
th
, 2010, for unknown reasons. 
He quickly fell into a coma and I was completely beside myself at his bedside. 
Eventually, my husband died. It was devastating. He was so young, and we were so in love. I still 
can’t remove my wedding ring. 
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My brother in law is a real estate lawyer for province of Ontario. He is very well-connected and 
also well-known and well-liked in his community. He has a large family of his own. 
However, when it was time to complete the chalitza ceremony, he refused. He wanted everything 
my husband left behind in exchange for going through with the ceremony. To his mind, because I 
didn’t merit to have children with his brother, technically there were no heirs and he felt he 
deserved everything, and that I should be left with nothing. I have been in this limbo stage, a 
quasi-aguna, who loved her husband and is being held hostage by her brother-in-law for a few 
years now. 
The rabbi from his shul in Toronto did give him an aliya although I think the rabbi was pushed 
to choose between his job and my brother-in-law and so the rabbi chose…  It’s a social thing, 
it’s not a factual thing, everyone just cares about their reputation, everyone’s pride matters 
more. 
Another big Toronto rabbi recently told me, “oh this is still going on, I thought it was taken care 
of already”. 
I’ve already learned it’s all about money. When a couple of friends arranged for flyers to be put 
in mailboxes in my brother-in-law’s area in Toronto publicizing the cherem he was put in by my 
rabbis in New York, I got death threat saying, “a bullet is cheaper than chalitza” implying it 
would cost my brother-in-law less to have me killed than to simply go through the chalitza 
ceremony. 
I was really my own advocate both in beit din and civil. But that said, I firmly believe, it’s NOT 
the Torah that’s the issue, it’s the people. 
 
These narratives, by mesuravot get from Toronto and New York, are the results of the 
first interviews I conducted in each location. They are also exceptional in distinct ways, with one 
obtaining a get in unusual circumstances by an abusive spouse and one refused a get in unusual 
circumstances, while still in love with her spouse, qualifying as a yevama. Although the 
narratives demonstrate, similar to all the narratives that follow, that women are more than 
passive captives awaiting to be freed by their captors, to use the language of the prayer that 
opened this study, they nonetheless highlight the extent to which women may be tied down due 
to their legal, religious, and social obligations and their own personal desires for the get.  
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As well, each narrative illustrates the degree to which women take religion seriously, 
setting the stage for legal approaches to remedy get refusal which tend also to take religion 
seriously such as legal pluralism, described in the coming chapter. Perhaps most significantly, 
and although the narratives may not explicitly indicate women’s strength or their roles as legal 
innovators or mobilizers, in reality each of these women, in fact affects and is affected by law. 
Their narratives reflect how law has treated them, and how they treat law, reflecting a critical 
legal pluralist approach which is introduced in this chapter and upon which I build throughout 
this study by respecting women’s choices, values, and legal demands. 
These narratives also signal a number of the emerging issues that arise and are elucidated 
throughout the analysis. For example, the diversity of women refused a get; one of the women is 
younger, one is older, one married a short time, without children, another married many years 
with a number of children. Furthermore, these narratives signal the complex roles of pride, 
shame, communal politics, and connections.  
 
 
In this chapter I consider questions about the dynamic relationship between law and 
religion which will shape my analysis regarding the extent to which legal regulation impacts 
religious social norms and the extent to which religious social norms influence legal regulation in 
the case of Jewish divorce in Toronto and New York. Here I will divide my examination into two 
sections. First, I will review legal pluralism as an approach to religion in public life (and as 
opposed to a tension in the broader field of socio-legal studies which, at times, does not 
adequately account for religion as a legal, normative order and identity). I come to argue that in 
shifting the field’s understanding of religion by considering legal pluralism- which does takes 
religion seriously as a valid iteration of identity and parallel legal system- the tensions may be 
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abated, enriching our understanding of law and religion in socio-legal studies. In particular, I 
build on critical legal pluralism, emerging from the work of Roderick MacDonald and Pascale 
Fournier allowing space for consideration of gender and religion and understanding individual 
women, in this case, mesuravot get, as active legal agents shaping and influencing legal and 
social norms as part of a dynamic relationship between individuals and law. Subsequently, I will 
review the existing literature on get refusal, focusing on the most recent studies and debates and 
their (emerging) themes and contributions. Although not all the studies are expressly socio-legal, 
they each offer an analysis of a problem such as this at the nexus of law, religion and gender in 
noteworthy and diverse ways. For example, I include a review of John Syrtash’s discussions of 
public policy in 1992, which served as the first analysis of the Canadian get laws. More 
contemporary studies such as those by Susan Weiss and Pascale Fournier introduce feminist and 
qualitative approaches that add depth and geographic breadth to studies in different geographic 
contexts. Examining these and other research contributions will elucidate my point of entry to 
the existing discourses and how I will bring together diverse literatures and approaches. I will 
argue for the importance of a culturally nuanced, socio-legal, religious-feminist approach which 
builds on and extends the existing debates. 
 
How I Come to Legal Pluralism 
Tensions between religion and law persist in today’s societies268. Consequently, 
understanding that get refusal stems from a complex set of factors, would help to challenge the 
notion that get refusal indicates an incompatibility between Judaism and civil law or the state 
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more broadly
269
. The set of factors which contribute to the persistence of get refusal may include 
religious norms, their interpretation by some rabbis, women’s desire to have proper religious 
divorce, as well as individual abusive men manipulating religion and taking advantage of a 
particular (often banal) legal asymmetry and thus also factors that are external, or outside the 
religion. Unfortunately, these nuanced factors are not often taken into account when considering 
the state’s role in attempting to manage get refusal and the phenomenon persists (despite 
approaches taken by the state to date as well as internal remedies). While I would be wary to 
label the Divorce Act solely as an example of the state’s ‘management’ of religion, being that the 
get amendments stemmed from internal communal advocacy, I nonetheless argue that the 
persistence of get refusal must not enable the myth that religion itself and Judaism in particular, 
are barbaric or abusive to women and thus must be contained
270
. On the contrary, my position 
attempts not to demonize religion and religious communities while simultaneously respecting the 
choices of women
271
 and I argue legal pluralist approaches support this view. 
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Finding an approach which would echo the respect and legitimacy given to religious 
norms became imperative because the women in this study indicated in their narratives that they 
take religion seriously in their quest for a get even when they are not concerned about other 
(Orthodox) religious norms, practices or obligations. Moreover, forcing individuals (women 
quite often, being that issues such as get refusal or veiling are gendered and impact women to a 
greater extent,) to abandon religion should not be considered a viable solution
272
. This conflict 
goes to the core of my argument regarding women’s right to choose when navigating between 
their right to religion and their right to divorce (which I elaborate on throughout this study). 
Essentially, the abandonment or the casting out of religion is not a realistic or practical remedy 
for many women experiencing get refusal nor one that respects religious rights but as I will 
illustrate below, a legal pluralist approach gives space for taking religion seriously as a 
normative framework, and thus also enables women to assert themselves. Shauna Van Praagh 
and Pascale Fournier both echo this sentiment, arguing that society ought to abandon the 
secularist conception of the ‘religious community’ as an association that members join and quit 
at will. They argue for the law’s need to acknowledge “religious subjects’ multiple webs of 
identity and belonging…across multiple spatial layers of identity”273, which is completely in-line 
with legal pluralist understandings of society being comprised of plural, layered or messy webs 
of normative orderings. To give but two examples, overlap occurs within legal systems as law of 
one system are invoked in the context of a different legal system’s proceedings (such as the 
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requirement for the removal of religious barriers to remarriage in the NYGL and Divorce Act) 
and overlap also occurs within individuals’ understandings and identities, as the laws of one 
legal system may be interpreted through the lens of another (such as rabbis’ understandings of 
prenuptial agreements as a civil/ stare tool strengthening their authority and/or even juridical 
autonomy of batei din). 
Nonetheless, the tension regarding how to manage religion and religious 
marriage/divorce in state/secular law and society
274
, which is compounded by the critique that 
some aspects of particular religions’ laws may be viewed as human rights violations by Canadian 
law and by legal scholars and advocates
275
, has led to a variety of approaches to ‘manage’ 
difference (only some of which have been successful based on recurrence of tensions). Thus 
embracing legal pluralist solutions which might seek more holistic and integrative approaches 
and which would potentially give women both a voice and a remedy to get refusal have not been 
embraced to date. That said, in the tradition of legal pluralist approaches (contrary to common 
multicultural approaches,) there is acknowledgement of overlapping religious and secular/state 
normative systems and a plurality or multiplicity of legal orders is embraced. Although both 
multiculturalism and legal pluralism attempt to integrate the rich social sphere in which cultures 
and religions overlap, neither approach really demands any particular policy outcome. It is really 
up to scholars and policy makers to navigate and integrate laws and legal systems and choose 
between them. The Divorce Act reform and the Bruker case (both discussed in chapter two) were 
legally plural remedies to a problem and the Arbitration Act reform was another response
276
.  To 
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be clear, in this study I am using legal pluralism as a socio-legal method, as a description of the 
reality in Toronto and New York “which points to a plurality of law –state and non-state- that 
actually exists within a unified domain such as civil state and religious law”277, and also as a 
policy approach which is an appropriate response to religion in the public sphere and which 
supports women’s choices. At a prescriptive level I thus contend, in-line with Suzanne Last 
Stone’s approach, that, “sovereignty can be located in non-state legal actors which the state 
defers to and recognizes, challenging the idea that ‘law is and should be the law of the state 
administered by a single set of institutions”278. In the following section I will delve deeper in to 
legal pluralism as one approach to religion. 
 
Socio-Legal Literatures: Legal Pluralist Approaches to Religion in Public Life 
Partly due to the historical tradition of commensurability between Jewish and state law 
which I established in chapter two, but also due to legal pluralism’s utility in providing nuance 
and inclusiveness to analyses regarding religion (including religious legal systems, religious 
communities, and religious women), legal pluralism is a fitting method of inquiry that acts as an 
illuminating lens through which to view the issue of iggun. John Griffiths and Sally Engle Merry 
engage in a discourse about the definition(s) and understanding(s) of legal pluralism, and how it 
works as a field of study. Griffiths makes an important contention:  
Lawyers, but also social scientists, have suffered from a chronic inability to see that the 
legal reality of the modern state is not at all that of the tidy, consistent, organized ideal so 
nicely captured in the common identification of law and the legal system, but that the 
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legal reality is rather an unsystematic collage of inconsistent and overlapping parts, 
lending itself to no easy legal interpretation…279 (Emphasis added) 
 
In other words, Griffiths is arguing that in order to get an accurate and holistic depiction of legal 
pluralism as a field of study, it is essential to understand that legal realities are indeed a messy, 
overlapping, collage of legal systems and this is reaffirmed by Werner Menski and others
280
. In 
fact Menski contends that that whether we like it or not, unofficial law (such as religious law) 
will operate regardless of what civil law dictates and some individuals will always feel bound by 
that, and my research reflects this point
281
. Moreover, the contention that legal realities are messy 
and overlapping is reflected significantly in contemporary times and particularly, in the chaotic 
collages of inconsistencies that emerge around the intersections between law and religion, such 
as this case study about get refusal. While Griffiths imagines multiple legal realities or systems 
to be overlapping, Merry uses the term ‘ordering’ with the purpose of calling attention to the 
intricacies of legal pluralism. Merry contends, “viewing situations as legally plural leads to an 
examination of … systems of normative ordering”282. This examination is vital to understanding 
how legal pluralism works as a field of study in that it highlights, “competing, contesting, and 
sometimes contradictory orders…”283 or legal systems. At its core, its central claim is that state 
law is not the only form of law that orders and gives meaning to life and indeed there is a 
dynamic aspect to legal pluralism wherein “coexisting but distinct legal orders continually 
penetrate and redefine one another”284. Consequently, it becomes clear that to Merry, legal 
                                                          
279
 John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” Journal of Legal Pluralism 24, (1986):1-56, 4. 
280
 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 115. 
281
 Werner Menski, “Ancient and Modern Boundary Crossings between Personal Laws and Civil Law in Composite 
India” in Marriage and Divorce in a Multi-Cultural Context: Considering the Boundaries of Civil Law and 
Religion, ed. Joel A. Nichols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 222. 
282
 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law and Society Review 22, (1988):869-896, 889. 
283
 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism”, 889. 
284
 Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class Americans 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 35. 
104 
 
pluralism is where two or more legal systems coexist within the same social field
285
 and their 
coexistence may have tensions rather than solely harmony, a characteristic descriptive of get 
refusal’s persistence, particularly in ‘secular’ democracies (outside of Israel). 
Both Griffiths and Merry note that legal pluralism has to do with multiplicity of legal 
systems within a social field - whether collaged and overlapping, or ordered, and whether 
religious/cultural, or secular/neutral. As a result, it is imperative to acknowledge the early work 
of Sally Falk Moore which preceded both Griffiths’ and Merry’s pieces on legal pluralism as a 
field of study by more than a dozen years. In her piece, Moore illustrates how the concept of the 
‘semi-autonomous social field’ is a way of defining a research problem- namely, that of how to 
study legal pluralism
286. Indeed Moore’s work remains so pivotal that it is widely used and 
adapted. Thus it is also a useful tool in this context, examining the complexity of the aguna issue 
as one at the crossroads between internal, halakha/Jewish law and external, state law. Moore 
states, “it is in these spaces where state enforceable law becomes opposed to the binding rules 
and customs generated in a social field and where the complex social field is to a large extent 
self-regulating, self-enforcing, and self-propelling within a certain legal, political, economic 
environment”287. This opposition precisely reflects this case study, examining the persistence and 
effects of get refusal in legally plural contexts (including both the productive, such as the 
establishment of get laws, and the destructive, such as batei din preventing their utility).  
In the ethnographic works of Jessica Fourneret and Susan Hirsch, both conduct a 
qualitative study using legal pluralism. The salient feature of these studies is the tug of war 
between religious and state/secular law, which ultimately highlights the negotiation and 
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navigation of individual female agency within a legally plural framework
288.  Fourneret’s piece 
discusses the school system in France at the time of Chirac’s Elysee Palace speech that enacted a 
law prohibiting public school students from wearing clothing and insignia that ‘openly manifest 
a religious affiliation’, including foremost female Muslim students wearing the hijab289. In her 
piece, Fourneret mentions one girl who exemplifies the balancing act of agency and conformity, 
but also of secular and religious law. A girl “shaved her head in order to avoid making a decision 
about which law to obey. She said, ‘I will respect both French law and Muslim law by taking off 
what I have on my head and not showing my hair”290 thereby navigating her way through the 
plural legal field as a female agent. Likewise, although in a very different context, Hirsch’s book 
highlights an almost parallel example in Kenya where “women’s use of Khadi’s Court 
constitutes an ambiguous form of (individual) resistance to male domination in Swahili 
society”291. Hirsch Illustrates, that women actively forum shop and through this and the way they 
narrate their own stories told in qadi courts
292
, they thereby challenge misconceptions of Muslim 
women as powerless, silent victims upon whom husbands simply pronounce divorce. Adapting 
this type of pluralist analysis enables the stretching of existing literatures to treat religion 
seriously as a valid legal system, as a valid iteration of identity, and it incorporates the 
complexities and experiences of Jewish female agunot navigating their way through a tug of war 
between agency and conformity and between religious and state/secular law, as my own 
qualitative data illustrates. Thus these studies, in addition to the theoretical texts of earlier legal 
                                                          
288
 These are two of many studies that achieve this important analytical nuance. 
Jessica Fourneret, “France: Banning Legal Pluralism by Passing a Law,” Hastings International and Comparative 
Law Review 29, no. 2 (2006):233-249, 242-244; Susan Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and the 
Discourses of Disputing in an African Islamic Court (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 115, 109. 
289
 Jessica Fourneret, “France: Banning Legal Pluralism by Passing a Law”, 233- 234.  
290
 Ibid, 244. 
291
 Susan Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering, 115. 
292
 Known as the ‘judge’s court’ of Islamic/Sharia law, similar to rabbinic court. 
106 
 
pluralist scholars, also indicate the benefit of framing get refusal and this study within the legal 
pluralist field. 
Thus, to reiterate, a legal pluralist approach is one where the method of inquiry and 
analysis are focused on overlapping normative orders in specific social fields
293
, and in the case 
of siruv get those would be the state and religious legal systems. In fact, when we embrace legal 
pluralism, we should not “automatically think in hierarchical ways about the outside law of the 
state as superior and sovereign to the inside law…rather, we think more in horizontal ways. We 
think about inside law being placed alongside outside law, and we then consider what kids of 
relationships there should be between the two legal systems”294. This pluralism would result in 
mutually constitutive and reciprocal interactions
295
 between law and religion, continuing the 
tradition elaborated in the previous chapter. Although in Canada “with the policy of 
accommodation, it seems religion is subservient to the outside law of the state rather than a 
legitimate legal system, making jurisdictional claims on its members”296 pluralism ought to be 
embraced. Instead of clinging to failed multicultural techniques, framing siruv get from a legal 
pluralist perspective might enable a cross cultural encounter with a diversity of remedies at hand 
to alleviate abusive instances that take advantage of a halakhic asymmetry
297
. Indeed this 
(remedial) approach would allow space not only for legal pluralist approaches but for communal, 
grassroots approaches as well. In essence a legal pluralist approach would open the field to a 
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‘grab-bag’ of potential remedies so women can have options and make unrestricted choices 
appropriate for themselves and their families. That said, there is a strong critique of the pluralist 
approach from within Judaism with some stating that the best and lasting solution for mesuravot 
get must come internally, from within Jewish law/halakha
298
. The reason for this is simple. 
While halakhic solutions are international and available to all Jewish women across time and 
space, some believe that the pluralist approaches may only provide solutions for some Jewish 
women within particular geographic locales or instances in time. Indeed, Jewish women seeking 
a get are always within halakhic jurisdiction because the Jewish legal rights and obligations are 
not tied to a particular place but rather to identity. Thus the Jewish legal/halakhic obligation to 
get a get and potential Jewish legal/ halakhic remedies would be multi or cross-jurisdictional 
whereas state remedies are always only beneficial in a restricted capacity to those within a 
specific jurisdiction. Moreover, pluralist remedies alone do not solve the dispute when norms 
conflict, it acknowledges the conflicting norms’ values but does not in and of itself resolve the 
divergences. 
However, as I illustrated in the previous chapter, as an historical legal tradition or 
framework, Jewish law has existed alongside and interacted with other legal systems across time 
and place. Thus legal pluralist approaches to get refusal can and would include space for 
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‘internal’, halakhic (and therefore non-state) remedies to get refusal as well as ‘external’ state 
legal remedies and a dynamic interaction between them. It is vital to understand that legal 
pluralism, in its heterogeneity, is broad, holistic, and inclusive enough that it would embrace 
halakhic remedies as one of many alternative normative orders
299
. Individuals should not be 
forced to be locked in to one or another seemingly competitive or contradictory legal system. For 
example, women should be able to opt to secure a get in beit din with or without the aid of legal 
pluralist remedies such as the Divorce Act or the NYGLs, or a prenuptial agreement if necessary, 
and then they should be able to opt to settle all remaining matters in civil court or beit din, 
whatever they choose. Moreover, this type of plural approach is by no means revolutionary or 
rebellious; it is a deeply-rooted historical tradition, as I illustrated in the previous chapter. H. 
Patrick Glenn pushes the idea of reciprocity of legal systems even further stating, “rather than 
presuming a radical separation between laws we should look for a ‘logic of fuzziness’ because in 
the real world boundaries are never sharp”300. In other words, the tradition of strategically 
navigating seemingly separate legal systems should remain, and in particular is an important, 
empowering option for women refused a get. 
I want to emphasize that I view legal pluralist remedies to get refusal as an option or 
remedy which would allow space for plural responses available to the fact of plural overlapping 
norms and indeed even to the phenomenon of get refusal. In other words, the reason legal 
pluralist approaches serve as a potential remedy is because they do not restrain religion in an 
effort to separate law and religion. On the contrary, pluralism is a mechanism or space through 
which to engage and accept religion in and with the state/secular law. The construct that law is 
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the supreme adjudicator is a narrative of the state centralist order, but does not accurately reflect 
the experiences of those subject to overlapping or plural legal orders (such as mesuravot get in 
this study). Indeed in the plurality, each may view the other as a minor player in decision-making 
at times
301
. As Martha Minow notes, 
Decisions reached within formal governmental authorities do not end the matter for 
member subgroups who are themselves tolerating the secular political arrangement only 
as long as it remains compatible with their own sense of alternative authorities...The 
official authorities may themselves seem peripheral to those minority groups that seems 
periphery to the majority.
302
 
 
In other words, and to contextualize Minow’s important argument within this case study, I would 
contend that the ‘Othering’ that occurs is also reciprocal, just as the state views religious legal 
orders as ‘Other’ so too do religious orders view the state legal order as ‘Other’. So from the 
perspective of mesuravot get, this tension illustrates the complexities with which they must 
navigate both systems in their quest of a get. Participants experienced messy webs of affiliation 
when state and religious norms conflict and claim authority. Thus legal pluralist approaches are 
perhaps the only ones within the broader field of socio-legal studies that allow space for religion 
to be taken seriously both as a valid iteration of identity and as a legal system- without casting it 
aside, tolerating it, or managing it in the way multicultural policies often do. Some scholars of 
legal pluralism, however, do not shy away from stating how law and religion can and should 
work together to enrich the field of socio-legal studies and our understandings of law and 
religion, even going so far as to make policy recommendations in some cases
303
. William 
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Connolly contends “deep pluralism” is the solution for religion in the secular sphere, enabling 
layered practices of connection to coexist in the public realm
304
 as opposed to shallow, secular 
conceptions of diversity or pluralism and beyond ‘mere tolerance’305. Connolly defends 
pluralism which had been severed due to the rise of secularism and which he argues may now be 
reinstated with the embrace of deep pluralism
306
. Connolly critiques a secular orientation to 
society which regulates diverse faiths and prefers enabling faiths, and layered practices of 
connection coexisting in public, embracing deep pluralism as “the philosophy of a messy 
universe”307. Bender and Klassen contend that pluralism is about hybridity and encounter308 
which would also see religion as an integral part of modern public life in the 21
st
 century. 
Moreover, Benjamin Berger notes that multiculturalist legal tools coming to manage diversity, 
distort the fact that law and religion meeting is not necessarily a crisis, or a culture clash (as 
might be implied by the language of scholars of multiculturalism such as Kymlicka, Brown, 
Benhabib and Eisenberg, such as ‘managing’ ‘tolerating’, which provoke tensions rather than 
solutions)
309. Rather, law and religion meeting might be viewed alternatively, as a “cross-cultural 
encounter” which could alleviate emerging tensions, like get refusal and the inequalities women 
face as a result
310. The most productive form of law’s pluralism is when “the nature of the cross 
cultural encounter between law and religion becomes transparent - an understanding cross 
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cultural experience”311. Understanding the pluralist remedies available to siruv get in this way, 
may enable communities to embrace this as one option amongst a diversity of remedies available 
that are at times ignored or even resisted, particularly in Toronto
312
.  
 Recognizing and embracing legal pluralist solutions enables the existence of religion in 
the public sphere and sees both law and religion as cultural systems, allowing for the recognition 
of religions as complex networks of affiliations rather than an altogether narrow and simplistic 
view of religions (or religious leaders) as necessarily misogynist
313
. Moreover, embracing legal 
pluralist solutions allows plural legal systems to respectfully, mutually coexist even to the point 
of reciprocity and mutual constitution at times (as I illustrated in the previous chapter), with the 
ability for Jewish law in this case, to invoke the power of the state in instances where there is 
abuse of the internal religious order (halakha) or conflicting rights for women, in this case the 
right to religion and the right of equality in divorce
314
.  
Shauna van Praagh claims that the phenomenon of overlapping normative orders, which 
is characteristic of legal pluralism is different, albeit connected to critical legal pluralism, whose 
definition is constantly evolving and developing and which would have individuals and 
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individual subjectivities as lawmakers
315
. Van Praagh maintains that when legal pluralism comes 
to meet feminist theory and/or methodologies, that is when critical legal pluralism emerges. 
Critical legal pluralism explores patterns of interactions between legal and normative systems in 
particular social sites through individual perceptions and narratives, as this research seeks to 
illustrate. Using critical legal pluralism, I examine the ways power and legitimacy intersect with 
individual women’s choices because it “allows the stories of women to be law-creating and law-
defining”316 exploring the ways in which a set of norms is relevant to them or governs their 
behaviours. It also illustrates that there is “heterogeneity, flux and dissonance”317 which in turn 
informs my argument calling for a plurality of remedies due to the plurality of experiences 
options women described and support. Critical legal pluralism is also adapted in this study 
because it fittingly enables me to ask women to reflect not only on how law treats them, but also 
to reflect on how they treat law. Indeed they affect and are affected by the normative orders in 
which they live. As a result, the conclusions and policy outcomes I propose reflect the diversity 
and divergence that emerged throughout the women’s narratives, especially regarding best 
solutions and in comparing civil remedies to halakhic ones. 
Roderick MacDonald’s development of critical legal pluralism and Pascale Fournier’s 
adoption of it are other contributions that I build on in my analytical approach. Incorporating 
elements of critical legal pluralism, which “understand the law as encompassing how legal 
subjects understand themselves and the law” is very beneficial for the goals of this analysis 
which seek, among other goals, to place the voices and experiences of Jewish women at the 
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centre of the analysis as active agents
318
. In other words, taking a critical legal pluralist approach 
sees individuals as those who have the power to shape and produce law as much as Parliament 
does through their “normative interpersonal interactions”319. Indeed law arises from, belongs to, 
and responds to everyone. Thus by adapting the approach taken in critical legal pluralism studies 
(and which I will elaborate below, in the context of Fournier’s contributions), I investigate the 
legal and social realities of mesuravot get through their first-person accounts which leads to the 
development of a fuller sense of law (or indeed the plurality of laws that are at play). This is not 
to say that the state has no role, rather, this type of approach emphasizes what individuals 
(mesuravot get) do with state law and how it influences their subjectivity and bargaining 
possibilities
320
. Critical legal pluralism allows my focus to be on the women refused a get as they 
navigate a complex and plural cite of legal and social tension
321
 in which they may take on the 
role of law-makers, mobilizers or innovators, influencing state law, and in which the law may 
shape their subjectivities. Although there is reciprocity here, critical legal pluralism nonetheless 
highlights that individual legal subjects, in this case individual mesuravot get, do posses 
transformative capacity to produce legal knowledge and fashion law and I build on this 
extensively in the coming chapters along with the narratives themselves which illustrate this 
reality throughout these pages. 
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Get-Refusal Literatures: Common Approaches to the Nexus of Religion, Law, and Gender 
The existing literature on get refusal includes both more traditional, rabbinic strands such 
as those by David J.  Bleich, Irving A. Breitowitz, Shlomo Riskin, and others
322
, as well as the 
more contemporary, legal or socio-legal strands such as those by Michael J. Broyde, Lisa 
Fishbayn-Joffe, Pascale Fournier, Rachel Levmore, Susan Weiss, and others
323
. Their collective 
work is crucial to the body of literature, and to movements and solutions. Bringing both 
literatures into conversation with one another so that the narratives and voices of the mesuravot 
get and the real-life, socio-legal realities that exist within normative religious, non-state orders 
can come to the fore can only enrich the scholarship; and this is what this study seeks to achieve.  
There are few contemporary, comprehensive studies examining the phenomenon of get 
refusal, and agunot. Though I will elaborate on each of the contributions in greater detail below, 
I will briefly describe them here in order to contextualize the existing literatures. In the Canadian 
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context, the field really begins with John Syrtashs’s work in 1992324. Since that time and indeed 
even since the more recent qualitative studies
325
, there have been shifts in the socio-legal realities 
within communities and legal systems
326
. The more contemporary studies I elaborate on below, 
give a rich introduction to the Canadian context with Syrtash and Norma Baumel Joseph both 
discussing their respective public policy contributions and their instrumental impacts on and the 
impacts of the legislative amendments. Fishbayn Joffe’s study, written in conversation with 
Syrtash (and Baumel Joseph to a lesser degree), calls into question understandings of 
‘multicultural accommodation’ and incorporates Ayelet Shachar’s important contributions 
(elaborated below). Fournier’s more recent work (2012) comparing Canadian and Israeli contexts 
makes significant contributions to the field and the ongoing debates both in terms of her 
methodological approach using qualitative interviews and her use of critical legal pluralism, 
adapted from Roderick Macdonald. Susan Weiss and Netty Gross-Horowitz’s study (2012) 
which recounts Weiss’ experiences in Israeli courts also merits review here, albeit from solely 
from the Israeli context and as such with divergent goals geared toward agunot in Israel and the 
Israeli legal and beit din systems. In particular, I will briefly review the contentions made by 
Syrtash, Fishbayn-Joffe, and Baumel Joseph, and I will more closely examine the two most 
recent studies, those by Fournier and Weiss and Gross-Horowitz. It is my hope that through the 
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analysis and reflection of the landscape we can move the research forward, building on the 
strengths of studies that preceded. 
I must begin this review of the literature by first acknowledging the work of John Syrtash 
and Norma Baumel Joseph who were pioneer activists on the issue of get refusal in Canada. 
Syrtash, Baumel Joseph, and Lisa Fishbayn-Joffe produced important work on get refusal 
focused solely on Canada, helping to develop a small body of literature. Each also considers the 
Canadian get legislation to be a success.   
John Syrtash’s 1992 book, Religion and Culture in Canadian Family Law, is helpful in 
understanding the Canadian context and the intersection of religion and family law
327
. His more 
recent 2005 paper, presented at Bar-Ilan University, Celebrating the Success of Canada’s “Get” 
Legislation and its Possible Impact on Israel, is a re-worked and abridged version of his main 
arguments regarding the get legislation - but geared toward a particular audience in a different 
socio-legal context
328
. Syrtash played a specialist role in the legislative reform which created 
what are now known as the Canadian ‘get laws’. He, along with a team of academics, activists, 
and rabbis, drafted the legal amendments which would ultimately become the amendments to the 
Family Law Act, provincially in Ontario and to the Divorce Act, federally across Canada
329
. 
Syrtash, himself Orthodox and working as a family law attorney, saw first-hand the recurrence of 
get refusal in Toronto and thus took an active role in the movement to get the amendments 
passed. He was both aligned with the Toronto Beit Din and familiar with the laws and courts of 
the state.  
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In his study, he investigates the different spheres of authority represented by the 
normative systems of cultural and religious communities which coexist in Canada
330
. In 
particular, the book addresses the issue of how the Canadian Charter of Right and Freedoms
331
 
may affect family law dispute resolution regarding divorce and custody disputes in general, not 
necessarily focused (only) on Judaism. He also undertakes an in-depth analysis of the legal 
amendments/get laws, arguing for their constitutionality anticipating future challenges (which 
have yet to materialize)
332
. Syrtash also discusses the success of the amendments being that they 
were thought to be widely supported and to prevent get refusal at the time
333
.  Indeed the success 
of amendments themselves being passed was and remains significant. To elaborate, the 
intersection of the legal systems and the debates at Parliament as a result of communal advocacy 
were all positive developments. Furthermore, there have been claims that for a period, there may 
have been a positive impact of the legal amendments
334
. Based on qualitative research between 
2012-2016, however, I argue that this assessment may be too optimistic. Although, it is likely 
that in the early years immediately following the laws’ enactment, there were dramatic 
successes. Nonetheless, as the women’s narratives will illustrate in the coming chapters, the 
realities in Toronto seem to have shifted in the decade or so since Syrtash’s last assessment.  
Although these laws have not yet been challenged in the courts, already in 1993, Syrtash 
foresaw the potential legal challenge which may still rise through the courts one day. In his 
defense of the get laws, Syrtash interestingly makes similar arguments to those that had 
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previously been made in favour of the constitutionality of the New York get laws foreshadowing 
a study like this, which compares the effects of the New York and Toronto get laws. In his 
defense of the amendments, Syrtash argues that multicultural practices such as religious 
arbitration and the desire for a Jewish divorce or get must be respected on the basis of Freedom 
of Religion, a Charter right
335
. This contention, about retaining and respecting religious 
minorities’ practices along with Syrtash’s attempts to be gender neutral like the legal 
amendments themselves, are valuable contributions
336
 of his scholarship. Moreover, Syrtash’s 
legal and advocacy work to aid agunot in Canada are also significant. 
Norma Baumel Joseph is a founding member of the Canadian Coalition of Jewish 
Women for the Get, which was established in the mid 1980s and served as an umbrella 
organization of six Jewish women’s groups (all of which are now non-operational)337. She also 
helped form the International Coalition for Agunah Rights (ICAR) in October of 1992 and 
worked on the ‘year of the agunah’ in 1993 during which there was a global attempt to free 
agunot. Baumel Joseph, a well-known Montreal-based aguna activist who also played an 
important role on the ‘Gett Committee’ which petitioned Parliament for the civil amendments, 
has made similar contentions to Syrtash
338
. In fact, when asked about the benefits of the 
Canadian civil amendments and the need to circumvent the Canadian remedies in favour of New 
York courts and batei din, where possible, Baumel Joseph stated, “We are better off within our 
own (Canadian) system” and “there are clear advantages to Canadian system”339. While this may 
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be Baumel Joseph’s experience based on her early work in Montreal, my research over the last 
number of years has shown, women refused a get are not always better off in the Canadian 
system (compared both the New York legal system and to the halakhic systems enforced by 
batei din), despite the potential effectiveness the civil remedy
340
.  
This optimistic assertion, that the civil legal amendments have prevented or solved get 
refusal in Toronto, exists in part because the Toronto Beit Din had initially supported, in the 
1980s/90s, the amendments when they were fist enacted, in 1985 and 1990 . Unfortunately, I 
illustrate, they have subsequently reneged their support, viewing many of its uses as coercive 
(the significance of which I will examine in the coming chapters). Thus, Syrtash’s confidence in 
the amendments and Baumel Joseph’s “clear advantages” to section 21.1 may require shifting 
due to a significant period of change, at least in recent years
341. Recently, Baumel Joseph’s 
stance did seem to evolve and she acknowledged that civil remedies are not the solution. Though 
she persisted that they are working in certain areas, she noted that lawyers’ lack of knowledge is 
one reason for its fallibility
342
. Baumel Joseph now believes that rather than prenuptial 
agreements, which are on the rise (outside Toronto, and in her city of Montreal, in particular), 
annulments (based on ancient Talmudic methods of hafka’ot, addressed in the previous chapter) 
are the perfect solution
343
. 
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Lisa Fishbayn-Joffe directs the project on Gender Culture Religion and Law at the 
Hadassah-Brandeis Institute and Brandeis University. As a Canadian, she too has been interested 
in the effectiveness of the Canadian get laws. Fishbayn-Joffe’s contribution, which she wrote in 
conversation with Syrtash and Baumel Joseph, echoes many of their arguments
344
. In fact, she 
stated that the get law has acted as a “catalyst to change minority practices that discriminate 
against women”345, citing the success of the get legislation346 in its ability, not only to remedy the 
problem of get refusal, but indeed even its ability to “correct” inequalities and serve as a “tool 
which enforces transformative dialogue”347. Perhaps again, this was the hope and expectation 
when the amendments were first passed. In this 2007/8 piece Fishbayn-Joffe goes so far as to 
claim that the “legislation has fostered dialogue between the beit din and get refusers about how 
patriarchal prerogatives embedded in Jewish law are used”, that the rates of refusal have 
decreased, and that “religious court has become a more congenial place for women”348.  
Fishbayn-Joffe acknowledges
349
that her contentions were predominantly based on 
conversations with Syrtash and Baumel Joseph (rather than primary research with women 
refused a get). Thus, Fishbayn-Joffe relied on the expertise and optimism of Syrtash and Baumel 
Joseph, even asserting a decrease in get refusal in Toronto. Nonetheless, Fishbayn-Joffe is one of 
very few scholars to look at get refusal in Canada. She includes a thorough analysis of 
multicultural theory, outlining the limitations of the “interventionist and immunization 
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approaches” (some which I reviewed, above)350 and adapts the notion of ‘dialogue’ from a host 
of multicultural theorists
351
. Thus, Fishbayn-Joffe’s work is an important addition to the 
scholarship on which future scholars can build. 
As the narratives emerging from my interviews with mesuravot get demonstrate, there 
have been no significant advances or transformative discussions in Toronto about the latent 
patriarchy covertly embedded in Jewish divorce law within the Orthodox community generally, 
or between beit din and get refusers in particular. Neither the beit din, nor the get refusers would 
concede this point (nor would they likely believe it altogether), and the enactment of the civil 
amendments in Canada has not changed that fact, even all these years after Fishbayn-Joffe’s 
claim. The secular amendments have not acted as a catalyst to change (what Fishbayn-Joffe 
calls) discriminatory practices toward women- get refusal, and indeed the phenomenon persists 
despite the secular remedies in place. Additionally, and as women have themselves reported, the 
Toronto Beit Din is unfortunately not a “congenial” place as a result of the state-law remedies (as 
Fishbayn-Joffe claimed). 
Syrtash, Baumel Joseph and Fishbayn-Joffe have made noteworthy contributions to the 
literature on agunot in Canada. That said, regrettably some of their hopeful and positive 
assertions, particularly those regarding the Canadian get legislation have seemed not to come to 
pass and are not reflected in the socio-legal realities and lived experiences within the Toronto 
Jewish community described by my participants. As the mesuravot get themselves affirmed in 
my interviews, the legislation has not had the intended impacts as a legal amelioration to a 
husband’s intransigence, thus some women are simply unable to benefit from the get legislation 
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which straddles the religious and civil realms. A full and rich discussion as to why this is the case 
will follow later in the analysis. Briefly, there is a multiplicity of complex and intersecting 
reasons the legislation has not had its intended effects. 
What my research has demonstrated, based interviews both with women refused a get as 
well as with other stakeholders such as rabbis, lawyers, academics, activists and others, is that 
legal remedies have not changed the social norms and behaviours ‘on the ground’. Put simply, 
get refusal persists despite the hope that the amendments would thwart and resolve the 
phenomenon
352
. Compounding this unexpected and disappointing fact is the problematic 
misconception that siruv get has been ‘solved’ by these amendments. What has occurred here is 
aptly captured by Sally Falk Moore’s description of a centralized government interacting with a 
social field:  
Innovative legislation and other attempts to direct change often fail to achieve their 
intended purposes; and even when they succeed wholly or partially, they frequently carry 
with them unplanned or unexpected consequences. This is partly because new laws are 
thrust upon ongoing social arrangements in which there are complexes of binding 
obligations already in existence
353
 
 
thus leaving women to negotiate and bargain in the shadows of legal pluralism
354
. 
 In other words, although the state, civil amendments were intended to remedy to a halakhic 
problem, the Toronto Beit Din understands them to be invalid, rendering any get given as a result 
of the laws a get meuseh, a coerced get or one given under duress. Consequently, and as Moore 
described (though she was describing a different context), the attempt to direct social change 
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through legal change is not (fully) successful and in this case study about divorce refusal, the 
result is that the phenomenon persists in Toronto today
355
. Compounding the fact that the beit din 
no longer supports the amendments are the troubling outcomes of the perceived success of the 
amendments. Primarily, there is widespread lack of acknowledgement that get refusal even exists 
in Toronto- both by community leaders and individual community members, and the idea 
persists that the beit din continues to support the amendments despite evidence to the contrary. 
Moreover, the early beit din support of the amendments lead to the dismantling of support groups 
and advocacy and now the lack of these groups serves as evidence to those who believe get 
refusal does not exist, who claim that if the problem would persist, the support would exist. 
Furthermore, the misconception that get refusal has been solved has also precluded and silenced 
other potential remedies from being embraced and adapted, such as prenuptial agreements and 
communal advocacy. 
 To be clear, it should not be surprising in and of itself that a law is not abided by 100%, 
there is always going to be some non-compliance and abuse of law. What is surprising, is that in 
Toronto silences persist about the non-compliance despite the fact that non-compliance other 
contexts has lead to public advocacy, ‘eshaming’, and other grassroots efforts (elaborated in 
chapters two and six). Furthermore, another surprising element is that the Toronto Beit Din is not 
seeking (religious) remedies to problems arising around get refusal’s persistence. Based on the 
primary data, I would argue that the beit din is contributing to the persistence of get refusal in 
this context (elaborated in chapters five and seven). 
In concluding my analysis of the Canadian scholarship, it seems that Syrtash, Baumel 
Joseph, and Fishbayn-Joffe cling to an optimistic view of the state’s legal amendments (despite 
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data indicating its marginal success in recent years, at least in Toronto). Particularly for Syrtash 
and Baumel Joseph, their years in the trenches, as advocates for the get legislation, and in 
Baumel Joseph’s case, as Canada’s best Jewish feminist advocate for women refused a get, has 
tied them especially tightly to the achievements of the get legislation, and with good reason.  
Baumel-Joseph and Syrtash were trailblazers and their work for agunot in Canada is noteworthy. 
They, along with Fishbayn-Joffe, each contribute significantly to the small body of literature on 
get refusal in the Canadian context; their contributions all but constitute the existing body of 
literature. Nonetheless, their contributions leave room for developing the field further. In this 
study I seek not only to conduct a gendered, socio-legal examination placing women’s voices 
and experiences at the centre of the analysis, I also seek to capture the complex normative socio-
legal realities within communities navigating the messy plural legal systems as they attempt to 
cope with the phenomenon of get refusal. Perhaps since I was not personally involved with or 
invested so deeply in the legislative amendments, a more holistic understanding of the realities 
women face is able to emerge. 
The two recent studies of get refusal that I will review are those by Pascale Fournier, 
Canada Research Chair on Legal Pluralism and Comparative Law at University of Ottawa, and 
by Susan Weiss, Founder of the Centre for Women’s Justice, matrimonial lawyer and aguna 
advocate (in Israel) who writes with Netty Gross-Horowitz, journalist for The Jerusalem Post. 
Although these are very different studies, they are contemporary studies that share similar 
epistemologies and methodologies, indicating the beginnings of a shift in literatures and debates 
around get refusal. 
Fournier, in her study, compares the solutions in Israel and Canada, examining a state law 
or civil remedy to a social problem, looking at ‘official legal’ and ‘unofficial socio-legal 
125 
 
responses
356
. Although this statement is not her key argument, it resonates with me in light of my 
findings: “Canadian civil state remedies are influenced by a web of alternative community 
responses and recourses…that at times render ineffective the civil remedies”357. She further 
states, “No policy response can ignore non-State normative commitments and communal 
affiliations as the latter often explain the shortcomings of the State law…”358. These introductory 
statements would benefit from further exploration. However, Fournier focuses on how women 
strategically navigate between state and religious legal systems, a finding that is reaffirmed by 
my data. Her significant contribution is her claim that secular remedies will not always work, 
and thus do not act as remedy to the aguna phenomena. My research compliments this claim and 
I take the analysis to the next level by investigating some of the reasons for the gap Fournier 
highlights. I would argue that while she does give a couple of the ‘official’ legal explanations for 
the shortcomings, a more fulsome discussion about the ‘unofficial’, socio-legal explanations 
would contribute to a more holistic analysis. For example, Fournier contends that women do not 
find secular civil courts to be a meaningful solution because community members and 
institutions provide them with the assistance and support they require
359
. While the first part of 
this claim is reflected in my research, some women have indicated just the opposite regarding 
communal support in Toronto, as I illustrate in the coming chapters.  Thus, Fournier’s primary 
research, the six interviews or “micro-level narratives”360 with “underground voices”361 (two 
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interviews in three cities, two provinces) conducted in Canada, are not a reflection of the socio-
legal realities ‘on the ground’, at least not in Toronto362.  
The ineffectiveness of the remedies is in part due to the reasons Fournier lays out, along 
with a multiplicity of other factors as well. I am including insights from my primary interviews 
and from existing studies to weave a more nuanced and complex picture in this study. Fournier 
states that contractual clauses like the example set in Bruker are seldomly used due to the 
existence of the ketuba contract which is a similar contract protecting the rights of women in 
matrimony and divorce. However, the ketuba has been held unenforceable in civil courts and 
some Jews do not see civil courts as offering a remedy
363
. Moreover, some women indicated that 
they do not employ contractual clauses because they are unaware of their potential effectiveness 
(indeed like in Bruker) and they are unaware for a number of reasons. Primarily, I illustrate
364
 
that the ineffectiveness of such remedies stems, more significantly from the deleterious 
perception by Toronto Jewish communities that the civil amendments of the 1980s and 1990s 
have solved the problem of iggun when in fact the rabbinate/rabbinic courts and individual rabbis 
have (at best) retracted their initial support of the civil amendments and (at worst) have even 
threatened women looking to employ the civil remedies with invalidating their get as coerced
365
.  
Notwithstanding Fournier’s important commitment to “providing fragments of untold 
knowledge” and her “aim to go beyond the conventional feminist accounts of the agunah 
problem”366 , her data is not reflected in the Toronto community. While she recognizes the 
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importance of communal intricacies and normative orderings, it seems odd to claim women 
avoid the civil remedies because they prefer to go to community members and institutions who 
can provide them with assistance and support
367
. Perhaps this was reflected in the responses of 
the women interviewed for her study. As I argue in this study, some women are forced (by threat 
of beit din or husband or both) not to take the civil route, some women then desperately attempt 
to get help elsewhere, within their communities and, only some (hardly any) women actually find 
the assistance and support they so desperately require. Because this reality is shameful and 
inexcusable, it is understandable that perhaps participants may not report it to an ‘outsider’ 
researcher, like Fournier. However, the dozens of women I interviewed in Toronto described 
having nowhere to turn for support. Contrary to Fournier’s understanding of women’s resistance 
to employing ‘external’ remedies368, there is simply nowhere for them to go. There is no social, 
rabbinic, or communal support for women refused a get in Toronto. Consequently, the failure of 
the civil remedies is unfortunately not due to the successes of the ‘internal’ religious remedies, 
communal affiliations, or normative orders. Or, to use Fournier’s terms, I would argue that the 
failure of the ‘official’ system is not due to the successes of the ‘unofficial’ system. 
Fournier draws on critical legal pluralism, inspired by Roderick A. Macdonald and 
others, which in our case sees women refused a get as legal agents who simultaneously effect 
and are affected by the secular (and I would argue, plural) normative order in which they live. 
Like my study, which tracks changes to socio-legal realities in New York and Toronto based on 
first-hand accounts of women refused a get, Fournier seeks to investigate the “everyday life 
normativity” of women concurrently navigating the intertwined and reciprocal civil and religious 
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legal systems
369. Fournier uses Manderson’s spatial analogy of legal pluralism to explore ways in 
which Jewish communal institutions might affect the state law’s effectiveness (or I would argue, 
ineffectiveness)
370
. She casts Jewish communal institutions and the way Jewish women navigate 
them as spatial layers of legal pluralism in Jewish communities which are social processes that 
affects state law
371
.This useful analogy, similar to the layering and repetition of the patchwork 
quilt metaphor I use in chapter five, allows the complexity and messiness of the plural, 
intersecting legal orders to come through while giving some sense of the layered challenges the 
women themselves must navigate.  
Fournier’s discussion of the Bruker decision and section 21.1 is interesting and 
constructively adds to the Canadian debates around get refusal. She speaks to the potential 
benefits and detriments of each ‘official’ approach, citing them as “mechanisms of integrative 
dialogue between the secular and religious”372. Indeed both Bruker, along with section 21.1, do 
have significant potential to remedy get refusal in Canada and yet the realities within the 
normative communal orders tell a different story. This integrative dialogue Fournier adapts, 
stemming from Shachar’s “joint-governance framework”373, is an idealistic notion at this time. 
The Canadian women I spoke with
374
 were in large part either unaware of the section 21.1 
amendment’s existence altogether, or were unable to make use of the remedies for a variety of 
reasons, both social and legal. This is surprising because there is lack of education in 
communities and even for lawyers (according to Joseph) and for this the community is at fault. 
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Schools, synagogues, rabbis, and even Act to End Violence Against Women (who run 
workshops on and give support to victims of domestic violence) all seem to avoid educating their 
students, members, constituents and audiences about get refusal. It is also surprising perhaps 
because it indicates the reach, influence, and power of the Toronto Beit Din (both of these 
surprising elements will be explored further in the coming chapters). That said, building and 
expanding on Fournier’s work, my research has shown that the reasons are far more nuanced, 
messy and complex than the existence or “impact of non-state forms of power on the behaviour 
of religious subjects”375. I found, the failure, unintended consequence, or disuse of the ‘official’ 
legal remedies is not due to the successes or uses of the ‘unofficial’ remedies.  
The non-state forms of power Fournier considers such as kherem, communal ostracism, 
or seruvim (orders of contempt of beit din) are examples of internal remedies
376
 that are rarely if 
ever invoked in Toronto Jewish communities thus are not having the results Fournier perceives. 
Consequently they have remained only ‘could-be’ remedies to solve instances of get refusal, 
though they have the potential to do so (and there are numerous cases in New York which attest 
to these non-state mechanisms’ successes). Indeed my research has confirmed that the Toronto 
Beit Din does not issue seruvim nor does the community invoke kherem
377
. Consequently 
Fournier’s argument about the successes of these types of mechanisms in other contexts378 is a 
hopeful overstatement if applied to the Canadian or at least Torontonian context and she does not 
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tease out these important nuances. She seems unaware of the complex dynamics and power 
struggles that exist between beit din and the secular/state legal sphere, particularly post the 
removal of religious arbitration, which has greatly impacted the willingness of beit din to engage 
in integrative dialogue, joint governance or indeed even offer women ‘non-official’ halakhic 
solutions from within their own legal tool-kit. 
Fournier relies on secondary sources for sensitive information regarding religion, 
halakhic terms, and internal communal dynamics and also draws on them in her brief discussion 
around efforts made to quantify agunot
379
. In some instances these sources do not accurately or 
adequately reflect the normative realities within communities and/or Jewish, halakhic legal 
concepts. Fournier’s conclusions are also unsettling, stating that “the Canadian approach to the 
agunah problem brings positive results when used by Jewish women”380. It is overly optimistic 
to claim that “Canadian approaches” bring positive results and it is certainly not echoed in my 
own study, as the narratives of women refused a get will illustrate. Fournier acknowledges earlier 
in her analysis that there are women who do not often have experiences that reflect such a claim 
even when they do attempt make use of the Canadian approaches. To be clear- there may be 
some women who benefit from the amendments however this should not be taken as the 
normative experience. Different women will have different experiences and for a plurality of 
different reasons. Although they have great potential as legal pluralist ameliorations, and I would 
include them in my ‘grab-bag’ of remedies (discussed further in the final chapter of this study), 
the Canadian approaches do not always lead to positive results, even when women do know 
about them and when they are used. Regrettably, women demonstrate that this is the case both 
for the official (secular) approaches, and the unofficial (religious) approaches. In some cases 
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outside Toronto it is grassroots or non-legal approaches that are more effective, and in other 
cases neither top-down legal approaches nor bottom-up grassroots approaches produce a get. 
Fournier’s supposition in her conclusion that beit din or “community interaction can sometimes 
be more efficient than state law”381 is a misstatement regarding the phenomenon of get refusal in 
Toronto, as my research shows. In fact, community interactions or unofficial, non-state 
normativities have not been more efficient than state law in the Toronto context, though I agree 
with Fournier that they have the great potential to be and ought to be embraced and invoked. 
Fournier’s approach using critical legal pluralism, storytelling, and qualitative methods 
has many benefits and promotes a rich and inclusive approach to the issue of get refusal. 
However, Fournier’s study has some limitations. Although she acknowledges that her study 
cannot be representative of all Canadian and Israeli women, she seems to suggest that the study 
can be indicative of the normative trends and realities beyond the cities in which she had her 
interviews conducted, in religious communities and in the lives of legal agents navigating 
between the secular and religious spheres. Despite her disclaimer, the experiences of the six 
women interviewed, along with her analytical review of a variety of socio-legal literature, 
becomes the basis of her study and upon which Fournier makes broad policy recommendations 
for the “Canadian Agunah”382 which as my data and analysis illustrate, do not seem to reflect the 
distinct issues emerging in the Toronto Jewish community and in relation to the Toronto Beit 
Din. While she suggests that Israeli women look to “Western Jewish women’s navigation of 
Jewish communal institutions”, my research illustrates that these institutions continue to fail 
Torontonian women, particularly by not issuing seruvim and kherems as the women indicate in 
the coming chapters. Western women are thus stuck between an official system and unofficial 
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system, which while attempting to navigate strategically, as Fournier notes (and as my research 
reaffirms), are often simply trapping them in dead marriages. Furthermore, Fournier’s 
suggestions that the Toronto Beit Din develop their own Sanctions Law illustrates that there 
remains a disconnect between the policy suggestions she makes and the communities’ normative 
realities and affiliations. This policy recommendation implies an unawareness that the Toronto 
Beit Din is resisting issuing seruvim, the traditional and most widely-accepted mechanisms of 
pressure
383
, and an unawareness that the Toronto Beit Din has come to forbid the use of the civil 
mechanisms that already exist (such as Bruker and section 21.1), all of which will be further 
explored in the coming chapters. Given that this is the case, I question the policy 
recommendation and wonder how and why the Toronto Beit Din would suddenly become willing 
to incorporate a Sanctions Law modelled on Israel’s law. Moreover, I wonder, would the women 
themselves actually embrace and feel comfortable with that type of remedy in a close-knit 
community like Toronto? 
Fournier meaningfully engages with literature on law and religion, such as Ayelet 
Shachar, as well as legal pluralism and critical legal pluralism inspired by Roderick Macdonald. 
Additionally, Fournier’s study, as well as that of Weiss and Gross-Horowitz, as we will see 
below, offer innovative methodological approaches inspired by feminist legal storytelling which 
are contributions I am inspired by and further develop in this study. Both studies also begin to 
weave together pointed analyses of law, gender, religion, and storytelling which I build on here 
as well. Consequently, the contributions of Fournier and Weiss and Gross-Horowitz are 
significant additions to the modest, existing body of literature on get refusal, which enable me to 
further advance and develop the field, expanding the boundaries of research on get refusal.  
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I must begin by introducing Weiss and her significant accomplishments on behalf of 
agunot in Israel. Susan Weiss is the founder and Executive Director of the Center for Women’s 
Justice, a non-governmental organization in Israel and previously worked with Yad La’Isha, both 
important, non-denominational organizations helping agunot in Israel. As an attorney and aguna 
activist , in 2001 she “initiated the innovative tacit of securing compensatory damages awards for 
women whose husband withheld a get by filing damages cases in Israel civil courts”384 (although 
all Jewish marriages in Israel fall within the domain of the Rabbinic Courts, despite one’s level 
of observance). This revolutionary approach reframed get refusal as a secular or state recognized 
emotional damage, even turning it into a human rights violation to measure monetarily in civil 
courts.  According to Weiss, if one does not honour their wife as per their ketuba commitment it 
violates heritage and therefore deserves damages. The civil courts in Israel tend to agree, being 
that Weiss has won close to 50 cases since she began this work, often getting both a judgment for 
hundreds of thousands of shekels, as well as the get from the husband”385. This approach has had 
such a far-reaching impact that Supreme Court Justice Rosalie Abella in Bruker cites Susan 
Weiss’ success in suing for damages in tort cases having to do with harms caused by get refusal 
in Israel, stating, “An agreement to provide a Jewish divorce is consistent with public policy 
values shared by other democracies”386.  Weiss personally feels that winning damages awards is 
only a partial victory because women often forgo the damages won in civil court in exchange for 
the get  which still allows for a price to be put on a get, sending the message the a get is not 
unconditional. That said, Weiss prefers this case by case approach rather than sweeping 
legislation but ultimately, according to her, the ‘problem’ will be solved once halakhic authority, 
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which “has its sources in a patriarchal system that is no longer relevant”387 is restricted. Indeed 
she is extremely critical of Jewish law, those who practice it and those who uphold it, including 
rabbis and dayyanim. Thus, although Weiss has helped many women, her harsh resistance to 
halakha also impacts the potential of her approaches to lead to widespread change and 
acceptance. 
While Susan Weiss and Netty Gross-Horowitz’s book unfolds around the personal stories 
told about six agunot which had never been done before in the existing literature on get refusal, 
their approach is not about the empowerment of women. In fact they state, “The halls of the 
religious courts are full of powerless women”388. Thus, although the cases of agunot are the 
focus of the book, the opportunities to empower women and to challenge stigmas agunot face 
about being only powerless, passive, victims
389
 were missed. Weiss and Gross-Horowitz focus 
on describing six extreme experiences with the Israeli batei din and the complex lay-of-the land 
regarding agunot in Israel, making arguments about religious marriage in Israel more broadly. 
The women around whom the author’s weave their analysis do not come across as positive, 
active agents, particularly since Weiss and Gross-Horowitz label them, “Clueless, Scarlet, Ping-
Pong, Accidental, Pawn and Reluctant”390. This study is more about the authors’ provoking the 
reader to react to the state of marriage and divorce in Israel than about focusing on the 
unsilencing of women refused a get or voicing their void, their agency. However, the women I 
interviewed would not have wanted to be labelled by any of the names used by Weiss and Gross. 
In fact, the mesuravot get who participated in this study would find it a derogatory betrayal of the 
                                                          
387
 Susan M. Weiss and Netty C. Gross-Horowitz, Marriage and Divorce in the Jewish State: Israel's Civil War 
(Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012). 
388
 Susan M. Weiss and Netty C. Gross-Horowitz, Marriage and Divorce in the Jewish State (Waltham, MA: 
Brandeis University Press, 2012), 40. 
389
 Thus the goal of Weiss and Gross-Horowitz’s contribution is different than my own. 
390
Susan M. Weiss and Netty C. Gross-Horowitz, Marriage and Divorce in the Jewish State, Table of Contents. 
These are also the titles of each of their chapters.  
135 
 
trusting relationships we had built. Moreover, even in the most helpless or abusive of situations, 
the women who participated in my study were so much more than the clueless victims or pawns, 
that the authors’ portray, but rather, were most-often active and astute agents in attempting to 
attain their get and navigate the complex, overlapping realities between civil and religious 
realms.  
Nonetheless, the book is an evocative, feminist study that enriches the existing literature 
and enlightens the reader to the plight of agunot in Israel. Its chief goal is to engage with the 
question: “is Israel a democracy or theocracy?”391 using agunot as their case study. Weiss and 
Gross-Horowitz go on to argue that by the rabbinate’s treatment of agunot, Israel is more of a 
theocracy and less of a democracy than some might like to admit. While they are driven to 
investigate this broad question, Weiss’ experience advocating for mesuravot get in Israel as an 
attorney in the trenches has marked her perceptions of Jewish law and those who observe it, 
which in turn, impacted the thrust of this study.  When referring, at a conference, to rabbis of the 
beit din in Israel she called them “short-sighted, arbitrary, patriarchal and not concerned with 
justice”392. The narrow arguments the authors make about halakhic marriage, divorce and 
religious leaders as necessarily patriarchal and misogynist seems both to undercut the beliefs of 
many women, thereby marginalizing them to Weiss’ significant contributions and perhaps even 
minimizing the potential far-reaching impact Weiss and Gross-Horowitz’s important work might 
have
393
. 
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The authors’ derogatory and condescending view of Orthodoxy, coupled with the names 
created for the women refused a get, comes across as disrespectful to the feminist principle of 
allowing women to choose
394
.  Women must not be made to feel that to choose religious 
marriage or divorce is to choose misogyny or theocracy, yet these are the contentions Weiss and 
Gross-Horowitz are making. In fact, women must have their right to religion without being made 
to feel belittled about their choice
395
.  For example, the authors, accepting a liberal secular 
feminist approach, ask themselves why women still choose to marry in Orthodox ceremonies, 
and conclude that even when women do make these conformist choices, civil remedies ought to 
be available (hearkening to Shachar’s joint governance model)396.  The authors never argue, 
however, that women can choose and even should choose to be Orthodox or ultra Orthodox 
because they might want to be. Moreover, the authors never concede that women can choose to 
marry in accordance with those customs and rituals, they can choose to remain in their 
communities, and they can even choose to seek advice of rabbis, but, in making those choices, 
they should not be seen to be conceding their right to divorce. In fact, the authors imply the 
contrary, suggesting Orthodox women should be penalized for such choices.  
The right to religion and the right to divorce are not mutually exclusive and consequently 
giving up the one to avoid problems with the other is not a solution, despite the claims of Weiss 
and Gross-Horowitz. Choosing religion does not mean giving up democracy, human rights, or 
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inevitably becoming an aguna. This nuanced, feminist, argument is made most effectively by 
Baumel Joseph
397
. Indeed she argues, that if women cannot get a get and the law is too 
patriarchal, it is not a solution to suggest they leave, for that 
misses the point- both of Orthodoxy and of feminism. Orthodox Jews are Orthodox 
because they believe in the integrity of the system and women choose to remain 
Orthodox because they believe in it and accept and find it meaningful. They do not wish 
to abandon their beliefs, their heritage, their community, no matter how they feel about a 
particular item, and no matter that at times they feel abandoned by that system. They 
have chosen to be Orthodox Jews. Their choice! And feminism is about choice. It’s about 
the ability of a woman to choose to stay where she is and perhaps want to renovate from 
within.
398
 
 
Thus the contention that the solution is to abandon halakhic marriage detracts much of the 
book’s successes in terms of its feminist agenda, empowerment of women, enabling women’s 
freedom of choice, and female storytelling. 
Weiss and Gross-Horowitz’s astute discussion about the ambiguous role of domestic 
violence in the rabbinic courts is so brief that it leaves me with a desire for further and deeper 
analysis
399
. Their sharp analysis of get refusal as a form of domestic violence which is not yet a 
taken-for-granted- fact in many communities (especially Toronto) would benefit from further 
exploration, particularly since domestic violence is at the core of the aguna phenomenon. In fact, 
each woman I interviewed described some form of domestic violence in marriage. That said, and 
building off of Weiss and Gross-Horowitz’s contributions, I maintain it is not the entire system 
of Orthodox marriage or halakha that we need to get rid of, the baby with bathwater, if you will. 
Rather, get refusal is a socio-legal phenomenon which has somehow developed, and which some 
individual abusive men exploit with the support of some corrupt rabbis and rabbinic courts. The 
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solution cannot and will not ever be to get rid of religion (or religious marriage) altogether 
despite the authors’ assertion that the system of Jewish marriages in Israel makes Israel a 
theocracy
400
. Again, that would not allow for multiple forms of expression and choice embraced 
by feminism and indeed, there will always be Jewish women who consciously choose Orthodoxy 
simply because they want to (and despite the risk of being called “clueless” by the authors) and 
these women ought to have a plurality of solutions available in their arsenal.  
Weiss and Gross-Horowitz acknowledge that the six stories they chose to include, out of 
the dozens and dozens Weiss has helped over the course of her important work, are about 
exceptional cases of mesuravot get “in extreme situations”401. While there are lessons to be 
learned by looking at the exceptional yet egregious cases, readers must also be cautious not to 
allow the six test cases to reflect the broad and nuanced, multifaceted set of experiences of most 
women who are refused a get, experiences which are no less egregious, but far more banal, and 
silent. Were the cases intended to compel the authors’ goals about Israel being a theocracy? 
What do the cases tell us about, or what can they demonstrate more broadly, about the 
‘normative’ experiences of women refused a get? These exceptional cases should be treated as 
such- exceptional. I do not wish to diminish the women’s experiences in any way, nor do I want 
these experiences to represent or stand for the experiences of all mesuravot get, who most often 
suffer in much more subtle ways (though often no less egregious)
402
. Particularly, reading from a 
North American context, it is important to acknowledge that there will not be a uniformity of 
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experience and that these six exceptional cases are not necessarily generalizable or representative 
but do give readers tremendous insight to the experiences of women refused a get. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has examined some relevant literatures discussing law and religion in Socio-
Legal Studies as well as the existing literature on get refusal, focusing on the most recent studies 
and debates and their emerging themes and goals with particular focus on those examining 
Toronto and/or those including women’s narratives. Together, the authors have developed a 
relatively small, but noteworthy body of literature, engaging with the nexus of law, religion, 
gender, and storytelling in significant and diverse ways. This is a significant accomplishment in 
terms of awareness of religion’s persistence in the public sphere and in the field of Socio-Legal 
Studies, and in terms of moving closer to viable remedies for get refusal. Collectively, the 
literature offers a strong and significant foundation and springboard from which to begin a new, 
nuanced analysis of iggun in Toronto and New York, building on and extending the debates. It is 
my hope that through critical analysis and reflection of the gaps in the landscape I can move the 
research slowly forward, expanding the strengths and improving on the limitations, with the 
ultimate goal of supporting the complex realities of women refused a get. While their collective 
stories are crucial to the body of literature, and to movements and solutions, the narratives of the 
mesuravot get and the real-life, socio-legal realities that exist within normative, religious, non-
state orders have at times been left out of debates in the literature.  
In the next chapter which focuses on the methodologies and methods used in conducting 
this study, I will explore how this study will build on the contributions of the noteworthy 
scholars and activists. I will further elucidate my methodological approach as well as my point of 
140 
 
entry to the existing discourses as an ‘insider’ and my incorporating a socio-legal, gendered 
analysis and a religious-feminist approach.  Such an approach has not yet been taken and will 
enable both an in-depth, textured and complex but still culturally nuanced enquiry by 
incorporating insights from my interviews and from existing studies to weave a more 
multifaceted picture and as such will expand the field and stretch the existing body of literature. 
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Chapter Four - Musings on Methodologies & Methods 
 
We got married in 1970; I was 17 he was 20; we were in love. 
 
During the 25 years we were generally quite happy.  He had a thriving dental practice. We had 6 
kids. We gave charity in community, and we made name for ourselves.  
 
At times there were red flags; a couple of uncontrolled rages… 
 
In 1995 the breakdown really started…He had entered in to a partnership in hotel, leveraging- 
$4 million…he became obsessed with this investment and began to slack at his dental practice, 
spending more and more time in Israel, He wanted to move the family there. Eventually he 
closed the practice and things started falling apart…He wouldn’t accept his responsibilities 
anymore. 
 
The abuse continued and in 1997 there was a choking incident. Shortly after, I started working, 
after years of staying at home because I knew then I would have to leave but I didn’t know how 
and who do you ask? I had nowhere to turn for help.  
 
In 2000, I went to get the get. He had the pen in his hand to sign it and said “I changed my 
mind” he felt I was his property. For 10 years, until 2007, the abuse increased. I lived with him 
knowing I had to get out and for the last 1 ½ years I lived in fear for my life. I didn’t sleep at 
night. 
 
In February 2007, I left with a wheelie suitcase after my children where privy to an incident and 
insisted I leave. I left not thinking I’d never go back, but I never went back. From that point I 
was without a get for another 5 years. 
 
He stalked me for a while until he moved to Israel. 
 
At that time, my machatunim connected me to ORA who connected me to a lawyer who 
connected me to Yad L’Isha who gave me a toenet. She arranged for 2 hazmanot there, which the 
Toronto Beit Din didn’t do for years here, and when I went to Israel for my granddaughter’s bat 
mitzvah, she arranged for me to go to the Beit Din for him to give me get in person. He was so 
defiant of Beit Din and treated them terribly despite the fact that it came out he was living with 
Phillipino girl… 
 
As one of the dayyanim said, “I was now good for any man”, my husband ripped up the get and 
threw it at the rabbi. So my 2
nd
 get attempt was ruined. 
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Eventually he was thrown in jail and after three weeks inside, he agreed to give me a get. If he 
hadn’t moved to Israel, I’d still be waiting. All the stars lined up just at that moment, it was all 
yad Hashem. If I was depending on or waiting for the actions of the Toronto Beit Din, I still 
would not have my get today.  
 
When I was going through it, I had nowhere to turn; I suffered in silence. There is more 
awareness nowadays than even a few years ago. We need support systems in place especially so 
women don’t lose their legal rights by their desperate actions – signing away rights in 
agreements in exchange for a get. I was advised “just be happy you got out”. 
  
The only way the solutions will work or even just start to happen is if you engage the frumer 
parts of the community, it’s gotta be within halacha otherwise, what’s the point if those more 
frum women are abandoned by a fringe solution? We need to work WITH them, the Beit Din and 
appease them to create a unified path. 
 
I believe there can be a solution because if they could find it in the beit din in Jerusalem, they 
could find it here, in Toronto. 
 
The amendments DID NOT HELP in my case. “I know I couldn’t have gotten the get if he hadn’t 
moved to Israel” They had never even issued any hazmanot, and no seruvim here in Toronto. 
 
There is no support here in Toronto, not legal, not rabbinical and so there is nothing to give 
hope. I understand halacha and I don’t challenge it, I don’t want to, but I hope there could be 
unity to find halachic solutions, especially for the child-baring aged women. 
 
~~~ 
 
On April 14
th
 of this year, I will be an Aguna for 5 years. I have no get, and no civil divorce and 
I have been married for 27 years.  
 
I am in an abusive marriage- all types of abuse, physical, emotional, sexual he controls the 
computers and other devices, for example. He is accidentally brilliant, but he never actually 
worked; he earned no parnasa.  While I’ve always juggled jobs. He says he’s a “non-
conformist” and thus can’t have a boss or rules if you know what I mean. I think he can’t stand 
others being in control of him. He’s also chronically late and often unreachable. 
 
The beginning of the end was when a dear friend of mine came to visit from Israel and I invited 
her to stay with us. Well it turns out, as I would find out later, they began an affair. I remember 
that I couldn’t believe my friend did that, but I was not surprised about my husband’s behaviour 
at all. 
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He became more and more abusive to me and the kids and I was so scared and subservient. I 
second guessed myself all the time. He undermined my parental abilities with all the kids, some 
of whom are high needs. He would throw insults at me all the time, calling me passive 
aggressive, fat, ugly, making comments about our sex life. 
 
Shortly after this ‘friend’s’ visit, but before I knew of the affair my husband decides he wants to 
go to Israel. But of course, we have no money for that. We have kids to feed, some with 
challenges that need extra therapies. But sure enough, he withdraws all our money- close to 
$10,000 and leaves to Israel without a note and makes no contact for 10 days. 
 
Basically, he abandoned the children, he abandoned me, and went to continue the affair with her 
in Israel.  
 
Turns out, I would find out later he secretly got married in Israel. I eventually found this out 
from his best friend. I went to see his parents in Connecticut for Shabbat and his mom denied 
everything and did nothing. 
 
I don’t know where to turn to next. 
 
In conducting interviews with the women whose narratives are included above, I was 
faced with some of the benefits and challenges of interviewing. The first narrative was shared by 
a woman from the Toronto area who goes far back with my family. She met my mother when 
they were away at sleepover camp, at the age of sixteen. She even attended my Bat Mitzvah. 
This presented me with both a benefit and challenge of being an ‘insider’ researcher. Having 
access to a mesurevet get whom I knew personally was invaluable in terms of data collection, 
establishing trust and rapport with the participant, and expanding a network of contacts via 
respondent-driven methodology. However, challenges also arose. Knowing my participant 
potentially also inhibited what she felt comfortable sharing, perhaps censoring her narrative 
because there was not enough distance between us. 
 The second narrative, with a woman from the New York area, presented some of the 
converse challenges and benefits. The participant shared very personal details including those 
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about child abuse and rape, perhaps because she felt comfortable with me being an insider to the 
Jewish community at large, but an outsider to her particular community in the Greater New York 
Area. That said, despite the participant’s openness, the interviews I conducted with her were 
exceedingly challenging. The participant at times began to cry, took calls from lawyers as well as 
from her children’s teachers, and her children. The participant twice had to leave the interview 
mid-way and we rescheduled, making the interview three parts. Twice, she brought at least one 
child with her. Each of these elements posed challenges to the interview process. However, 
although challenges arose, for which I was not well-trained (I am not a social worker or a 
therapist), the benefits of socio-legal storytelling in line with feminist research methods and 
methodologies and as opposed to more positivist methods such as quantifying, nonetheless 
outweighed the detriments. The results yielded rich, primary accounts of experiences by women 
refused a get as they navigate between plural legal orders. 
 
 
In line with this project’s objectives of analyzing to what degree state legal remedies 
impact religious social norms, and incorporating and highlighting the lived realities of women 
refused a get, in this chapter, I will examine the methodological and epistemological 
considerations arising from the research design to conduct this nuanced study that builds on and 
expands the existing body of literature. Consequently, I will explain the deliberate choices 
concerning the research methods and design including the importance and effectiveness of socio-
legal, gendered storytelling, the ‘religious feminist approach’ I take, and the question of 
quantifying mesuravot get. This chapter is a precursor to chapter five where I analyze the 
primary data, the women’s narratives. This chapter, its antecedent, addresses why I chose to 
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centre this study around mesuravot get, placing their narratives and experiences at the centre of 
my analysis by addressing the questions: ‘what is a qualitative socio-legal gendered storytelling 
and a religious-feminist approach and why are they the ideal methodological and epistemological 
perspectives applied to this analytical socio-legal study of get refusal? I also consider how and 
why I am well-positioned to conduct this sensitive but vital research, bringing disparate 
literatures and perspectives into conversation with one another. The bulk of this chapter will 
highlight the decisions made in the process of conducting the research, beginning with a 
discussion/disclosure of my positionality and the religious-feminist approach I implement 
throughout the study. Moving toward chapter five, the end of this chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of methods and the practical considerations and questions that emerge addressing the 
particularities of who I interviewed, how I found the participants, as well as where and when the 
interviews were conducted. 
 
Perspective, Posture, Positionality- My Religious Feminist Approach 
I find it challenging to situate my positionality explicitly and neatly because I am 
positioned at the edges of several categories, fitting comfortably neither entirely inside nor 
outside of them. Trinh H. Minh-Ha captures this sensation eloquently, stating: 
Working right at the limits of several categories and approaches to knowledge means that 
one is neither entirely inside or outside. One has to push one’s work as far as one can go: 
to the borderlines, where one never stops, walking on the edges, incurring constantly the 
risk of falling off one side or the other side of the limit while undoing, redoing, or 
modifying this limit.
403
 
 
Indeed, a religious feminist approach, like the one I employ in this study, does not have a single 
orientation and thus I work in between and on the edges of a few of my identities or networks of 
                                                          
403
 Minh-ha quoted by Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, “Introduction: Emergent Methods in Social Research Within and 
Across Disciplines,” in Emergent Methods in Social Research, eds. Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Lina 
Leavy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), xii. 
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affiliation, attempting to do a multifaceted critical socio-legal analysis while doing justice to the 
religion and to feminist principles, and thus, I am always ‘walking on the edges’ of each. It is 
messy and inherently political as well
404
. Moreover, my perspective impacts the research I 
choose to do, the questions I choose to ask, the access I am granted or denied, as well as the 
stories disclosed. In other words, I employ an analytical approach that weaves diverse literatures 
and debates together with first-hand narratives and I have come to these, at least in part, due to 
my upbringing- both in the academic and private realms. The positionality of researchers impacts 
the way we produce knowledge. In this vein I disclose that I am a religious Jewish, woman, 
feminist, socio-legal researcher, insider
405
. These intersecting identities impact the nature and 
conscience of the research, enabling and complicating this religious feminist approach
406
.  
As I indicated earlier, to date, the analyses of get refusal have consisted mostly of two 
dichotomous streams: 1) male-authored, often conservative analyses, often by rabbis, who offer 
numerous suggestions for solutions from within Jewish Law
407
, such as those by Bleich, 
Breitowitz; and others, and 2) female-authored, often liberal analyses, often by non-Orthodox 
women, using feminist scrutiny and often abandoning concern for Jewish Law, such as those by 
Aranoff, Haut, Weiss, Halperin-Kaddari and others
408
. I bring the two streams into conversation, 
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 Yasmin Gunaratnam, “Chapter 4: Messy Work Qualitative Interviewing Across Difference,” in Researching 
‘Race’ and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge, Power, ed. Yasmin Gunaratnam (London, UK: Sage, 2003), 79-108.  
405
 I should also acknowledge that I have never been married and thus have never experienced get refusal myself, 
nor has anyone in my family. While this might be a point for criticism, it is nonetheless widely acknowledged in 
academic circles that one need not themselves be the object of the study nor ought the author to have personally 
experienced the phenomenon being studied in order to conduct sound and strong research. 
406
 An approach which has not been utilized in studies of get refusal to date. 
407
 Rabbi David J. Bleich, “A Suggested Antenuptial Agreement: A Proposal in Wake of Avitzur,” Journal of 
Halakha and Contemporary Society 7, (1984): 25-41; Rabbi David J. Bleich, “Jewish Divorce: Judicial 
Misconceptions and Possible Means of Civil Enforcement,” Connecticut Law Review 16, no. 2 (1984): 201-290; 
Rabbi Irving A. Breitowitz, Between Civil and Religious Law: The Plight of the Agunah in American Society 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
408
 Susan Aranoff and Rivka Haut, The Wed-Locked Agunot: Orthodox Jewish Women Chained to Dead Marriages 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co. Inc, 2015); Rivka Haut, “A Factor in Preventing Cases of Agunah,” JOFA 
Journal 1, no. 3 (1999); Susan M. Weiss, and Netty C. Gross-Horowitz. Marriage and Divorce in the Jewish State: 
Israel's Civil War (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012); Rivka Haut, Susan Aranoff, Susan Weiss, Ruth 
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embracing an analytical approach which is fresh and yet layered, wherein I refuse to abandon 
concern for Jewish law, yet I embrace a plurality of legal orders and remedies along with 
feminist methodological and epistemological approaches to research. Moreover, the historic and 
current landscape of scholars, activists and documentarians working on the issue of iggun is not 
only quite polarized but in addition, it has often been abstractly theoretical, writing about agunot 
rather than writing practically, for agunot
409
 or even with agunot, reflecting on their experiences 
and analyzing the remedies they might feel comfortable utilizing. Whereas the religious feminist 
paradigm I suggest enables increased accuracy, intimacy, and access to communal and legal 
nuances by including women’s voices and placing women’s experiences at the centre of this 
study.  
I argue that mainstream voices and nuanced critical approaches that fall somewhere 
between the two extremes I described, and which place mesuravot get at the centre, are necessary 
in the growth of scholarship on get refusal. I am such a voice and I take such an approach. Being 
observant of halakha
410
, the Orthodoxy I was raised with was one which empowered women and 
in which I was permitted to question and which had answers
411. I have also been ‘brought up’ by 
a socio-legal studies program which has fostered an understanding and analytic approach of 
complex sites of legal pluralism, law and religion, multiculturalism and the schisms that emerge.  
In other words, I respect and take religion seriously and I benefit from a deep sense of cultural 
understanding whilst taking seriously the tensions between the state and religion, particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Halperin-Kaddari, The Agunah Summit (New York University Law School, New York, NY, June 24, 2013); Blu 
Greenberg, “The International Beit Din: Resolving the Agunah Crisis” and Norma Joseph “Northern Exposure: 
Agunah in Canada” (presentations at JOFA- Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance Conference, Columbia University, 
New York, NY, January 15, 2017). 
409
 Faye Lisa Rosenberg, “Jewish Women Praying for Divorce: The Plight of Agunot in Contemporary Judaism” 
(Dissertation, York University, 1999). 
410
 “Frum from birth” or ‘ffb’- born and raised Orthodox. This is a common classifying acronym in the Jewish 
world. I was also educated in religious (all girls) schools. 
411
 And wherein I had wonderful female role models who inspired me academically. 
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those that emerge around a woman’s right to marriage and divorce as well as her right to 
religion. The study also benefits from my deep communal ties (as this research demonstrates) 
and yet, I can nonetheless identify flaws and question injustices that persist within the Jewish 
community (get refusal being but one). That said, I am writing against those who view religion in 
general and Judaism in particular as a patriarchal system that subordinates women
412
. In fact, as I 
elaborate throughout the study, dismissing halakha is detrimental to mesuravot get, particularly 
the most vulnerable among them, who are ultra Orthodox. Women often choose to remain 
members of their communities and do not ascribe to solutions some suggest which dismiss 
halakha
413
. The religious feminist approach I espouse is more balanced than such an extreme 
approach. 
My view of a feminist approach acknowledges recursivity
414
, the positionality of the 
researcher, and also recognizes that even as researchers or ‘experts’, we are constantly 
uncovering, discovering, learning from and with the real experts- in this case, the mesuravot get 
                                                          
412
 I am engaging implicitly with the threads of three scholarly discourses:  
a) Wherein some feminist theologians say that any patriarchy in Christianity or Western culture is a legacy of 
Judaism. Judith Plaskow and Susannah Heschel have written on the anti-Judaic thrust. Judith Plaskow, “Blaming the 
Jews for the Birth of Patriarchy,” in Nice Jewish Girls, ed., Evelyn T. Beck (Watertown, MA: Persephone, 1982), 
250-254; Susannah Heschel, “Anti-Judaism in Christian Feminist Theology,” Tikkun 5, no. 3 (1990): 25-28, 95-97.  
b) Wherein some Jewish feminists argue that Jewish marriage (and hence divorce) is inherently anti-woman, 
relegating women to the position of chattel, for example Rachel Adler. Rachel Adler, Engendering Judaism: An 
Inclusive Theology and Ethics (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999).  
c) Wherein some argue that Judaism or Jewish marriage is not systematically anti-woman. Among others, Judith 
Hauptman and Avraham Grossman have written on this. Judith Hauptman, Rereading the Rabbis: A Woman’s Voice 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Avraham Grossman, Pious and Rebellious: Jewish Women in Medieval 
Europe (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2004).  
In the context of our particular case study, on get refusal, these critiques have been made to some degree by Jewish 
feminist aguna advocates Susan Weiss, Susan Aranoff, Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, among others. 
413
 This was addressed at length in chapter 3. There I also drew attention to scholars who discuss the importance of 
respecting women’s choices. 
414
 Frankenberg discusses ‘recursivity’ (as more appropriate than reflexivity), implying that what was in the past - 
both the research itself, and the positionedness of the researcher - are not necessarily fixed, but rather always with 
the potential for, “re-examination and revision” as well as re-use in future work (107). Frankenberg further notes 
that the tool of recursivity allows the researcher, “to make visible that which was taken as a priori at an earlier 
stage”, effectively allowing for the ‘underbelly’ of assumed or proscribed knowledge to be uncovered (107).  
Ruth Frankenberg, “On Unsteady Ground: Crafting and Engaging in the Critical Study of Whiteness,” in 
Researching Race and Racism, eds. Martin Blumer and John Solomos (London, UK: Routledge, 2004), 104-118.  
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themselves
415
. I am simultaneously working with and through my positionality as a woman 
inside the Orthodox Jewish community, and yet as a woman outside the ‘knowers and 
experiencers of iggun’, a ‘hidden population’416. It is a delicate balance to acknowledge my own 
positionality
417
, while still placing the women refused a get at the centre of the analysis; thus 
reflexivity of positionality must not come at the cost of re-silencing those to whom we are often 
attempting to give voice
418
. In fact, acknowledging my positionality, compounded by the lived 
experience of participants, allows for a deeper, more meaningful, and thus also more acute and 
accurate awareness not only of the individual researcher, and mesuravot get, but also, how that 
researcher, interacts with, connects to, and focuses on participants without encroaching upon 
them
419
 thereby enabling voices and experiences of women to become known
420
. Furthermore, a 
feminist approach, “is an innovative approach to knowledge building that breaks down barriers 
between academia and activism and between theory and practice…scholars of this method seek 
to give voice…and to uncover hidden knowledge…”421 and these are precisely my intentions. I 
hope I have achieved here an in-depth analytical socio-legal study, weaving diverse sets of 
literatures and debates together, and taking seriously legal, religious, and social considerations 
                                                          
415
 I should note that I have never been married and thus have never been refused a get myself, as some out in the 
field have assumed as I am conducting this study (in talks and book shops among other instances). 
416
 A population for which no sampling frame already exists - so that the population's actual size and boundaries are 
unknown.  
Douglas D. Heckathorn, “Respondent-Drive Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations,” 
Social Problems 44, (1997): 174-199; Douglas D. Heckathorn, “Respondent-Drive Sampling II: Deriving Valid 
Population Estimates from Chain Referral Samples of Hidden Populations,” Social Problems 49, (2002):11-34. 
417
 Ruth Frankenberg, “On Unsteady Ground”, 106. 
418
 M. Fonow and J. Cook, “Feminist Methodology: New Applications in the Academy and Public Policy,” Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30, (2005): 2211-2236, 2221. 
And indeed I have witness this phenomenon first hand at The Agunah Summit (Conference by The NYU Tikvah 
Center for Law and Jewish Civilization and JOFA-Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance Lecture, New York 
University School of Law, New York, June 24, 2013) where not one agunah was invited to participate in a full-day 
conference on get refusal. 
419
 More than is inherent in the researcher-researched dynamic at face value. 
Yasmin Gunaratnam, “Chapter 4: Messy Work Qualitative Interviewing Across Difference”, 87, 88. 
420
 Marjorie DeVault, “Talking and Listening from Women’s Standpoint: Feminist Strategies for Listening and 
Analysis,” in Liberating Method: Feminism and Social Research, ed. Marjorie DeVault (Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press, 1999), 59-83, 60-61, 69, 71. 
421
 Ibid, 77. 
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which might make an impact both in the academic and activist realms by revealing the 
previously unseen and unknown realities around get refusal (like the batting of a quilt). 
In the remainder of this section I probe further the consequences of my own membership 
in the Orthodox Jewish community on the research, my positionality as an ‘insider’422. This 
status possesses some potential advantages and challenges. I will consider both and elaborate on 
the ways in which I mediate or navigate the potential drawbacks. Perhaps the primary benefit is 
that my ‘insider’ status allows me accessibility to knowledge that would otherwise be 
inaccessible (particularly, I was able to access Ultra Orthodox or Hasidic participants, segments 
of the Jewish population that are often insular, and likely to resist outsiders, and often have). The 
research illustrates that I enjoyed access to all facets of the Jewish community, across all levels 
of (non)observance. Thus, this study benefits from ‘ethnographic privilege’423. The fact that I am 
an Orthodox Jewish woman, a community member, and that the participants know this, 
underscores our mutual respect. They also recognize that I have an understanding of the culture, 
knowledge and values we share as well as the laws we follow, the language we speak and turns 
of phrase used
424
, and in fact, even that which goes unspoken such as the modest dress, the 
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 An academic insider is defined as a, “researcher who studies a group to whom they belong”. 
B. Mullings, “Insider, Outsider, Both or Neither: Some Dilemmas of Interviewing in a Cross-Cultural Setting,” 
Geoforum 30, no. 4 (1999): 337-350, 340. 
423
 Patricia Zavella, “Feminist Insider Dilemmas: Constructing Ethnic Identity with ‘Chicana’ Informants,” 
Frontiers 13, no. 3 (1999): 53-76, 54.  
 
Other scholars who have examined the phenomenon of get refusal and attempted to conduct qualitative interviews 
have perhaps not benefitted from this degree of ethnographic privilege. Here I am thinking about scholars such as: 
Pascale Fournier, Lisa Fishbayn, Anat Livshits, Lisa Rosenberg, among others. These are women who are not 
‘insiders’ to the communities they have researched and yet they have conducted research on agunot nonetheless. 
Rosenberg acknowledged her ‘outsider’ status as a methodological detriment which complicated her research while 
Livshits described to me that she deceptively poses as an insider by strategically attending synagogues and altering 
her dress so that agunot might confide in her despite her own personal non-affiliation and resistance to halakha (this 
type or research much be questioned ethically and rigorously). 
424
 Depending on the participant, I might have dropped Hebrew or Yiddish phrases into our conversations, wished 
them a “Shabbat Shalom or Good Shabbos” and a “Shana Tova”-wishes for a nice weekend or new year. Or 
answered “Barukh Hashem” - thank G-d when asked ‘how are you’? These often diminutive and routine expressions 
were significant bridges to building trust and rapport with participants and signaled my insider status. 
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blessings recited over food or drink, the kosher venue chosen etcetera
425
. From this 
understanding emerges equality, reciprocity, and trust between the participants and myself; and, 
it serves to breakdown the harmful power dynamics most often inherent in interviews of the 
knower and the known, the object, and the subject
426
. Consequently, because we share a belief 
system, community, and gender that connects us, rapport builds and a trusting relationship 
forms
427
. I also benefit from insider knowledge and understanding of institutions, hierarchies 
(both formal and informal), power structures, taboos and internal politics. For example, I know 
much about particular rabbis or batei din simply from having grown up in a particular 
community. This insider knowledge may at times be transformed into valuable research data 
informing context or arguments made by participants or myself throughout this study. Awareness 
of taboos existing within insular communities was also constructive in conducting this research 
and particularly in comparing New York and Toronto. On a broader level, as an insider, I 
benefited greatly from the fact that data collection does not just occur during the finite time of 
the interview or meeting. It may continue well past that, in community, at events, in synagogue, 
during Sabbath or holiday meals, at lectures, among other places. This is both a privilege and 
responsibility not afforded to outsiders whose access is far more limited and detached. However, 
with this access comes challenges and great responsibility. 
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 Regardless of the level of observance of the participant, because in fact, even when the participant was non-
observant, they were at ease and open being that I was an insider, even if they themselves were or had shifted 
‘outside’. There is plenty of shame and protectiveness of community even in cases where women became 
disenchanted and not affiliated or where they were not affiliated in the first place. 
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 Verta Taylor, “Feminist Methodology in Social Movements Research,” Qualitative Sociology 21, no. 4 (1998): 
357-379, 371; and Joan Acker, Kate Barry, and Joke Esseveld, “Objectivity and Truth: Problems in Doing Feminist 
Research,” in Feminism and Social Change: Bridging Theory and Practice, ed. Heidi Gottfried (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1996), 60-87, 80, 84. 
 
Consider the complex and dependent power dynamic that Susan Weiss had with her participants being that she was 
their attorney and presumably also charged them a fee for her legal work on their behalf. 
427
 Joan Acker, Kate Barry, and Joke Esseveld, “Objectivity and Truth” in Feminism and Social Change: Bridging 
Theory and Practice, ed. Heidi Gottfried (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 68. 
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Due to the potential challenges that might arise, some might interrogate my positionality 
as an insider. There may be the approach that I am exploiting my positionality in order to 
conduct sensitive research and I also may be critiqued due to my positionality with the claim that 
I am ‘too close’. This claim may manifest in a variety of ways. For example, I might have a loss 
of objectivity due to my personal connection with the communities being explored (although 
feminists and others have long argued that there is no such a thing as true objectivity) and this 
lack of objectivity might be perceived as detrimental to the research. Perhaps I may 
unconsciously make assumptions and/or overlook aspects or routine behaviours of participants or 
communities which might stand out to a researcher with more distance. There is also the 
possibility that participants may make assumptions about what I know as an insider, and so they 
do not tell me. That said, feminist scholars have long made the claim that there will always be 
‘untold’ knowledge and never will there be ‘full Truth’. There is also the risk that perhaps my 
closeness might cloud the ‘bigger picture’ and/or that I might focus too heavily on groups in 
which I am an insider. For example, I have been faced with the question in my community and at 
academic conferences ‘if it is possible that my research is too Orthodox-focused?’. There is also 
the possibility that some participants might feel more comfortable with outsider, and because I 
am an insider, may feel there is not enough distance to ‘really open up’. They may feel 
uncomfortable sharing with someone on the inside because of the shame and taboos associated 
with ‘airing dirty laundry’ (on which I elaborate in chapter six) and because they may continue to 
see me in the community we will continue to share after the interview or indeed even after the 
entire project is complete. (Of course, the converse may also be true. That is some participants 
may only feel comfortable sharing with me because I am a familiar. Participants may feel that 
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their stories are not really ‘airing dirty laundry’ or giving religion or community a ‘bad name’ 
because I am an insider to it). 
I tried to overcome and anticipate some of the potential challenges of my insider status by 
proactively anticipating them. For example, I kept some distance with agunot I interviewed by 
not sharing my personal thoughts or feelings, beliefs or opinions. I told participants, ‘assume I 
know nothing’ and asked them to share their stories ‘from the beginning’. Only after they relayed 
what they wanted to share in their own words would I try to fill in any gaps or direct the 
conversation by asking questions off my prepared questionnaire (which can be found in the 
appendices). I also had to compartmentalize my identity as a researcher and activist and not 
interfere in participant’s cases. For example, when attending rallies against recalcitrant men in 
New York, I only attended rallies against recalcitrant husbands when I did not interview their 
wives.  I also once had to decline an offer posed by a participant to attempt to trap her husband 
by ‘picking him up or allowing him to pick me up’ at a Jewish singles event she knew he was 
attending. 
I also confronted my own blind spots with help from my committee, recognizing that I 
would be naturally protective of Orthodoxy, rabbis and batei din and resistant to some of the 
claims made by ‘feminist’ aguna experts about ‘best solutions’ who place the blame for get 
refusal solely with the Orthodox halakha, rabbis and batei din. As a result, I focused on 
following the data presented by my heterogeneous stakeholders and cross-referenced as much as 
possible with multiple other data sources, thus making arguments based on a plurality and 
inclusivity of data sources, including but not limited to primary and ‘insider’. As a result, I have 
come to relay facts about rabbis and batei din, for example which may have been challenging for 
me as an insider had I not focused on following the data expressed by participants. This approach 
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was also a useful technique to abate the concern that I might be too Ortho-focused. The research 
itself demonstrates the egalitarian approach taken so that the study is reflective of diverse 
women’s experiences of get refusal. That said, there is a tremendous weight of accountability, 
responsibility, and even guilt throughout the research process being that I am a part of the 
community. I do still attempt to be careful with my portrayal of Jewish law, Jewish men or the 
religion more broadly as the sole cause of get refusal, and I am cautious in my writing regarding 
the words I choose and where and/whether I choose to publish
428
.As this study illustrates, I take a 
more nuanced approach attempting to walk on the edges of different groups, a broad community 
of stakeholders, and weave their various interests into a complex tapestry. 
There are another set of challenges I face as an insider that are ‘read on’ to me based on 
my identity. For example, and as I have noted earlier in this study, being a young woman 
working on get refusal I would often be read as a feminist, a negative thing for many rabbis, 
lawyers, dayyanim and at times even viewed as a negative attribute by women I interviewed. 
Likewise, my identity as female, Orthodox, single (never married) were all similarly interpreted 
by participants- sometimes as a benefit, and sometimes as a detriment thus sometimes enabling 
access and sometimes hindering it. 
Now that we have explored the consequences of my insider status and the religious-
feminist approach that emerged consequently, I will elucidate my deliberate decision to embrace 
gendered, socio-legal storytelling methodologically and epistemologically. 
 
Socio-Legal Storytelling 
A socio-legal approach acknowledges that the law is not always what it claims to be- not 
always equal, accessible, just, fair, or pure and untainted by the social realm, other legal systems, 
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and the messy coexistence of alternative normative orderings, beliefs and mores
429
. In fact, a 
socio-legal approach understands that law is inseparable from social life and social life is 
inseparable from law. Inevitably law is affected by “how and what people inside and outside the 
official legal system think about law”430. The converse is also true; that is, social orders are 
affected by the normative legal frameworks that are at play both inside and outside of that 
particular social order. Law and society are in a dynamic relationship, constantly and reflexively 
impacting one another. In the context of this study then, a socio-legal approach would embrace 
the understanding that the social normativities that prevail regarding get refusal have been 
influenced by the (secular) legal amendments and the (Jewish legal) halakhic approaches and 
decisions, while conversely, the legal amendments and the halakhic decisions have been 
impacted by prevailing social normativities. Additionally, individual narratives will show women 
strategically straddling both, intersecting legal systems and tactically choosing in which realm 
they might fare better. This contention aligns with that of Fournier, who also reaches this 
conclusion in her important study
431
. 
Stretching the principles of a socio-legal analysis further, a gendered analysis is one that 
“overtly attempts to take account of women’s social experiences, as expressed through a 
deconstruction of falsely universalized knowledge”, contrary to traditional scholarship which 
“conforms to norms of objectivity, rationality”432. In embracing a gendered socio-legal analysis 
here, I am giving a platform to women’s voices so that their realities may deconstruct the 
“falsely universalized knowledge” that surrounds the phenomenon of get refusal (such as the 
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notion that the ‘problem is solved’, the insistence that there are ‘just a few’ agunot, or the denial 
of get extortion as a tactic to exact civil concessions, to name but three of many). 
This study employs a gendered socio-legal approach in that it embraces a multiplicity of 
perspectives, rather than a single, hierarchical authoritative state-legal, rabbinic or activist voice. 
Hence, storytelling, and particularly storytelling from the margins, or from alternative 
perspectives is embraced in this analysis, adding depth, complexity, and a more holistic, 
inclusive picture of lived realities and experiences, building on some of the studies discussed in 
the previous chapter. Brooks and Gewirtz in, Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law 
contend, “storytelling disrupts rational social science, invites both the teller and the listener to 
confront messy and complex realities”433, and that is precisely my goal- to disrupt normative 
ideas surrounding get refusal and open up a space for us to confront the realities regarding get 
refusal, by listening to the stories despite the widespread misconceptions and repudiation of the 
phenomenon. 
 According to Robert Kagan, a socio-legal approach, and particularly one that embraces 
storytelling, is concerned with the effects of law on individuals and groups, especially those who 
are most often on the limits of society and frequently left out of law and legal discourse 
altogether
434
. Consequently, and contrary to the literature in the previous chapter, the analysis in 
this study includes the narratives of women refused a get who are most frequently left out of law 
and legal discourse, with the explicit goal of empowerment, voicing voids, and revealing a more 
accurate picture of the realities and experiences of get refusal.  For example, women shared their 
realities: 
                                                          
433
 Citing Hannah Arendt; Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds., Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 33.  
434
 Robert A. Kagan, “What Socio-Legal Scholars Should Do When There is Too Much Law to Study,” Journal of 
Law and Society 22, no. 1 (1995): 140-148, 145. 
157 
 
“If we are going to be real about it the bigger picture, it is that rabbinic leaders refuse to 
acknowledge that there is abuse within their communities”435 
“In reality, he had no action taken against him by or within the community”436 
“It’s not really about money or extortion, rather it’s really ALL about control”437 
Gendered storytelling has traditionally not been considered a legitimate scholarly 
approach to data collection and this perhaps explains to some degree the absence of gendered 
analyses within the existing literature on get refusal, (and indeed even in those texts/studies 
completed by women). The male point of view, characterized as and embodied through the 
traditional methods and goals of ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’, have historically been preferred 
(especially in academia) given that they were considered neutral and scientific (see discussion of 
attempts to quantify agunot, to follow). However, according to Ann Oakley, a qualitative method 
paradigm is an alternative, albeit inherently better way of knowing
438
. That is to say that though 
we are still constricted by the broader methodological tendency (which is male), Oakley argues 
that qualitative methods are better- not more neutral, truthful, or objective, but rather more 
complete and complex - and in that, they enable a more accurate and ethical way of researching.  
In doing a gendered socio-legal analysis then, I am embracing qualitative methods, ‘feminine 
narratives’439 and simultaneously deconstructing the dualism or the fictive, rigid binary that (still 
to some degree) exists between scholarly ‘male’ and low-brow ‘female’ methods in academic 
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analyses. This methodological approach welcomes a multiplicity of knowledges and experiences, 
one of the drawbacks of some of the existing literature
440
.  
A goal of using a gendered, socio-legal analysis is to decenter law, and thus too, 
traditional legal methods which are often exclusionary and reproduce law as true, by adding 
women’s stories, narratives, and experiences so that we may grasp the significance of what had 
been previously left out
441
. And this is reflected in the existing literature on get refusal to some 
extent. Thus my inclusion of feminine methods and feminine stories highlights all the more so 
the gaps that previously existed
442
. Indeed one woman I interviewed expressed her thanks to me 
for our meeting with, “now I have a voice”443. A gendered analysis using women’s stories then 
gives fuller, richer accounts of events and experiences and according to Carol Weisbrod may 
even be considered another “version of (Geertz’s) ‘thick description’ giving us a fuller sense of 
what is real”444. 
I am interested in a female-centred, revolutionary writing practice which would subvert 
the dominant patriarchal use of women’s stories445, inspired by feminist philosopher, Helene 
Ciouxs.  In fact, Oakley coined the phrase “mutual listening”446, which implies that we hear and 
                                                          
440
 Kathey Lahey, “Until Women Themselves Have Told All There Is To Tell”, 535. 
441
 Lori Beaman, “Legal Ethnography: Exploring the Gendered Nature of Legal Method,” Critical Criminology 7, 
no. 1 (1996): 53-74, 68. 
442
 By using the term(s), ‘feminine narrative’ or ‘feminine storytelling’ as opposed to ‘women’s’ or ‘female 
storytelling’ I am referencing Helene Cixous, and her understanding that language is not neutral. Cixous believed 
that language is a patriarchal instrument that represents males and their interests. This conception, based on 
‘logocentrism’ (western beginnings and idealism) is morphed by Cixous into ‘phallocentrism’, or that which 
privileges masculinity. Cixous then is critical of this gender distinction and binary opposition and embraces the 
concept of ‘feminine narrative/writing’ as the freedom not to belong to the binary of phallocentrism. She stated, 
“feminine writing (narrative) liberates women and language; it’s linguistic liberation” (137-138). And as such, her 
goal is to read and write texts in order to displace the operating concepts of femininity and masculinity in major 
discourses governing society, and it is in this spirit which I adapt her term here. 
443
 J.S. January 19, 2014. 
444
 Carol Weisbrod, Butterfly, The Bride: Essays on Law, Narrative, and the Family (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999), 13. 
445
 Weiss and Gross-Horowitz have expropriated women’s stories in a patriarchal and derogatory manner, even 
despite their own self-identification as feminists. 
446
 Ann Oakley, Experiments in Knowing (Malden, MA: New Press, 2000), 47. 
159 
 
give voice to those who had previously been silent and silenced. It is in that vein that I conduct 
gendered analyses in this study and that feminine narratives not only anchor my analysis of get 
refusal, but are given a platform throughout this study.  
Jane Baron contends that storytelling, in its multiplicity of forms must be viewed as a 
power. Understanding that stories may empower the narrator by giving them a voice is 
imperative. In fact, we must have a “commitment to the POWER of language and to the 
reclaiming of that language which has been made to work against us; in the transformation of 
silence into language and action…”, according to Audre Lorde447. In this vein, the socio-legal 
storytelling utilized here challenges those who get to speak in law most often, in the context of 
get refusal. The goal is to question, which voices are heard and which stories are told? By 
whom? Who has been silenced
448
? Women said things like: “Women should at least be heard but 
also have control over bodies and futures”449 and “I felt that anything I would have to say would 
not be heard”450. Thus, it is the women refused a get who have been silenced and it is the men’s 
stories, both the recalcitrant husbands’ and batei din’s, that have been at the centre of approaches 
most often (although I note emphatically that it is not only men who silence the women, rather 
many ‘expert advocates’ who work on behalf of agunot also silence the women, as I explore a 
points throughout this study). The choice to embrace this type of storytelling methodology and 
epistemology reverses these imbalances and serves as a corrective. 
Baron further argues, that stories have a “transformative potential” yet the law and 
dominant patriarchal normative orders are “highly resistant to stories which may challenge its 
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own conventions and ideological narratives”451. And indeed, throughout the course of conducting 
this research, I experienced resistance from some who viewed this project and its goals and 
narratives as threatening to their normative conventions and ideological narratives. Thus, in 
using the method of storytelling, this gendered socio-legal research is trying to unearth often 
disregarded transformative narratives and subjugated knowledges with the intent that they do 
challenge norms, stretch minds and ruffle brains (rather than feathers). The goal is about 
awareness and visibility, not tunnel vision of dominant lenses. I can only hope that this project 
may have additional benefits and that Farber and Sherry were correct in their observation that, 
“stories from the bottom”452 or the margins are particularly valuable to research as they ‘cure 
problems in law, including at times, gender discrimination
453
. Thus, it is my hope that my 
deliberate choice to include “counter-stories” as a powerful tool for “outgroups” may in fact lead 
to changes in social and legal realities
454
.  
I will include here a brief discussion of a few studies that embrace qualitative, gendered, 
socio-legal storytelling
455
 with similar methodological and epistemological intentions in order to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of such approaches. Each example illustrates how individual 
women use storytelling as a powerful tool to engage with and potentially transform their social 
and/or legal realities, to challenge the status quo
456
 in line with the principles of critical legal 
pluralism (though the authors may not frame it as such) and each example is at the nexus of law, 
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gender, and storytelling. It is from these examples that I draw inspiration for this study exploring 
get refusal, adapting key insights to the get refusal context.  
 Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith, in Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of 
Recognition, make clear that “storytelling constitutes social action” in their analysis of the 
“belated narrating”457 of grandmothers’ forced into sexual slavery during WWII. Stories are 
emotive and are thus effective in eliciting socio-legal transformations; “Stories can interfere in 
the public sphere, contest social norms, expose the fictions of ‘official history’, and prompt 
resistance beyond the provenance of the story within and beyond the borders of the nation and 
community- these are known as “disruptions of storytelling”458. I argue that the feminine 
narratives included throughout this study be viewed as examples of ‘disruptive storytelling’459 
which examine whether particular laws or norms are relevant to them and will determine their 
behaviours. For example: 
“Religious community should be embarrassed that this is going on”460  
“How the women feel is how men should be meant to feel- trapped and alone”461 
“It should be possible for secular remedy to solve iggun”462 
“Beit din should have power to issue a get”463  
“We shouldn’t have to explain to anyone why we want a get”464 
In these excerpts women illustrate that they are law-creating and norm-creating, indicating what 
‘should’ be done in particular socio-legal moments and contexts. This disruptive storytelling thus 
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has powerful transformative capacity and framed in this way, also builds on critical legal 
pluralist approaches. The stories told throughout the study disrupt normative ideas about Jewish 
marriage, divorce, and Jewish women’s (and men’s) experiences, and their uniformity. The 
narratives ‘set the record straight’ so to speak, by expressing their realities which are in fact 
contrary to mass perception. For example, stories and feminine narrative disrupt the perception 
that women are passive in their legal (or other) identities and while navigating through their 
experiences of being refused a get in plural legal orders.  
Sara Horowitz’s goal in sharing her own narrative about receiving a get in, Jewish 
Women Speak Out, was to “bring the personal into the realm of the scholarly by blurring the line 
that separates the ‘objective outsider’ who watches and analyzes; from the ‘insider’ who 
experiences and has the ability to recount, but often does not get the last, authoritative word” 465. 
Horowitz (though writing from a position of privilege as a Professor) takes on the ‘malestream’ 
and writes against it knowingly. “While the traditional get ritual can work to silence and 
humiliate women, our own capacities enable us to choose how we experience it…the telling 
itself becomes incorporated into the ritual” and empowers the silenced466. Horowitz draws a 
more holistic picture of law’s complexities and the transformative impact of feminine narratives 
when they are used to enable and empower women (in contrast to the studies discussed in the 
previous chapter).  
Susan Hirsch’s, Pronouncing and Persevering, challenges the dominant stereotypes of 
the silent, veiled Muslim woman using examples of Swahili women’s storytelling in Kadhi 
courts. In reality, as the stories show, and similar to Jewish women, “Swahili women actively 
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pursue claims in court, telling eloquent stories that challenge the circumstances of their lives and 
their gendered, legal and linguistic positions”467. Hirsch notes, “Narrative is a form of 
countermajoratarian argument, a genre for oppositionists intent of showing up the exclusions that 
occur in law- a way of saying, you cannot understand until you have listened to our story”468 and 
as in our Kenyan example, this is particularly true for get refusal. Mesuravot get are often 
excluded in law and society and from legal and social inquiries, and especially in Toronto, where 
there’s formidable denial of get refusal’s mere existence. 
These three examples challenge normative, hegemonic legal scholarship and illustrate 
that it must stretch to include feminine narrative or rather, it must stretch its (mis)understanding 
that feminine narratives are not equal to law because in reality, “‘excluded voices narrative’ can 
effect legal change by correcting partial representations”469. Feminine narratives, like those of 
the Japanese comfort women, Sara Horowitz, and the Swahili women in the Kadhi Court, are not 
only a means of “talking back”- where marginalized women move from the margins to the main 
stage, they also allow women to transform their silence, where there had previously been void, 
into language and then potentially into action
470
. The examples illustrate that female narrating or 
storytelling in law is a powerful tool (and at times resistance) that does elicit legal and social 
transformation
471
 (which also reflects critical legal pluralism). Women act as legal innovators 
and mobilizers through their storytelling which illustrates that law both arises from, belongs to, 
and responds to everyone; influencing their legal and social environments, just as they are 
                                                          
467
 Susan F. Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and the Discourses of Disputing in an African Islamic 
Court (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1998), 10-11. 
468
 Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds. Law’s Stories (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 13. 
469
 Judy Scales Trent in Susan Sage Heinzelman and Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, Representing Women: Law, 
Literature, and Feminism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 5. 
470
 Susan F. Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1998), 219, 239, 243. 
471
 Helene Cixous called for feminine experience to be included in law and called on women to “write themselves”. 
Close to Derrida (both in real life and in ideology) and Bourdieu, Cixous was opposed to rigid, sharp dualities, and 
essentializing of concepts (6). Thus, feminine writing, and gendered storytelling in law was seen by all three 
scholars as a deconstructive step, the beginning of legal and social transformation in and of itself. 
164 
 
influenced by them. “Women use language and story in public and their voices may begin to 
sound less out-of-place or threatening. Their stories reshape hegemonic approaches to law and 
gender opening possibilities while still reflecting relations of power…”472, and this is a goal in 
including women’s stories here- that hegemonic approaches to get refusal and mesuravot get 
might be challenged in light of the complex narratives coming to the fore. 
Each example illustrates marginalized stories as a transformative socio-legal method to 
unsettle the socio-legal status quo, giving unique representation to particular voices, perspectives 
and experiences of victimization, subjugation, and discrimination traditionally left out of legal 
scholarship and ignored when shaping law
473
. This approach can acknowledge experiences of the 
East and Southeast Asian comfort women which had been previously ‘taboo’, or can allow 
Swahili women to strategically tell stories to change their social and legal realities and challenge 
widespread misconceptions about Muslim women, or can allow space for the stories of 
mesuravot get who have been repeatedly silenced and sidelined yet actively navigate the multiple 
legal systems to which they ascribe.  
 Thus, the significance of mesuravot get storytelling is substantial. They may reconfigure 
power relations socially and they may reconfigure power relations legally by challenging 
individuals’, communities’, and batei din’s normative, hegemonic understandings through the act 
of sounding their silences. Their storytelling also empowers women, themselves and others by 
‘trickling down’, and shows it is “possible for women to narrate their lives against the strictures 
in which they live”474. Moreover the significance of mesuravot get telling their stories has 
transformative power despite the limits set by culture, law and language
475
. Though I note, that 
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there are most definitely challenges to my methodological and epistemological contentions about 
women’s storytelling476, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks, shattering the constructed 
normative ideologies about women, about storytelling, and about women’s storytelling in socio-
legal contexts, in this case, Jewish women navigating plural legal systems to secure a get
477
. 
Simply put, getting in between and amongst the lines through narrative transports the reader and 
the writer to a deeper place of understanding from an academic or scholarly perspective, but also 
(not instead of) from a human, empathetic, and open perspective; resulting not in a simpler 
understanding because of the telling of a story, but in a deeper, multi-tiered, multi-faceted and 
complex understanding
478
. 
 
To Count or not to Count? 
In addition to my deliberate choices to utilize gendered socio-legal storytelling and to 
develop a complex religious-feminist approach mixing feminist precepts, socio-legal methods, 
and respect for halakha and its observers, another deliberate choice was made in the research 
design. I am consciously eschewing quantifying in this study as a result of frequently being 
asked to quantify agunot and as a result of the unsuccessful attempts to quantify agunot in the 
past
479
. I argue that attempts to quantify agunot
480
 are doomed to fail, and furthermore, that they 
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are misguided attempts in the first place. The existing studies are flawed
481
 because getting an 
accurate number is impossible due to a definitional issue, an assumption of self- identification, 
and because a statistic usurps attention from the issue of get refusal and extortion, anchoring 
wives to broken down marriages and overshadows the significant concerns that emerge from a 
more nuanced study such as the pervasiveness of domestic abuse.  
Arriving at an agreed upon definition of ‘aguna/mesurevet get’ is a prerequisite for 
establishing an accurate and accepted statistic, and being that agreeing to this universal definition 
is impossible, a reliable statistic on this issue is, by default, also impossible. There is no 
uniformity or consensus among and across Jewish communities about the definitions, and the 
terms have shifted for various reasons historically and geographically sensitive. Who is an aguna 
versus a mesurevet get and who decides this in each jurisdiction? Moreover, inactive cases and 
new cases are most often not counted in surveys as there is frequently a minimum length 
requirement imposed by batei din in order to earn the legal designation of ‘aguna’ and which 
may vary court by court. Different rabbinical courts and support organizations from city to city 
have diverging views on definitions - some seeking narrower definitions resulting in a smaller 
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statistic, and some seeking a broader definitions resulting in a larger statistic. Consequently, 
there is a significant definitional issue preventing a legitimate and widely agreed upon statistic. 
The presumption of and need for the self- identification of agunot to a support group or 
beit din in order to be counted in quantifying studies is also flawed. As with other forms of 
domestic abuse, many women are too frightened, too ashamed, too proud, or too concerned with 
their children’s well-being and privacy to turn to support organizations or they me be too 
disenchanted to go to beit din, and yet they do not exist (statistically) from a census’ point of 
view because they have not self identified to one of the organizations being polled.  Attempts to 
quantify agunot are not concerned with counting women refused a get who have not (yet) sought 
support or opened case files. Polling support organizations or courts about their aguna cases- the 
women that presented themselves to the organizations- rather than attempting to track or account 
for the women themselves, undercuts the magnitude of the issue and women’s experiences 
actively navigating through the phenomenon of get refusal.   
Aside from both the definitional issue as well as the presupposition of self-identification, 
the third reason that attempts to quantify agunot is an undependable methodological approach is 
because seeking a number clouds the issues and prevents meaningful and constructive 
engagement with and usurps attention from the issue of get refusal itself. It is for this reason 
primarily that I eschew quantifying in method and in principle in this project. In her important 
article, “The Aguna- A Statistic or a Real Problem?”, Rachel Levmore a rabbinic court advocate 
in Israel on behalf of women and one of very few sitting members of the State of Israel’s 
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Commission for the Appointment of Rabbinical Court Judges
482
, brilliantly captures my 
argument.   
Get refusal is the ultimate form of domestic abuse...It is an untenable situation that 
Jewish women can be held captive in a marriage from which they have exited 
emotionally as well as in a practical manner, but are not able to exit in a formal manner; 
...that the husband, is more powerful not only than his wife, not only than her family, not 
only than the entire community, but perhaps most troubling, that an individual man is far 
more powerful than the beit din which cannot dissolve the marriage against his will. 
These principles must be spoken about...
483
. 
 
 The outcry should be against the very possibility of such instances occurring and the untold 
suffering of the modern-day aguna. Those who relate to the aguna problem would do well to 
turn focus from numbers to the voices, and narratives of those who actually are encountering the 
phenomena. A local Toronto Rabbi, with training in guidance and counselling, of the Aish 
Thornhill Community Shul, recently stated that it really doesn’t matter if the synagogue down 
the street (the BAYT, the largest Orthodox synagogue in Canada) had “only one or two agunot 
out of  their 800 members because it is such a small and insignificant number.”484. Besides, he 
said, it isn’t his congregation, where he said there are no agunot. He went on to say that even 
when there are agunot in the community on occasion, there is nothing rabbis can do because the 
men leave Toronto
485
. The well-regarded pulpit rabbi whose mission it is to engage in 
community outreach, sent the opposite message regarding agunot indicating that when 
communities focus on the numbers, women fall through the cracks. 
In principle, do fifty agunot matter less than five hundred? I argue, the mantra ought to 
be, ‘one aguna is too many’ rather than how many agunot are there?486 It does not matter how 
                                                          
482
 Levmore also has a PhD in Talmud and Jewish law, is one of the authors for the Prenuptial Agreement for 
Mutual Respect, a widely used prenup in Israel and is the Director of the Agunot and Get-Refusal Prevention 
Project, of the International Young Israel Movement in Israel and the Jewish Agency. 
483Dr. Rachel Levmore, “The Aguna- a Statistic or a ‘Real’ Problem?” Jerusalem Post, November 16, 2009. 
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 Rabbi Avraham Rothman, AEVAW Talk, “Behind Closed Doors”, November 14, 2017, Toronto. 
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 Ibid. 
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 As I said to the Canadian Jewish News in 2009. 
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many agunot there are, it matters only that the phenomenon persists
487
. Staying fixated on 
quantifying agunot bestows meaning on to the number and implies that one statistic might 
invoke anger, shock, action, while another number is negligible, eliciting only tacit acceptance 
and passivity and these reactions are subjective and potentially dangerous
488
. We can argue 
endlessly about the critiques of scientific method more broadly as an appropriate (socio-legal or 
social science) research method, but in fact people would do well to turn their focus from the 
question of numbers to the plurality of experiences, voices, and narratives of those encountering 
the phenomena as per Rae Anderson’s piece in Ethnographic Feminisms: Essay in 
Anthropology, titled “Three Voices” which all tell the same story but with three different voices: 
one poetic and evocative, one through images, and one from training in the academy. In “Three 
Voices”, no voice can be more authoritative than the others because “all contribute to 
knowledge…the voices complement, contradict and hence enrich each other. It is only 
Convention who stills the Polyphony, who privileges one sort of discourse over another”489 and I 
argue that quantifying ought not to be privileged at the expense of losing first-hand knowledge, 
experience, and narratives. 
As a result, (and as opposed to quantifying,) I argue in favour of an alternate method of 
inquiry and analysis for feminist socio-legal research which more accurately illustrates the 
significance of the particular issue at hand - Jewish divorce refusal. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the use of narratives and “thick description” rather than quantifying, using scientific 
                                                          
487Paul Lungen, “Despite Changes in Law, Agunah Problem Persists,” Canadian Jewish News, March 25, 2010. 
http://www.cjnews.com/news/despite-changes-law-agunah-problem-persists.  
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 For example, the number 462, that was most recent statistic that was released for agunot in North America, was 
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489Rae Anderson, “Engendering the Mask: Three Voices,” in Ethnographic Feminisms, eds. Sally Cole and Lynne 
Phillips (Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press, 1995), 207-231. 
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method, produces more meaningful research
490
 by “exploring the meaning of events in the eyes 
of women”, rather than others reading meaning onto events that certain women have 
experienced
491
, in keeping with the deliberate objectives of this project. No one can claim the 
privilege of authoritative knowledge of social reality other than those experiencing it. In this 
vein, rather than attempting to quantify agunot, it would be more constructive to use the voices 
of agunot to tell the story rather than relying only on questionable numbers. This method, rather 
than quantifying, accurately portrays Jewish women as active agents navigating and negotiating 
their way through get refusal, rather than silencing them and cutting out large portions of them 
due to definitional shortfalls and presumptions of self-identification to particular support 
organizations. Moreover, as Shulamit Reinharz articulates in her chapter Feminist Oral History 
from her book with Lynn Davidman, Feminist Methods is Social Research, “oral history also 
corrects the biased view that had previously not included the voices of those at the centre… 
injustices can be righted when people tell their stories”492 and this is a goal of this study- to be 
more inclusive than the studies that preceded by giving space to women refused a get to speak on 
their own terms. Thus, not only is gendered socio-legal storytelling an appropriate research 
method for my research on Jewish divorce refusal and extortion, it also aligns with the critical 
legal pluralism approach I am developing herein, and additionally it would be inappropriate not 
to employ the method. I argue that the research benefits more from narratives than numbers. 
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Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973); David M. 
Engel and Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2003); Susan F. Hirsch 
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How: Seek and You Shall Find: 
This remainder of the chapter will reflect on the research methods themselves rather than 
the methodological and epistemological description of the research design, discussed in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. In other words, I will describe how I was able to locate 
participants for the research. The significance of this discussion is three-fold. Complexities 
conducting primary, qualitative, empirical research will be illuminated, the importance of being 
an ‘insider’ researcher will be further elucidated, and above all, this discussion will support the 
contention of Toronto’s resistance to acknowledging and improving siruv get with greater 
openness in New York. 
  Participants in New York and Toronto were located in multiple ways, namely, through 
responent-drive samplings, through pre-exsiting field contacts with experts and leading support 
organizations, and with a couple of strategically placed ‘calls for participants’. The goal was that 
participants would partake as willingly and organically as possible despite the predetermined 
target number of interviews. Respondent-driven sampling, is a more accurate variation of the 
snowball technique
493
. In his paper on respondent-driven sampling, Douglas Heckathorn explains 
that the respondent-driven sampling is particularly useful when dealing with a 'hidden 
population'. According to Heckathorn, this may include a population for which no sampling 
frame already exists - so that the population's actual size and boundaries are unknown. Because 
there is no accurate sampling frame already in existence for  mesuravot get, employing this 
methodology is more precise than the snowball technique which does not include this nuanced 
acknowledgement of 'hidden populations'. 
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  Respondent-driven sampling also has the benefit of limiting potential biases of the 
researcher recruiting particular participants (only those they may already be acquainted with), 
and it provides a means for speeding the recruitment process while simultaneously ensuring that 
different sectors of the target population are adequately represented among the participants. 
Within the ‘hidden population’ there is diversity across the traditional identity markers yet 
women unite because of their shared, anchored/limbo status, as mesuravot get, developing a 
(concealed) network (often meeting one another through lawyers, social workers, rabbis, 
etcetera). Thus, it is because the sampling is respondent-driven that diversity among participants 
is more likely because members of the ‘hidden population’ know each other, while the 
reasearcher, is unfamiliar, and outsider to the particularities of the hidden population. Perhaps 
most importantly, the respondent-driven method seems to empower the participants, which is an 
explicit goal of this project, as previously discussed.  
  Aside from the respondent driven sampling method, I also have the benefit of working 
closely with Organization for the Resolution of Agunot (ORA) since 2009. ORA and their 
executive director, Rabbi Jeremy Stern, have helped well over 280 women get their get since the 
organization’s inception in 2002. They are a New York- based non-profit organzation that is 
international in scope, with a lengthy waiting list in addition to approximately seventy active 
cases at any given time. Stern sent out my call for participants to his entire database of 
mesuravot get and I was overwhlemed by the significant response from a broad cross section of 
women. He understands the potential benfits of both empowering individual women, and more 
broadly, stimulating greater awareness and education stemming from this research, hence he 
shared my call for participants without being proprietary. 
---- Original Message ---- 
From: Rabbi Jeremy Stern  
To: "Yael CB Machtinger"  
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Sent: Tue, Oct 22, 2013, 3:14 PM 
Subject: Re: hi 
Yael, 
 
It's great to hear from you. I just sent out a mass email to all current and former agunot in our files. I hope you 
receive many responses! 
 
Best of luck with your research, and please keep me posted. 
 
All the best, 
Jeremy 
 
On Oct 22, 2013, at 3:12 PM, "Rabbi Jeremy Stern" wrote: 
Dear Current and Former Agunot, 
 
I hope this email finds you well. A PhD student at York University, Yael Machtinger, who is a friend of mine, is 
writing her doctoral dissertation on agunot in New York and Toronto. She is looking to interview current and 
former agunot and asked me to reach out to you to see if you would be interested in speaking with her. Your 
participation could greatly advance her research, which will hopefully assist in advancing our advocacy on behalf 
of agunot. 
 
If you are interested in speaking with Yael, please email her at testemail or call her at testemail. I do not have any 
more information about her research than what I've shared with you, so please be in touch with her if you have 
any questions. 
 
Thank you so much, 
Jeremy 
 
Rabbi Jeremy Stern, Executive Director, Organization for the Resolution of Agunot (ORA) 
ORA is the only non-profit organization addressing the agunah crisis on a case-by-case basis worldwide. 
 
 
       Perhaps not surprisingly, though noteworthy, I had a contrary experience within my own 
community. In Toronto, when I reached out to three distinct groups I was faced with reticence 
and reluctance. These groups are: TorontoGrapevine, Act to End Violence Against Women 
(AEVAW- previously, Jewish Women International Canada), and TASC (Toronto Aguna 
Support Coalition). The three groups are in different levels of development- one is decades old 
while one is fledgling- and each caters to a different, but at times overlapping demographic. 
While TorontoGrapevine is a list serve for mostly religious women and requires references in 
order to be added, AEVAW is a non-denominational organization that changed its name to make 
clear that its mandate included serving also non-Jewish women, whom it found it was helping 
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more than the observant community at times
494. TASC is a coalition of ‘Modern Orthodox’ 
community members- a lawyer, community activists, and some current and former mesuravot 
get, among others, who have yet to get off the ground. It is virtually unheard of, has no 
media/internet presence, and its mission is still ambiguous. In all three cases, these groups 
responded that were unable to support this project. They did, however help to prove the thesis- 
that there is a deep and persistent gap between legal regulation and social behaviour, as well as 
distinct resistance to manage and acknowledge get refusal in Toronto (compared to New York), 
with these impacting the mesuravot get in a myriad of previously unrecognized and silenced 
ways. Support groups do not support mesuravot get and there is a clear distinction on this point 
between Toronto and New York, with Toronto being markedly silent on this matter. 
      Being already an ‘insider’ to the Jewish (and Orthodox) community, I was a member of 
the TorontoGrapevine, run by women and for women, for the purposes of connecting, building 
community, and general networking among (religious) women. I had already been vetted and 
approved after sending in references, about two years prior to my request below (the same 
request sent out by ORA). I want to make explicit that the way I used specific phrases in other 
languages -Hebrew and Yiddish- situated me as an insider. My use of particular terminology, I 
hoped, would help the moderators to see that I was ‘one of them’ and make them comfortable to 
post my request.   
 
 
From: Yael Machtinger 
To: Group Moderator  
Subject: Looking to interview women who currently are/have been 'mesuravot get'.  
 
Dear women of the grapevine, 
My name is Yael Machtinger. I’m a frum, PhD Candidate in Socio-Legal Studies at York University. 
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175 
 
My Dissertation focuses on agunot who are mesuravot get and as such I am looking to interview women 
who currently are, or who were mesuravot get in each of three Jewish epicenters: Toronto, Montreal, and 
New York. I have already interviewed a number of women in New York (with the help of ORA - 
Organization for the Resolution of Agunot). 
Approval of my Dissertation Proposal by the Office of Research Ethics at York University will 
assure/guarantee confidentiality and anonymity. The purpose of the research is empowerment of 
women, and enabling them to be at the centre of scholarly socio-legal research, in line with halakha. 
Participants will be asked to share their stories and to answer some semi-structured questions. 
Participants can choose not to answer or withdraw at any time. 
The research may give you and/or the community a voice; it may allow you to narrate your own 
remembered past and in that way it may be affirming and beneficial. Your participation may also elicit 
positive change to you personally, and/or to our communities. 
"Great community depends on great conversation".  Please feel free to call my confidential #: 416-873-
7682  or email: testemail. Thanks in advance. 
This request, however, was never sent out to the women of the Grapevine list serve. I inquired 
with the moderators, after a few days went by without seeing my post. 
 
From: Yael Machtinger 
To: Group Moderator  
Subject: Following up  
 
Dear Group Moderator, 
I sent an email a couple of days ago and I am following up. I’m a doctoral candidate at York University 
and I am seeking to interview women who are agunos. 
I have not yet seen the post going out to the group and I am wondering when we can expect to see it, as it 
is time sensitive. 
Thanks in advance, tizku l'mitzvot, 
Yael Machtinger 
I got this response: 
 
 
From: Group Moderator  
To: Yael Machtinger 
Subject: Re: Following up  
 
  thanks, we got it and are discussing posting it. we will get back to you soon.  
 
 
A day or two later, I tried to ease their concerns: 
 
From: Yael Machtinger 
To: Group Moderator  
Subject: Re(2): Following up  
 
Dear Moderators, 
I am Yael Machtinger, the doctoral candidate who would like to send out the email that is under 
discussion. I would like to assure you that I have no agenda. I've been working on this project for the past 
four years (first for my MA, and now for my PhD).  
 
This has nothing what-so-ever to do with the events going on in New York in recent weeks. (Such as 
Rabbi Mendel Epstein’s arrest or Gital Dodelson’s story in the NY Post) 
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Please let me know if I can be a part of your discussion or address any questions or concerns that you 
might have. I would be happy to speak with you on the phone or come meet you in person. 
 
These women want to tell their story, and need a safe and trustworthy place to do so. You would be doing 
a great chesed! I can guarantee them confidentiality, and anonymity. I've had a lot of experience doing 
this, and have just returned from a trip to New York where (unfortunately), I interviewed dozens of 
agunos. Rabbi Jeremy Stern from ORA has supported me, and sent this very email to his entire database of 
agunos - over 200. 
 
I believe that the mission statement of the Grapevine is to allow for exactly this type of thing. It’s a safe, 
tznius place where women can share, and help one another.  
Respectfully, 
Yael Machtinger495 
 
I never heard back from them, and my request was never posted. This anecdote, illustrates how 
complex it was to garner participation with this research in Toronto, and particularly, that women 
impacted by, interested in, or who are themselves mesuravot get, are denied a voice in Toronto. 
The issue of get refusal is so taboo and riddled with many misconceptions that even in a ‘safe’, 
women-only, vetted forum, this conversation was too difficult to have openly (at least in the eyes 
of the moderators, through perhaps not the women members themselves). Collectively, as 
women refused a get and women working on their behalf, our mere existence is denied through 
silencing and consequently, so is our access to communal services whether it be a women’s list 
serve, a beit din, or communal support organizations; and this is in contrast to reports by New 
York participants. 
In my meeting with AEVAW, in 2014, I was shown a small pamphlet which was the 
main effort the organization had made on behalf of mesuravot get since its inception in the 
1980s. When I suggested a more inclusive approach to their domestic violence workshops, with 
some focusing directly on the persistent scrooge of iggun, or other concerted efforts on the issue 
of get refusal as a form of domestic abuse, I was deflected and told their efforts “focus now on 
women of all religious and ethnic communities”496 and thus there is no room to focus on get 
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refusal as a distinct form of domestic abuse. Subsequent to our meeting, AEVAW did run a 
series of articles in The Canadian Jewish News during the winter of 2015 about domestic abuse 
in religious circles, but there was no mention made of get refusal. In June 2016 AEVAW took a 
small advertisement out in The Community Link, a catalogue that is delivered to (mostly) 
Orthodox Jews throughout the greater Toronto area. In conjunction with Project S.A.R.A.H. 
(Stop Abusive Relationships at Home), based in New Jersey and New York, they held three 
community leader workshops: one for Rabbis and khasson (groom) teachers, one for Rebbitzins 
(rabbis’ wives), and one for kallah (bride) teachers and shadchanim (matchmakers)497. The ad 
read: “Domestic Abuse in Our Community” and the workshops were aimed at “recognizing the 
difference between shalom bayis problems and abuse, enabling the leaders to respond to 
suspicions of abuse, and supplying references for referral in cases of abuse”498. The ad 
prominently highlighted that the workshops were endorsed by Rabbi Mordechai Lowy, a well 
respected Orthodox, local rabbi. I was permitted to attend the workshop for kallah teachers and 
shadchanim. While I was (pleasantly) surprised to see a crowded room with chairs out-the-door 
and with at least forty Orthodox women in attendance, a testament to the prevalence of domestic 
violence even in Orthodox marriages, something that was denied vehemently until recent years, I 
was silenced when I attempted to make the link between domestic abuse and get refusal. In fact, 
when we were asked to pass our questions forward at the beginning of the presentation to be 
addressed at the end of the workshop, my question, which read: “can we discuss that refusing a 
get is also a form of domestic abuse and that women who are refused a get have also experienced 
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other types of domestic abuse?” was not shared. The question was not read to the group during 
the question period at the end, and although I handed it in within the first few minutes of the 
workshop, but rather, it was stifled by a moderator who kept it until the very end and then 
dismissed it for lack of relevance and lack of time. After the event, when I pressed one of the 
organizers on their silencing of the issue of get refusal she said that they had to be careful with 
what they speak about because the rabbis will not refer women to them or endorse them if they 
disapprove of their content in helping religious women; “we have to be careful not to ruffle their 
feathers”, she said. This claim needs corroboration but is potentially significant because it 
implies the power of the local rabbinate/beit din has a far reach. The one Jewish support 
organization is now not (solely) helping Jewish women, and is not (visibly) helping agunot. This 
should not be the case because this means mesuravot get have nowhere to turn for help, as my 
primary research illustrates (below). 
As for TASC, while I was invited to attend early meetings in 2012, the organization has 
yet to get off the ground. They were to focus on encouraging transparency and streamlining of 
procedures at Toronto Beit Din and to establish committees on directed efforts, including 
website, and education. To date and to the best of my knowledge most of the traction TASC 
enjoyed early on has faded and not much has been done to get them off the ground. I have also 
heard that although TASC solicited volunteers, when TASC is called or emailed the organization 
does not respond
499
. I have also heard during interviews that TASC will only formally help 
women who sign a legal retainer
500
. 
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The difficulties I describe regarding ‘how’ I located participants are indicative of a larger 
problem, beyond typical complexities regarding ‘data-collection’. Although enlisting participants 
to this type of research, dealing with sensitive and often hidden groups, may often be a challenge 
for any researcher, the challenge here was compounded. There is simply an unwillingness to 
acknowledge that siruv get exists and persists in Toronto following the legal amendments of the 
1980s and 1990s. Even among supporters of mesuravot get there seems to be reticence and 
reluctance to take a stand openly within the Toronto community. Each woman I interviewed in 
Toronto cited her isolation, having no organization to turn to for support. This must not be 
understated. Not one woman felt she had support from any existing organization. This is not to 
say that these women do not exist, or that the issue is not prevalent, but rather that there is no 
place for them to go for support, and so to, no place for me to go as a researcher looking for 
participants.  
Consequently, my being an ‘insider’ to the challenging Toronto community has been 
imperative both to getting to the underbelly of knowledge around siruv get in Toronto and to 
finding participants despite the challenges posed by the Toronto organizations. Without my well-
established, communal ties to various synagogues and friends across and from deep within the 
Toronto Jewish community, and having built rapport and trust all the while, this research would 
have been both unfeasible, and impossible to conduct in good conscience
501
. It was my own 
membership in the community coupled with my initial contacts which allowed me to then benefit 
from respondent-driven sampling and achieve a more natural, participant pool independent from 
an organization. The Toronto participants ‘snow-balled’ from friends of family, friends of 
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friends, and then most significantly- from each other. Furthermore, my Toronto ‘expert’ contacts 
such as rabbis, lawyers, and Canadian ‘aguna activists’ participated in large part because I was 
considered a trustworthy insider, born and raised in the community with a well-known family 
and traditional upbringing. And yet, despite this, some rabbis still resisted conversation (indeed, 
until this day). 
Simultaneously, I benefitted from the openness and kindness of ORA in New York for 
my participant pool there, which then also expanded with a respondent-driven sampling, taking 
me both in to Conservative communities and deep into Hasidic communities despite my having 
no ties there. Consequently, I arguably benefitted from a more holistic participant pool in New 
York, than in my native Toronto (ironically). 
In discussing ‘how’ I was able to locate participants for the research, I hope that some of 
the complexities in conducting primary research have become clear, that the importance of being 
an ‘insider’ researcher has been underscored, and that above all, the contention about greater 
openness in New York compared to distinct silences and resistance in Toronto has been 
furthered. 502 
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181 
 
Who: Profiling Participants: 
This section will reflect on the identities of the participants themselves. In other words, I 
will describe who participated in the research, focusing on the demographics of the women 
refused a get. This discussion has important implications and noteworthy findings that have not 
been made in other studies regarding who the women actually are. Namely, I will demonstrate in 
this section that siruv get is indiscriminate, cutting across typical identity barriers and affecting 
all types of women, not just the religious, which is a common and detrimental misconception. 
This revelation about siruv get’s inter-denominational impact notably leads us to consider get 
refusal as a distinct form of Jewish domestic abuse whereby refusal of a get is used as any other 
abuse tactic, cutting across forms of identity, time, and place, and impacting all types of women. 
I am often faced with the fallacy that only Ultra-Orthodox or Hasidic women are victims 
of get refusal and moreover, that if they would not be so willing to ‘submit to patriarchal 
religious structures they would not find themselves in such predicament, as to be refused a 
get’503.  These are similar to fallacies associated with other types of gendered abuse, like ‘she 
was asking for it because she was dressed promiscuously’. Just like this fiction, the fallacy 
claiming that the phenomenon of get refusal is one that impacts only the Ultra-Orthodox or 
Hasidic women due to their choice to be religious is grievous. Furthermore, by framing their get 
refusal a result of their choice of religious practice- that places the blame on the individual 
woman herself, simply because of her choices or identity. I argue, women have a right to religion 
and a right to divorce, not one or the other, but both. Furthermore, just as it is understood that 
sexual assault impacts all types of women, this is true with the abuse of siruv get as well. All 
types of women are impacted, not only the Ultra Orthodox. Blaming a woman’s religious 
observance for her being the target of abuse makes religion the cause or ‘problem’ and absolves 
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the aggressor, implying that women who are more stringent in their observance should always 
foresee the potential abuse of get refusal (similar to the troubling fallacy that a woman wearing a 
mini skirt should always foresee the potential rape).  In these scenarios, it is not only imperative 
that the onus be placed on the aggressor, but also that the very premise upon which the fallacy 
stands be itself exposed as false. My research illustrates, it is not just one category of woman 
more likely to be refused a get. The phenomenon, just like other abuses, is indiscriminate
504
. The 
mesuravot get ranged in age, class, ethnicity, level of religious observance, time spent as a 
mesurevet get, current marital status, and number of children.  
Indeed, my research demonstrates that siruv get cuts across observance levels and other 
identity markers as well. I interviewed women of diverse ethnic and national origins, at various 
socio-economic levels, at varied ages, women who were married for different lengths of time, 
women who married at different ages, women who were refused a get for different lengths of 
time, women with children and women without children, and women with varied current marital 
status. To clarify, the phenomenon of get refusal is not one that targets a small and 
distinguishable group of only Ultra-Orthodox women. Any Jewish woman might be impacted at 
any time; there is no formula or prototype to avoid. I interviewed women who self-defined as 
‘not-affiliated’, ‘not observant’, ‘Traditional’, Conservative, Modern-Orthodox, Ultra-Orthodox, 
and Hasidic. Included in this group were both women who were “frum from birth”, that is born 
into observant homes and were observant from birth, and “baalot teshuva”, that is women who 
became religious later in life. Women who were Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Bukhari, Lubavitch and 
Russian Jews (groups whose rituals and observance varies greatly) were also interviewed. I also 
spoke with women who lived in Upper East Side Manhattan condos and women who needed 
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food stamps to feed their children and asked for clothing hand-me-downs during our interviews. 
The women I met with were in their 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, and even 70s, including women 
married in their teens or 20s and in their 30s or 40s. I interviewed women married only a year or 
two before becoming anchored to a dead marriage by being refused a get, and women married 20 
or 30 years before becoming anchored. I interviewed women anchored for ‘only’ a year, and 
women anchored for 20 years. I interviewed some women who were happily remarried, some 
happily single, and some still in a state of limbo either refused a get and with a civil divorce, or 
without either. There is no unifying or homogenous factor about the demographics of the women 
themselves who wind up as mesuravot get. Consequently, the premise that only Ultra-Orthodox 
women are in danger of becoming mesuravot get and that the danger stems from their religious 
observance (and so women should be less observant) is erroneous and myopic
505
. A brief note 
about the commonalities or ‘constants’ of the participants: each participant was a woman who, 
though not necessarily religious, was nonetheless concerned with the get or the ramifications, 
either social, legal, or both, of not having a get. As well, not one woman ever anticipated she 
would find herself in the position of being refused a get. Finally, each participant was also 
willing and often eager to share her story and had expressed gratitude for being given the 
opportunity to articulate and share. 
The other participants, including experts with ties to siruv get  in the Greater Toronto or 
New York area, comprised a diverse demographic as well. I spoke with social workers/marriage 
counsellors, rabbis, legal professionals such as attorneys or judges (both state and rabbinic) who 
specialize in complex Jewish divorce cases such as refusals and extortion, advocates working 
with and supporting women trapped in their marriages, other experts such as professors, authors, 
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researchers, and film producers. My contacts with this diverse group of experts also emerged and 
developed over time, building trust and rapport through my own involvement in the academic 
and activist communities since 2009. I have both attended and presented at numerous 
conferences, growing my participants all the while. ‘The Aguna Summit’ at New York 
University’s Tikvah Center for Jewish Law and Civilization in conjunction with the Jewish 
Orthodox Feminist Alliance (JOFA), in particular, allowed me to build relationships and nurture 
contacts that I would later revisit for these interviews, almost a year after the landmark event 
which brought together over 200 international aguna experts. Celebrated Orthodox feminist, Blu 
Greenberg, and Rabbi Jeremy Stern extended me a sought-after invitation to the closed-door 
summit (where Alan Dershowitz, Tzipi Livni, and Dorit Beinish were the keynote speakers, and 
where no mesuravot get were themselves asked to speak). There too, I was exposed to a varied 
demographic; experts ranged from liberal, anti-religion feminists to Orthodox rabbis, as well as a 
variety of lawyers, social activists, academics, and world-renowned aguna specialists along with 
international media. 
Initially, the goal set out in the research proposal was a total of approximately twenty 
interviews in each location (40 total), with at least half (20) of the interviews being with women 
who experienced siruv get themselves and half (20) of the interviews being with individuals 
comprising all the other stakeholders combined.  Contrary to my initial concern of conducting 
more interviews in Toronto than New York, I actually found many more participants in New 
York from across all cohorts than I was able to find in Toronto, despite my own residence and 
familiarity with the Toronto community. This goes to the broader argument of the research 
claiming Toronto is distinct from other legally plural jewish communities, such as New York, 
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which, contrary to Toronto, is more proactive, willing, and open to discussing and questioning 
the persistence of siruv get
506
.   
The exact number of mesuravot get interviewed is thirty, twelve from Toronto and 
eighteen from New York (and ten more than anticipated). These are by no means all the agunot 
that exist in Toronto and New York; again, quanitfying is not the goal, nor are all these cases 
currently ongoing. I stress that this research must not be considered exhaustive. There are more 
agunot out there with more stories and experiences. However, these thirty interviews were in-
depth, lengthy interviews including the women’s own self-narration and working through a semi-
structured questionnaire. There were additional participants who contacted me through ORA’s 
call for participants and I wanted each woman to feel as though her voice was heard rather than 
resilenced, and so rather than turn women away, I conducted preliminary interviews (here I 
included all women who answered the call- not only New York participants). I spoke to women 
from Houston, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Miami, Israel, and Montreal, confirming what one 
professor once told me, that “wherever there are Jews in the world, there are agunot”507 and 
proving again that all types of Jewish women may find themselves refused a get. Additionally, I 
conducted about another twenty interviews with ‘aguna experts’ of all types; rabbis, attorneys, 
activists, abuse professionals, academics and others.  
Reflecting on who were the participants in this research, focusing particuarly on the 
demographics of the women refused a get has lead me to an important supposition. Further to 
ORA’s well-established platform, that get refusal is a type of domestic abuse, I would like to 
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posit one step further and suggest that get refusal is a distinct type of Jewish domestic abuse. 
That is to say, get refusal is not a problem with Judaism writ large, but rather individual 
recalcitrant men take advantage of an asymmetry in one aspect of Jewish law and use religion as 
a weapon or tool of abuse. For example, it is a twisted interpretation of halakha used to control, 
influence, restrict the actions of women, and often to extort money or other matrimonial 
concessions, keeping them chained or anchored to dead marriages at the will and whim of the 
recalcitrant husband. Women also described other instances of their husbands distorting religion 
as a means to abuse by throwing slurs about wives’ lack of piety or even mikvah attendance. 
Though I delve further into this contention in the coming chapters, it is important to note here, in 
the context of the inter-denominational and intersectional impact of siruv get, that this 
phenomenon of divorce refusal is a form of domestic abuse that, just like other forms of 
domestic abuse, is indiscriminate, impacting any and all types of Jewish women, not only the 
Ultra Orthodox. 
508
 
 
When and Where: Surroundings, Sites and Settings: 
I interviewed participants for just under a year, from roughly early fall 2013 through late 
summer 2014, beginning with well-known, ‘expert’ interviews for the first few months, followed 
by interviews with mesuravot get past and present. The in-depth interviews themselves ranged in 
length, typically lasting about an hour and a half to two hours. Very often, particularly in the 
New York context, I would have to schedule entire days for interviews allowing time for my 
travel to accommodate women at their convenience. I travelled extensively in the greater New 
York area, on the North Shore and South Shore of Long Island (Great Neck, Rosalyn, Five 
Towns), Staten Island, Brooklyn, Flatbush, all over Manhattan and New Jersey (including 
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interviews in Lakewood, with a large Hasidic population). In Toronto, I also travelled all over 
the Greater Toronto Area. Often, interviews were conducted early in the morning, before women 
went to work, or later in the evening or night, after they got home. 
Most often the interviews were conducted over coffee (and sometimes muffins) in local 
coffee shops, but at times, I visited women’s places of work to do extended lunch interviews, and 
I also visited their homes for greater privacy and/or convenience, if they preferred. There were 
also occasions where I met women outside of their own neighbourhoods for their greater privacy 
and comfort. I conducted two interviews via Skype with cameras and was surprised at the level 
of intimacy and comfort that was maintained.  
It is important to note that interviews were conducted at the convenience of the 
participants, to maintain a principle of the project- enabling the women to give sounds to their 
silent voices that had been previously left out of both academic and activist work on siruv get 
and putting their stories at the centre of scholarly analysis. Because I was particularly focused on 
making the women feel safe and comfortable to self-narrate, tell their story, and share their 
remembered past or present experiences in ways they never were able to before, I was intent on 
each interview being done at times and places that were most preferred by the women 
themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illuminated how this study fills gaps in the existing body of literature, 
considered in the previous chapter, by examining the methodological and epistemological 
considerations arising from the research design. This study builds and expands on the previous 
studies by embracing a gendered socio-legal analysis and the goals of female empowerment and 
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respecting women choices by adopting a religious feminist approach and gendered socio-legal 
storytelling. Eschewing quantifying in favour of qualitative research and storytelling is also in 
line with the precepts of the approaches I employ. My religious-feminist approach, implemented 
in part as a result of my positionality as an insider, is methodologically and epistemologically in 
accordance with socio-legal gendered storytelling. Consequently, I made the decision in the 
research design to respect religion/religious identities and feminist precepts such as respect for 
the choices women make, while simultaneously critiquing get refusal and incorporating the 
textured stories about mesuravot get’s lived realities into my analysis. This chapter, addressed 
the question: ‘why are qualitative socio-legal gendered storytelling and a religious-feminist 
approach the ideal methodological and epistemological perspectives applied to this nuanced 
socio-legal study of get refusal?’, and it sets the stage for chapter five, which examines and 
analyzes the primary data, the women’s narratives. 
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Chapter Five - Mesuravot Get Move From the Margins to the Main Stage 
 
The men in his family did not believe in giving the get he has three uncles who all didn’t give 
gets. 
 
He was violent; he had a chemical imbalance. We went to psychiatrists, marriage counsellors, 
rabbis, mekubalim, and they all said he needs to be and remain medicated. 
 
He was extremely controlling; his opinion is always right. 
 
We got married in 1990.  We were married 1 week and knew it was bad. I had a baby girl after 
10 months and he left three months after that. He left multiple times. 
Then we had a boy, a year later…but he was never happy.  We bought house, we moved to the 
Five Towns area of Long Island, we had two more kids, but he was still never happy. 
 
I wanted to leave- but he always threatened me with the same three threats: 1) I’ll take kids 2) 
I’ll take everything 3) I’ll burn the house down with you in it. 
 
Needles to say, the kids were much affected. He was crazy about money- charged our teenage 
daughter for gas, deducted money from things… 
 
He blamed his family, his sisters, his lawyers, and even his interveners… he was convinced that 
everyone had brainwashed me into wanting a divorce 
 
Rabbi K, a very well-known, renowned rabbi got involved in 2005 because I showed up to his 
house at 11pm with sunglasses on because I had a black eye. I lived on egg shells, in terror when 
I decided it was enough (though I had a great support system, job etc. and it was time to leave) 
 
My oldest son has the most issues because he was the most tortured…I told my husband, ‘don’t 
mess with the kids’ but when I could no longer be the buffer, I filed papers. I was scared and 
went to court for an order of protection after he came in at night with a knife... in January 2009. 
 
He beat up his own brother, who is chareidi with long beard, and he came to warn me about his 
brother/my husband, that he may be coming with his car to drive it into our house… 
 
The Rabbinical Council of America had issued 3 hazmanot and 4 warning letters had been sent 
about an upcoming seruv. ORA offered to picket and another beit din in Boro Park also sent 2 
hazmanot but I was still my own advocate pressuring them to do seruvim. 
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The get refuser/my husband called kids to say goodbye, that he was off to Mexico. He knew he 
was at his rope’s end and so he wanted a deal. He had list of demands- no support, no alimony 
and on and on. He also wanted me to read an entire script he wrote and film it for him to watch 
stating he’s a good husband, father and that I made up that he had given me battered woman 
syndrome… 
 
When I finally got the get, it took 8 hours in June 2010. The sofer, at the writing of the get asked 
me how I lived with him for 18 years… Since September 2005, I had not been in same room as 
him. I paid him $300,000 extra for the house. We didn’t have a prenuptial agreement but I did 
know about the get law. I would have been prepared to try to use it in secular court but I ended 
up settling- but it was DEFINITELY get extortion.  
 
Turns out that hubby went to a crooked, Ultra Orthodox beit din in Queens and the day before 
they wrote the get at our meeting, he had written a document stating that he’s being FORCED to 
give the get, still trying to outsmart everyone and control my future by making it seem like it was 
a get meuseh. 
 
In beit din it’s not fair like court. There is no reconcilable difference- the power is in the man’s 
hands- and so the get itself is inherently gendered…but nonetheless, the day of the get it was all 
men but I felt safe and protected, not humiliated at all. 
 
I think that people are not afraid of rabbis, but they are more afraid of courts and so prenuptial 
agreement is the best solution available. 
 
I had a collection of CDs of shiurim which gave me chizuk and my emuna in Hashem was 
strengthened. Nothing happens in this world without Hashem. It was because I’m a strong and 
happy person, that’s why it happened to me. 
 
His 6 siblings invite me to their events with my new husband and they were at my 2
nd
 wedding, 
once I finally got my get. I’m happier now than I was miserable then.   
~~~ 
 
We were married 13 years, and had two boys. We separated for the last three years and I fought 
for the get for three years. 
 
Only recently I found out that my husband was a wanted criminal in Israel, and that he fled, 
bought a new identity down in Florida and gave me a different name. I also learned that he was 
dismissed from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and his gun license was taken away due to an 
‘impulsive disorder’. It gets worse. His uncle married us. He was aware of his background but 
did not disclose it to me. 
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In my marriage there was rape, there was abuse of my children and myself, which he would 
come to lie about under oath. But, I spent months in a shelter so that served as proof. The shelter 
was very tough for my sons and me even though we aren’t religious. He left threatening 
messages and was a compulsive liar. 
 
He also once tried to kidnap my son from school which led to a restraining order which he then 
broke two more times; one time on Shabbat. 
 
At the very beginning I felt that rabbis really didn’t believe me since outwardly he was a nice 
and sympathetic character. Only once the community and my rabbis saw evidence, the 
community stepped up. When the police went to his home after he broke the order of protection 
they found 22 guns with a man whose gun license was revoked! 
 
My kids have seen their father two times in 3 years. He abused them and at the ages of 8 and 9 
they were still in pull ups as a result. 
 
I was being punished for something he did and he was trying to extort the get from me. They 
were all holding me hostage. I didn’t have faith in the whole Orthodox world when this was 
going on and only now I’m slowly coming back to it. I had rabbis on a pedestal for so long and I 
don’t do that anymore.  
 
That is a form of abuse- that is withholding a get. I think a permanent restraining order should 
be enough to warrant a get- because if a civil judge granted it- Jewish law should accept that 
and issue a get. 
 
At the get ceremony itself I did bring a female acquaintance, but yes, there were a lot of men in 
the room, it’s pretty intimidating. But, NOW I HAVE A VOICE. Do I believe in teshuva? No, you 
can’t change a zebra’s stripes, you can’t paint over it, or dye its hair. Once a sinner, always a 
sinner. 
 
That said, to put a get into a prenuptial agreement is so sad. Do I think prenuptial agreements 
protect us? Yah, but it shouldn’t have to. Rabbis are condoning and enabling abuse rather than 
counselling, educating, creating awareness, etcetera. I think there should be a Shabbat women’s 
group. 
 
I felt so alone. It was my life’s test. 
 
192 
 
The two narratives which open this chapter are extreme. One from the New York area 
and one from the Toronto area, each highlights the challenges in collecting and including 
primary narratives in a study such as this. How does the author choose which stories to include? 
Do they choose the most horrifying? Do they include full length narratives or excerpts? What is 
the most impactful but also the most sincere method, which does not reflect calculated, 
extractionary tactics coming only to include stories which bolster the agenda of the study but 
rather which reflects dedication to the principles of feminist, socio-legal storytelling in line with 
the tenets of critical legal pluralism? Balancing complete narratives, along with close analyses of 
shorter excerpts is the approach taken herein. Nonetheless, the questions around exceptionality 
and generalizability of instances of get refusal do get thrown up. 
 It is also fitting that these are the stories opening this chapter that conducts careful 
analyses of narrative excerpts being that these stories highlight many themes arising from a 
‘zoom-out’ approach or generalization, which this chapter enables. For example, the narratives 
signal the extent to which domestic abuse is at the core of get refusal. The narratives also 
indicate the heterogeneity of the participants, and more broadly, of mesuravot get in general. 
Perhaps most striking in these narratives is the extent to which women who have been refused a 
get (and experienced other forms of abuse) are also active agents in their legal and social 
realities. Through the women’s unsettling storytelling, they illustrate that they have shaped and 
informed social and legal norms (reflecting critical legal pluralism).  
 
The practical research questions: Who, What, When, Where, Why and How were 
addressed in chapter four, dealing with methodological and epistemological considerations as 
well as the question of quantifying mesuravot get and elucidating the importance and 
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effectiveness of gendered storytelling. In this chapter, I will conduct a closer analysis of the 
gendered stories of siruv get, highlighting the lived realities of mesuravot get by revealing what 
is most often invisible in the mainstream discourses and thus I will place women’s voices at the 
centre of my analysis. The gendered storytelling I will explore below, in the tradition of socio-
legal storytelling and critical legal pluralism, will highlight many aspects of siruv get, 
particularly speaking to my broad line of inquiry and guiding question: has law reform impacted 
religious social norms on the issue of get refusal and what have been the outcomes of these 
attempts? The narratives of women give a rich and unparalleled understanding of these and 
other, deeper aspects of get refusal, some of which were not initially anticipated at the outset of 
this study but became central to its contributions.  
Spending a year in the field and attempting to transition the women’s stories to the page 
was challenging. How could I capture it all? I was looking for a methodological tool to aide in 
my attempts to capture their complexity and enable my deep analytical engagement concurrently. 
The patchwork quilt metaphor and milot manchot or leitworts, highlight a seriality which while 
simultaneously depicting the illusion of uniformity and standardization, in reality also illustrate 
that each facet or narrative that emerges is individual and distinctive. I came to find these as 
compelling tools which also speak to the challenge of research engaging with primary data from 
participants- that is: giving space and agency to the participants for their complete narratives or 
doing a more targeted analysis of narrative excerpts which serve the thesis, and which may be 
read as more exploitative and not in line with feminist principles or methodologies. These tools 
help in balancing the methodological concerns when attempting to integrate primary data. 
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The Quilt Metaphor - A Broader Conception 
Drawing on the metaphors used by Paula Saukko, Lori Koelsch, Shauna Van Praagh, and 
perhaps most famously, Deleuze and Guattari
509
, I use quilting as a recurring metaphor fading in 
and out of the paper when fitting, and most significantly in this chapter. Quilting is the process of 
sewing two or more layers of fabric together to make a thicker and more constructive object than 
the sum of its parts. Most often quilts are layered, with a top fabric, a batting in the middle, and a 
backing. Though there are a variety of quilts, most often they involve repetitious patterns, with 
an array of colours and shapes. Of course, quilts serve multiple purposes. They are warm and 
comforting, but may also be cumbersome and old. They are considered to be traditional, but also 
an updated, modern trend. They are viewed simultaneously as a practical and impractical art and 
yet they are often used to mark significant life events, like the famous ‘wedding ring quilt 
pattern’ often gifted to newlywed couples for their matrimonial bed. 
The symbol and analogy of a quilt are appropriate in my analysis of get refusal for a 
number of reasons: for example, quilts have a simultaneous weighty and reassuring character. 
Similarly, the get ritual may be viewed as a comforting albeit banal, simple step allowing for 
spiritual or religious closure, as some women described, and yet in some instances, it may also 
be viewed as a cumbersome necessity which abusive men may take advantage of and thus it may 
feel too traditional, requiring updates. Turning this complex site of socio-legal tension- that is, 
the refusal of a religious divorce in a secular context- into a site where we can summon an image 
or metaphor allows us to tell a story about get refusal in a more nuanced way, that is 
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constructive. By weaving an image into the analysis we may capture aspects for our 
consideration which may have otherwise been left out and which may portray the plural ways in 
which law interacts with everyday lives or norms, allowing us to question the realities that 
emerge. This project, like a quilt, investigates the multiple, layers at play regarding get refusal in 
New York and Toronto. As will be illustrated below, some of the strands simultaneously stitched 
together are religious law, state law, normative religious expectations and rituals, normative 
‘secular’/non-religious assumptions, the realities women experience, the contradictory ways in 
which women are portrayed, the silences- of women, communities, batei din, and the control and 
abuse of recalcitrant husbands. The threads get tangled at times and they are constantly 
enmeshed and impacting one another, never isolated. The image of a quilt, its multiple layers and 
diverse patches offers an effective framework for the layered analysis at the nexus of law and 
religion. Moreover, if we can imagine each story as a patch and this collective project as a 
patchwork quilt, thus Jewish women’s experiences are not erased, and on the contrary, are 
reaffirmed and acknowledged. In fact it is my dream that each woman who participated actually 
fashion a patch and that a real patchwork quilt is created from this study which can travel across 
Jewish communities unfurling the realities of get refusal in New York and Toronto. 
Another fitting connection between the quilt metaphor and this study is that there are 
similarities between the construction of a quilt to legal pluralism, the existence of plural, 
overlapping normative orders or legal systems in one jurisdiction. Legal pluralism, like the quilt, 
sees the potential of layering as a strengthening mechanism; to make the whole better than the 
sum of its parts. By layering fabrics the quilt becomes strong and warm, by layering legal 
pluralist solutions and grassroots efforts, the tensions arising from get refusal may be abated. 
Furthermore, by layering narratives and experiences of get refusal an enhanced and renewed 
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critical approach regarding the persistence of the phenomenon, coupled with empathy for those 
refused a get, may emerge. 
The quilt metaphor also extends meaningfully to the women’s stories. Like a quilt, 
stitched together with different shapes or colours, each story has its own identity and 
characteristics, and yet like a quilt’s repetitious patterns, there are broad tropes and even 
particular phrases in the stories that are also repetitious, lending us rhythmic resonances. The 
patchwork quilt metaphor allows us to examine the exceptionality and uniqueness of each 
narrative by zooming in, and the common elements, the generalizability, and the broader 
(perhaps problematic) normative elements at play by zooming out. It supports a process of 
inclusion. Perhaps most importantly, the patchwork quilt metaphor used in analysis of the 
primary narratives of mesuravot get upends conventional notions of Jewish women (as well as 
men), Jewish marriage and divorce, rabbis and rabbinic courts, as well as state law and legal 
remedies and disrupts accepted characters of each as well.  In order “to negotiate the dilemmas” 
of conducting research within a “contradictory terrain” wherein we are interested in the voice of 
subjugated groups while simultaneously investigating discourses and cultures- both social and 
legal, secular and religious, which in fact shape our voices, I incorporate a quilting mode of 
analysis where fitting
510
 and I further contend that this approach echoes the critical legal pluralist 
approach employed throughout this study. Thus the metaphor meaningfully integrates the plural 
strands or objectives and is sensitive to the “resonances between them” 511 both of which 
illustrate that women refused a get are powerful agents who can shape, mobilize, and produce 
law. 
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Tools & Tales: Leitworts, the Patchwork Quilt, and Close Analyses  
 
This section will explore and analyse the women’s narratives that emerged during the 
course of the semi-structured interviews, revealing what most often is invisible in the mainstream 
discourses on get refusal, and highlighting the lived realities of the women themselves. It is 
challenging to incorporate the women’s stories in a manner that both acknowledges the 
particularities of each story and the exceptionality of the phenomenon of get refusal while 
simultaneously investigating the recurring tropes, and repetitive language but also the silences, 
emotions and gestures. Although the women interviewed were a significantly heterogeneous 
group, with diverse stories, there are noteworthy common, parallel narrative arcs that emerged 
from the interviews. The remainder of this chapter will both ‘zoom in’ and ‘zoom out’ on the 
narratives to examine more closely (and perhaps surprisingly) some of the recurring expressions, 
patterns and commonalities in the narratives. Compounding the perhaps unconventional social 
science methods of milot manchot or leitworts and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s quilt 
method enables both levels of analysis -the ‘zoom in’ and ‘zoom out’- which will allow me to 
illustrate both the particularities and generalizations that emerge from the narratives. 
Before elaborating on my use of these methods, I need to acknowledge that milot 
manchot/leitworts and at times also the quilt method are used as modes of textual analysis which 
aid in the reading, understanding, and interpreting of written texts. Yet, here, I am using these 
methods to help in my analysis of oral exchanges (which were subsequently transcribed), a 
somewhat different genre. I will illustrate in the coming analysis that these methods are 
appropriate and useful for analysis of oral narratives, yet I need to address some unique aspects 
of oral accounts that often get lost textual in analyses. Orality and spoken memories allow for a 
unique analysis of aspects left out of the textual account. This builds on Clifford Geertz’s famous 
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work on ‘thick descriptions’ to some degree, which seeks to capture the richness and complexity 
of human culture, in part by elaborating on contexts through thick, as opposed to thin 
descriptions
512
. For example, there many moments when the mesuravot get paused, hesitated, fell 
into silence, were incoherent, laughed, wept, became enraged, gestured, and left the interview for 
a breath of air. There were also times when a woman and/or I had to navigate the approach of an 
acquaintance during confidential interviews in public places. There were three occasions where 
women who answered the call for participants and who had spoken with me over the phone later 
cancelled the scheduled interviews. These moments do not come through in the text and yet there 
is what to be learned from the sounds of these silences. 
A number of women hesitated while relaying aspects of their narratives and self censored 
at times. There were pauses and vacillation during some interviews and there were also times 
when women shared things and then asked that they be ‘off the record’513. On the converse, there 
were women who seemed to hold back very little and yet were incoherent, telling their stories in 
a disjointed order, sometimes rambling as a result of overwhelming emotions
514
. Some women 
were so overcome with recounting their stories of suffering, abuse, pain and control that they 
wept
515
 (and there were moments when it was difficult for me as well). Although some women 
were emotional because they were still in the midst of their get refusal, others were affected 
simply by revisiting the experience of get refusal although they were no longer refused a get. 
Two of these women, put on sunglasses, a way to mask their emotional responses. On the 
spectrum of emotional responses, women not only wept, but a number of them also laughed, 
often with sarcasm or even ‘gallows humour’ reflecting on their experiences of abuse. Notably, 
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most women who displayed humour were women who had received their gets
516
. A few women, 
who narrated very difficult siruv get experiences which were ongoing were so clearly in a state 
of denial, they were disconnected from the dire realities of the marital conflicts they described
517
. 
Dr. David Pelcovitz has found that agunot do experience high levels of anxiety and denial
518
. 
Finally, there were three women who cancelled scheduled interviews. One explicitly said, “My 
husband doesn’t want me to interview. Sorry.”519. While another woman, one of the youngest 
participants wrote, “Hey. I am not feeling great today. I didn't go to school…My mom thinks I'm 
having a panic attack about telling my story to someone”520. Of course, these silences were the 
most challenging for me to bear; nonetheless they speak to the layered complexities emerging 
from the voicing of the narratives and having had to endure the abuse of get refusal. I wanted to 
ask the first woman, “is the husband who doesn’t want you to interview the same one refusing to 
grant you a get? If so, must you obey? If not, I wonder, is it another controlling relationship?” I 
wanted to ask the second woman who cancelled, “Do you often experience these ‘panic attacks’? 
Is your day to day activity often compromised due to your experiences of get refusal? Have you 
been able to recount your story to others/to professionals?”. However, all these questions, and so 
many more, went unasked and unanswered. It became clear that even when women may desire to 
share their experiences, they may nonetheless find themselves silenced (in perhaps unexpected 
and challenging ways). 
 Turning back to the methods used to analyze the narratives, ‘milot manchot’ or 
‘leitworts’ are repeated words that draw attention because of their repetition in a narrative cycle. 
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Identifying and analyzing the words and themes is a common method used in the literary study 
of Biblical narratives
521
. This method encourages being attuned to recurring threads in a series of 
texts or narratives in a meaningful way so that upon review, there is a bigger picture revealed to 
the reader
522. With this literary tool or method, the recurrence must be “meaningful”, relying on 
circularity where the reader first identifies a specialness in the narrative, and then a secondary 
specialness when the repetition is identified (the beginning of the process relies on this 
discretion). To be clear, it is not about the number of repetitions, but the fact that the repetition 
garners attention due to its repetitiveness, which alerts the reader, or in this case researcher, to 
notice larger trends or themes across narratives. The reason this method is effective in this 
context is because it assists in examining not only the particular and the exceptional, but also the 
wide-ranging, and the generalizable. While the method is traditionally used to analyze a text, I 
adapt it here slightly to aid in the analysis of an oral narrative, and also a subsequent 
transcription- a text. The method helps to consider which words some women say and others do 
not, and which are repeated and what might a word’s repetition or absence signal which might 
otherwise go unnoticed? Although not every repetition is noteworthy, in my role as listener, and 
as researcher, I tried to ‘follow the research’. Thus, when women conveyed a concept or 
experience with meaning, it left a deep impression. The women self-narrated. While it could be 
argued that the meaningfulness of a repeated word is my subjective response as interpreter of 
data, I believe that my highlighting the meaningfulness of repeated words is simply transferring 
to you, the reader, what struck me while sitting across from women, listening to their stories, 
prior to words becoming a text for which I was involved in creating meaning. And in fact, often, 
once the narratives were transcribed as text, the meaningfulness of words was reaffirmed by their 
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circular recurrence throughout the narrative texts when applying the analytical tool of milot 
manchot/leitwort.
523
 
The patchwork quilt method was first envisioned by Deleuze and Guattari and then 
applied by Paula Saukko, Lori Koelsch and many other feminist scholars. Deleuze and Guattari 
describe a patchwork quilt as one with no center and the design (of patches) follows no linear or 
hierarchical pattern, in contrast to an embroidered quilt which develops a pattern working from 
the centre. The patchwork method allows for a more tangled, multifaceted, analysis of the 
“rhythmic resonances”524 that connect the narratives of the women. Each patch is separate, 
unique, and independent and when the disjointed patches are woven together, they begin together 
to create a whole, unified object. So too are the narratives of the participants. Each narrative has 
its own facets, unique from the others as we see throughout this study. Yet when stitched 
together and analyzed alongside one another, as I do in this chapter, they begin also to become 
entwined, weaving a collective story. Additionally, although the women interviewed were 
unfamiliar with one another, and while each story can stand alone as a unique patch, examining 
the stories in this manner also highlights the recurring plot patterns. This qualitative research 
method allows the narratives to remain individualized without conflating or generalizing, yet it 
simultaneously allows narratives to collectively contribute to the common arcs in the stories, 
reflecting also the commonalities in the lived realities of the women. According to Koelsch, “The 
patchwork quilt metaphor is a means to present participant data as both unique and as part of a 
larger whole”525. 
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The patchwork quilt method utilizes the women’s narratives, exposing the covert 
discourses that exist and which silently underpin the issue of get refusal. The discourses are like 
the batting of a quilt, holding it together, yet the discourses are rendered invisible while tying the 
narratives together. Thus, when I bring the previously-hidden discourses to the fore, the 
collective patchwork of narratives becomes suggestive, challenging existing claims that are 
counter to the underlying discourses and thereby serves as a means of collective consciousness-
raising, and in line with a critical legal pluralist approach which understands women as active 
participants in their social and legal realities.  
For example, these excerpts (of many more I could have included) serve as disruptive 
storytelling by challenging normative assumptions about mesuravot get which portray them as 
meek, submissive, passive victims:  
“This has been the best time of my life- I have my boy, I have my girl, I can host Shabbat meals, 
and I get invited. This is the most independent I’ve been in years. I couldn’t do that with my 
husband”526. 
“I’m not scared of it now- I’d want to go with women, to hold their hand so they aren’t alone like 
I was…”527. 
“I didn’t feel intimidated”528. 
“Not everyone is strong enough to handle it like I did -You don’t reason with a terrorist, why 
would you reason with an abuser”529. 
“Now I have a voice”530. 
Indeed, in addition to a more nuanced portrayal of women refused a get, there were a number of 
(unanticipated) themes that emerged from analyzing the diverse narrative patches and the 
leitworts: 1) get refusal is a form of domestic abuse most often present along with other types of 
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domestic abuse, 2) get refusal does not discriminate and impacts all  types of women- not only 
observant Orthodox women but women across all levels of observance, 3) mesuravot get 
experience silencing/isolation, 4) mesuravot get are active agents/women are their own best 
advocates, 5) The faith of mesuravot get most often persists though their respect for individual 
rabbis decreases considerably, and 6) get refusal has asymmetrical gendered impacts (which I 
discussed in earlier chapters and in the coming chapter). There were also a number of women 
who indicated that get refusal exists in their husband’s family where the mother or grandmother 
of husbands were agunot or brothers of husbands were refused get, and then the husband 
proceeds to do the same to his wife
531
. For example, women described: 
“The men in his family did not believe in giving the get he has three uncles who all didn’t give 
gets”532. 
“My mother in law also paid my father in law for her get”533. 
“My hubby’s parents had iggun- both his mum and myself were agunot”534. 
“I became friends with his mom, my mother in law, who needed a get from his step father at the 
age of 83. In fact she still has no get although the step father himself has remarried”535. 
Perhaps this requires further investigation of the possibility that siruv get, like other forms of 
domestic abuse, may become habitual in families as learned behaviours which are shared or 
passed down. This is potentially significant. Additionally, a few stories emerged, particularly in 
the Toronto context, where the women sought a heter, that is approval or rabbinic ‘blessings’ 
prior to leaving the abusive household, indicating both their desire for communal/rabbinic 
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support likely due to the close-knit, and judgmental community, but also the powerful reach of 
the rabbinate in the lives of individuals (and women in particular)
536
.  
“Rabbis said “not time for divorce yet””537. 
“I went to Rabbi K’s house for his approval to leave my marriage one night at 11pm with 
sunglasses because I had a black eye”538. 
“I wanted a get but three rabbis said ‘shalom bayit’…”539. 
“I knew I needed to get approval before leaving, I couldn’t just decide to leave on my own. I 
needed permission and affirmation before acting because I had four young kids, my youngest 
was only nine months old and I was going to walk away from a marriage and break the family. I 
spoke to our therapist, a famous rabbi, and my personal rabbi. They all told me to leave”540. 
 
I may be unable to analyze the potential salience of each of these repetitive trends in 
depth, but I note their significance nonetheless. The fact that there were numerous cases where 
the refusal recurred within families and that numerous women felt they needed their extrication 
from abusive marriages endorsed, speaks to the complexities around get refusal, particularly as a 
persisting phenomenon within insular communities (such as Toronto). These two trends in the 
research reaffirm that get refusal is a form of domestic abuse. Furthermore, because 
rabbinic/communal support is so important to some women, this might suggest to what degree 
state, civil changes (or even creative alternative halakhic remedies) may or may not impact the 
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phenomenon, particularly if specific rabbis from whom women seek permission/blessing to leave 
their marriages, do not approve. To clarify, if some women will always only ultimately seek their 
rabbi’s approval, it is possible that for some women a pluralist or civil remedy might never be 
useful or permitted. Consequently, these two emerging themes are important indicators to 
consider along with the more prevalent discourses discussed herein, especially in light of the 
contention that civil law in Toronto has impacted social norms and behaviours. These themes 
elicit another question: to what extent might civil laws impact religious norms or behaviours 
when the abuse of get refusal runs in families or when women seek the permission of clergy to 
opt-out of their marriages and perhaps to opt-in to civil remedies? 
These themes ought to be exposed in part as comprising the larger discourses underlying 
get refusal that often go concealed, suppressed, or dormant, acting as hidden quilt batting, rather 
than simply persisting as unexamined “reified tropes”541. Bringing these discourses to the 
foreground of the analysis and acknowledging their ongoing underpinning may lead to the 
empowerment of the women and perhaps even to widespread normative change being that the 
emerging discourses are in fact contrary to widespread assertions about mesuravot get and iggun. 
   Consequently, and acknowledging that the common drawback of excerpting from the 
original narratives is that the richness of the complete narrative might be diminished or obscured, 
I will turn to the leitworts as well as common narrative arcs emerging from the patches of the 
quilt, using excerpts to enable deeper analysis
542
.  
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   The initial trope that emerged from the narratives is that women take marriage seriously. 
No woman enters marriage thinking that if things ‘get tough’, she will ‘simply get a divorce’, 
particularly within and among Jewish communities where marriage is sacred and where divorce 
is not taken lightly and is often still stigmatized as ‘worse than a bad marriage’ in many 
communities (although getting an uncontested divorce is most often straightforward in Judaism 
especially when compared with civil law). Jewish communities generally, and rabbis in 
particular, will often instruct couples to go for counselling and attempt every means for 
reconciliation before divorce, which is seen as a last resort, for the sake of ‘shlom bayit’, “marital 
home characterized by peaceful and happy relationship between a wife and husband”543 this will 
be further elaborated in the coming chapter. And indeed, each woman I interviewed regarded 
divorce as just that- a last resort. Another emerging trope was that when looking back on their 
dating relationships with their now-recalcitrant husbands, no woman could have anticipated 
becoming a mesurevet get although some women did describe ‘red flags’ about troubling 
behaviours of their spouse or even about the ultimate failure of the marriage in retrospect
544
. The 
trope that emerged was most often that women got married hoping to live ‘happily ever after’, 
never thinking they would experience siruv get. An additional trope that recurred was that 
women’s primary concern was for their children when faced with the prospect of iggun545. To 
reiterate, across the board, among all the women I interviewed, none anticipated getting divorced 
let alone finding themselves mesuravot get. They cherished and struggled for their marriages, 
often attempting to work things out long after it was clear that the marriage was irreparable and 
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often after abusive incidents. As well, across the board, all the women with children who I 
interviewed said that they had made decisions motivated by the well-being of their children. 
 The most notable arc among the narratives of the women interviewed is that despite the 
extremely heterogeneous group they comprise, each woman valued the get. Each woman viewed 
the get as her legal-halakhic right and/or requirement, not as an optional deed and not to be 
replaced by any ‘alternative remedy’. “I’m not religious but it became so important to me”546. 
This reality speaks to the fact that get refusal is an undiscriminating phenomenon, and more so, 
that it is not only Orthodox women who want or need a get. The fact that the get is required by 
all types of women allays the common misconception that siruv get is only an Orthodox issue. 
 Additionally, using the method of milot manchot or leitworts revealed repeated words that 
unearthed themes whose significance and prevalence were previously indistinct. For example, 
get refusal is often portrayed by non-profit organizations and in the media as a form of domestic 
abuse as a strategy employed to evoke concern, response, and also to encourage funding for non-
profit organizations working on iggun. Yet, the real-life, lived experiences of mesuravot get 
indicate that in fact get refusers most often have actually been abusive in a multitude of other 
ways, with the refusal of the get acting as the final form of abuse in a well-established pattern of 
abusive/controlling behaviours. The unrelenting re-emergence of the word ‘abuse’ recurred 
throughout the women’s narratives, often alongside descriptions of emotional, verbal, 
psychological, financial, sexual and even religious abuses, a revealing narrative similarity in the 
diverse patchwork. The word ‘abuse’ was used fifty-two times, ‘extortion’ eleven times, ‘power’ 
twenty times, ‘order of protection’ thirteen times, ‘police’ ten times, and the word ‘control’ 
emerged thirty-two times throughout the interviews. 
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 Women told me about husbands with controlling personalities, anger management issues, 
drinking problems, drug addictions and gambling addictions, all of which would contribute to 
abusive events and environments at home during the marriage. They described these among 
other abuses: 
 
“I was so scared and subservient. I second guessed myself all the time. He abused me and also 
undermined my parental abilities with the kids, some of whom are high needs. He called me fat, 
ugly”547. 
 
“I felt like a slave”548.  
 
“He lacked emotional intelligence, he was manipulative, took out his rage on me, blamed me. It 
was like my own personal holocaust that I didn’t see coming and couldn’t believe it when I found 
myself in that situation. […] He controlled where I went, what I did, who I spoke to. He treated 
me as a sexualized body, using my past against me, telling me my family and I were useless”549. 
 
“I was so skinny I couldn’t eat. He said multiple times ‘until you die you won’t see a get’. I felt in 
jail in an open world”550. 
 
“He forbid me from seeing my parents, they hadn’t met their grandkids. He didn’t even let me 
send them pictures[….] He would throw things. He hit our son when he was only 21 months. He 
didn’t let me sleep at night. There were miscarriages. He had me clock in and out since I was the 
only one working but he wouldn’t let me leave the house otherwise. I was on a budget. […] 
Emotional abuse was the worst. I was not permitted to host or visit with friends. He’d give me 
the cold shoulder while simultaneously controlling my time and body. But now, get refusal is the 
biggest abuse of power he wields in the end”551. 
 
 In these few difficult excerpts, women described all types of abuses and in interviews they 
elaborated physical abuse, sexual abuse, and violence, even leading to miscarriages of children, 
stalking, attempted kidnappings, and rape in marriage. They described financial abuses including 
racking up debts on women’s credit cards, or severely budgeting women. Women described 
religious, spiritual, emotional and psychological abuse whereby husbands distorted religion as a 
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means by which to abuse women, using aspects of Jewish ritual observance including laws of 
kosher, forcing wives to eat non-kosher food, laws of tzniut or modesty, forcing women to cover 
or uncover their hair or dress in particular ways, and laws of taharat hamishpacha or family 
purity, nidda and mikva
552
. Men also threw slurs about wives’ lack of piety, and abused wives in 
the name of religion in other ways. This type or aspect of abuse seemed to be particularly 
challenging for women, having aspects of their identity which they might otherwise find 
comforting, manipulated. I elaborate on aspects of spiritual abuse in the coming chapter at 
greater length. 
 Women also described husbands turning off hot water valves, naming children without 
wife’s consent, men cutting women off from their families, men insulting women’s sexual 
abilities, figures and intellect. The women described a range of experiences- moving from abuse 
and controlling behaviours during the marriage to siruv get as a form of abuse/control that 
continues into the period in which the marriage is effectively over, yet the abuse/control is 
played out over the issue of the get. Women described that their husbands would attempt to 
leverage the get in exchange for civil concessions far beyond those they might be entitled to, 
turning the religious legal requirement into a civil bargaining chip. Here is a selection of 
accounts, particularly discussing get extortion: 
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“He was using his Jewishness to extort money. He claimed his righteousness over me to extort 
from me”553. 
 
“He was violent, had a chemical imbalance, mental health problems […] I lived on eggshells, in 
terror. I was scared. I once showed up to my rabbi’s house at 11pm with sunglasses because I 
had a black eye; that was in 2005. […] I eventually went to court for an order of protection after 
he came in at night with a knife, threatened to hurt me and burn the house down. in January 
2009 […] I paid him $300,000 for our house. It was definitely extortion”554. 
“When I arrived at beit din the day of the get I made a point of saying out loud, ‘I’m here to buy 
my get’”555. 
“It was not a good marriage from the beginning. We had 5 kids and I was the sole bread-winner. 
I had never done anything against him. We did whatever he wanted […] I went to rabbis for 
counselling, and I wanted him to go. I went to marriage counsellors too but nothing helped […] I 
waited 4 years without doing anything to be freed due to my community. Eventually, the beit din 
Israel said “Kava diyyun l’get” and the judge acknowledged “Ee efshar l’hachriach otta”- that 
they could not force me to go back with him because he was abusive and a pathological liar but I 
still don’t have a get. He portrays himself, and perhaps even really delusionally views himself as 
a ‘nebach’ case who has been wronged by his wife. He claims I’ve ‘gone modern’ because my 
sheitel is a few inches too long and I drive […] It’s not fair. I’m supporting his 5 kids and he is 
manipulating our religion to use as domestic abuse weapon”556. 
“My ex-husband took my religion to the bank. It was complete extortion. I ended up paying 
$30,000 for my get”557. 
“He had an internet addiction. He played video games for hours, I found out he was chatting 
with women online. He racked up debt in my name and took loans without my knowledge with 
which he bought an extensive and pricey Star Wars collection. […] He told me he hadn’t loved 
me in 10 years and that I wasn’t good in bed so I revamped my style and became a gym rat 
thinking if I changed myself that would change him. I was only without my get for two years, but 
those were the longest two years of my life. […] He still got everything- $20,000 to pay his debts 
and $80,000 for the sale of the house”558. 
“It’s one thing when you’re the one getting the abuse, it’s another thing to watch it happen to 
your kids […] The situation paralyzes you. Your brain is compartmentalized. You become 
desensitized to abuse, control, fear…”559. 
 Women (and their children) suffered staggering abuses at the hands of their husbands 
(and fathers). The repeated patterns that emerged throughout my interviews regarding a variety 
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domestic abuses was alarming despite the fact that it is widely understood (at least among 
‘aguna experts’) that a husband’s refusal of a get, which is his absolute right,  has become a 
means to control the destiny of a woman. In interview after interview, women described abuses 
which preceded the refusal of a get and which thus indicated a pattern of abusive or controlling 
behaviour. Their repeated words and stories highlighted a significant, albeit alarming trend. 
The repetition of the word ‘abuse’ in the passages from the interviews triggered me to re-
examine the cyclical nature of the narratives being that many follow the same trajectory. It is a 
recurring refrain, although these narratives are not representative of all women’s experiences or 
narratives. However, the examination revealed that framing get refusal as a form of abuse is 
much more than a strategic tag-line by advocacy groups. Indeed the repetitions and cyclical 
nature of the narratives reveal an incontrovertible reality - each and every woman, out of the 
dozens and dozens of women I interviewed also described some former controlling and/or 
abusive behaviours culminating with the final abuse of get refusal (as well as get extortion at 
times).  
This fact is not to say abuse definitively exists in all cases of get refusal everywhere, at 
all times, only that it did exist in each of the marriages of the women I interviewed. This fact also 
need not imply that domestic abuse causes get refusal. The relationships must not be viewed as 
necessarily causal, for that implies there is no free choice of a moral actor to overcome 
individual tendencies or histories of abuse and do the right thing- that is give a get 
unconditionally, which men are capable of despite habitually abusive behaviours. There are 
certainly instances where a couple divorces due to abuse in the marriage, yet the husband does 
not refuse his wife a get. That said, while we must be cautious not to view the relationship as 
causal, there is certainly correlation. Women who are mesuravot get seem very often to, and in 
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the cases of my participants, have always also experienced previous abuses at their husbands’ 
hands (figuratively and frequently literally). The repetitive narratives have illustrated that get 
refusal is a significant form of control as it impedes a woman’s future and impacts her legal, 
social, marital, and sexual status. While he is more easily able to move on, she is dependent on 
her abuser for her freedom. Her destiny and liberty are unambiguously in his hands. Husbands 
who refuse a get are individuals who have abusive and controlling behaviours and thus it is not 
unlikely that they would have abused or controlled their spouse in numerous capacities during 
marriage. This assertion emerging from my primary research is confirmed by Rabbi Dr. 
Abraham J. Twerski, scholar of Jewish domestic abuse, who echoes this claim and goes so far as 
to say: 
A husband’s refusal to provide a get is an obvious abuse of power. He has taken a 
provision of the Torah and made it into a weapon of tyranny and oppression. Without 
exception, every case of an aguna, every case of a husband’s refusal to give a get will 
reveal a history of a woman having been abused during the marriage. This last and 
perhaps greatest abuse of power, the refusal to give a get, is used only by individuals who 
were abusers and who had been either batterers or tyrannical controllers of their wives
560
. 
 
 Moreover, the common arcs and milot manchot among the diverse narratives reveal that 
women who are mesuravot get are subject to abuse in triplicate. That is to say, a pattern emerged 
from the patchwork of narratives. Multiple women illustrated: 1) the abuses they endured in their 
marriages, (as was illustrated above); and then further described 2) the abuse that is the act of get 
refusal in and of itself, (which I will illustrate below); while concurrently enduring 3) the silent 
acquiescence of their communities and rabbis who, by not doing or saying anything at communal 
or even grassroots levels, passively enable the abuses. Excerpts of interviews will illustrate the 
trifecta follow further below.  
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“To have to pay your abuser off in order for him to grant a get of his free will is just another kind 
of abuse and control”561. 
“I got divorced because of abuse - and this- [get refusal] was just another form of abuse- 
another form of control. The communal silence is a whole other level”562. 
 “I’m free though imprisoned because I’m without an abusive husband and yet get refusal is 
abuse […] get refusal is biggest abuse of power they wield in the end”563. 
 “It bothered me that he was able to one up them- the rabbis. When they asked him why it took 6 
years, it was all about financial gain and control, power. The get was his golden ticket, his 
trump card”564. 
 
“Withholding a get is the ultimate control because I can’t run from it like you can run from 
physical or emotional abuse”565. 
 
 It is noteworthy that perhaps the most egregious descriptions of the silences occurring 
within communities come from the Torontonian mesuravot get, rather than those I interviewed 
from New York. The women highlighted not only the silent acquiescence of rabbis and 
communities at large, but they astutely bring these previously-covert discourses to the fore. That 
is, their collective patchwork of narratives becomes suggestive and even consciousness-raising 
by challenging existing claims. Particularly in the Toronto Jewish community, there is a 
challenge to the claim that the civil legal amendments to get refusal were effective in remedying 
get refusal and/or denying there are any agunot in Toronto
566
. The fact that these, the most 
troubling accounts of communal futility amongst all my interviews, come from Torontonian 
women, helps to decipher some distinctions between siruv get in Toronto and other legally plural 
Jewish centres, like New York. The Torontonian women paint a bleak picture of their rabbinic 
leaders, in particular the Toronto beit din, which is in contrast to the much more mixed accounts 
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from the women in the New York context. Here is some of what the Torontonian mesuravot get 
described: 
“At the time, I felt they were abusing their authority, and that they shouldn’t have authority, but 
really- if people cared, we would have another beit din. But if no one cares, if the community is 
silent, complacent, then why should our rabbis care?”567. 
“They revoked get 100% because I went to police. My involving the secular legal system due to 
my need for protection and fear of abuse, made them exert religious control […] they didn’t care 
at all about abuse, they forced me to be in the same room as my abuser, despite legal restriction 
on this, and even mocked me about this saying, “don’t worry, no one will be calling the police 
here”. They ignored my suffering. […] It’s also very offensive that so many girls, who had been 
my friends, supported him and invited him to social events, birthday parties and things… I felt 
betrayed”568. 
“If the rabbis would stand up against domestic abuse, women wouldn’t have to live in fear; they 
wouldn’t have to go back into abusive marriages because they are left no other choice, with 
nowhere to turn for support and without a get! […] None of the rabbanim understand. They 
don’t have a grasp of the issues that arise in marriage and they think the causes of problems are 
simple, like I don’t know how to cook dinner properly. They have no idea about the levels of 
control and withholding that might exist”569. 
 
“You feel stuck, like a chain on your leg and you can’t really move. I felt stuck. Worst feeling I’ve 
ever had in my life and no one in our community helped. I had called Rabbi O., the Av Beit Din 
of Toronto twenty times but he never called me back and he never once called my husband. 
Eventually he told me ‘when your husband is ready, he will come. Rabbi S just said, ‘hatzlacha 
raba’”570. 
 
 An additional discourse unearthed by the milot manchot throughout the diverse 
narrative patches of the women’s stories, is the degree to which the women themselves are 
silenced, alone, fearful and captive and yet, they often become savvy, active agents working as 
their own best advocates to unstitch themselves from the ties that bind. Alongside the accounts of 
abuse and communal inaction, women repeatedly described their experiences of isolation, fear, 
and being silenced. However, the women also, and I believe perhaps 
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unintentionally/unconsciously, conveyed their dogged tenacity, faith and endurance in their quest 
to get their get. This most-often-hidden theme, just like quilt batting, surfaced between the lines 
of their narratives in our meetings becoming visible to me in the course of their storytelling (not 
their self-description). This conflation of two seemingly contradictory experiences emerges as a 
vital discourse underlying get refusal. The stories of the women I interviewed, themselves 
confirm that although mesuravot get  may be subject to the whim of their recalcitrant husbands, 
and although they do indeed feel suppressed, silenced, isolated and scared, they are nonetheless 
proactive, determined, and resolute both in their pursuit of a get, and most often, in their faith as 
well. This empowering lesson has been problematically overlooked in the existing discourses 
that circulate by and among ‘aguna experts’- both in the socio-legal and Jewish bodies of 
literature and at conferences
571
. The milot manchot that highlighted these important tropes for 
deeper analysis were the words: ‘free/freedom’ which was used fourteen times, ‘silent/silenced’ 
which was used twelve times, ‘fear’ which was used seven times, and the word ‘alone’ which 
was used seventeen times.  
“Basically I was being held hostage but at the same time I was so proud of myself, I was doing so 
much alone. I went to a ‘do your own divorce’ place for $399, because I had no money and I 
filed all kinds of motions and that was really putting pressure on him. […] Beit din doesn’t do 
anything alone”572. 
 
“I felt like a slave. […] No one would have believed me if I hadn’t gone to the hospital. […] I 
was all alone. […] It freed me, getting the get…I refused to be victimized. […] It will give you 
something you didn’t know you needed. Don’t accept that you don’t need a get even if you are 
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Reform…It’s my freedom, it’s my power. […] You have to self-advocate, because otherwise you 
are just a number, just a statistic”573. 
 
“When I was going through it I had nowhere to turn. I suffered in silence. […] There is no 
support here in Toronto, not legal, nor rabbinical and so there is nothing to give hope. I had to 
get a job at my age… […] I sought out Yad L’Isha in Israel myself and worked with an advocate 
there”574. 
 
“I’m doing everything alone, raising 5 children.” Then she asks me if I know what the hardest 
day is for her? She answers: “The holiday of Passover because it’s totally within peoples’ hands 
to change this and nobody is. How can I celebrate freedom on Passover, when I myself am not 
free?”575. 
 
“I was scared…but I forced them (beit din) to do seruvim”576. 
 
“The beit din here is more passive, they’ll do stuff and support me but only at my constant 
request”577. 
 
“I was offended that anyone would steal my freedom; my inalienable right. […] I made my own 
fact sheet and put it up around town. I went to shul each morning to the 6am minyan so the rabbi 
would have to see me and I would ask ‘is today gonna be the day?’ I went to the women’s 
tehillim group and I made them add my name to daven for. I even donated a new door-stop to the 
shul which they really needed at the time. I inscribed it ‘donated by R anticipating her get from 
Y.D.’ so they would have to see it and think of me every day. I did all this because I felt that 
whatever I had to say would not be heard. I really felt abandoned. […] The bottom line is, when 
communities cease to tolerate wives being agunot, the problem will cease to exist”578.  
 
 These, among other of the women’s narratives, unearth how the individual women act but 
also how they feel being mesuravot get. They allow us to peer into their lives. The women’s own 
descriptions, rife with contradiction portraying themselves both as isolated and scared and 
simultaneously (and subconsciously) brave and able to channel the inner workings of obstructive 
communities, help us to better understand what it is both to navigate and to experience siruv get. 
The desire to be ‘free’, expressed in a multitude of ways indicates that women feel “stuck, unable 
to move on with life”, “trapped”, like a “hostage” or at times, even like a “slave”, to use their 
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own words. It is clear that the lived realities of the women interviewed are complex. The women 
refuse to be stifled, and although they are silenced in some ways, they are also active, 
independent, strong and self-advocating. It is important to accurately portray mesuravot get as 
the complex and multifaceted women they are. They are a diverse a group, united by their 
experiences of being refused a get, and by their persistence in seeking one. Portraying the 
women as one-dimensional, with only a passive existence of victimhood to be pitied, serves to 
re-silence and re-victimize women, and egregiously, portrays the women inaccurately, 
undercutting their dynamic and inspirational steadfastness
579
. 
 
 Thus far, and with the help of the milot manchot/leitworts and patchwork quilt methods, 
my analysis has shown that there are noteworthy similarities in the narratives of mesuravot get 
despite the diversity of the women themselves. The women described numerous common 
experiences, regularly using the same recurring words and across all of the diverse narrative 
patches. However, there is also a diversity of experiences that emerges through this analysis. 
Shifting slightly, the remainder of this chapter will examine broad themes emerging from the 
patchwork of narratives which reveal particularities of the women’s narratives, experiences, and 
even ideologies. These particularities illustrate the women’s diverse positions on the same sets of 
issues, rather than emerging as a direct result of milot manchot indicating similar positions on 
similar issues. There were marked distinctions among the women’s narratives on three 
                                                          
579
 While Susan Weiss and Netty Gross-Horowtiz’s book unfolds around the personal stories told about six agunot, I 
find limitations to their approach regarding empowerment of women. In fact they state, “the halls of the religious 
courts are full of powerless women” (page 40). The book is a significant contribution to the field, but the goals are 
different (than my own) and focus more on describing experiences in Israel with the Israeli batei din and the 
complex lay-of-the land regarding agunot in Israel. The agunot do not necessarily come across as positive, active 
agents, particularly since they are labelled, “Clueless, Scarlet, Ping-Pong, Accidental, Pawn and Reluctant”. The 
dozens of women I interviewed would not have wanted to be labelled by any of the names used therein. They would 
find it a betrayal. They were so much more than clueless victims or pawns and were most-often active agents in 
attaining their get. Susan M. Weiss, and Netty C. Gross-Horowitz, Marriage and Divorce in the Jewish State: 
Israel's Civil War (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012). 
218 
 
significant issues: 1) when asked what they felt was the best solutions for get refusal, 2) when 
speaking about how get refusal may have impacted their faith in G-d, observance of religion, and 
respect of rabbis, and 3) when describing/when asked about gendered experiences or effects 
navigating siruv get. 
 Women had a diversity opinions regarding the ‘best solutions’ for get refusal, illustrating 
both their agency and their law-creation, ranging from civil/state to religious, top down or legally 
implemented to bottom up or grassroots, and even new suggestions that had not previously been 
proposed. In a sense, women were and are undoubtedly shaping and producing new legal norms 
which, in turn, and with time, will impact both social and legal realities. The diversity of ‘best 
solutions’ not only reflects the diversity of women the phenomenon of get refusal impacts, but 
also informs my call for a ‘grab bag’ of remedies and suggests that this approach is one that 
women both desire and which would respect feminist principles. I argue that through this 
multiplicity of proposed remedies offered by women, we get a glimpse into the power of 
narratives and the impact of asking how individuals treat law, rather than asking only about how 
law treats them, a true critical legal pluralist approach. The range of the women’s responses to 
‘best solutions’ emphasizes also that women take on the role of law-makers, influencing law as it 
influences them.  
 The discussions around women’s persistent faith and continued belief in G-d and 
devotion to the religion, coupled with women’s simultaneous criticism of rabbis and batei din 
emerged from the patchwork of narratives throughout my interviews with the women. This 
plurality of views appeared and reappeared at times in the women’s own words during the 
interview, as excerpted below, and at times these differences were more subtle, surfacing in other 
ways- through comments before or after the interview about one’s weekend, one’s kids, or even 
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through women reciting blessings over their coffee, or their choice of venue. Another 
particularity that emerged was the women’s opinions and experiences regarding siruv get as a 
gendered phenomenon. Here too there were a grab-bag of responses from the women, with some 
women stating, and at times insisting, that their experiences were not gendered, yet described 
incidents at other points of the interviews that might be viewed as gendered by others, contrary 
to a particular mesurevet get’s self-narration and/or experience.  
 I deliberately included many additional excerpts from the women’s narratives, compared 
to the prior excerpts above, in order to demonstrate the array of particularities women described 
regarding each of the three issues, without attempting to generalize or simplify their own self-
narration. Here are excerpts on women’s diverse ideas around ‘best solutions’ for the 
phenomenon of get refusal: 
“Civil law is not the answer and not any better than beit din you are still ‘just a number’. It’s just 
a day at work and that’s all. In fact civil lawyers and judges are even less invested than rabbis, 
and in my case, the civil system really didn’t influence my husband”580. 
 
“I went to civil court first, before my husband, because I needed an order of protection and then 
found out that because I was the plaintiff, the get law could do nothing to protect me. […] Later 
it became increasingly clear by working within the system and from my network of aguna 
friends, that the secular family courts in Nassau County were extremely unsympathetic to the 
plight of agunot, even despite the prominence of Jews throughout the area. The prenuptial 
agreement is okay but who enforces the money owed as maintenance? It just gives the power 
back to the secular courts and away from rabbis. This ping pong might work sometimes, but it 
could also just be more time and costly to the wife and so I’m not sure it will help in all cases. 
That said, I do think it should be possible for a secular remedy to solve this problem- a get law 
that actually helps women and is still halakhically viable. […] I’m frum, but Rabbi Rackman’s 
court makes sense. A woman should be allowed, even not right away, but after a period of 10, 20 
years to just go to a beit din for frauded marriage and get hafka’ot or mekach ta’ut. It can’t just 
be up to rabbis because many of them have their heads in the clouds. If it doesn’t touch them, if 
it’s not their daughters, they aren’t aware. Problem stems from rabbanim around […] More of 
them need to be made aware and do whatever it takes to modify halakha to change this”581.  
 
 “Real consequences, real solutions must come from civil court because beit din cannot enforce 
and if we can’t go the route of forcing, and we can’t enforce, than we have to rely on civil. There 
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should be willingness to help and support. Some rabbi’s instigate a fight and they are hurting not 
only women, but their entire congregations too. And let’s not forget- who is a rabbi? It’s just a 
person who passes a test of knowledge; they are not necessarily all ethical”582. 
 
“New York Get Law did nothing for me because I was the plaintiff, although I only learned it 
worked like that once I was in court. […] Are bottom up approaches ever going to change 
someone who knows that they have something over you in the get? It’s very powerful. Batei din 
should have the power to issue a get if a woman has a good enough reason, without the 
husband’s free will/consent. Secular solutions are good, they can’t hurt, but they won’t solve 
religious problems. […] It’s frustrating that nothing can be done when the rabbis can come up 
with a solution if they wanted to. We need to ask, who is gaining by not doing this?”583. 
 
“I think a permanent restraining order should be enough somehow for a beit din to issue a get on 
their own, without a husband’s consent or free will. If the civil judge can grant it, Jewish law 
should accept that and just go ahead and issue a get […] Jewish law has to change rabbis are 
enabling rather than counselling and educating. To put a get in a prenup is so sad. I do think 
they protect us but they shouldn’t have to”584. 
 
“Marriages have to have an expiry date- if a couple is separated for a certain, lengthy period of 
time, there needs to be a way rabbis can give an automatic get without the husbands consent. 
The civil secular remedies won’t work in my community- they are good for the modern. It’s funny 
because the only solutions we have for this are from the middle ages and rabbis are so busy with 
trying to control all the new stuff, the use of the internet. They should be busy trying to make the 
old stuff new, so that we can apply it today”585. 
 
“Prenuptial agreements are good, but also important to get married civilly, which I hadn’t done 
and which I think made it harder to get a get”586. 
 
“I had a prenuptial agreement but the rabbi who married us lost it and there were no other 
copies, so it didn’t help in my case. […] you wouldn’t reason with a terrorist so why would you 
reason with an abuser? The solution must involve empowerment of beit din rather than 
individual man”587. 
 
“I know this sounds horrible but right now, in the thick of things, the only solution I see for my 
own case is if my husband would just die. […] There is no solution. Everything is in the man’s 
hands and women like me are just screwed. […] there should be some sort of rule that if you 
have a restraining order in place that should guarantee an aguna her freedom after a while. […] 
There is no point in annulments if you can’t move on within your community. I think a get tied to 
civil law is fantastic because secular law can be more powerful than getting a get, which is such 
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a crock because it’s ineffective, outdated, and unfair to women. You can wait until he decides to 
untie you, or you can wait until he dies, whichever comes first”588. 
 
“Prenuptial agreements are a must. They must become as natural as a ketuba. And, if you ask 
me, I would take that even one step further. With a ketuba, I would prepare a ready get and even 
an agreed upon time frame before marriage, that if there is no get after a certain amount of time, 
the couple would both agree to using the pre-prepared get. Like maybe after a year and a half to 
show the couple really tried to reconcile, and then use the ready get. Tying it to secular is also 
good because with the rabbanim nothing moved with me, but once the secular was in play that 
added pressure. But people have to sit with secular courts and judges and explain the issue 
because they don’t always get it. […] The ultimate solution must come from halakha, but in the 
mean time also prenuptial agreements and pre-made gets should be done by everyone”589. 
 
“The best solution would be if rabbis found a loop-hole and just went ahead and issued gets after 
a certain amount of time. Short of that there needs to be support groups since there’s nothing in 
Toronto, not even the civil laws, and women have to be their own advocates- strong and 
tenacious, because there is no one else to help in Toronto. Unfortunately, not every woman is 
capable of being like that when faced with this situation”590. 
 
“I have no clue what the best remedy is, but civil law is amazing- or at least it was in my case, I 
was in a position where civil law was on my side but the actual get laws won’t help in reality.. 
[…] I used the civil as a scare tactic first to get him to show up at beit din. […] Then, in my case 
I had made a detailed ruse, after seeking rabbinic consultation with a leading American 
Orthodox rabbi and with my Canadian lawyer. We came up with a plan and I agreed to mediate 
all issues in beit din, which was the only way my husband agreed to show up but, that right after 
the shtar berurin was signed and I was delivered my get, we would serve him with papers to go 
to civil to mediate the rest of the issues. I would never mediate in beit din over custody. Since my 
case though, the beit din has made it clear they would name any get derived in this manner 
unkosher. […] I realized that you have to figure out what is going to motivate a person to give a 
get- it may be vilifying them, but it may be building them up. A part of me wonders if emotional 
validation would help get refusers more than making them a pariah. […] I had to almost become 
unemotional to get the get. I realized that you are more likely to get a get when you stop 
asking”591. 
 
“I would have used the civil but I had heard that the Toronto Beit Din finds the civil remedy as 
conditional due to the amendments’ necessity to impose a time-frame or deadline on removing 
the barriers to remarriage. The beit din started to view the imposition of a deadline as a coercive 
tactic or penalty in exchange for a get and so won’t allow gets granted as a result or at least 
won’t view a get given as a result as kosher gets. Ironically though, it was still conditional on my 
part because it was predicated on my first delivering a cheque to pay-off my husband for the get. 
[…] The best solution for Toronto is to get rid of the Toronto Beit Din. […] We all agree that 
halakha is archaic but true believers are okay with archaic halakhic principles the issue is that 
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the leaders must step up and must acknowledge that refusal is a form of domestic abuse, that 
abuse in and of itself does exist within their communities, and about how individual men can 
abuse halakha” 592. 
 
“The solutions should be: 1) the prenuptial agreement- this should be like genetic testing in our 
community, everyone should just do it for protection and without question. It needs to become a 
safety requirement, without emotion just a banal necessity 2) Re-name and re-market the prenup 
so it doesn’t have any negative associations like regular pre-nups 3) more awareness. There is 
more awareness than even a few years ago, when I was going through it, but there needs to be 
even more. […] The only way the solutions will work or even just start to make a dent is if the 
frumer community is engaged. It’s gotta be within halakha otherwise it will never work. What’s 
the point if frum women will be abandoned by a fringe solution? We need to work with them and 
even appease batei din to create a unified path. […] I believe there can be a solution, because if 
they could ultimately find me one in Israel, than the beit din in Toronto could have found it here 
as well. The Canadian get laws did not help me”593. 
 
 Whereas some women articulated the civil court judges were empathetic and 
understanding, others expressed the opposite- that civil courts and judges do not at all 
understand, and are in fact harsh on women such as the judges in Nassau County on Long Island, 
which has a significant Jewish population. There are also judges who are simply unaware of the 
phenomenon and have not been educated on how to appropriately navigate between the two legal 
systems as civil judges with sensitivity. Some women insisted that because the civil/state courts 
and judges are more authoritative than rabbis on the beit din, the solutions must come from them 
to be impactful. Conversely, some women insisted that no matter how impactful, the civil/state 
system would still fall short of inducing certain abusive and recalcitrant malicious men to grant 
gets. Some women also astutely noted that while the civil/state court system might have more 
‘teeth’, it is most often a lengthier and more costly process. Some women insisted, that no matter 
the cost, or duration, it is still vital to have civil remedies and enforceability insisting that all the 
power cannot be solely in the hands of rabbis who frequently do nothing with their power to help 
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women or worse, wield the power to further their own interests or the recalcitrant husband’s 
interests rather than help mesuravot get attain their freedom.   
 Women were correct to point out that despite the intent behind the civil legal 
amendments, and the authority and enforceability that comes along with the state centralist legal 
regime, the civil get laws fail women, at least some of the time. Under the New York Get Law, 
women cannot be the plaintiff and benefit from the protections of the law as the Law precludes 
this, yet very often women are the plaintiffs, as they petition the court for Orders of Protection in 
many cases. In Canada, the amendments to the Family Law Act and the Divorce Act dealing with 
the get refusal have also not been effective in eradicating get refusal, as I discussed earlier. Civil 
enforcement of prenuptial agreements is a separate matter. By and large, women, even Hasidic 
and Ultra Orthodox women, did feel that should prenuptial agreements be upheld in civil courts 
and allow women to sue for damages, that they might be effective particularly if all segments of 
Jewish communities agree to sign them and it becomes mainstream like the ketuba, the Jewish 
legal marriage contract. Here too however, women were cautious and mentioned a variety in 
instances in which prenuptial agreements, while a significant accomplishment, might still fall 
short of protecting all women in all cases. One woman interviewed, who had signed prenuptial 
agreement, was unable to benefit from it simply because it got lost during the course of her 
marriage and was not filed by a reputable beit din. 
 While many women support civil/state remedies in whole or in part, there were still 
women who insisted that such remedies could never completely solve a religious legal/ halakhic 
problem. The question repeatedly arose, ‘is it a matter of rabbinic will?’ even if rabbis wanted to 
find a solution, would they? Could they?
594
 Women had diverse opinions on this matter (as do 
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advocates). That said, quite a few women suggested a statute of limitations on get refusal after 
which time a beit din should unilaterally, without a man’s consent or free will, be able to issue a 
get in his stead. Women also suggested that an Order of Protection and/or a documented pattern 
of abuse should be enough for a beit din to issue a get without a husband’s consent after an 
agreed upon length of time. Some women proposed that rabbis and rabbinic courts should simply 
be bold enough to rely on old, and outdated Talmudic remedies which have fallen into disuse 
(such as those enumerated in chapter two). 
 It is evident that when asked about ‘best solutions’ there is no consensus among the 
women; no generalizable and conclusive ideal remedy. The diversity of responses from women 
reinforces understandings regarding the diversity of their narratives and experiences. The 
narratives surrounding best remedies also elaborates not only on how law or legal systems treat 
women, but perhaps more interestingly and significantly, they illustrate how women treat law, 
exploring to what extent particular laws or norms are relevant to them and if and how they might 
determine women’s behaviours. Women believe in a range of remedies because they have had a 
range of experiences in navigating their get refusal. Whether they believe the best remedies come 
from within the religion or outside it, from within legal systems, or from grassroots efforts, the 
only conclusion that can decisively be drawn is that women are faced with this form of abuse to 
which there is no remedy to date, yet for which there exists a variety of potential remedies. This 
conclusion in and of itself is potentially both socially and legally transformative, indicating that 
women’s storytelling is a powerful tool through which women can shape and produce law and 
legal norms. 
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 There were also marked distinctions among the women’s narratives regarding religious 
belief and adherence. Below are women’s excerpts reflecting on how get refusal may have 
impacted their faith in G-d, observance of religion, and respect of rabbis. I group them roughly 
into two categories: 1) women who express disillusionment with and/or disappointment in 
rabbis/rabbinic bodies, distinguishing between religion, Torah and God, and the people who 
misuse, abuse, and twist it; and 2) women who see their suffering in context of a divine plan and 
link their suffering to a traditional Jewish way of understanding both personal and collective 
suffering in which women feel a direct line to God (an assertion of self worth and dignity in a 
situation that strips one of it); or women who have had positive interactions with rabbis or others 
in the Jewish community who help maintain a positive attitude towards Jewish community and 
Judaism. 
“The hardest part is the rabbis. They say ‘too bad, you’re married, deal with it’. I find myself 
asking ‘why am I in a religion that’s working against me? And even more so, why am I bringing 
up my girls in a religion that may not protect them like it’s not protecting me now? It’s just 
regular human rights; we shouldn’t have to explain why we want a get. […] I would never leave 
my community”595. 
 
“It felt like a money business- I was dealing with rabbis, but not with the rabbis you think of- 
they were robotic. The rabbis I went to initially were awful but ORA really helped me. I learned 
that religious people are not necessarily good or honest, just because they are religious. I felt 
judged because I had not really been a part of the community previously or maybe because my 
family is not religious. Maybe a non-charedi beit din would have treated me better and I would 
have gotten my get sooner. […] I lost my naiveté; I had lots of resentment. […] I learned that 
some rabbis are just people. Now I base my religious observance on Halakha, not on people or 
on what people might think”596. 
 
“I didn’t have faith in the Orthodox world for a while and only now I’m slowly coming back to it 
because I see now that the problem is not the religion. I realize now that I had put rabbis on a 
pedestal for so long and I don’t do that anymore.[…] At first they didn’t believe me but who can 
you trust if you can’t trust a rabbi?!”597.    
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“The rabbis didn’t know how to deal with him. They thought that if they wouldn’t let him in to 
shul (synagogue) he’d stop being religious and what kind of a role model would that be for our 
sons? But I answered that what kind of a role model is he for his sons by refusing his wife and 
their mother a get? Minyan (quorum of ten men needed for prayer) is not what makes someone a 
role model or a good person to emulate. […] I have to be honest, I’m really disappointed - 
Hashem helped me want to be divorced but the get process was sick. There was no support; it 
was a sick, sick thing. I was and still am disillusioned. This is a frum guy with a long beard. 
Although, he could behave this way without religious or social repercussions. […] The attitude 
in Lubavitch is that the ‘abishter et helfen’ but I believe you need to make it help- to be active. 
[…] halakha is a little screwed. […] I daven (pray) to Hashem everyday both for myself, and for 
him. […] I gave up so much to become religious so why is this my life, I was a little angry with 
Hashem and I was disillusioned with the Toronto Beit Din, but mostly I realize it’s all my 
husband’s fault”598. 
 
“It was a nes. I never expected to get my get. […] He went back to the beit din a few months later 
to try and revoke the get. I freaked out and called Rabbi O. and while Rabbi O. said the beit din 
wouldn’t give it much credence, he also said, ‘but everyone deserves their day in court’. That 
really changed my outlook because after all of my husbands’ manipulation, lying and cheating, 
the beit din still give men like him the time of day. That was an eye-opener. […] Perhaps in 
Lubavitch they are too busy not wanting to turn away a Jewish soul and so would never turn a 
man away from shul but really that is a super negative thing because they are not thinking about 
the potential for a woman to leave Judaism because she feels abandoned or even of the potential 
children she’d be able to bring into the word if she was not chained”599. 
 
“The problem is not religion; it’s the people who don’t adhere to religion”600. 
 
“Beit din in Toronto believes in extortion. He wanted me to delete evidence I had against him, 
pictures of abuse, recordings of his rage, in exchange for a get- that was definitely extortion. It 
also speaks to the clash between the Jewish and secular systems. […] They revoked my first get 
100% because I went to police and involved the civil system, after I had agreed not to do so 
when I was granted my (1
st) get.  […] The Toronto Beit Din is scared of the secular legal system 
encroaching on their turf and the women are the collateral damage. […] Leaves me questioning. 
I don’t know if I’d ever get married again, and if I do, maybe only civilly. I am healing from all 
this now but after having my get revoked once I can’t trust that it’s really over”601. 
 
“I’m not putting down rabbis, it’s not their fault”602. 
 
“The rabbis don’t do anything but give a speech on Shabbos. But, they are just human, I’m 
indifferent, I have no opinion of them. I’m still a deep believer in this religion. This hasn’t turned 
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me off religion, not at all. I send my kids to yeshiva day school. It’s about my husband, not the 
religion. Do I think badly of this religion? NO!”603. 
 
“At first the rabbis did nothing, they said ‘shalom bayit’ […] Now I compartmentalize rabbanim 
vs. rabbanut. Some rabbis felt my pain but couldn’t help- they belong to bigger rabbinic 
organizations, groups and they felt they’d lose their status or ‘lose face’ if they’d speak out and 
help me. It’s not halakha, but, there is a petach (a small opening)- if they wanted to, they could 
be creative and open it up and help, not too much, but just a little. […] I believe everything 
happens for a reason and I am still religious, I am still a believer. I was very strong with emuna- 
people used to come give me chizuk (strength) and they’d tell me that I gave it to them [...] My 
father told me he gave me permission to move on and try to remarry if I could, but I told him that 
I was still a believer”604. 
 
“I know I couldn’t have gotten the get in Toronto if he hadn’t moved to Israel. I would still be an 
aguna so that certainly makes me feel negatively toward the Toronto Beit Din. They had never 
even issued any hazmanot or seruvim. At the very, very end, when I was finally about to get the 
get in Israel, the beit din  there asked for a letter affirming I had tried in Toronto to get my get 
before in Toronto and Rabbi O. obliged. […] If my husband’s father hadn’t moved to Israel this 
never would have been solved. It couldn’t have happened two years earlier, when my husband 
gave the get and ripped it up in a rage, it was meant to be at that exact time. All the stars lined 
up just at that moment, it was all yad Hashem. There is no way I would have my get today if I 
was depending on or waiting for the actions of the Toronto Beit Din”605. 
 
“My rabbi was awesome and he hooked me up with ORA and he was such a support throughout 
the process. ORA was a good support too and I felt that the Beth Din of America really heard 
me. They spoke to me for hours at a time”606. 
 
“The Av Beit Din of Queens helped me […] In beit din, it’s not fair like secular court […] I 
gained emuna in Hashem and learned that nothing in this world happens without Hashem”607. 
 
“The experience strengthened me. There must have been a reason that Hashem kept the get from 
me for that exact number of years until the point when I was meant to get it. It strengthened my 
emuna (belief or faith) because logically it made no sense, so you have to look higher or deeper- 
there must be some reason Hashem is doing this, there must be a plan but you just don’t know it 
at the time…”608. 
 
“It’s not the Torah that’s the issue, it’s the people. They are abusing the Torah. […] I clearly 
saw the hand of G-d repeatedly throughout this ordeal”609. 
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“Although it took me a while to get to this point, I realize that being an aguna is straight from 
Hashem. I grieve so much, but Hashem wants me to be alone now. Yoseph Hatzadik (righteous) 
was happy in prison, he’s inspiring me. I am free while imprisoned though, because I don’t live 
with my abuser anymore
610. […] I won in civil court every time and so it would be a deep insult 
to Hashem to be anxious and have doubts. The get has to come through prayer, teshuva. We have 
to thank Hashem for the blessings and for the hardships, both”611. 
 
“Two miracles happened when I needed them to, which were straight from Hashem: 1) I got sole 
custody of our kids and 2) I eventually got my get all the other matters, including the civil 
divorce itself are dragging slowly through the courts”612. 
 
 Women often made distinctions between their faith in G-d or their continued adherence to 
religious laws and rituals and their disrespect that emerged for individual rabbis and/or rabbinic 
courts. While many women’s faith seemed at times unwavering and even strengthened, some had 
seen another side to the clergy and consequently distinguished the individual ‘bad men’ from the 
collective ‘good religion’. That said, some women, even when faced with unhelpful clergy, 
where able to decipher that the lack of empathy, support, or willingness to speak up in the face of 
an acquiescent, passive community was not even to the fault of the individual rabbi, but rather to 
rabbinical training which does not adequately equip rabbis to deal with get refusal and issues of 
domestic abuse and counsel women in overlapping legal jurisdictions. Perhaps surprisingly, 
women often reported in fact that their faith was strengthened during their struggle for a get and 
that the struggle itself made it clear that individual bad people were the problem, rather than the 
religion or even religious law/halakha in and of itself. This strengthening of faith was not 
characteristic of all the women who participated, but it was true for the majority, a finding I was 
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not expecting, and which made the women all the more inspiring in their tenacity
613
. This finding 
also speaks to the critics
614
 who argue the best solution is to simply opt out of (patriarchal) 
religion and/or religious marriage altogether
615
.  
 There were women too who described individual rabbis and rabbinic courts that were 
supportive, particularly ORA and the Beth Din of America in New York. That said, the Toronto 
rabbis were largely described by women who had been refused a get as lacking empathy, and 
mired in community politics and judgement. The Toronto Beit Din was also described as lacking 
protocol and cowering to pressure by influential individuals, enabling financial extortion, and  
seizing an intense desire to hold on to power over the civil court system, all of which further 
deleteriously impacts women’s impressions of rabbis and rabbinic courts and their experiences 
with them. Several women indicated in fact that their pessimistic impressions of rabbis and 
rabbinic courts is informed by the rabbis’ support of abusive men, abusive tactics like extortion, 
and shirking ethical behaviour when communal politics are at play. Women explained that these 
factors, among others, lead them to question their religious observance in particular, and the 
religion itself, more generally. In some cases, their experience of the abuse of get refusal is so 
traumatic that they walk away from the entire system.  
 Perhaps most striking was the reference to human rights abuse by E.R., a woman from 
the Hasidic community of Ger. We met secretly, at a coffee shop in a Jewish neighbourhood in 
Brooklyn, but not her neighbourhood, in order to minimize the chances of her being recognized 
with someone as ‘modern’ as me. The coffee shop, although it had a kosher certification, did not 
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meet the exacting standards of Ger, and E kindly declined my repeated offer to join me for a 
coffee and a muffin. In fully modest garb, her hair covered with a wig, E shared her story of get 
refusal with me and while she made it explicitly clear that she would never leave her community, 
and that it is where she belongs, she simultaneously questioned her ability to raise daughters in a 
community which she felt had not protected her, nor had it protected her human rights. She also 
used the word “sexist” in the interview (see excerpt below), and as the only woman to use the 
word, it stood out amongst all the narrative patches. It is vital not to scrutinize or purport to 
understand the significance or motivation of E’s word choices, words which were not milot 
manchot, yet in their gravity draw attention. That said through my analysis here an appreciation 
for the marked distinctions among the mesuravot get’s narratives concerning how get refusal 
may have impacted their faith in G-d, observance of religion, and respect of rabbis does emerge.  
 There was also striking diversity among the women’s narratives describing gendered 
experiences or effects navigating siruv get. While some women described a power imbalance 
based solely on gender, some did not see their situation in gendered terms.  A number of women 
were struck by the maleness of the beit din and halakhic authorities and some seem to place the 
gendering of siruv get in the context of a larger gendered system with which some women took 
issue as having broad negative implications on women, and with which some had no problems. 
Indeed some women were able to distinguish between a negative, gendered siruv get experience, 
that is the abuse of gendered power inherent in the siruv or refusal of the get, and recognize that 
the experience need not necessarily sour women on the gendered structure or interpretation of 
halakha, religious community, or communal participation generally. Below are women’s 
excerpts reflecting this diversity: 
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“Even though they all - the rabbis and dayyanim- supported me, I still felt separate from them 
[…] I definitely feel like it was gendered but I don’t want to say that I wasn’t supported. It’s just, 
if you walk into a room with all one gender…”616.     
                                                                            
“She was adamant that her experiences were not gendered but in the next answer described how 
women are “made to feel like chopped liver- I had a 10 year-old son that no one offered to take 
to shul to kiddish, etcetera.” She also noted that rabbis asked her “what more can you give him 
in exchange for your get”617. 
 
“The first rabbi I went to discuss a get was my husband’s rabbi, Rabbi O. He said, ‘it won’t be 
easy’ and laughed at me; but the Beit Din of America gave me confidence and I didn’t feel as 
intimidated as I thought I would when I had to speak in beit din. Rabbi R. from the Beit din of 
America was my cheerleader. […] It did strike me that I accepted the get in a room full of men, 
while my husband kept leaving disrespectfully in the middle. It’s also gendered in terms of 
motherhood, all the onus is on us”618 . 
 
“I didn’t feel like it was gendered and I have no bad feeling toward rabbis but it did make me 
question my religion. And yet, I would do anything for the get, my Jewish divorce. I believe that 
it separates two peoples’ neshamas from each other and that’s what I wanted”619. 
 
“There is no reconcilable difference- the power is in the man’s hands that is the bottom line, and 
so the get itself is inherently gendered. Being gendered is not always necessarily bad; it’s when 
one gender takes advantage that things go bad”620. 
 
“I did bring a female support the day of the get, yes, the situation felt gendered, there were a lot 
of men in the room and I felt pretty intimidated and alone”621. 
 
“Ger is very sexist in New York, women basically don’t exist”622. 
 
“Let’s be honest, guys have all the power and women have nothing. I have a civil restraining 
order but even then it’s all up to him, it’s horrible to be a woman. I’m Orthodox and I believe in 
it, but it’s geared towards men. An individual man can use Jewish law…”623. 
 
“…harder to be women. Every woman has to ask herself before she gets married, ‘can I divorce 
him. A woman’s dedication and commitment to family is innate and internal, a husband’s is not 
the same”624. 
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“I believe the rabbis listen and believe women more than men, but they can’t and won’t do 
anything”625. 
 
“It was actually a liberating experience…where my concerns for community standards and what 
other people think of me were broken down. I did feel I had communal support from individual 
friends and rabbis, though there was no action taken against him by/within community, and 
remained in a community kollel but rabbis did go to try and reason with him on my behalf even 
though he makes a very sympathetic character. […] This has made me feel resentful 
to…gender…a woman’s status in Judaism…but it’s we who are perverting it- the halakha. We 
are perverting it by making every other boy a rabbi, rather than just the elite learned and pious. 
This gives more and more power to men and a higher status who don’t deserve it and who are 
not worthy. By doing this we are also making the implicit statement that men may be the moral 
and spiritual leaders of the home, but that is not true in the Torah, nor it is historically accurate, 
it has always been the women”626.  
 
“I had to deliver a cheque before I got my get and that was okay, that was not viewed as my 
receiving get in a way that was against my will as long as it would be given of his free will… I 
didn’t really want to say that I was ‘willingly’ accepting the get when the rabbis asked me that 
question at beit din. Because, in reality, I was unwillingly paying him off in order for him to 
agree to give me a get of his free will. It is hypocritical and ironic that his willingness in this 
sense was more important than mine to beit din. He would not be permitted to give me a get 
unwillingly and he would only agree to give it a get willingly if I paid him off, even though I 
would be doing so unwillingly. At the end of the day, I had no choice. […] It was my most 
humble experience but it did feel very one-sided. I knew he was dating after the get was revoked 
and even after I got a letter from the beit din telling me I was not allowed to date since I was 
technically still married. He just went on with life, went to our friends’ parties and everyone 
believed him while I stayed home”627. 
 
“It’s definitely gendered but what can we do? I understand halakha and I don’t challenge it, I 
don’t want to but I do hope that there could be unity amongst Jews to find halakhic solutions, 
especially for child-baring aged women”628. 
 
 When asked pointedly about gendered experiences in our interviews, women often denied 
having such experiences or expressed hesitation in answering the question. I assume these 
women do not often think about their lived experiences in those terms. Most often however, 
women did describe gendered experiences and/or effects over the course of our interviews 
without framing them or perhaps perceiving them as explicitly gendered. Even within interviews, 
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women described conflicting accounts of support of men/rabbis and discrimination from 
men/rabbis based solely on gender, and often times not intentional or malicious but rather simply 
banal fallouts of an abuse perpetrated on women most often. In discussing the burdens of being a 
single mother without support, the gendered effects of get refusal emerged (although this is 
characteristic of many women going through contentious divorce). Women with sons particularly 
described how their status as a mesurevet get impacted their boys, who suffered in the religious 
ritual observance demanded of males without a present guiding male role-model; prayer with a 
minyan, or quorum, kiddush, or consecrating the wine on Sabbath, and Bar Mitzvah, the 
ceremony celebrating a boy’s transition to manhood, often by chanting from the Torah. 
 Women described the gendered effects embedded in siruv get, such as the assumption 
that a woman must negotiate or barter for her get rather than be granted it unconditionally, as is 
required by halakha. Women made it clear that the requirement of their receiving the get of free 
will was negated, trivialized and disparaged by rabbis’ enabling the extortionate demands and 
advising women to pay off their husbands in exchange for a get. Some also illustrated that the get 
itself is inherently gendered being that it is initiated by the man and placed into the woman’s 
open arms. Consequently the structure itself is gendered or at least the structure enables men to 
use it as a tool of abuse. Women also described the gendered format of the beit din, where the 
woman was the only female in the room, surrounded by men and despite feeling safe, still feeling 
outnumbered. While women noted that they would not change halakha, and that individual 
rabbis were often supportive in one-on-one environments, women also recognized that it is 
communities’ passivity that enables the gendered abuse perpetrated by men in their refusing a 
get. As the excerpts and analysis have shown, women’s narratives describe a range of gendered 
experiences or effects navigating siruv get. 
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Conclusion 
 Using the unconventional tools of leitworts or milot manchot as well as the patchwork 
quilt metaphor, I conducted a closer analysis of the narratives of mesuravot get in this chapter. 
These tools, supporting both a close analysis and a broader one (allowing us to ‘zoom in’ and 
‘zoom out’) enabled previously unforeseen discourses to come to the fore and allowed space for 
women’s voices and experiences to be seen and heard, revealing that women refused a get, while 
heterogeneous in many ways, also share many commonalities and in fact can be seen not as 
passive victims but as active agents who are “law-creating and law-defining” in many ways. 
 The marked distinctions among ‘patches’ of the women’s narratives on the final three 
significant issues discussed in this chapter: best solutions for get refusal, impact on their faith in 
G-d, observance of religion, respect of rabbis, and gendered experiences or effects navigating 
siruv get, are noteworthy for multiple reasons. The distinctions explore patterns of the 
interactions between legal and normative systems in particular social sites, thus making space for 
women and their perceptions and experiences of state and religious law. Simultaneously, the 
differences among the narrative patches speak to the importance of analyzing narratives for both 
the similarities and particularities therein. The points of comparison and the points of divergence 
both allow us to peer into and better understand the multiplicity of experiences diverse women 
have of siruv get and the complex realities they are forced to navigate. Through the deep analysis 
done in this chapter, employing the leitwort and patchwork quilt tools, the women further 
demonstrate their roles as legal actors who can shape and produce law and legal norms as well as 
demonstrating the transformative power of narratives. Furthermore, through this comprehensive 
analysis, the principal contentions of this study become further established. That is, there are 
distinctions between Toronto and other legally plural communities. Get refusal is a form of abuse 
that potentially impacts all types of Jewish women but women do not necessarily blame or 
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abandon religion altogether, nor do all women necessarily considered their experiences to be 
gendered. Women endure abuses yet they are also their own best advocates when faced with 
iggun and are not solely defined by their victimhood. And ultimately, the narratives further allow 
us to consider to what degree civil/state remedies actually impact religious and social 
behaviours- both for better and for worse regarding get refusal. Thus, I argue, the narratives of 
women considered in this chapter are powerfully law-generating and law-defining and further 
build on the critical legal pluralist approach embraced in this study. Moreover, the narratives 
illustrated that although law reform has had some impacts, in its primary goal of changing 
behaviours in the most basic way- that is preventing get refusal altogether, it is clear from the 
women’s narratives, that it has failed to impact social behaviour in that intended and most 
significant way. Perhaps in New York law reform has at least lead to a secondary goal, a greater 
willingness to speak openly and greater awareness having lead to collective consciousness 
raising, but even that secondary accomplishment is lacking in Toronto after and despite the legal 
regulation here. 
 Few women professed the virtues of any get law and there were mixed opinions regarding 
the positive impacts of other civil remedies. When reflecting on the excerpts regarding this point, 
it is possible that the quotes referring to Toronto illustrate that Canadian civil remedies have 
hardened the Toronto Beit Din in a way that is distinct from New York. While women expressed 
hope for the effectiveness of pre-nuptial agreements, they have poked holes too in its universal 
acceptance and effectiveness among all levels of observance. Consequently, when reflecting on 
the principal guiding question, to what degree civil/state remedies actually impact religious and 
social behaviours, the excerpts do not conclusively reveal either legal order to be the ideal venue 
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or schema for solving get refusal. In fact I contend that the diversity of narratives indicates that 
the best approach to solutions is also one of diversity.  
 The gendered stories of siruv get I analyzed in this chapter highlight the lived realities of 
mesuravot get and place their voices at the centre of the analysis. Milot manchot or leitworts and 
the patchwork quilt metaphor were effective methods in that although each story of abuse is 
staggering in and of itself, compounded over and over again, it has become undeniable that the 
underlying issue is the concealed conflagration of domestic abuse persisting unacknowledged in 
Jewish communities, particularly in Toronto. There are lessons to be learned here both by 
looking at the exceptional instances of egregious abuse in marriage, but also in the 
generalizability that emerges upon analysis of the repetitious patterns of the narrative patches.  
Women also had wide-ranging, particular, and distinct opinions as to best solutions; regarding 
religion, rabbis, and rabbinic courts; and even gendered experiences and impacts. To be clear, I 
am arguing that we need to see that particularity, not solely the exceptionality - meaning each 
story is unique and distinctive but together these stories are not so rare, infrequent, sporadic, or 
uncommon that the phenomenon and experiences of get refusal should be considered altogether 
exceptional. Each story ought to stand alone, and be distinct, but also allow us to make 
generalizations across stories, while simultaneously reinforcing that get refusal is a unique 
phenomenon yet not too unique or rare, that it happens everywhere and to anyone. 
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Chapter Six - The Batting of the Quilt: Investigating Overlooked Aspects of Get Refusal 
 
Everyone in this ‘business’ is liars. 
 
Mendel Epstein, you know the famous rabbi who was just arrested, worked with me for 1 year 
before his arrest. I had faith that he’d help, but he didn’t help me either and now he’s gone. He 
wanted to transfer my file from New York to Israel in the hopes that the beit din in Israel might 
put more sanctions on my husband but that got schlepped along for a year and we were just 
about to move forward and he goes and gets arrested. Epstein’s rate was $500/hour but when 
someone really didn’t have the money, like me, he didn’t take that rate- he charged her very little 
for the entire year. When you think about it, lawyers could take the same rate and not get your 
get, so really, if he’s providing the service, why shouldn’t he charge for it? I don’t blame him, 
but why did he have to go and leave me like this? What do I do now? 
 
It was not a good marriage from the beginning. We have 5 kids, I’m the only one making 
parnasa. I never did anything against him or without him.  
 
After we married, we moved to Israel so my husband could learn in the Ger kollel and we lived 
there for 7 ½ years. We only moved back to the States because my son needed therapy. 
 
I had gone to rabbis for counseling and I wanted him to go too. We went to a marriage 
counsellor finally and then it turned out he was going alone and I found out that he had been 
trying to manipulate counsellor against me despite the fact that he’s a pathological liar.  
 
He has the best lawyer. I’m not sure where the money comes from to pay the lawyer though. He 
portrays himself, and perhaps even really dillusionally views himself as a ‘nebach’ case, the 
victim in all this who has been wronged by his wife. He claims I’ve gone modern because my 
sheitel is a few inches too long and I drive, but how else am I supposed to take care of 5 kids?! 
 
After 4 years of waiting around without doing anything against him or for myself to be freed, due 
to community pressure and because of my lack of funds, raising 5 kids alone, I finally went to 
Epstein and he schlepped me around for a year.  
Previously I had gone to rabbis who all said I should stay with my husband. 
I’ve been waiting for a get for 5 years. 
 
It’s not fair. I’m supporting his 5 kids. He’s not a mensch. 
Even in beit din, everyone is thinking about him versus me- the two sides, nobody was thinking 
about the kids. You know, in civil court, sometimes the judge appoints a lawyer for the kids- I 
think that’s smart, I wish that would happen in this case and that beit din would do that too. 
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 Marriages have to have an expiry date – if a couple is separated for a certain period of time, 
there needs to be an automatic get. 
 
It’s funny because the only solution we have for the problem of get refusal is from the middle 
ages and they (the rabbis) are so busy with internet, with all the new stuff they want to control or 
monitor rather than making the old stuff new again. 
 
Secular civil remedies won’t work in my community- it’s good for the more modern people. 
(I asked her what will work?) Nothing will work. Ger is the hardest place, the hardest 
community. Ger is very sexist, women basically don’t exist. It’s such a weapon that they have. 
 It’s just regular human rights. We shouldn’t have to explain to anyone why we want a get. 
The Torah says we have to push geirim away three times, but that’s not true for the get! 
I find myself asking “why am I in a religion that’s working against me? And even more so, why 
am I bringing up my girls in a religion that won’t protect them? The hardest part is the rabbis.  
 
I wonder, do you know the average length of time women are agunos and what do you think are 
solutions?… 
 
Will I get the prenuptial agreement if I ever get married again? Definitely, even though it’s not 
done in my community, and I wouldn’t let my daughter get married without one! 
 
By the way, do you know what the hardest day is? The holiday of Passover because it’s totally 
within peoples’ hands to change this and nobody is. How can I celebrate freedom when I myself 
and not free? 
~~~ 
 
I almost forget to think I’m divorced 
 
We met in the Bukhari community. He was from abroad, and I was a baal teshuva. 
 
I felt communal pressure to marry, but not really from my parents who were not too religious.  
 
We married in March 2010. 
Looking back, I can see now that there were red flags, but I ignored them and got married 
anyway. 
 
I guess the Jewish notion that ‘you can make it work for shalom bayit’ and that ‘it’s up to the 
woman’ played a role. I was naïve and I believed it. Maybe it was ‘baal teshuva syndrome’ you 
just believe deeply that everything’s gonna work out. 
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Our wedding was really great, people still say what a great wedding it was, but immediately, the 
next day it got bad.  
 
He was controlling and lacked emotional intelligence. He was manipulative, took out his rage on 
me, blamed me for things. It’s a terrible comparison to make but it was kind of like my own 
Holocaust in that I totally didn’t see it coming and I couldn’t believe I was in that situation with 
nowhere to go. 
 
He really had lots of control issues. He treated me as sexualized body, using my past against me, 
saying that my family and I are worthless. 
 
He started to control where I went, what I did, who I spoke to he would say things like, “I 
suggest you should…” 
 
I felt completely alone and I tried not to involve my parents since they were more modern, not 
religious and wouldn’t understand. 
 
Now I think that you can only be subjected to control when you have some weaknesses… 
 
There was a cycle of abuse. He left after a fight wanting a break, then we got back together and 
he was very charming, then it happened again. Finally he agreed to go to a Kabbalistic rabbi. I 
had begged him to try anything even to go to such rabbis but then the rabbis said “it’s not time 
for divorce yet”… 
 
He racked up debt of 100 grand, told lies, got paranoid, blamed others.  
 
I got pregnant and he was better for a while but things got bad again and I lost the child. Worse, 
he genuinely felt he was victim; that I did him wrong. 
 
He wanted to use this Charedi beit din in Boro Park and they asked me, “Why should he give 
you a get? It’s his right so what are you going to do about it?” I felt like it was just about the 
money, a business. It’s not the rabbis you think of…He was extorting me for the get and they 
were enabling it. 
 
He called me names, stalked me on Facebook, and left incessant messages on my phone. He had 
irrational views and demands, and didn’t admit his wrongs. He was malicious. I needed orders 
of protection because I felt unsafe and unprotected. 
 
Lawyers, mediators, rabbis who were awful and dropped me- ORA really helped me. 
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When I arrived at beit din, September 24, 2013, I announced to the rabbis, ‘“I’m here to buy a 
get”! 
 
I felt judged because I was not really a part of the community- my family not being religious- 
maybe a non-charedi beit din would have treated me better and gotten me my get sooner. Is it 
gendered? Absolutely! Women should at least be heard but also have control over bodies and 
futures. 
 
I lost my naiveté; I had lots of resentment. I learned the important lesson not to base religion on 
people- not my ex, his family, or rabbis. Religious people are not necessarily good or honest, just 
because they are religious. I base my religion on Halacha now, not on people. Rabbis are just 
people. 
~~~ 
We got married in Sept 2011. In June 2012, we separated- on the 30th, a Tuesday, after a terrible 
weekend. I changed the locks. He thought it was an empty threat, but I did it. 
I asked for the get numerous times. On Dec 24
th
 I got my get through mediation with rabbi B. 
There had been verbal, emotional and then a couple of incidents of physical abuse. There were 
Threats, I had fear. I had restraining order against him in place. On Jan 10
th
 2013, a Thursday, 
there was an incident. I found out he still had key to building/garage. I filed a police report, and 
because of the order of protection I had, police had to arrest him and lay charges. He had been 
stalking me leaving threatening messages, leaving notes on window sills. 
Later, on November 13, 2013, I got a letter from the beit din, nullifying/revoking the get- after 
about 1 year of divorce and a year and a half of separation. I was told that this was unheard of 
in any beit din worldwide; none of them revoke gets. 
I felt like the civil law and religious law were at odds… 
In February, on Purim, we both wound up at the same party. He legally was supposed to leave, 
even if he was there 1
st (which he wasn’t) and he did not leave. I knew something bad would 
happen. Sure enough he began to cause a scene. He started to rant and rave about ‘how he was 
so happy not being married to such a terrible person’- even though we both knew technically he 
still was married to me, the terrible person, because we both knew the get was revoked. 
I believe that the Toronto Beit Din believes in extortion. He wanted $7000 for the 2
nd
 get in order 
to pay for criminal lawyers needed after I called police on him and they laid charges. He also 
wanted me to delete evidence I had against him- photos and recordings proving his abuse, rage, 
etcetera. It was definitely get extortion, and definitely speaks to clash between civil and religious 
legal systems…because the beit din didn’t seem to care about my need for a restraining order. 
I had to deliver the cheque before I received the get, and that was okay, but going for a support 
order was viewed as not okay, as contrary to Beit Din … 
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His dad is the real crazy one, it was all driven by him, more so than my ex. He threatened the 
Beit Din, made stink all over city. He threatened the Beit Din that he’d go to the media, he told 
lies about me and my family... My family and I didn’t say anything, we were very private. 
To have to pay your abuser is another form of abuse and another form of control. I did not want 
to say that I was “willingly” accepting the get because I was unwillingly paying him off in order 
for him to give it to me. It is hypocritical and ironic that his willingness in this sense is more 
important than mine to the Beit Din - he can’t give a get unwillingly and will only give it 
willingly if I  paid him off which makes me then unwilling… 
At the end of the day, I had no choice. I believe they revoked my 1
st
 get 100% because I went to 
police. They didn’t care at all about abuse, they forced me to be in the same room as my abuser, 
despite legal restriction on this, and even mocked me about this saying ‘don’t worry, no one will 
be calling the police here’. 
I would have used civil amendments but I heard the Beit Din finds the civil as conditional due to 
amendments which impose a time frame or ‘penalty’ in exchange for a get – ironically though, 
it’s still conditional because it was predicated on him first receiving $7000 from me. 
It was my most humble experience. I felt betrayed by people who are supposed to be the holiest 
in the community. My needs were not important, I was never asked why I went to the police. No 
one ever asked if I was okay; if I was safe. I was silenced- by the Beit Din - no one even called 
me to meetings, they called my proxies- brothers and my lawyer. 
I lived in fear for the first 6 months after the get was revoked and I was really hurt. It’s very 
offensive that so many young girls, our age supported him and continued to socialize with him. 
It felt very one-sided. I knew he was dating, he just went on with life and everyone believed him, 
but in the letter I got from the beit din telling me my get was void, it also said I could not date. 
I want you to know: 
1- I got divorced because of abuse – and this was just another form of abuse- another form 
of control, refusing to give me a get. 
2- Communal silence is a whole other form of abuse I had to endure. 
Therefore problems in Toronto are abuse, and communal silence, and Beit Din’s actions or 
inactions. I wasn’t counted as a person with my own voice; I was talked to through men- they 
even complained to my brothers at the Beit Din that my hair wasn’t covered! 
All this leaves me questioning…The halacha is archaic but a true believer will be okay with that- 
with archaic halachic principles- but, leaders must step up. They must acknowledge get refusal is 
a form of domestic abuse, it’s about how individuals use halacha. Also, if we are going to be real 
about it, the bigger picture is that rabbinic leaders refuse to acknowledge that there is abuse 
within their communities’ altogether. Domestic abuse is the untold norm! 
It was a long process, but it was healing in the end. 
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Once again, the narratives opening this chapter demonstrate the diversity of the women 
refused a get. However, what is particularly noteworthy is that the narratives here also hint at 
hidden aspects of get refusal upon which I elaborate herein. Specifically, each narrative draws on 
terms or concepts existing within Judaism which, when misconstrued, help to sustain abusive 
relationships. They illustrate the pressure felt by women to get approval of rabbis or community 
leaders before leaving abusive spouses as well as the shame, guilt, and responsibility individual 
women feel when a marriage breaks down, particularly due to the concepts such as shalom bayit, 
a peaceful house, among others. These participants also insinuated that they have become social 
pariahs within their communities for speaking out about, or even just for actively attempting to 
navigate being refused a get. This aspect of the narratives speaks to another issue underpinning 
get refusal, the potentially effective remedy of shaming recalcitrant husbands. The final story in 
this trio, from a Torontonian woman, also indicates the degree to which domestic violence may 
be intertwined with get refusal although it is not often understood in such terms in the existing 
literature or even amongst scholars, activists, and feminists. 
 
 
Picking up on my previous discussion, in this chapter I analyze unexplored issues that 
underpin the issue of get refusal. That is, I will explore themes and tactics chosen by those who 
are trying to confront get refusal. I reflect on visual representations associated with get refusal 
(and how they portray women as slaves), the use of social media by mesuravot get to assert their 
agency in galvanizing kherem or ‘e-shaming’629, and I examine get refusal as a named site of 
                                                          
629
 E-shaming has never been used in the context of get refusal, or agunot, though it has been employed in other 
contexts, such as shaming criminals, particularly those who have committed crimes against women and children. In 
this context I am defining e-shaming as the interaction between get refusal and technology wherein the use of 
technology helps to remedy instances of get refusal by shaming recalcitrant husbands 
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domestic abuse which is bolstered by abusive men manipulating a lexicon existing within 
Judaism and the normative cultural assumption that a get can be negotiated. While these aspects 
of get refusal may seem at first glance to be disjointed, in reality these are all facets of get refusal 
which have been eschewed in the existing literature. These aspects of get refusal are 
understudied if not altogether overlooked- both by the socio-legal literature addressing get 
refusal, as well as the literature by Jewish scholars, including feminists. They are connected in 
that they have been absent. Thus, I bring them to the foreground in this chapter, linking these 
seemingly disjointed components of get refusal, rather than continuing to conceal or repress 
these analyses.  
In fact, my image analysis of the visual representations and the shift toward ‘e-shaming’ 
will directly link to my subsequent examination which sees get refusal as a form of domestic 
violence that is supported by normative cultural assumptions and terminology. Thus, not only 
have these facets all gone unexplored, but my exploration of one of these facets lead me to the 
(re)affirmation of the (need for the) other. To clarify, my analysis of the visual representations of 
get refusal and the use of social media further exposed the profundity of the abuse of get refusal. 
Conversely, framing and understanding get refusal as a site of  domestic abuse reaffirms the need 
to employ ‘e-shaming’ not only as a potential remedy to get refusal itself, but also as a tool for 
empowering women who have experienced the abuse of get refusal; it has dual corrective power. 
The ensuing analysis furthers and deepens the plural objectives of this research by empowering 
women, ‘voicing their void’630, and by considering the extent to which internal (religious) social 
                                                          
630
 Sara R. Horowitz, “Voicing the Void: Muteness and Memory in Holocaust Fiction,” (New York, NY: SUNY 
Press, 1997). In her study, Horowitz notes that where silences exist, they represent a both a difficulty in saying 
something meaningful about a trying issue or event and a difficulty about the issue/event in and of itself. In this 
context, when we allow women to voice their void regarding get refusal we are attempting to acknowledge both 
these aspects. 
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norms have been impacted by state legal reforms (thereby also demonstrating the potentially 
transformative power of grassroots efforts to impact both social and legal change). 
 
Representation Analysis: From Images and Wanted Ads to ‘E-Shaming’ 
Inspired by Rae Anderson’s, piece in Ethnographic Feminisms: Essay in Anthropology, 
titled “Three Voices”631, this section will draw on an analysis of images of get refusal used in an 
array of circumstances; namely: images used by advocacy groups, posters at rallies, and 
newspaper and social media advocacy/advertisements. Here, I will pick up on my earlier 
discussion of ‘wanted ads’ of men 100 years ago and connect them to similar contemporary 
images, I will consider a rebooted, re-imagined kherem through social media ‘e-shaming’, and I 
will illustrate how social media has become a platform whereby mesuravot get can assert their 
agency. Consequently, this analysis will also elaborate on a few ‘bottom up’632 remedies 
available to respond to get refusal, including community organized grassroots initiatives.  
I will begin by exploring an unexpected and often ignored site of analysis that has not 
been previously analyzed - and that is the representations of get refusal. I use the word 
‘representations’ in a broad sense, to include pictures, descriptions, or accounts of someone or 
something specific, the collection or description of somebody or something specific, or a set of 
recognized images in a particular field of activity, including social media. This exploration will 
underscore a way in which women are silenced and have been portrayed as passive. Furthermore, 
regarding my consideration of the question ‘to what extent has law impacted social norms’, the 
                                                          
631
 Rae Anderson, “Engendering the Mask: Three Voices,” in Ethnographic Feminisms: Essay in Anthropology, ed. 
Sally Cole and Lynne Phillips (Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press, 1995). Their piece does not privilege one 
form of knowledge and they tell the same story in three voices- through images, through stories, and through a 
scholarly analysis. 
632
 That is the ‘non- official’ or grassroots approaches to remedy get refusal that do not rely on the official legal 
mechanisms of state or Jewish law. 
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“massification”633 of the representations, that is the persistent scale portraying get refusal, 
indicates that to some degree, top down approaches
634
 to remedy get refusal alone have not 
sufficed and that women are erroneously portrayed as helpless, shackled, victims, much like 
slaves are depicted. Through analysis I illustrate that grassroots efforts are still a necessity and 
that legal reforms have not impacted social norms in a sufficient way so as to negate the need for 
the massification of representations by solving the issue because culture has been more forceful 
and potent.  
 
Images 
Fuyuki Kurasawa, in the context of contemporary forms of slavery, developed a model 
for analyzing the images depicting slavery. Inspired by his methodology, I adapt his 
comprehensive model here to some extent for analysis of get refusal. Interestingly, often the 
images used in get refusal advocacy invoke that of slavery or chattel- that is, shackles handcuffs, 
chains or anchors. Recall that the word agun in Hebrew translates literally to ‘anchor’. 
Consequently, women without a get (whatever the reason) are considered anchored, chained, or 
shackled to their unwanted marriages, unable to escape and move on with their lives freely. One 
woman told me, “I felt like a slave”635 and Alan Dershowitz expressed at the 2012 Aguna 
                                                          
633
 Fuyuki Kurasawa, “Show and Tell: Contemporary Anti-Slavery Advocacy as Symbolic Work,” in Contemporary 
Slavery Popular Rhetoric and Political Practice, eds. Annie Bunting and Joel Quirk (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 
2017).While Kurasawa uses ‘massification’ as the illustration of the scale of slavery by portraying an 
undifferentiated group of enslaved subjects” page 3, I am inspired by his use of the term and the connections 
between the representations of slavery and get refusal. Consequently, and with his study informing this analysis, I 
adapt the term more literally- implying that the massification of the representations themselves have been an 
indication of the persistence (and to some degree the scale) of that which they portray. In other words, it is not only 
that the representations portray a large undifferentiated group of women refused a get, although, that is also accurate 
to some degree, but rather I focus here on the volume of representations – the ongoing massification as indicative 
the significant persistence of the phenomenon and the meanings that might be drawn by the similar representations. 
634
 That is the approaches of the ‘official’ legal systems, whether they be the state-run or internal, Jewish legal 
systems. 
635
 S.L. October 23, 2013. 
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Summit, “let us not mince words, agunot are modern day slaves”636, both echoing the same 
sentiment, that women refused a get are unable to make basic choices about their lives and their 
destinies, much like slaves whose decisions are understood to be made by their owners/masters. 
Moreover, the right to marry and divorce has been a principal issue taken up by CEDAW
637
. 
Some feminist critics of Jewish marriage claim that the kinyan requirement is a halakhically 
mandated way to ‘own’ a wife, similar to chattel638. It is intriguing that slavery or chattel are 
used as the comparators to get refusal. Indeed slaves and mesuravot get have been similarly 
depicted as victims without agency, or even identity. It is this vein I rely on Kurasawa’s model of 
analysis for slavery iconography and (liberally) adapt it to analyze various representations in the 
field of get refusal. 
Rather than assuming get refusal is a ‘bad’ phenomenon existing in society “whose self-
evident status as a morally abhorrent fact serves as an unquestioned point of analytical 
departure”, I will examine some of the images through which advocacy groups produce such a 
construction as a moral evil against which public opinion can be mobilized and steps can be 
taken to prevent or stop the phenomenon’s persistence639. Understanding how the evil of get 
refusal is formed as a public ‘wrong’ is interesting because the images/representations are 
virtually identical across time and place, despite diverse contexts- social, political, historical, 
etcetera.  
                                                          
636
 Alan Dershowitz, Keynote Address, (presentation at The Agunah Summit, New York University Law School, 
New York, NY, June 24, 2013). 
637
 As was noted by Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, member on the expert committee of the UN Committee on Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), though she was speaking more in her capacity as 
academic rather than UN representative (if the two can be cleanly severed). Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, “Call to Action” 
(presentation at The Agunah Summit, New York University Law School, New York, NY, June 24, 2013). 
638
 For example, Rachel Adler, Engendering Judaism: An Inclusive Theology and Ethics (Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press, 1999). 
639
 Fuyuki Kurasawa, “Show and Tell,” in Contemporary Slavery Popular Rhetoric and Political Practice, eds. 
Annie Bunting and Joel Quirk (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017), 1. 
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Having examined hundreds of images, I grouped them together based on the “visual 
tropes” I identified640. The images are evocative at times and “harness power to gain socio-
political traction”641. The vast majority of the existing images (which are used by advocacy 
groups) are of women’s hands in shackles, handcuffs, or tied and constrained in some way (see 
images 1.1-1.9 at the end of this chapter). The women’s faces and bodies are not shown (much 
like the images Kurasawa analyzes in the context of slavery). This portrayal makes this issue 
both simultaneously unrelatable and yet a universal phenomenon. On the one hand, by showing 
only hands it may be difficult to elicit empathy, after all, if this issue is faceless, one might ask, 
who does it impact? Moreover, showing only the cuffed hands of women portrays them as 
“suffering, enslaved subjects”642 passive captives, victims, unable to assert agency by navigating 
their way through the complex web of normative legal and social orders, which of course, is 
contrary to my empirical evidence. While perhaps this design “cultivates moral revulsion and 
outrage among viewers”643 and is consequently effective, “women’s agency is central to the 
practices of feminist advocacy” and yet ironically, as with the massification of this first visual 
trope, much of the feminist advocacy uses imagery that portrays the very opposite- that is, 
women’s passivity, their victimhood and subjugation644. On the other hand, consider that the 
manacled hands could belong to anyone, and potentially any Jewish woman is at risk. I believe 
the massification of these types of images, this particular visual trope, should emphasize the 
universality of get refusal and its interdenominational impact and that is in fact an powerful 
impact of the trope. 
                                                          
640
Fuyuki Kurasawa, “Show and Tell”, 3. 
641
 Ibid, 2. 
642
 Ibid, 10. 
643
 Ibid 10-11. 
644
 Andrea J. Nichols, Feminist Advocacy: Gendered Organizations in Community-Based Responses to Domestic 
Violence (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2014), 12. 
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The second category of images portrays the shackles or manacles breaking open, freeing 
the woman’s hands (images 2.1-2.3). Massification of these images is not nearly to the same 
degree as the previous icon; far fewer exist. These images are interesting though in that they 
evoke a different reaction. While the previous icon elicits sadness, anger, despair at an abuse 
with no end in sight, moral indignation at an immoral abuse; this image elicits hope, optimism, 
renewal and a restored sense of justice. That said, the images do nothing for the accurate 
portrayal of women. They are still face-less and body-less, and consequently still problematically 
represented as silent and passive.  
The third and fourth representations or iconographic tropes or are sloganed posters and 
rally posters, both used as part of advocacy efforts by organizations (images 3.1-3.8 and 4.1-
4.14). The latter always have the same format and include the picture of the recalcitrant spouse 
and/or a picture of the formal, rabbinic seruv or order of contempt which ‘officially’ allows for 
kherem manoeuvres, a few key facts of the case, including the length of recalcitrance. The 
similarity to the ‘wanted ads’ in the Gallery of Vanished Husbands  from The Jewish Daily 
Forward in the early 1900s will be elaborated below
645
. These ads are publicized by social media 
campaigns on Facebook and other forum, and email blitzes by advocacy organizations which 
organize rallies, most often ORA. The former include slogans like: “When one is in chains, we 
are all bound”, “Every Aguna is my sister”, “Get refusal=domestic abuse”, “Shame on you, stop 
the abuse”, etcetera. The only slogan with the explicit goal of empowering women states, 
“Agunot of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains”. These slogans are 
significant for a number of reasons. They invoke community, they associate get refusal with 
                                                          
645
 Indeed there are examples from even earlier, as Professor Haim Sperber’s research illustrates. Including those 
from Hamagid, a Hebrew newspaper circulated throughout Europe. Sperber notes in particular examples from 
Warsaw in 1866 and Bucharest in 1873. Haim Sperber, “Agunot in Eastern Europe and North America, 1900–1914: 
Sources and Narratives” (presentation at Hadassah-Brandeis Institute's Spring Seminar Series on New Approaches 
to the Agunah Problem, Brandeis University, Waltham MA, February 4th, 2015). 
249 
 
abuse, and they invoke shame. I will discuss them briefly here and will expand on their 
significance further below. The first two slogans are a communal call to action and lay 
responsibility at the hands of community. This is significant in that women often described their 
solitude and having no sense of communal support in my empirical interviews. The third slogan, 
associating get refusal with domestic abuse is imperative to advocacy movements and ORA has 
led this charge. The significance of this association is plural. While there is greater 
acknowledgement within Jewish (observant) communities that domestic abuse exists and is a 
harm that ought to be contained, this acknowledgement does not extend to get refusal. 
Consequently, framing get refusal as a form of domestic abuse is a smart, strategic move, making 
it difficult for communities to (continue to) ignore. Framing it as domestic abuse also puts the 
onus on the recalcitrant in a way none of the other iconographic tropes have done and moreover, 
shame as a strategy to impel the recalcitrant is invoked, hearkening back to the traditional 
kherem, a method of persuasion employing shaming, ostracism, and even excommunication or 
banishment. The final slogan interestingly empowers women refused a get and encourages them 
to self-identify in order to unite and build a community and support network.  Consequently this 
slogan is not only unique in that it empowers women and is explicitly for the mesuravot get, 
contrary to the other representations, but moreover, it is a call to action for the women to sound 
their silences and use their agency to empower the larger group.  
Like in Kurasawa’s analysis, I have not offered here a comprehensive analysis of every 
visual representation of get refusal, for that would be far beyond the scope of this chapter. I 
examined hundreds of images and grouped them into the most common visual tropes or 
categories of images, which gives a good sense of the current trends in the field more broadly. 
Using Kurasawa’s model and adopting a “culturally-attuned critical sociology enables us to gain 
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a fuller understanding of the oft-neglected symbolic work that underpins” get refusal activism646. 
It is crucial also to note that while the visibility of the representations in and of themselves are 
positive, when women are “positioned as passive victims awaiting rescue” there are troubling 
gendered narratives that percolate into the important “pictorial campaigns”647. What is revealed 
through this analysis however, is the striking reality of get refusal as a form of abuse (wherein 
women are chained, unable to assert their freedom). 
 
Wanted Ads 
Apart from the four visual tropes emerging from the images associated with get refusal, 
other significant representations of get refusal are prevalent ‘in the field’- both in print and 
online/ on social media- and those are lists of seruvim, or orders of contempt published in 
popular Jewish Presses as well as the Israeli Rabbinic Court’s wanted ads, and specific social 
media campaigns for particular mesuravot get (images 5.1-5.3). Although some might consider 
listings to be a different class of subject, I include the listings in this analysis of diverse 
representations nonetheless being that they are a comparable symbolic feature. Akin to the 
previous images, the listings too have become potent representations of get refusal (that are often 
accompanied by images as well). And, because the modern-day representations so clearly 
hearken back to the images of ‘wanted ads’ from 100 years ago in the “Gallery of Vanished 
Husbands” featured in The Jewish Daily Forward, it would be remiss not to pick up on our 
earlier discussion. The modern-day stream of images of men who have absconded from 
marriages figuratively rather than literally, are more than reminiscent of the 100-year-old wanted 
ads, they are a re-imagined, rebooted version. Although the “Gallery of Vanished Husbands” 
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dealt with the ‘classic’ agunot, whose husbands were missing and thereby unable to grant them a 
get, similar methods are being used today to deal with mesuravot get, women who are not 
‘simply’ abandoned, but are openly refused a get by recalcitrant men whose whereabouts are 
known. As a means of grassroots storytelling, these images are meaningful in that they do often 
elicit social or at times even legal transformations (rather than legal regulation leading to 
normative social reform). But, on a simpler and yet significant level, these representations are 
meaningful even without transformation, but in their mere existence in the public realm, raising 
awareness and insisting that the problem persists.  
The list of seruvim appears weekly in Jewish news media, in particular The Jewish Press. 
They may also be publicized within communities, posted in Jewish establishments and 
synagogues and disseminated widely via social media. The listing includes the husband’s name, 
city, the beit din that issued the seruv and the year in which it was issued. There is also 
disclaimer that each person included on the list has either withheld a get upon being ordered to 
grant one (by a beit din) or has refused to appear before a beit din in matters pertaining to a get, 
or for otherwise failing to follow the orders of the beit din in matters pertaining to a get. The 
disclaimer also refers the public to sources for consultation regarding how to treat the men listed, 
who are mesarev l’din, refusing to submit to judgement. The Israeli Rabbinical Court’s webpage 
which features their ‘wanted ad’ similarly features pictures and some biographical information 
about the men refusing gets, but it goes even further. Because family law is under the purview of 
the rabbinic courts, this webpage is a tab on the rabbinic court’s site which also features an entire 
investigation bureau whose task it is to search the world for the absconding husbands. The tab, 
titled, “wanted pages” includes pictures of the men and a plea to the public, “the administration 
252 
 
of the beit din requests the help of the public … If you have details that aid in the capture of one 
of these get refusers please fill out a form and you can help release an aguna”648.  
There are also individual websites and Facebook pages set up for particular mesuravot 
get (images 6.1-6.5). The websites, comprised primarily of images telling a story of get refusal, 
also include information about the recalcitrant husband and the conditions of the seruv along 
with links to legal documents to support their claims, and also often including personal 
information having to do with the wife and children and at times also information about the 
husbands’ family and/or supporters649. The websites, hashtags, and Twitter pages such as: 
freelonna.org, freegital.com, #freeadina, #Tweet for Freedom, #freehernow, @Eli_Shur_, and 
others, are powerful representations of the women’s journeys, proactively navigating plural legal 
systems, while concurrently being abused and controlled by their husbands in the form of get 
refusal. ORA, who often helps women establish these campaigns has said, “we want their names 
and faces to be known throughout the United States and worldwide, so they can’t escape or hide 
in another community, that his back will be against the wall…We aim to make them so famous, 
they can’t slink away change their names and continue their abuses toward their families”. As a 
result, some of the YouTube clips have had 68,000 views while some websites have had 14,000 
hits
650
, publicising the men who have chained their wives to unwanted marriages. The seruv 
listing, the wanted page on the rabbinic court’s website, and the individual websites for particular 
mesuravot get, are three examples of noteworthy representations prevalent in the field of get 
refusal. 
The ongoing use of these diverse publicized representations is symbolic and the 
significance of their perpetuation is threefold. The seruv listings, wanted page, and individual 
                                                          
648
 http://rbc.gov.il/Wanted/Pages/default.aspx. 
649
 Often, a condition of giving the get is the removal of these websites and other social media.  
650
 Email correspondence from ORA, January 7, 2016. 
253 
 
websites, despite being different mediums, each make the get refuser known, while illustrating 
the willingness of some communities to acknowledge the persistence of get refusal and challenge 
it publicly, in newspapers and online. This highlights a marked distinction, particularly between 
New York, which has the highest readership of The Jewish Press and where the Organization for 
the Resolution of Agunot (which helps some women with setting up websites) is most active, and 
Toronto, which has no public notification system in place regarding seruvim, and has no 
community support organization in place to advocate for agunot. The representations 
additionally illustrate that the phenomenon persists, despite the available pluralist remedies at 
hand (including in the New York context, the New York get laws, the Domestic Relations Law, 
and prenuptial agreements, and in the Canadian context, the get amendments to the Divorce Act 
and Family Law Act). The representations are also significant in that they chronicle the stories of 
particular instances of get refusal, illustrating the sustained utility and persistence of telling the 
stories of get refusal as well as exposing the reality that get refusal is in fact a form of domestic 
abuse.  
These three representations have much in common with the Gallery of Vanished 
Husbands, noted above. The analysis here, will elaborate and explain the similarities in greater 
detail, and will elucidate the significance of the parallels. The Gallery is fascinating in that it 
brought the issue and the faces of deserters “compellingly into the broad public arena”, telling 
stories and biographies of individual men and the circumstances under which they disappeared
651
 
(image 7). I should note that ads were most often placed by Jewish social service organizations 
trying to find the men no longer supporting their families (and in order to alleviate the great drain 
the phenomenon was having on the agencies themselves). Similarly, the seruv listing and wanted 
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page particularly mimic the Gallery being that they too are often updated by social service 
agencies or rabbinic courts and by including minimal biographic information about the 
absconding or get refusing husband as well as a photograph. However, the individual websites 
telling the stories of individual women also share similarities. At the time the Gallery was 
published in the Jewish Daily Forward, it had another feature in contrast to the Gallery which 
was often the front page feature. Running in tandem to the Gallery, the Bintl Brivs, or Bundle of 
Letters, were letters to the editor which notably ran as responses to the Gallery, and were 
featured at the back of the section. The Bundle featured letters from abandoned, silenced wives 
in contrast to the Gallery, which only introduced the men. These letters filled in the gaps of the 
men’s stories featured in the Gallery, being that they were written by the women or even their 
children at times, often describing their shame, abuse, anger, love, needs and destitution
652
. 
These letters demanded that women’s voices and stories be heard and that their needs and 
experiences be known by the community, just like what is being accomplished through the 
popping up of websites and twitter pages. What is noteworthy, is that the letters, like the use of 
social media by mesuravot get are a means of ‘talking back’, of the women moving from the 
margins to the main stage and affirming that women are not only passive victims of this form of 
abuse, as they were, and are often still portrayed, like in the images of shackled hands, but rather 
they are simultaneously, active agents as well. It is in this vein that the individual websites 
hearken back to the Gallery and the bintl brivs. Comparing the modern-day representations: the 
seruvim, the wanted ads, and the social media movement by individual women to the to the 
representations of the past is significant because the Gallery and the Bintl Brivs together reflect 
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the powerful remedy resurfacing today of voicing the voids of the marginalized while 
simultaneously adapting the traditional remedy or social pressure of kherem.  
 
E-Shaming
653
 
The contemporary kherem emerging from the varied representations is a renewed version 
of the traditional mechanism to pressure or shame a husband to grant a get, using what I would 
like to call, ‘e-shaming’. E-shaming is the interaction between get refusal and technology 
wherein the use of technology helps to remedy instances of get refusal by shaming recalcitrant 
husbands. While this nexus is not novel, as our analysis of the Forward (which used the 
technology of the day) illustrated, the use of the technology, is an innovative take on remedying 
this challenging, deep-rooted phenomenon (one which persists despite legal regulation). In this 
digital age, the interaction between siruv get and technology has only intensified as we have 
moved on from solely poster-ing communities or setting up rallies (though these are still 
important facets of kherem that must persist). E-shaming is a constructive and effective strategy, 
another grassroots approach to induce husbands to grant gets, despite their desire to control their 
wives by refusing the get. The reason e-shaming is so beneficial, more so than other grassroots 
remedies, is because it cuts across boundaries and networks of affiliation that exist in the real 
world. One of the major critiques of traditional kherem is that recalcitrant husbands can move to 
a new community or join a new synagogue pretty easily in contemporary times, leaving their bad 
behaviour behind them. Thus, the effects of the kherem are not nearly as severe or impactful as 
they were centuries or even decades ago, when moving was far more onerous and expensive and 
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congregations were not as prevalent. E-shaming reverses this effect. Using social media to shame 
and shun husbands makes it extremely difficult for recalcitrants to simply move on, despite the 
ease with which they may physically move away or find a new synagogue. The free flow of 
information makes it so that the husband too is chained to his choice to chain his wife. Markedly, 
approaches to siruv get have transformed under the sway of new developments to a broad array 
of social media.  
Yoni Goldstein, editor of the Canadian Jewish News, wrote in his ‘letter from the editor’ 
on “The Media’s Role in Helping Agunot”, that he had recently met a woman whose husband 
was refusing to grant a get. He asked how he could help, and she asked for him to help her get 
her story into the Israeli news media because, “she hoped the media might be able to shame her 
husband into freeing her”654. Goldstein believes, “if the media and the Internet can be harnessed 
to further this agenda, that can only add another powerful weapon in this essential battle”655. 
The Times of Israel Blog
656
 also recently featured a post by Osnat Sharon, rabbinic court 
advocate with Yad L’Isha657 on “Using the Power of Shaming for Good”658.  She made the 
argument that while online shaming has led to significant negative consequences online, such as 
teen suicides and bullying, online shaming has also had success in other arenas, “last week 
shaming proved its strength against one of the more difficult phenomena our society must deal 
with: sarvanut get”. Sharon was referring to an Israeli case, which after one Facebook post 
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telling of a man’s refusal to grant a get (from a modern Orthodox enclave in central Israel), went 
viral.  
A few hours after the post was published, the internet overflowed with comments against 
the husband and his family who had supported him in his actions. Like joined like; share 
was heaped upon share in what can only be referred to as a modern interpretation of the 
power which was, in days of old, reserved only for the couple’s community” (referring 
here to the traditional kherem). 
 
Confirming my contention that e-shaming is an effective mechanism of a reimagined kherem, 
Sharon went on, “The term ‘shaming’ is integral to the vocabulary of the Facebook and Twitter 
generation…the Town Square has been replaced by a virtual space in which one’s individual 
influence is, at all times, a finger click away”659. Jewish communities the world over are now 
employing their individual, online influence to fight the injustice of get refusal wherever it may 
rear its head. Already in 2013, Mayim Bialik, PhD, popular actress, writer, and blogger wrote a 
month-long series on her blog about the aguna issue with the intention of raising awareness 
through her social media presence, taking the issue from the margins to the main stage. While 
this educational campaign did not explicitly ‘e-shame’, it nonetheless publicized the issue, 
setting the stage for potent ‘e-shaming’. Stories have been chronicled in publications ranging 
from The Daily Mail and The New York Times to Haaretz and The Brooklyn Buzz. Crowd-
funding and YouTube videos have been used in some cases along with the Facebook and Twitter 
campaigns.  
 On yet another popular Blog, Kvetching Editor, a recent post, “Agunot in the Age of 
Facebook”, also surfaced recently660. Discussing what the implications are of shaming someone 
publicly in the new age of technology, the author acknowledges that we turn to Facebook to 
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“make things happen”661. Citing as well the Gallery, the author highlights the interesting shift 
from going to the Yiddish newspapers to a Facebook page or website in order to pressure men to 
“do the right thing”662. Rabbinic Court Advocate and author of an Israeli version of the aguna 
prenup, The Agreement for Mutual Respect, Rachel Levmore also picked up on this interesting 
trend in her piece “‘Wanted’ on International Aguna Day”, in The Jerusalem Post663. Citing the 
Israeli Rabbinic Court’s ability to “keep up with the latest technological tools available”, 
Levmore also makes the link between the ‘wanted’ ad on their website and the Gallery, referring 
to both as the most “modern means” at the disposal of communities to help free agunot664.  
Levmore further corroborates that with mobility between communities being easier than ever, the 
traditional kherem may no longer be as effective as was intended. The recalcitrant can easily 
“distance himself from a rabbi he doesn’t like or retreat from a community altogether…the most 
sophisticated or stubborn the individual, the more difficult for the community kherem to exert 
any authority”665.  
 These reports confirm the contentions I illustrate here regarding the significance of e-
shaming and using social media. This nexus, of get refusal and technology, enables women to be 
active participants in navigating plural, complex legal orders, challenging the merely passive 
victims they are portrayed as. Indeed, and as noted above, agunot are often portrayed as 
submissive and powerless, as is reflected in the images of anonymous shackled hands, yet the 
next part of our discussion will reflect on but one example (of many) which illustrates the shift 
from framing and understanding mesuravot get as passive or helpless victims of abuse to active 
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participants in the campaigns to exact a get through the innovative use of social media and e-
shaming. Gital Dodelson’s story (which follows) will further demonstrate how e-shaming via 
social media has become a platform whereby mesuravot get can recast the mistaken perceptions 
about themselves and assert their agency, changing the narrative about mesuravot get as (only) 
submissive victims.  
 
E-Shaming: A Number of Illustrations 
Gital Dodelson married Avrohom Meir Weiss in February 2009. They had a baby boy, 
Aryeh, in November 2009, and ten months after their marriage, in December 2009, Dodelson 
took her newborn son and left. Weiss initially filed for full custody in New Jersey civil court in 
2010, circumventing the tradition, particularly of the ultra-Orthodox (which the couple was), that 
is, to go first to beit din to resolve all legal matters. The couple was eventually civilly divorced in 
2012 and in their divorce, the court had blocked his bid for full custody. Weiss was unhappy 
with the conditions of the civil court, and used the get as leverage in the beit din, attempting to 
renegotiate terms in his favour, in exchange for the get. Among his new demands was shared 
custody, 50-50, as well as $350,000 to cover his legal expenses. That said, at this point, Weiss 
was also in contempt of rabbinic court, ignoring several seruvim from reputable batei din and 
leading rabbis in the ultra-Orthodox community, of which he purported to be a part.  
After more than three years Dodelson went public with her story thereby challenging the 
normative reactions, responses, and perceptions about siruv get, mesuravot get, and sarvanim 
and their supporters, particularly through the social media movement she created which served to 
both support her in her plight, and shame her husband in remarkable and creative ways. 
Dodelson told her story in her own words and wrote as a first-person narrative to the New York 
Post on November 4
th
, 2012 (image 8). A conflagration erupted after breaking her silence by 
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telling her story, particularly on and through social media. Dodelson’s use of social media and e-
shaming was an act of resistance. She resisted the silencing so often imposed on mesuravot get 
and communities were forced to take heed to her plight in particular, and the abuse that is get 
refusal more broadly. They listened and reacted to Dodelson’s story, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of using social media to shame recalcitrant husbands in light of siruv get. Indeed, 
the Post story, which was released both in print and online versions, lead to a ripple effect of 
stories about siruv get (regarding both the Dodelson and other cases) in a wide variety of media 
outlets. Significantly, the e-shaming and social media pressure served to spread the word about a 
variety of influential, grassroots approaches communities should take to aid Dodelson in her 
efforts to get her get. 
Weiss’ family has significant ancestral heritage; his great-grandfather was Rabbi Moshe 
Feinstein, a revered rabbinic authority, who most ironically, was a champion of aguna rights. His 
grandfather was the head rabbi of the Yeshiva of Staten Island, where Weiss was a student, while 
his father and uncle, who had supported him financially and personally, both held important 
positions at Artscroll, a leading Jewish publishing house. I say, ‘held’ because Dodelson’s e-
shaming efforts garnered such a support movement that community members inundated Artscroll 
with so many phone calls that Weiss’ father and uncle were forced to step down. There was also 
pressure on his grandfather to expel Weiss from the Staten Island Yeshiva666. Dodelson’s 
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unsilencing led to a movement which garnered a online communal, reimagined kherem, far more 
effective than a traditional kherem within the physical community might be, that pressured and 
shamed not only Weiss himself, but all those close to him, supporting and even encouraging his 
get refusal. Ultimately, this strategy did precipitate Dodelson’s get667. In fact, this grassroots 
(rather than legal) strategy not only contributed to Dodelson securing a get, but it also exposed 
the depths of the abuse of get refusal including the troubling normative cultural assumption that a 
get can be negotiated
 668
. 
In another well-publicized case, Tamar Epstein also saw improvements when she went 
public about her husband’s get refusal in 2012. Her husband, Aharon Freidman was an aide to 
United States Congressman David Camp, House Chair of the Ways and Means Committee. 
Protesters launched a “full scale social media attack” to compel Congressman Camp to grant a 
get
669. They “swarmed his Facebook page as part of a concerted effort to pressure Camp to coax 
his employee into granting his wife a divorce”670 and Camp swiftly ordered that his public 
posting page be disabled. Separately, a video clip of a rally was shared with over 1,600 people on 
Facebook and a petition garnered over 2,500 signatures urging Camp to take a stand against 
domestic abuse being perpetrated by his aide. It read,  
By refusing to condemn Friedman, in fact, dismissing criticism of Friedman’s behaviour 
as “gossip”, Dave Camp is by default supporting abusive behaviour. We aren’t asking 
Dave Camp to fire Aharon Friedman. All we want is for Camp to require that Friedman 
stop abusing his wife. It is a pity to be known as the congressman who employs and 
encourages abuse of women
671
.  
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Camp was dragged into a complex tangle of religion and politics through an epic social media 
campaign as a modern day kherem mechanism.  
Both Epstein and Weiss were able to rely on the reputations of their husbands (and their 
families) in order to elicit response and action by going public. There is strong evidence, both 
historical and current, that gendered storytelling by mesuravot get using media, and now “web 
soap boxes”672 via social media and e-shaming does have positive impact on, and may even 
remedy the abusive instances of get refusal that women experience. Not every aguna might find 
e-shaming to be as successful as women with husbands whose reputations matter- whether 
professional, communal, or ancestral, but the nexus of technology and get refusal is nonetheless 
a promising, innovative tactic that may have positive impacts on the phenomenon and one which 
is becoming dominant.
673
  
Most recently, one of the women I interviewed went public with her story and although 
her husband did not have important lineage or reputation, the tactic of e-shaming proved 
successful in her case. In January of 2006, at thirty-three years old Basya Ruth Gilman met the 
man she would marry, Isaac Duke, on the Upper West Side of Manhattan.  They were married in 
a Hasidic wedding in Boro Park, New York in August of 2006.  Shortly after the wedding, Duke 
began his verbal and psychological abuse by isolating her from her family and friends, using 
derogatory language toward her and her family. Gilman ran away from her marital home four 
times during her first year of marriage.  She was immersed in a cycle of abuse. During one 
period of reconciliation she agreed to move to Miami Beach to ‘start over’, giving up her 
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successful business and the family’s only income. In Miami, the cycle continued, and while there 
were good periods, Duke quickly bankrupted the couple, having complete control of their 
finances. The couple had their first child, a boy, born in June of 2008. Shlomo Helbrans, the cult 
leader of Lev Tahor, a group of religious extremists (living in Montreal at the time and who have 
been continuously investigated for wife and child abuse), named their son, without Gilman’s 
knowledge and at Duke’s request. After the birth, the situation further deteriorated. He forbid her 
parents from ever meeting their grandchild and became extremely physically and spiritually 
abusive. In September of 2009, Gilman given birth to a daughter, but while on hospital bed rest 
for two months she called a divorce attorney, learning for the first time that she could go to the 
Miami courthouse and obtain a domestic violence injunction, and that it would not be kidnapping 
if she left the house with her children. Once home from the hospital, and with threats of 
kidnapping and encouragement to commit suicide from Duke, Gilman made covert plans to 
escape with her children one Friday afternoon, with the help of one remaining friend. 
Subsequently, Duke told Gilman that he would exchange a get for their son, attempting to 
negotiate, with their children as collateral. She never spoke to Duke again. 
Since then, Gilman, with the encouragement of her rabbi in Miami, obtained a restraining 
order from the civil court, a civil divorce, and all the protections from Duke that they could 
afford her. She has sole custody of both children, sole decision making for both of them, a 
domestic violence injunction (stay away order) that does not expire for fifteen years, and the 
court supervises all visits between Duke and the children. At of the time of this writing, the court 
has suspended his visitation altogether as a result of his aggressive and difficult behavior at 
supervised visitation and yet Duke wanted Gilman to renegotiate custody.  Gilman’s son is now 
seven, her daughter is six, and she is forty-four.  She has been separated from her husband and 
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waiting for a get for six years and civilly divorced as of July 2012 but Duke continued to make 
good on his threat to indefinitely refuse Gilman’s get, that is, until the campaign took off. 
Gilman, after being abused in her marriage and then abused by the denial of a get for six years, 
finally decided she had nothing left to lose and allowed a group of her friends to create a website 
and launch a social media campaign to attempt to exact a get from her husband, Isaac Duke 
(image 9). Gilman recounts her story on the site, includes links to court documents, pictures of 
Duke, and a list of suggested ways to ‘e-shame’ or pressure Duke to grant a get. The site 
recommended praying for Gilman and all agunot, writing  letters to Duke at his home, place of 
business, and on Facebook, writing letters to Duke’s rabbi/the synagogue that allows him to 
continue to pray there, avoiding socializing or doing business with Duke, and spreading and 
sharing the story in communities around the world and on social media. 
Even without the help of a support organization, Basya Ruth’s story went viral, Duke’s 
face was all over social media, all over Miami, and massive letter-writing campaigns rapidly 
resulted. This case of e-shaming was so successful, that after some manoeuvring (on Duke’s 
part) but within two months, Gilman received her get after waiting without hope of a get for six 
years, illustrating that e-shaming can be an effective remedy for women (and/or inducement for 
men) and in fighting the normative cultural assumption that a get can be negotiated. Duke also 
illustrated the capacity of women to be innovators and mobilizers in her ability to harness 
community and shift socio-legal and socio-cultural norms about law and the get, reflecting the 
potential impact of a critical legal pluralist approach.  
On a smaller scale, mesuravot get who participated by allowing me to interview them 
also described making use of e-shaming. Two of the women created their own fact sheets, 
similar to ORA’s and sent the fact sheets to individuals in their respective communities in an ‘e-
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blast’ (image 10). Two more women contributed personal reflections and/or poems which were 
published in popular Jewish news media and picked up in their online forum (‘Image’ 11). One 
woman created a ‘meme’ that went viral amongst her contacts (image 12) and one woman, who 
noticed the synagogue door always banged shut, donated a door stop to her synagogue and wrote 
on it ‘donated by R.W. in honour of her anticipation of her get by Y.W.’ in the merit of receiving 
a get’674 (image 13). She sent the photograph of the doorstop to members of her community and 
said to me, “I donated the doorstop so they would see it every single day as they walked into and 
out of synagogue and so they’d have to stop and think about my being stuck every day, just like 
the doorstop”. This type of contemporary kherem and e-shaming are extensions of the 
representations of get refusal in that they each symbolically publicize the abuse that is get refusal 
with the ultimate goal(s) of (potentially) remedying a case, exposing get refusal as domestic 
abuse which controls the destiny of women, and/or empowering the previously silenced 
mesurevet get herself. The examples of my participants using social media and e-shaming in 
their own, innovative capacities is a noteworthy example of critical legal pluralism and further 
attests to the vital connection that has emerged between technology and get refusal, a connection 
that is seldomly spoken about or acknowledged in the academic literatures and yet which has had 
profound impacts for mesuravot get in a plurality of ways, as this chapter indicates. Although 
these varied representations have not been considered until now, their utility ought to be revealed 
and embraced.
675
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 I would be remiss if I did not note a GQ fashion spread and article (along with many other social media/news 
media reports regarding allegations against Rabbi Mendel Epstein and a group of his associates, some also rabbis. In 
an undercover, FBI sting operation (right out of Hollywood) the group was arrested and indicted on multiple counts 
of kidnapping and assault. Dubbed the “prodfather” for his use of electric cattle prods to coerce recalcitrant 
husbands to grants gets, 69 year-old Epstein faces 10 years in prison (with some of his associates receiving similar 
sentences and some cutting deals). While violence is of course not condoned here nor is it condoned by Orthodox 
congregations, recall that there was a rabbinic allowance for ‘forcefully convincing’ a husband to recall that giving a 
get was in fact always what he intended to do (noted earlier in this study). What I would like to point out is that 
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That said, I want to be clear that this analysis should not be taken as my unabashed 
championing of this type of campaign for each and every woman refused a get for two reasons. 
First, and in reality, not every woman would feel comfortable with the creative technique of e-
shaming using a variety of social media platforms, it should be noted, and I am not advocating 
that each woman go to the local press necessarily. Moreover, while I do argue that e-shaming 
and platforms that enable women to express their experiences of get refusal have the benefit of 
empowering women, that is not to say that women who choose not to go public are passive 
victims (who are to blame). On the contrary, choosing not go public is a calculated choice as 
well. Indeed, the complexity and ‘messiness’ of individual families’ lives and choices ought to 
be respected and a public campaign may not always be in everyone’s best interests. 
Additionally, e-shaming should not be taken as the absolute solution to get refusal nor 
should it absolve attempts for other solutions. In reality, e-shaming does not always exact a get. 
However, I would contend that where women are comfortable, e-shaming ought to be embraced 
as one of many potential tools that might elicit a get, along with other legal, halakhic, and social 
pressures and potential remedies (such as framing the refusal as domestic abuse, prenups, 
annulments, etcetera). That said, while e-shaming may not exact a get in every case, the converse 
is also true. E-shaming may and has exacted a get in many cases (as I illustrated above)
676
. 
Moreover, e-shaming always exacts success (even if it does not directly lead to a get) because it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
some women who sought help from Epstein (a few of whom I interviewed) viewed him as their saviour, their last 
vestige of hope when they had nowhere else to turn and his arrest distinguished any chance at a get. While Epstein at 
times charged women tens of thousands of dollars for his ‘services’ many women felt it was money well spent, and 
certainly preferred than paying off their extorting husbands. While this example of media use may require analysis, 
here I raise this story simply as a counter to the ‘traditional’ e-shaming discussed above, but yet as another example 
of the effective use of social media at the nexus with get refusal. Matthew Shaer, “The Orthodox Hit Squad,” GQ-
Gentelman’s Quarterly, September 2, 2014, http://www.gq.com/story/epstein-Orthodox-hit-squad.  
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Adina Porat a get for eight years and within a few weeks of an e-shaming social media campaign granted a get, 
among others. 
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empowers mesuravot get
677
. Consequently, e-shaming, even when failing to exact a get, is still a 
remarkable accomplishment in that women refused a get who choose to shame, are no longer 
silenced, they are using their agency by employing the tactic of e-shaming to reverse their slave-
like, anonymous portrayals as passive victims so prevalent in the massification of existing 
iconography. 
The objective of this analysis is to alert readers to the rising phenomenon of publicizing 
stories symbolically, utilizing diverse representations
678
 and the potentially transformative 
successes they have been known to produce. In this context, I want to reiterate that I am 
examining e-shaming as an offshoot of the prevalent representations surrounding siruv get. 
Because of the rising trend employing these ‘e-mechanisms’, it is important to highlight this type 
representation as well and underscore its potential effectiveness in challenging dominant 
perceptions about agunot  as weak, passive, submissive victims of abuse, and in challenging 
dominant normative reactions by communities (particularly Toronto) which is to deny and avoid 
the phenomenon altogether. This representation further contributes to the self-narration of 
mesuravot get and I welcome giving them a safe, welcoming and encouraging platform from 
which to tell their stories should they choose to do so. If this can be achieved through social 
media campaigns and e-shaming, that is noteworthy. Significantly the representations discussed 
also have the power to redirect the shame. So many of the women I interviewed described the 
shame they feel, having endured abuse, having wronged their families by failing at marriage, 
having disappointed the community/ the marriage ideal the religion propagates, among other 
                                                          
677
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shameful expressions they described
679
. Using varied representations at the nexus of technology 
and get refusal in order to expose recalcitrant husbands as those who should be ashamed is a 
powerful tool which recasts the key characters. Moreover, my analysis of the visual 
representations of get refusal and the use of social media further exposes the extent of the abuse 
that is get refusal. These diverse representations have the ability to re-empower the traditional 
kherem mechanism with the objective of encouraging unwilling husbands to willingly grant gets 
making a traditional tool which was criticized as being virtually obsolete in a global world, into 
an expedient, digital tool of the 21
st
 century and beyond. 
In their study of the impact of religious images in, “Photo Elicitation and the Visual 
Sociology of Religion”, Roman Williams and Kyle Whitehouse illustrate that, “research 
(methods) that rely on words or numbers alone may miss visual data important to 
understanding”680. They are correct in their contention and indeed this study is richer having 
analyzed the representations surrounding get refusal. Undoubtedly, they do impart additional 
understanding of the phenomena itself (that is, women relying on the free will of abusive, 
contemptible men for their own freedom), as well as understanding about Jewish communities 
(their ability to shame the husbands rather than ignore the shame the wives feel), and the 
evolution of tradition (the high-tech kherem).  In particular, the analysis of various 
representations highlights the extent to which get refusal is entangled with domestic abuse. 
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Manipulation of Culture Buttresses Abuse 
While the earlier portion of this chapter analyzed diverse representations of get refusal 
which highlighted the fact that get refusal is always linked with domestic abuse, the remainder of 
the analysis will discuss aspects of get refusal and domestic abuse reflecting the need for diverse 
representations such as ‘e-shaming’ both as a potential remedy to get refusal itself, but also as a 
instrument of empowerment for women. This next part of this chapter will shift in theme, though 
will continue to uncover unacknowledged aspects of get refusal. In the previous chapter, I 
illustrated that get refusal is a form of domestic abuse that, like other forms of domestic abuse, is 
arbitrary- potentially impacting any Jewish woman, and at all levels of (non)observance. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will illustrate that get refusal is often the culmination of a pattern of 
abuse which persisted throughout the marriage. Subsequently, I will investigate how the 
phenomenon of get refusal enables men to use religion (in this case, Judaism) as a weapon or 
tool of abuse
681. Indeed, a woman’s “membership in a faith community or religious subculture is 
another aspect perpetrators can use in their efforts to control”682. Women described husbands 
distorting religion as a means to abuse by throwing slurs about wives’ lack of piety, ritual 
observance, and even mikvah attendance. I maintain that there is a hidden pervasiveness of 
domestic abuse persisting unacknowledged in Jewish communities (and likely other religious 
communities as well). Like in other religions, spirituality is an integral part of everyday life, and 
thus often plays and integral role in domestic abuses occurring within religious communities
683
. 
In particular, individual, recalcitrant men manipulate Jewish law and use religion as a weapon to 
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commit spiritual abuse both by negotiating that which should be granted unconditionally and by 
employing a lexicon of terms existing within Judaism to buttress them in their recalcitrance.  
Rather than concealing or repressing analyses regarding get refusal and domestic abuse, I 
bring them to the foreground here, where I will explore more deeply the intrinsic connection of 
get refusal to domestic violence, picking up from my introductory discussion emerging from the 
mesuravot get’s own words in the previous chapter and from discussions in this chapter 
illustrating that get refusal is abusive through the diverse representations analyzed. There has 
been minimal acknowledgement of get refusal as a noteworthy type of domestic abuse, and 
mostly by organizations such as ORA, rather than in the existing body of literatures. Indeed the 
existing literature on get refusal- whether it be Jewish, feminist, or socio-legal- does not frame 
the phenomenon as an example of domestic abuse
684
. Only in the last year have courts begun to 
consider this connection, with the Israeli beit din, London beit din, and Australian Supreme 
Court all explicitly labelling get refusal as psychological abuse, emotional abuse, and domestic 
abuse respectively
685
. Although the various representations of get refusal alert us to this 
phenomenon, there has not been an in-depth examination of the ways in which get refusal as a 
Jewish, legal/halakhic requirement is potentially the culmination or zenith of a protracted pattern 
of abuse which is bolstered by religion, although Alison Cares and Gretchen Cusick note that the 
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get is a fundamental way in which men use Judaism to control their wives
686
. I have found that 
mesuravot get describe their husbands using religion or religious obligations in their abuse and as 
additional ways to abuse them (as the women’s first-hand narratives illustrated in the last 
chapter). For example, there have been manipulative attempts to negotiate for a get
687
 which 
should be granted freely, unconditionally, and separately from other matters arising in divorce, 
and there are also a number of traditional expressions, which when misconstrued by abusive 
men, will act as conceptual resources to support and justify their domestic abuse.  Below I 
address some aspects of the interface between religion and domestic violence that emerge within 
Judaism, as well as those aspects which are not distinct to Judaism and which emerge elsewhere, 
but which nonetheless feature prominently in the narratives of mesuravot get.   
 
Twisting Terminology 
 In “The Perils of Privatized Marriage”, Robin Fretwell Wilson demonstrates that 
domestic violence exists amongst religious groups in almost the same rates as it does amongst 
the general public, despite common misconceptions to the contrary, and yet religious groups do 
not have the same protections in place for women who experience domestic violence as the 
general public
688
. Nancy Nason-Clark, in, “When Terror Strikes Home”, contends that “violence 
knows no boundaries of class colour or religious persuasion” and religious women are almost as 
likely as any other women to experience abuse despite the fact that their husbands vow to love 
                                                          
686
 Alison C. Cares and Gretchen R. Cusick, “Risks and Opportunities of Faith and Culture,” Journal of Family 
Violence 27, no. 5 (2012): 434. 
687
 For example, attempting to use children as pawns, often going against court rulings with the “best interests” taken 
into account, attempting to renegotiate other unfavourable terms already decided by civil court, and in one case even 
demanding a woman recant claims to police and delete evidence of domestic violence in order to expunge a 
husband’s record because he was a day school teacher (P.L. August 13, 2014). 
688
  Robin Fretwell Wilson, “The Perils of Privatized Marriage,” in Marriage and Divorce in a Multi-Cultural 
Context: Considering the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion, ed. Joel A. Nichols (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 253-283, 269.  
272 
 
them before God
689
. Nason-Clark notes that theistic women are more vulnerable to abuse even 
though there is no evidence that violence is more frequent or more severe in theistic families
690
. 
The reason they are more vulnerable is because they are less likely to leave marriages, more 
likely to forgive and believe a husband’s pleas for forgiveness and promises to change abusive 
behaviours, less likely to seek support resources or shelters, more resistent to separating or 
divorcing, and more likely to experience shame and guilt in having failed their families and God 
in not being able to make the marriage work
691
. These last two contentions particulary came 
through in the narratives of the mesuravot get I interviewed. 
Consequently, a theistic woman may be more vulnerable than a non-beleiver. In Judasim 
this vulnerability is compounded by the lexicon of ideaological concepts which are internal to 
communitites, as I elaborate below. Fretwell-Wilson (corroborating some of my own findings as 
well as Nason-Clark’s contentions), further maintains that all theistic women find it difficult to 
leave their abuser due to their “religious beliefs about…doctrinal distortions about suffering and 
forginveness” as well as traditional gender roles692. Moreover, while the abused women may 
look to their communities for support, “studies reveal that victims are likley to find cold comfort 
in their religious communities. Religious goups often acquiese, or worse, condone family 
violence”693. As I illustrated in the previous chapter, these findings are reflected in many of the 
narratives of the women interviewed who described having nowhere to turn for support or 
comfort. Some women also described that their husbands had communal support in their 
abuse/get refusal or even that ceratin rabbis did condone the abuse. Two women explained, 
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“Rabbi W did give him an aliya in shul on Shabbos694. The rabbi was pushed to choose between 
his job and my husband and so the rabbi chose supporting my husband”695 and “My husband can 
now get aliyot in shul and give kiddushim but my rabbi won’t support me”696. Another described, 
“My Rabbi is always helpful in the private, emotional process, but not when he needs to speak 
up or help in public”697. Yet another woman expressed, “Some rabbis felt my pain but couldn’t 
help me- they belonged to larger rabbinic organizations and they’d lose their status, and/or ‘lose 
face’ if they’d come out and help me”698. In keeping with these excerpts, Nason-Clark describes 
the phenomena of condoning abuse or of turning a blind eye to the negatives that happen within 
a religious community as a “sacred silence”699 and she includes religious women who do not 
seek support because of their shame in this notion wherein their communities pay no heed to the 
abuses existing within. She concludes that religion constructs the notion of family as being of 
utmost importance and consequenlty also constructs divorce ‘bad’700. Moreover, religion 
“spiritualizes social problems” such as divorce and abuse, and makes abuse marginalized 
because of the gender divide in religion
701
. This is particularly true regarding the phenomenon of 
get refusal. 
In fact, my primary research illustrates that the contentions of Nason-Clark and Fretwell 
Wilson about the persistence of domestic violence within religious communities and their 
assessments regarding some of the additional vulnerabilities religious women face when they 
experience abuse holds true for Jewish communities and Jewish women, at least in New York 
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and Toronto. Janet Mosher, in “The Complicity of the State in the Intimate Abuse of Immigrant 
Women”, picks up on the theme of the vulnerability of women when faced with domestic abuse 
in her discussion about low-income/migrant/racialized women. However, her arguments can be 
applied in the context of Jewish women refused a get. She argues, “social structures too often 
reinforce the batterer’s conduct and enable his power…abusive men often manipulate systems to 
further their control” and she later states, “…men’s abuse is emboldened by the inaction of those 
same systems” 702. Indeed mesuravot get reinforce Mosher’s claims. One woman explained, “The 
beit din was so strict and my husband knew how to use and manipulate their stringency to his 
benefit”703. Another woman described, “The problems in Toronto are abuse, communal silence, 
and the Beit Din’s actions or inactions; and my ex took advantage of those problems”704. 
Whether they are state systems or religious ones, I would posit that Mosher is correct in arguing 
that individual men are often emboldened and enabled by the attitudes of the regulating social 
structures, which in the Toronto context would have recalcitrant husbands refusing their wives a 
get, emboldened and enabled by the Toronto Beit Din, as my interviews have demonstrated. 
Mosher further contends that abuse in cultural/religious communities is not always solely about 
the individual abuser, but rather about institutions, ideologies, structures and regulating 
normative orderings, all of which either blatantly favour men, or which abusive men are able to 
manipulate in their favour
705. Indeed one woman I interviewed spoke about how “We are 
somehow perverting it”706 when speaking about the entire system regulating marriage and 
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divorce- halakha and ritual observance. The “system is flawed” she said707. Cathy Holtmann and 
Nason-Clark similarly suggest, “some men misinterpret elements of their faith or tradition to 
justify their abusive behaviour”708. Moreover, communities as well as abusive, observant men 
often tend to minimize and or rationalize their abuse and its significant danger and exploitation. 
In fact, there is a “tendency of community, particularly men to deny or minimize the occurrence 
of violence within the family” altogether709. As reflected in my primary research, the assessments 
of Sevcik, Mosher as well as Holtmann and Nason-Clark are correctly upheld by my study. 
Individual men do manipulate or intentionally misinterpret the system or the tenets of their faith 
in order to further their abuse and persist in their recalcitrance at times with the aid of batei din 
or indeed even entire communities (and consequently it is not necessarily halakha in and of itself 
which is flawed as was established in the previous chapter). Moreover, “Rather than broad public 
concern…instead we see women positioned as the object of public disdain, regarded as the other 
within their own communities…instilling fear in the normative centre” and this contention also 
bares true regarding agunot
710
. Mesuravot get are at times, and always in Toronto, cast as the 
Other
711
, isolated and marginalized, thus feeling disgraced and shamed.   
As the literature illustrates, there are certainly culturally nuanced aspects to domestic 
violence which are not distinct to Judaism alone. Many cultures and/or religions share a number 
of aspects of domestic violence which the general public do have to navigate; some of which 
were enumerated above, including the insular, tight-knit communities focusing on the sanctity of 
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the family unit and responsibility to maintain intact family structure
712
 as well as avoiding the 
scandal of divorce and the intense shame and isolation that often accompanies it, to name a few. 
That said, get refusal and get extortion are aspects or types of domestic abuse that are unique to 
Judaism, as was elaborated and demonstrated in the previous chapter
713
. Get refusal as a form of 
domestic violence impacts more than “the interpersonal level, but the transcendental one”714, 
leaving scars on the soul, not only the mind and/or body. Carol Goodman-Kaufman confirms, 
“Jewish women must endure a unique form of psychological abuse known as the withholding of 
a get”715. Refusing a spouse a Jewish divorce controls her destiny in a nuanced way that is uses 
religion as a form of domestic abuse, as the narratives demonstrate. Moreover, Judaism has a 
lexicon that buttresses this type of abuse (get refusal). 
“Myths die hard” as Rabbi Dr. Twerski reminds us, in the second edition of his 
groundbreaking, Shame Borne in Silence: Spouse Abuse in the Jewish Community, which was re-
released in 2015
716
. There exists a misconception that Jewish men make ideal husbands, “they 
don’t drink, gamble, or beat their wives” and thus domestic abuse does not exist within the 
Jewish community
717
.  Yet, as my primary research confirms, “race, religion, ethic group, 
philosophy, socio-economic level, education level – none of these preclude abuse like siruv 
get…there is simply no immunity”718. Nonetheless, this persisting myth of the ideal husband 
leads to a stigma surrounding Jewish domestic abuse leading to shame, silence, and things going 
                                                          
712
 Cathy Holtmann and Nancy Nason-Clark, “Reconfiguring Stained Glass,” in Seeing Religion, ed. Roman R. 
Williams (New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor Francis Group, 2015), 180. 
713
 Though there are certainly comparators in other religions, such as women being denied their Mahr in Muslim 
marriages. There can be analogies within a range of religious traditions because abusive, religious men who 
manipulate their religions are also manipulating the patriarchy and power embedded in those power relations which 
they use as justification for their behaviour. 
714
 Nicole Deshan and Zipi Levi, “Spiritual Abuse,” Violence Against Women 15, no. 11 (2009): 1302.  
715
 Carol Goodman-Kaufmann, Sins of Omission: The Jewish Community’s Reaction to Domestic Violence (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2003), 40. 
716
 Rabbi Dr. Abraham J. Twerski, The Shame Borne in Silence: Spouse Abuse in the Jewish Community 2
nd
 edition, 
(Jerusalem, Israel: Urim Publications, 2015), 9. 
717
 Abraham J. Twerski, The Shame Borne in Silence (Jerusalem, Israel: Urim Publications, 2015) 9. 
718
 Ibid, 23. 
277 
 
untreated, “perhaps the incidence is not the astronomical number that exists in the non-Jewish 
population, but neither is it an isolated phenomenon that can be ignored”719. Twerski notes that 
there are halakhot and other Talmudic precepts that address the love and respect a husband must 
show his wife. Even aside from his ketuba contract obligations, the Talmud states, “a husband 
should love his wife as much as he loves himself and should respect her even more than he 
respects himself”; “restoring peace in the home is of the highest order”; “This relationship cannot 
be a master-slave relationship in either direction and neither a husband nor a wife should be 
emotionally abused and have their dignity shattered”720. Maimonides goes even further and 
prohibits sexual abuse within marriage, noting that a husband “is not to have intercourse while 
drunk or in the midst of a quarrel; he is not to do so out of hate, nor may he take her by force 
with her in fear of him”721. Thus, the myth of the ideal Jewish husband persists. The canonical 
discussions about marital abuse only support the myth that domestic abuse does not exist in 
Jewish families
722
.  
In tandem, the concept of the Yiddisheh Mameh and the Eshet Chayil compound the 
myths that Jewish marriages are immune to abuse. A yiddisheh mameh is based on the 
traditional, immigrant Jewish mother who puts husband’s and children’s needs before her own, 
strives for happy families and full bellies ahead of her own personal aspirations
723
. An eshet 
chayil or woman of valour is the ideal Jewish wife, encapsulating the ideal wife and mother. 
These concepts place the responsibility (or burden) on the wife to achieve the ideal of shalom 
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bayit, or peace in the home, as we discussed earlier in this study. There is greater pressure on 
women/wives to avoid the ‘failure’ of a non-ideal marriage even in cases where they might be 
abused. Moreover, these concepts all but absolve the (abusive) husband of any responsibility or 
obligation to fulfill shalom bayit himself. In fact, the sanctity of this concept is so robust, 
“Jewish women feel obligated to maintain shalom bayit in the home”724 and when they ‘fail’ and 
when there is abuse in the home, the level of shame is immense in that they are not only failing 
at this ideal of shalom bayit and thus at their very identities and obligations as Jewish 
women/mothers, but they are also failing their communities and religion. Irene Sevcik confirms 
in, Finding Their Voices: Women from Religious/ Ethno-cultural Communities Speak about 
Family Violence, that a Jewish woman’s experience of domestic abuse is challenging in part 
because of this concept of shalom bayit which is often misinterpreted as the “sole responsibility 
of the wives” 725.  
If it is a “wife’s responsibility for ensuring domestic tranquility- shalom bayit, … there is 
shame and self-blame if she is unable to achieve the ideals to which Jewish marriage is held”726. 
There is “embarrassment for seeking help from within their community; concerns that seeking 
help from resources outside the community will bring shame upon all Jewish people; and a deep 
sense of failure on both emotional and cultural levels”727. Indeed by turning faith into a weapon 
of abuse, get refusal perpetrators render their victims unlikely to turn to their religious 
communities for support, as they may have otherwise. 
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In addition to the routine role the concept of shalom bayit plays in Jewish domestic abuse 
as just described, often in cases of get refusal shalom bayit is used as a rationale for men refusing 
a get, claiming they want to reconcile when in reality they want to prolong their control and 
abuse by refusing to grant a get. The concept is also used by rabbis and/or batei din who counsel 
and encourage reconciliation of couples for the sake of shalom bayit when one party appears 
before the rabbinic court to exact a get and despite the risk of ignoring (allegations of) abuses 
and potentially empowering recalcitrant husbands
728
. This was reflected in the narratives of a 
number of women who wanted to leave their marriages but stayed for the sake of “shalom bayit”. 
They do not realize that “the abuser does not see this as a restoration of shalom bayis, a peaceful 
home. Rather, the abuser sees his wife’s return as a triumph on his part and as a capitulation by 
the beit din”, thus only empowering the abuser further729. Husbands use the threat of get refusal 
as a way to keep their wives in the marriage, threatening that if they try to leave, they will never 
grant a get, thus it is not even worth trying. As the primary evidence illustrated, a number of 
participants in my study reported that they were encouraged to reconcile with their 
spouse/abuser- the ideal of shalom bayit being more valued than their safety and experiences of 
abuse. 
Compounding this principle, there are a number of other concepts that are available tools 
in Judaism that feed and support the abusive dynamics some men construct by refusing a get. 
With the pressure on Jewish women to maintain the ideal of shalom bayit women refused a get 
may well (want to/ feel pressure to) consider such normative values and principles despite the 
fact that some women described these very notions as complicating their attempts to exact a get. 
Teshuva, the significant value of repentance and forgiveness in Judaism makes it all the more 
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difficult for Jewish abused women who, if the husband is remorseful about his recalcitrance or 
other abuses, would often “want to embrace this value, wipe the slate clean and begin again”730. 
Like the cycles of abuse typical of many abusive relationships, the concept of teshuva may make 
women more vulnerable to abuse by believing a husband’s pleas for forgiveness. Thus, when 
intersecting with domestic violence, teshuva may place women in even greater danger with the 
weight of a moral/religious precept coming to bare on their decision to stay, forgive, and accept 
apologies for abuse.  Jewish women might also want to avoid a shandeh, a shame or disgrace and 
thereby avoid leaving abusive relationships or attempting to obtain a get. In line with the shame 
women of many religious persuasions feel (as discussed above), this form of shame, a shandeh, 
has Jewish elements. Jewish domestic abuse, Jewish divorce, and particularly get refusal all carry 
the stigma of being a shandeh. Consequently, women, even if they would not normally concern 
themselves with the opinions of others in their communities (although many of them would and 
would want to avoid a shandeh,) would certainly resist a shameful stigma that could affect their 
children’s marriage prospects, which these types of shandehs undoubtedly do731. On a larger 
scale, there is concern that the disgrace and shame travels beyond the insular Jewish 
communities, “exposing Jewish misconduct to a Christian majority is a shandeh, a shame that 
brings disgrace upon all Jews in that each shoulders the burden of representing an entire 
people…anti-Semitism”732. Indeed, in some communities, even in the 21st century, the pressure 
to not bring shame or disgrace is compounded by significant fears of anti-Semitism, which is on 
the rise worldwide, and women refused a get feel this pressure
733
. 
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Picking up on the notion that Jewish women are pressured to avoid communal shame as 
well the broader shame that may spill over to the general community, the shandeh that is get 
refusal is then further compounded by additional concepts such as chilul Hashem, mesira, da’at 
Torah and lashon hara.“Airing dirty laundry” has long been a fear of Jews living in Diasporic 
communities worldwide
734
 “due to fear developed over hundreds of generations wherein Jewish 
communities were persecuted, victimized and when regimes randomly captured Jews and 
tortured them”735. Fear of the host nation and what may be the fallout of Jewish ‘bad’ or 
shameful behaviour is commonplace and is simultaneously a “communal defense mechanism of 
survivorship”736. Michael Salamon, speaking about abuse in the Jewish community and factors 
that undermine the apprehension of offenders and the treatment of victims, goes so far as to say 
that in a post-Holocaust world, Jews have significant fears that no one will help them in times of 
need -which history has proven is a recurring phenomenon and rising anti-Semitism reaffirms 
and compounds these fears
737
. Consequently, this occurrence - that is of airing out dirty laundry 
to the broader, non-observant community would be considered a chilul Hashem. In other words, 
(some might interpret this to mean that) bringing get refusal (or other Jewish abuses) into the 
realm of the broader, non-religious, normative order or to the attention of the state’s regulating 
bodies such as police, child welfare agencies, or judicial systems would be considered a 
desecration of G-d’s name and the ethical/moral ideals God has set, bringing substantial shame 
on the self and the community. While not all religious Jews ascribe to the notion of chilul 
Hashem when it comes to abuses such as these, some do contend that reporting get refusal or 
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other abuses to state regulating bodies brings shame to the entire community
738
 and may impact 
one’s impression of Jews and Jewish behaviour.  
Mesira, to turn over or give up to authorities, is similar to chilul Hashem. It is a dictate 
forbidding Jews from turning over or reporting crimes of a Jew to non-rabbinic or civil 
authorities largely due to fear of punishment without due process or cause (which again, has 
recurred historically, and is likely not a concept unique to Judaism alone)
739
. Considered to be a 
negative act of betrayal, informing state regulating bodies is more about Jews turning in and 
turning on other Jews
740
 rather than the consideration of the ramifications if abusive Jews are not 
turned in to the appropriate authorities (backed by the force of the state). In light of the 
significant risk of not turning in abusive individuals, particularly husbands who have abused 
their wives (and children), leading rabbis have stated that the law prohibiting mesira no longer 
applies
741
. 
Reliance on da’at Torah, or the knowledge of Torah, is a concept that dictates that well-
learned rabbinic leaders should be sought out to inform all life-impacting decisions based on 
their superior knowledge and values
742
. This concept is based on the presumption that the 
individual rabbi consulted has studied so intensively that he has the insight and wisdom to handle 
what is being asked of him, while still being comfortable with the limitations of his own 
knowledge so as to consult other authorities. Da’at Torah is relied upon by some (most often the 
ultra Orthodox/hasidic) to make decisions about their private family lives. Women often seek 
advice regarding the decision to leave an abusive husband and/or to fight for a get or to accept 
the abuse. In fact, as my interviews illustrated, a number of women interviewed described 
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seeking out rabbinic approval before making the choice to leave abusive marriages and start 
fighting for the get (particularly Torontonian women interviewed). Consequently, the notion of 
da’at Torah may have a significant impact on the abuses Jewish women endure. 
The concept of lashon hara is prominent in Judaism and underpins the lexicon addressed 
here, making it another tool to feed and support the abuse associated with get refusal. Lashon 
hara, or evil tongue is the prohibition against derogatory speech or gossip about another person 
in halakha
743
.  This concept has been manipulated and is often used to prevent people who 
witness or experience abuse from speaking out, almost guilting them into silence and shaming 
them for breaking the prohibition if they choose to speak out
744
. Consequently the concept of 
lashon hara, along with mesira, chilul Hashem and da’at Torah all have the potential to 
compound one another and buttress a husband’s abusive power while simultaneously blinding 
communities and rabbis to a husband’s abuses through their reliance on and adherence to these 
concepts. 
We have examined here the lexicon within Judaism that when manipulated, impacts 
domestic abuses such as get refusal, as well as some of the marked aspects all types of religious 
women come up against when negotiating and deliberating how and if to act on their domestic 
abuses. This analysis addressed the interface between religion and domestic violence by 
considering the litany of concepts which often bolster the abuser’s pattern of control and power 
and yet which reinforce this interconnection between religion and domestic abuse in general, and 
Judaism and get refusal in particular. Many of the concepts discussed slip quickly into religious, 
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socio-cultural rationales for the perpetuation of get refusal. The consequences of these phrases 
are significant. Forgiving an abuser because of teshuva, staying in an abusive marriage in order 
to be perceived as an eshet chayil or because of the wife’s responsibility of shalom bayit or 
because not doing so would be a shandeh and might impact a family’s standing or a child’s 
marriage prospects must be revealed and discussed openly as enabling and perpetuating abuse. 
Moreover, wanting to avoid the prohibitions of mesira, lashon hara, or chilul Hashem must not 
come at the expense of bolstering a husband’s abusive capacities through the guise of revered 
religious observance. These concepts by default absolve the husband of responsibility for his 
actions, placing all the blame, shame and guilt on the wife alone.  
By challenging the misuse, misinterpretation, and manipulation of the concepts by men, 
and at times rabbis, batei din and even entire communities, as I begin to do here, I expose the 
latent risks to Jewish women. Indeed, for women, their “Jewish identity provides an additional 
set of ‘tools’ for her partner to use as part of a pattern of abuse” as is the case with get refusal745. 
In fact, Alison Cares, in her study speaking with Jewish victims of domestic abuse, found that 
70% of the women she interviews felt that their abuse was intimately connected to their Judaism, 
and this is reflected is my primary research as well
746
. However, the remedy here is not to 
eliminate Jewish observance, halakhot of marriage and divorce, or even the Jewish lexicon 
altogether. On the contrary, and as was illustrated by their narratives, women still see the 
importance of their religious identity and communal, socio-cultural and religious norms in their 
lives, which often include some or all of the precepts discussed above. Domestic abuse is 
challenging for religious women due in part to the “denial of existence of problems by 
community, expectations to line up culturally and or theologically, based on idealism, and efforts 
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to avoid disapproval”747. This culturally nuanced complexity all religious women face 
complicates Jewish women’s decisions when faced with get refusal. Women want the right to 
divorce and to remain a part of their religious communities. Mesuravot get should not have to 
face a choice between remaining in their religious communities and in limbo, or gaining 
freedom, but losing their friends, families, and core systems of meaning, placing them outside 
their social fabric
748
. Ultimately, it is crucial to recognize that there are significant implications 
both socially and legally for women when identifying get refusal as a form of domestic abuse. 
Framing the phenomenon in a way that provides a context which both the social and legal worlds 
can understand, rather than dismissing get refusal as (only) a religious issue, or one to brush 
under the rug, is a significant step toward preventing the abuse of get refusal and validating the 
experiences of women. 
 
Get as Negotiated 
In addition to the varied representations and the e-shaming movement now associated 
with get refusal, as well as the often veiled connection between domestic abuse and Judaism, 
aspects of which were exposed above, the final often-concealed aspect of get refusal examined in 
this chapter which further underscores get refusal as a form of domestic abuse is the unspoken 
disproportional impact of get refusal on women due to the uninterogated normative cultural 
assumption that a get can be negotiated. My research illustrates that the terminology and 
language that are prevalent in a culture are not the only mechanisms abusive men manipulate in 
order exert their control over their spouse. Framing the get as an asset that can be negotiated 
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along with other assets, rather than as a separate release that is disconnected from civil divorce 
negotiations is a tactical move that has somehow become standard practice for those looking to 
have power over their spouse, as the narratives have revealed
749
. Thus get refusal as a site of 
domestic abuse is bolstered as well by abusive men manipulating a woman’s right to receive a 
get unconditionally within Judaism. It is troubling that a husband’s refusal to grant a get has 
come to be normatively recognized as his free-will, his prerogative, or his bargaining chip, and 
not a gross domestic abuse violation which controls the psychological, social, halakhic/legal, and 
sexual destiny of this spouse. One woman accurately articulated, “A religious right is not one of 
the things you deal with in court. Court is for 1) custody and 2) assets”750, describing her 
frustration with the negotiation of her get as opposed to the get being given freely at beit din 
prior to any divorce proceedings in civil court. In reality, should communities shift their 
normative thinking, rather than perpetuate the norm that a get can be leveraged, the 
disproportionate abusive impact on women when faced with get refusal would begin to alleviate. 
It is untenable that there exists a notion that a get must come at a price that can be negotiated or 
used as a bargaining chip, as numerous mesuravot get and aguna advocates have described
751
. 
The dominant discourse about ‘get-giving’ must change so that it is no longer misused by men as 
a tool to further abuse their wives. I would argue as ORA, and other advocacy groups contend, 
that in the interests of gender equality, it must become normative that the get is unconditional 
and that it is given and accepted first, before and separate from civil bargaining. It should not 
come during civil negotiations and thus (perhaps inevitably) be used as leverage for more 
favourable concessions, as the mesuravot get interviewed enumerated. The stories of mesuravot 
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have demonstrated a cultural norm that has somehow developed- and that is, that a get is 
negotiable, that a husband may wait and negotiate all other matters such as custody, access, 
alimony and division of assets before granting a get, resulting in a disproportionate gendered 
impact to the detriment of women, reinforcing the abuse that is get refusal. Waiting until after the 
negotiation of the terms in civil proceedings opens the door for get extortion; implying that if a 
woman grants her husband favourable terms, he will grant her a get. If a woman (at any level of 
observance), is refused a get, her husband has the ability, power, and control to turn her into a 
persona non grata; no man concerned with halakha will date her, and she becomes segregated 
from her community, unable to move on with her life and freely exit her dead marriage.  
In order to alleviate some of the gendered and abusive impacts of get refusal, Jewish 
communities might develop a new hegemonic discourse
752
. As the stories of get refusal have 
shown, women would likely benefit if the default normative principle might regress to its 
intended biblical origin- that a get must be given and accepted unconditionally, and swiftly (and 
apart from any civil matters). Perhaps the unequal impact and abuse women face would diminish 
if there was a concerted effort to rid communities of the notion that “inducements” or even 
“bribery” are acceptable requirements in exchange for a get, a notion whose origins can be traced 
back to the 12
th
 century but was not a common tactic until the last 50 years or so
753
 (and if 
communities are using the get as a bargaining chip by relying on the 12
th
 century precedent, 
perhaps the alternate remedies such as kiddushei ta’ut and hafka’ot, discussed in early chapters 
of this study, and which also date back ought to be equally embraced rather than resisted, as one 
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woman suggested
754
). Mesuravot get expressed that ridding the get of its bargaining power could 
alleviate much of the abusive power men exert in their manipulation of divorce negotiations. 
This struggle is a perfect example of juggling between Jewish women’s right to religion and their 
claims for equality in their right to divorce. As one mesurevet get asserted, “it’s all too easy for a 
civil judge to view this right for a woman as a man’s asset and enable the negotiation or rather 
extortion of a get for other legitimate civil matters in return like custody and other assets”755. To 
reiterate, changing the cultural norm about get-giving could alleviate one aspect of the abuse 
women suffer through the refusal of a get for all women by disabling men to manipulate the act 
of giving the get as a point of negotiation (whereas the rabbinic will to embrace alternative 
remedies could always only alleviate the gendered impact of siruv get for some women- those 
who feel a get is not required). There will always be some women who will hold out for a get 
because it is their will and right. As one woman maintained, “The bottom line is, when 
communities cease to tolerate wives being extorted, the problem will cease to exist”756.  Thus 
changing the conception of a get’s bargaining power which is manipulated by get refusers, and 
unearthing it as an abusive tactic must thus be a part of the methods to alleviate the gendered 
impact of siruv get. 
 
Conclusion 
I conducted often concealed analyses in this chapter regarding the diverse representations 
of get refusal (whether it be through images, wanted ads, or e-shaming) or discussions about 
aspects of culture which have become abusive tactics when manipulated by perpetrators of abuse 
to rationalize or support their behaviour. While these components of get refusal may have 
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seemed at first glance to be disjointed, in reality they are connected more deeply. They are all 
facets of get refusal which have been all but ignored in both the socio-legal and get-refusal 
literatures, and even by Jewish and feminist scholars. In reality however, the analysis of the 
visual representations and the shift toward ‘e-shaming’ underscores that get refusal is a form of 
domestic violence that is supported by normative cultural assumptions and terminology. Thus, 
not only have these facets all gone unexplored, but my exploration of one of these facets lead me 
to the (re)affirmation of the (need for the) other. In other words, my analysis of the visual 
representations of get refusal and the use of social media further exposed the profundity of the 
abuse of get refusal. Conversely, framing and understanding get refusal as a site of domestic 
abuse reaffirms the need to employ ‘e-shaming’. 
This chapter has explicitly considered and analyzed the images associated with get 
refusal (and how they portrayed women as slaves), the use of social media by mesuravot get to 
assert their agency, and has investigated of the use of social media in galvanizing kherem
757
, or 
‘e-shaming’. Furthermore, and by exploring both the normative lexicon and the normative 
presumption that a get can be negotiated that exist in Judaism and which are aspects of culture 
that are exploited by abusive men, there has been an examination of get refusal as a site of 
domestic abuse. Revealing the covert elements of get refusal that lie latent but indeed impact all 
the diverse patches or stories forming the patchwork quilt (considered earlier) and discussing 
them here, furthers and deepens the plural objectives of this research by empowering women, 
voicing their void, and considering the extent to which (internal) religious social norms have 
                                                          
757
 Kherem is the most severe form of excommunication Judaism. In the instances of get refusal, it is a traditional 
method of persuasion employing shaming, ostracism, and even excommunication or banishment. Rabbeinu Tam, 
one of the greatest Tosafist medieval rabbis created this sanction known as “harchakot d’Rabeinu Tam”, or the 
distancing of our rabbi, Tam. The sanction stated that although one cannot force a husband, one should place an 
obligation on the public and on the authorities to avoid all contact with the man until a get is granted including not 
doing him any favours, not conducting business with him, and not even circumcising or burying his children until he 
divorces his wife. 
290 
 
been impacted by state legal reforms (thereby also demonstrating the potentially transformative 
power of grassroots efforts to impact both social and legal change). In fact, reflecting on the 
analyses above, it seems that internal religious social norms have not been impacted by legal 
reforms in expected ways (so as to halt get refusal altogether). Indeed, culture is a more forceful 
and potent factor that those who argued for legal reform would have it. I argue, if the social 
norms had been impacted by the legal reforms in a way which resolved or stopped the 
phenomenon of get refusal, these strong threads, these prevailing discourses underlying get 
refusal (varied representations, men distorting the lexicon to buttress Jewish abuse, and the 
normative theory that a get is negotiable) would begin to dissipate, and yet, they remain strong in 
both New York and Toronto, as my research has demonstrated. 
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 ICAR- International Coalition of Agunot Rights 
  
Images 2.1-2.3 
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Images 3.1-3.8 
 Pin, widely available at rallies 
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 From an Aguna support group in Argentina 
 “Chained to her ring against her will” 
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Images 5.1-5.3 
                  
http://rbc.gov.il/Wanted/Pages/default.aspx 
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Images 6.1-6.5 
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Image 7 
 
The Jewish Daily Forward, Forward Association Inc. (The Dorot Jewish Division, The New 
York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations) 
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Image 8 (top right corner) 
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Image 10 
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‘Image’ 11 
My body it did not hurt when you hit my head, but my soul my self it was as if dead  
I had wished that you loved me, but you chose to scare me instead 
Wine bottles you threw at me,  
my ankles bled,  
Finally there was no choice and I fled.  
 
The way of the tyrant is like this; 
when all gets too much  
out of the blue comes the kiss 
To make it seem that all is just fine, 
Sweet and charming you are for a time 
Around and around it goes like this 
Did you know what you were doing  
Or were you oblivious?  
 
Someone had hurt you when you were a boy 
And robbed you of all that we could have shared in joy 
Our son , our daughter so precious and sweet  
For their sake I'll remember when we did first meet 
For sure there were reasons for us to be 
I thank you and pray that you might understand me 
 
Though we've been apart for so long, your grip your grasp you hang on 
You think that it's you who chains me here, 
You still try to torment me but I overcame my fear 
The King is My Father, He will set me free, you can never have any hold on me. 
~ B.R.G., 2014 
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Image 13 
 
  
“Donated by Rachel, anticipating her get from Yitzchak Dees” 
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Chapter Seven - Toronto and New York 
We dated and met in Brooklyn (I had moved there from Israel to get married. I was very 
determined; I left Israel with three suitcases).  
He wasn’t great but I married him anyway. He was controlling and if I’m honest, he made me 
cry at our wedding. The next day, after wedding, he made me drive to return my dress, which 
was rented, because but because I had had a car accident just recently, I really didn’t want to 
drive and he forced me. 
Already that day I wanted Hashem to give me strength to divorce him. I actually remember 
thinking that. 
My family didn’t want me to get married to him but I was stubborn. He was controlling; there 
was verbal abuse and he didn’t take care of me. There was no money to support me and he 
called me fat, stupid. I was studying for a BA and he said ‘so what if you have a BA degree, that 
doesn’t make you smart’, and things like that. I started to believe what he was saying. I became 
completely dependent on him and quit. All my bold confidence and independence that I came to 
America with shrank and disappeared. 
Now he really wants me back but then he had ignored me, he didn’t support me, and abused me 
for no reason. 
He has a mean personality and eventually I found out he also cheated. 
After our baby (son) was born I decided I wanted a divorce but he said only the civil and that he 
wouldn’t give me a get. I managed to leave the house with a garbage bag of clothes… 
I wanted to start the process with a beit din but 3 rabbis said ‘shalom bayit’ first and sent me 
back… I finally met a random rabbi not affiliated with any beit din who said he was willing to do 
seruvim for $700- he did them but nothing else and then disappeared. I lost the $700, it was a 
scam. 
Then my husband had paid off six lawyers so as not to defend me and he had a friend who was 
friends with our judge. Eventually I complained to the district attorney, and eventually, I got a 
new judge who was indeed more favourable. 
I was an aguna for four years- roughly from the ages 27-30 ish (which are key years) and he 
didn’t want anything. He made no real demands; but there was lots and lots of court, including 
an order of protection. 
He squeezed my blood; I was so skinny I couldn’t eat. He had said multiple times ‘until I die you 
won’t see a get’. I felt in a jail in an open world. 
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In the end, the civil and get were at same time, through beit din- there was his civil agreement 
prepared at beit din and I signed it despite it being extremely unfavorable to me. I would have 
signed anything- even to clean his bathroom everyday- I just wanted to be free. 
I believe everything is for a reason… 
My father, a very religious man had come to me and allowed me to date while I was an aguna. 
He said he understood, and that it was okay if I wanted to, but I couldn’t. I was still religious, I 
was still a believer. 
My husband was manic. He took bulbs out of lights in my room when I had moved to the 
basement, before I finally moved out. He had turned off the hot water in the house every time I 
showered. It took a while until I figured it out. I have trauma from marriage. I’m afraid to get 
married again even though I want to. 
I have full custody but right now he has all the decision making powers regarding their school, 
health, etcetera. I also can’t leave New York (to go home to Israel to see my family). I didn’t get 
anything- not support, alimony, no house or anything in it. Nothing was in the agreement I 
signed. 
A day after I got my get I went to the corner store to buy milk and I was struck by how beautiful a 
day it was. I was desensitized before, but once I got my life back, I saw how beautiful life could 
be… 
Now I think that prenuptial agreements are a must. It has to be as natural as the ketuba. It has to 
be with the ketuba- and if you ask me- there should also be a ready ‘get ‘and an agreed upon 
time frame, like a year and a half to show the couple really tried and then you can use the ready 
‘get’. 
At secular court I felt more confident, more heard, there are ways to try to get under a husband’s 
skin and annoy him, pressure him through secular court in order to get some power back for 
religious court/ get dealings. Secular court gave me hope and confidence, but at the end it’s 
really only a miracle. If you ask me, it wasn’t the secular in the end; it was a miracle. People 
have to sit with secular court and explain the issue, especially when it’s only the woman who 
wants a get. Secular courts and judges don’t always get it. 
I was very strong with emuna- people used to come give me chizuk and they’d tell me that I give 
more to them. 
Now I compartmentalize rabbanim vs. rabbanut. Some rabbis felt my pain but couldn’t help me- 
if they belonged to larger rabbinic organizations or groups and they’d lose their status, and/or 
‘lose face’ if they’d come out and help me. Rabbanim could find a ‘petach’ if they wanted to be 
creative and open it up and help but it’s not okay for them to open up halakha too much. 
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Ultimately the solution must come from Halakha but in the meantime also prenuptial agreements 
and pre-made ‘gets’ are good. 
Every woman has to ask herself before she gets married, “Can I divorce him?”- A woman’s 
dedication and commitment to family is innate and internal – a husband has to work on it… 
~~~ 
The differences between New York and Toronto are about more than just how they treat or deal 
with agunot and more than to do with the size of the communities, Toronto’s Jewish community 
being smaller, or the niceness and propriety of Canadians over the Americans and their 
abrasiveness and antagonism. Rather, this is about how men treat women in our communities, 
therein lies the difference 
We were married about six years until the breakdown of the marriage. I owned a home before I 
got married, and had a great job, but I gave it all up for a family. I had a nanny, I never worked, 
it looked like I had the best life- and at the beginning I did. I had weekly manicures, the works, 
and no one would suspect that with all that, I was being controlled, and things were being 
withheld. Money was allotted for certain things and sometimes I had no money for groceries, or 
no money for a particular week. 
My husband can now get aliyahs in shul and can give kiddishes, but my rabbi won’t support me. 
Now I’m all alone, with four kids, and he doesn’t even pay child support. 
I never thought I could live like this- in a two bedroom apartment. I used to feel bad for people 
who lived like I’m living now. Though now I understand it’s not so bad, it’s not important. I 
rather live like this than live in a big house with a nanny but be living with him like I used to…   
I get help from private individuals- since there are no organizations to help and I’m always 
worried because there is only so long individual people will be willing to help. Plus, they still see 
me with nice things because I still try to sustain as much as I can a certain lifestyle for my kids, 
what they are used to. But in reality, my mother buys my kids and me clothes, my brother just 
bought me a new car- I couldn’t do any of it on my own. 
Looking back, I’d never marry my husband now, and I worry about repeating my mistakes as I 
start to date… I’m so cautious. 
None of the rabbonim understand. They don’t have a grasp of the issues that arise in a marriage. 
They think that the causes for problems are all simple, like I don’t know how to cook dinner 
properly. They have no idea about control, about withholding… 
I knew I needed to get approval from some rabbis before leaving; I couldn’t just decide to leave 
on my own. I needed permission and affirmation before acting because I had four young kids, my 
youngest was only 9 months old and I was going to walk away from a marriage and break the 
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family. I spoke to our therapist, Dr. Gerber, Rav Pamensky, and my personal rabbi, they all told 
me to leave. 
Three times, Rabbis Ochs and Shochet sent me home without a get simply because my husband 
said the wrong word or the right word the wrong way. They were so strict and he knew how to 
use and manipulate their stringency to his benefit- he was himself a smart lawyer. My own 
stepmother, as a result of her own difficulties securing a get, dissuaded me from leaving and 
encouraged me to try to work things out further. 
I was struck by how everyone gave the man so much control- my own family, the rabbis, 
everyone. 
But, honestly, at that point, I wasn’t even thinking about a get, I didn’t even care about it yet. All 
I thought was that it would be better to be alone and an aguna than with him. I did know that he 
went around telling everyone that he’d never give me a get. And so the amazing thing was that I 
was an aguna, but in a sense I sort of didn’t even feel it. I knew subconsciously, in my heart that 
I would get the get when I needed it. 
I was in denial, or too overwhelmed with all the changes to realize I needed one for over a year, 
until 2 miracles happened when I needed them to: 1- I won sole custody, and 2- I got my get. 
Everything else is dragging along slowly in the courts. 
I won sole custody because he decided on a whim he was moving to Montreal and so I ran to the 
courts, to Judge Kaufman in Newmarket courts who is amazing and I got it right away. It was a 
nes – I never expected a get. I had called rabbi Shochet for a get when my husband left to 
suddenly move to Montreal. My Lubavitch rabbi was called because my husband had told a 
Lubavitch rabbi in Montreal that he was a single guy without kids and the rabbi in Montreal had 
his doubts. All the stars just aligned. I went to an emergency-convened beit din and when he 
dropped the get into my hands it was the most amazing feeling….He wanted to go for lunch after, 
that’s how an unstable a personality he is. 
He then went back a few months later to try and reverse the get. I freaked out, called Rabbi Ochs 
and he said that while they are not giving it much credence, everyone deserves their day in court, 
and they are going to hear what he has to say about perhaps being forced into granting get. I 
was Skyped into to that session and was asked many questions. 
Later that day I called Rabbi Ochs to follow up and he told me the get was kosher, and not to 
worry, but I told him about my concerns, and how this might haunt me again in the future if my 
ex decides to try and take it back again and he assured me, it was all done, never to be revisited. 
Today, my outlook has totally changed because of what I’ve been through.  
He manipulates, and lies, and cheats, and people still give him, and all the men like him, the time 
of day; this was an eye-opener. 
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We were not civilly married, we only married under chuppa and we were common law partners 
and so I did try to use civil law as a threat but it didn’t work for me. 
I wonder if there is a propensity in Lubavitch for get refusal? Because they are ‘too accepting’ 
because they don’t want to turn anyone away… It’s more about not losing a Jewish soul- so if 
they turn a man away from shul, that’s a super negative thing (though they’re not thinking about 
the potential for a woman’s soul to leave Judaism because she feels abandoned, or of the 
potential children she may be able to bring into world if not chained to her marriage). They think 
if they push men away they will lose them. This could be important in terms of potential 
communal sanctions against recalcitrant men- cherem. 
The converse may also be true, I wonder. Maybe there is less occurrence of get refusal in the 
FFB- frum from birth communities?  
Anyway, I believe the rabbis, not the civil laws, have to give a voice to women. They should not 
stand idly behind the men. How the women feel is how men should be meant to feel- trapped and 
alone. Men should be meant to feel trapped and alone. Men don’t care about any laws, not 
Jewish, not civil unless maybe they would be handcuffed- until then, they don’t care about the 
law. 
It should be same within beit din, just like in civil court- that without a get, your word in the 
community or the court means nothing. 
The rabbis and men like to be applauded for building yeshivas, not for helping women. 
A friend of mine is in the same situation. She told me that she was being seriously, physically 
abused and was asking for a get from her husband. He says to her ‘you’ll be in a wheelchair or 
dead before I ever give you a get’. He threatens her so severely and incessantly that she’ll never 
get a get and she believes him. She went back to live under the same roof as her abusive 
husband, who throws furniture at her from across the room. I speak to her every day to check on 
her, though I never ask her about her husband. I see her sometimes, black and blue, and so can 
the rabbis see it. If the rabbis would stand up against domestic abuse, women wouldn’t have to 
live in fear; they wouldn’t have to go back into abusive marriages because they are left no other 
choice, without a get! 
~~~ 
My rabbi was awesome- and had insisted on the prenup when I told him I was engaged. 
At the time, I thought I was signing it for ‘other women’, as a way to help break the social 
stigma. That said, I did cross off the optional part of the prenup which grants permission to the 
beit din also to arbitrate custody and other such matters.   
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I was in my mid to late thirties when I finally got married, and have come to a modern form of 
Orthodoxy or even ‘conservadoxy’ relatively recently to that time. 
Anyway, I ended up filing for divorce after just nine months of marriage. I admitted to myself 
that there were problems before and after the marriage although my parents seemed well aware. 
There were some symptoms of his being dysfunctional. He had no job, he owed back taxes… 
Once we were married, he used religion against me quite a bit. For example, I felt strongly about 
mikva attendance and I went, although there was no sex going on between us. Ironically, he 
claimed I was never religious enough for him although he was not religious either. 
When my husband said he won’t give me a get my rabbi gave me a flyer about ORA and I started 
to go to the Beit Din of America. They issued hazmanot and helped in other ways but he was 
clever and agreed to show up after the 3
rd
 hazmana so as to avoid public seruv. 
ORA, as well as some rabbis that ORA sent me to, who were affiliated with Yeshiva University 
(YU), were very good support. They also assigned me a great toen (rabbinic court advocate). 
The beit din spoke to me for hours at a time. They really heard me. 
I had paid for everything; all the debts he racked up. Then he said he wanted our marriage to 
work and I said, ‘of course he does! Because I’m funding him!’I re-furnished our apartment, 
paid for his health insurance. He could have lived like that forever! 
I remember at the end of the "trial" day, the rabbis told us that there was a fee for the day. I 
don't remember how much. I remember them saying that each of us owed 1/2. I was so relieved. 
It was the first monetary obligation that was not put 100% on me. I had a check book and wrote 
my check then. My husband said he'd have to pay in the future because he had no method of 
payment with him. I appreciated that the Beth Din did not look to me for full payment. Until that 
moment, we were considered married and I was responsible for him financially. Of course, I 
remained responsible for many of his expenses until the civil divorce was settled because we 
were still civilly married.  
 
The rabbis were nice and friendly and I believe what got him to give the get was pressure from 
the entire situation- that ORA and my rabbis put on him and through family. ORA made it an 
issue to his family. 
That said, I did decide that if the religion wasn’t going to work for me and get me through this, I 
would have just walked away from it. 
In the end, mine was one of the first prenups tested in beit din. He tried to ask me for one million 
dollars and said he’d not give the get unless I paid it. I wound up paying $40,000. 
But still feel that the prenuptial agreement was enormously helpful. It really put the beit din in to 
action. 
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On the matter of his extortion, it was the religious system that helped. It was a religious issue, 
the get wasn’t an asset that we had to split or negotiate in civil court and I didn’t want to. 
There is always a risk with a civil judge who doesn’t know religion and its nuances and so it’s 
all too easy for a civil judge to view this right for a woman as a man’s asset and enable the 
negotiation; that is, extortion of a get for other legitimate civil matters in return- custody 
etcetera. So if a judge was trying to rule fairly and equally, and considers a get as an asset for a 
woman, she will have to pay a price for the get in the civil structure of equal bargaining power. 
It’s a religious issue, and right of a women & shouldn’t be caught up in issues dealt with in civil 
court 
I think the best solution is ideally from the beit din/rabbis. And, if it was halakhically possible, 
for beit din to equalize things, or for rabbis to find a way to issue a get without husbands’ 
approval. Religion relying on civil law is enormously problematic. 
 
The narratives here signal some of the discrepancies between New York and Toronto 
which will be elaborated upon in the chapter. In particular, these narratives highlight some of the 
divergences regarding the roles and behaviours of batei din. While one narrative highlights a 
negative experience with a beit din that was separate from the Beth Din of America’s network, 
that same participant clearly distinguishes between rabbanim and rabbanut, that is, individual 
rabbis and the institution of the rabbinate. She indicates that while she had negative perceptions 
and experiences with ‘the institution’, the batei din she had been attempting to work with, she 
nonetheless resisted painting all rabbis with the same brush.  
Another participant, herself, makes a comparison between New York and Toronto in the 
narrative she shared, having lived in both locales. She seems to indicate, based on her personal 
knowledge, as well as observations made based on friends’ experiences of get refusal, that 
generally speaking, New York might offer better mechanisms for positively navigating get 
refusal when compared with Toronto. She also elaborates on her experiences within the Toronto 
context and implies that in New York issues around get refusal, domestic abuse in particular, are 
acknowledged and managed more appropriately 
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The final participant in this series actually indicates that her experiences both with 
individual rabbis and batei din were quite positive. Despite the abuse she faced, including 
extortionate demands subsumed in her husband’s refusal to grant a get, the participant 
nonetheless describes very encouraging interactions. Thus the narratives opening this chapter 
gesture to the inconsistencies between New York and Toronto concerning get refusal, elaborated 
upon in the coming chapter. 
 
 
In this chapter, divided into two large sections, I develop the conclusions emerging from 
this study. First, I assess the differences between the sites of analysis, New York and Toronto, 
and subsequently, I elaborate more broadly on the lessons learned. This assessment will highlight 
the comparative nature of this project, and more importantly, it will underscore aspects 
surrounding get refusal that have been successful and that ought to celebrated and proliferated, as 
well as shortcomings and malfunctions that ought to be acknowledged and corrected. Here, in 
this comparative analysis, I bring to bear earlier explorations of diverse literatures and 
approaches, I build on and extend the debates, I assess policy recommendations, proposed 
remedies, and most essentially I incorporate mesuravot get’s experiences all in order to address 
the lingering queries; To what extent are New York and Toronto distinct or similar regarding get 
refusal? How and why might the connections between these two locales be significant on the 
issue of get refusal? What impacts might this have and/or to what extent might this be 
noteworthy? While these queries are not the primary focus of this project, these remaining 
questions do weave in and out of earlier analyses, and in particular are highlighted repeatedly 
throughout women’s narratives. Thus, this analysis, focusing on the relationship between New 
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York and Toronto is intertwined with the findings and significance of this study and is based 
heavily on the primary data collected –mainly from women refused a get but also additional 
stakeholders such as rabbis, judges, activists/advocates, and others. This analysis is also 
informed by my own observations at communities at rallies, workshops, film screenings, 
educational community panels, school visits, and even personal interactions with stakeholders, 
community leaders, and media (the goal of my analysis is not to be condemnatory, rather simply 
to relay internal facts). This examination illustrates that each of these major Jewish centres 
serves as a beacon- either the guiding light or the flare signal- to Jewish communities beyond 
their borders. In other words, what goes on here, matters; it has a wide a deep impact. Moreover, 
borrowing and adapting the analogy of  Mnookin and Kornhauser’s notable work, ‘In the 
Shadows of the Law’758, to ‘In the Shadows of Legal Pluralism’, enables a nuanced consideration 
of the conclusions and lessons emerging from this research. 
 
Difference, Divergence: Remedies, Support, Character 
 Despite the enduring connections between New York and Toronto, when it comes to the 
phenomenon of get refusal (upon which I elaborate at length in the early chapters of this study), I 
argue there are marked distinctions between the two locales. This section will elaborate and 
explore some of the essential inconsistencies. Namely I will explore inconsistent remedies to get 
refusal such as inconsistent use of traditional halakhic protocol by batei din and the inconsistent 
use of prenuptial agreements inconsistencies regarding available services such as those offered 
by Jewish organizations dedicated to helping women refused a get or to framing get refusal as 
domestic abuse, inconsistent media representation such as the use of media in educating and 
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 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,” Yale 
Law Journal 88, (1978-1979): 950-997. 
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shaming, and perhaps even inconsistent community characters (among the mainstream/ modern 
Orthodox) such as tight-knit and concentrated versus spread out and more transparent. 
 Ultimately, and unlike in New York
759
, perhaps the most significant aspect that aides in 
the continuation of get refusal in Toronto is the Toronto Beit Din’s failure to employ the non-
contentious halakhic remedies within their arsenal (and their lack of transparency regarding their 
inaction and the impact of it). As I explained in chapter two, rabbinic courts have a specific 
protocol when individuals seek their intervention on the matter of dissolving a martial contract. 
If a spouse refuses to appear before the beit din, first the court issues up to three hazmanot or 
summonses to appear, at that point, if the spouse still refuses to appear before the beit din, a 
hatra’at seruv is issued or a warning of a forthcoming issuance of a contempt order, and finally 
if the spouse continues to ignore these summons, a seruv is issued, an order of contempt for 
refusing to arrive at beit din (and begin negotiating in good faith). This official protocol is vital 
because it is only at the point of issuing a seruv that the recalcitrant spouse becomes ‘officially’ 
recalcitrant in the eyes of halakha (regardless of how much time has elapsed from his initial 
refusal to grant the get). Moreover, a seruv serves as a prerequisite for a kherem to be issued 
against the recalcitrant spouse by the beit din and for the community to exert its pressure. Thus a 
seruv is imperative for communal ostracism and shaming (as well as e-shaming) to commence 
within the confines of Jewish legal and moral codes of conduct. In conjunction with this, and 
perhaps the principle reason why issuing seruvim is so imperative, is because only after a seruv 
is in place does a woman get the halakhic designation of an ‘aguna’ (again, regardless of how 
much time has elapsed since her spouse’s initial refusal to grant the get). To clarify, even if a 
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 This is not a sweeping contention. There are certainly rogue batei din in New York that likewise do not follow 
protocol, however generally, and as was illustrated by the narratives of women from New York, the Beth Din of 
America (BDA), the ‘mainstream Orthodox’ and largest rabbinical court in America serving affiliated and 
unaffiliated Jews does employ this protocol and is quite transparent about their procedures. 
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wife is refused a get by her husband for years, if the beit din has not issued a seruv, the wife is 
‘technically’ not considered to be an ‘official’ aguna. Thus, these well-established mechanisms 
available to batei din ought to act as the first-line of defense for potential agunot, and batei din 
should, without reservation, employ these protocols in all cases and in a timely manner. 
Moreover, it is not uncommon in some cases that these traditional halakhic mechanisms may be 
enough to exact a get.  
Thus, I argue it is all the more problematic that the Toronto Beit Din does not employ 
these basic halakhic procedures. My primary data illustrates that the Toronto Beit Din fails to 
issue hazmanot and seruvim. Each research participant from Toronto described this phenomenon 
repeatedly over the course of the time I spent interviewing
760
. One woman described the Av Beit 
Din or head of court’s answer when she requested he issue a hazmana to her husband by saying, 
“when he’s ready, he’ll come”761 and many others simply stated matter-of-factly over the course 
of our interviews, “they had never even issued any hazmanot, and no seruvim”762. Other 
stakeholders such as lawyers and others in Toronto confirmed this with one advocate saying 
“This beit din is at least 50% of the problem in getting a woman her get in Toronto, and that’s a 
very modest estimate”763. Moreover, this troubling reality in Toronto was known by Jeremy 
Stern, Executive Director of New York-based ORA who in an interview with me expressed his 
deep concern regarding the Toronto Beit Din’s lack of action, “The purpose of issuing a seruv is 
to take the case out of the zone of ‘he- said she-said’ and into the zone of objective recalcitrance. 
Thus by not issuing seruvim, the Toronto Beit Din only serves to exacerbate antagonism and 
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 In particular, interviews with B.F.; J.D.; P.L.; D.R.; S.M; M.G.; C.S.; E.L.; M.S. among others; and this 
disturbing trend was echoed as well in my Master’s research, though the focus of that project was different.  
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 B.F. June 14, 2014. 
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 C.S. August 17, 2014. 
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 Anonymous advocate from http://agunahandherget.com/.    
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perpetuate a stalemate” wherein women remain married against their will764. That said, there are 
few if any consequences in terms of enforcement outside of Toronto regarding the failure of the 
Toronto Beit Din to follow protocol
765
. One example of the Beth Din of America facilitating and 
encouraging gittin versus the Toronto Beit Din’s approach can be seen even in their convening of 
sessions. While the Beth Din of America has convened emergency sessions in the middle of the 
night and across the greater New York area according to the recalcitrant husband’s will in order 
to facilitate gittin particularly in contentious cases
766
, in contrast, in Toronto, the beit din has 
cancelled sessions, rescheduled, and delayed sessions, rather than convening according to the 
sensitive needs of agunot and thereby enabling refusers and undermining their own legitimacy as 
a respectable and professional legal/halakhic entity
767
. 
Perhaps most egregious, in 2012 at a panel held at the BAYT, the largest Orthodox 
synagogue in Canada, Rabbi Vale, the public face and voice of the Toronto Beit Din 
acknowledged (rather than denied) on the record that indeed the beit din does not follow well-
established traditional protocols
768
. The event in and of itself was very significant because it was 
the first public event in over 20 years that saw Orthodox rabbis openly acknowledging the 
persistence of get refusal in Toronto rather than the common misconception that the get laws had 
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Interview with Jeremy Stern, June 29, 2014. 
765
 Although there have been some consequences in terms of the Toronto Beit Din’s reputation, according to expert 
(rabbinic and advocate) contacts in New York and Boston. Yet, this has not impacted the Toronto Beit Din’s 
behaviour or actions in any way. 
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 Personal interviews with members of the Beth Din of America, Jeremy Stern and other advocates, as well as a 
number of women refused a get. 
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 Personal interviews with rabbis, advocates, as well as a number of women refused a get. 
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 Rabbi Asher Vale, Director of the Beis Din of the Vaad Harabonim of Toronto, The Plight of the Agunah in Our 
Community: Bridging Gaps Between Rabbinate, Academy, and Community, (panel discussion with Rabbi Daniel 
Korobkin, Yael Machtinger, Sharon Shore and Rabbi Asher Vale, Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation, 
Thornhill, ON, April 29, 2012), 
http://koshertube.com/videos/index.php?option=com_seyretandtask=videodirectlinkandItemid=4andid=11072. 
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all but solved the phenomenon
769
. However, the night prior to the event the rabbi of the 
synagogue, Rabbi Daniel Korobkin, who was to moderate the panel which included Rabbi Vale, 
(Orthodox) attorney and partner at Epstein Cole, Sharon Shore, and myself, was called to an 
emergency meeting by the beit din who strongly encouraged him to cancel the event the 
following evening. Shore and I hypothesized that the beit din was concerned about our remarks 
(as women) however the beit din was actually incredibly concerned with what Rabbi Vale might 
say (being that he had not secured their permission or approval to participate in this event). The 
event proceeded and as it turned out, the beit din was correct to be concerned about Rabbi Vale’s 
participation because, as I indicated, he did acknowledge on record and in front of a large and 
rowdy (mostly Orthodox) crowd that seruvim are not issued in Toronto. During the question 
period, an audience member asked why the beit din does not issue hazmanot and seruvim. The 
crowd of over 200 attendees cheered on the audience member for being so gutsy so as to directly 
ask the pointed question and Rabbi Vale responded, ‘we do not issue hazmanot or seruvim when 
we know the husband will not show up to beit din. The reason we don’t issue them because if we 
do and they do not come, that is disrespectful of the beit din and that is a disrespect we cannot 
tolerate’770. This alarming admission indicates that the beit din of Toronto is more interested in 
its powerful status as a regulating institution than doing justice, and women are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of this distorted approach
771
. To be clear, the rabbinic court of justice in Toronto is 
admittedly more concerned with the way it perceives itself than with the abuse women face as a 
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The previous rabbi of the synagogue, who retired two years prior, refused to discuss the matter with me. In fact 
when I called him his response was, “Yael, you know I love you and your family but I can’t discuss this with you. 
You should talk to (attorney John Syrtash). This was a rabbi who sat on the Beit Din’s gittin or divorce panel.  
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 A power play which I will contend the beit din feels it must make due to the stripping of much of its powers by 
the removal of religious arbitration in Ontario. 
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result of get refusal. I argue that what the beit din actually achieves is the reverse of what it 
intends. By allowing an individual man to be more powerful than the beit din¸ and thus in a sense 
more powerful than the entire institution and what it represents, the beit din is actually enabling 
and even perpetuating the disrespect men have for the courts and their judges, allowing 
themselves to be used and manipulated as pawns in husbands’ abusive habits. Moreover, not 
only is the beit din then helping to accomplish the antithesis of what they would like, they are 
contributing to significant harms to women by perpetuating get refusal and sending the message 
to men that a get can be negotiated. The beit din through their official policy of inaction is also 
tacitly approving of the domestic abuses being perpetrated by recalcitrant husbands rather than 
supporting women who are attempting to remove themselves (and at times their children) from 
abusive relationships. It is clear from the women’s experiences and stories of get refusal that the 
Toronto Beit Din should rethink their priorities for they are serving no one but abusive men and 
harming women, rabbis of the beit din, and the entire institution of the beit din and rabbinate 
more broadly.   
Furthermore, I argue that the Toronto Beit Din’s lack of protocol which is reflected in my 
primary data and which was affirmed by the beit din themselves is a factor that makes Toronto 
distinct
772
. In fact, during a call I received from Executive Director of the Jewish Community 
Council of Montreal (Rosh Va’ad Ha’ir), Rabbi Emmanuel, we discussed the creative use of the 
get laws in that jurisdiction, the issues with the proposed Canadian prenup, and the fact that the 
Montreal beit din does issue hazmanot. When asked about the protocol of the Toronto beit din, 
he too affirmed, “there’s totally, totally no leadership, there no guts there. None of the individual 
rabbis have any guts to support a woman. Unfortunately, the beit din is not formalized at all, it’s 
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not structured at all. It’s a free for all”773. Moreover, and in contrast to what Torontonian women 
reported, the New York women I interviewed who experienced get refusal reported that the Beth 
Din of America did issue hazmanot and eventually, seruvim as well
774
. Although a couple of 
women indicated they pressured the court to issue these summons in a timely fashion or that they 
were their own best advocates, there were no reports of the beit din refusing to issue a hazmana 
or seruv altogether from the New York participants. This distinction is significant.  
The passive approach of the Toronto Beit Din also contributes to the widespread fallacy 
that there are no agunot in Toronto, another difference between New York and Toronto that I 
have discussed throughout the study and will elaborate on further, below. Briefly, the beit din’s 
avoidance of protocol in their refusal to issue seruvim sends the message to the community that 
there are no agunot in Toronto when in fact there are women refused a get who are simply 
prevented from ‘benefiting’ from the ‘aguna’ designation in law due to the beit din.  In other 
words, there are women refused a get in Toronto however the community is not aware because a 
seruv is never issued and this gives the impression that because there are not seruvim, there must 
not be any agunot. This passivity or lack of transparency is a problematic and recurring theme 
with the Toronto Beit Din, as this research demonstrates. 
Another aspect that aides in the perpetuation of get refusal in Toronto which is 
inconsistent with approaches to remedies for get refusal in New York is the beit din’s position on 
prenuptial agreements.  I elaborated on the problems with prenuptial agreements in the Toronto 
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another beit din’s toes. Some men agree to show up after third hazmana and then begin not showing up again thus 
some batei din begin the entire hazmana process from the beginning. One woman explained, “by requesting a 
change in beit din to halt hazmana and seruv process he one-upped me and them because this way I was not even 
deemed an aguna and his name couldn’t even be in the press- but I was still without a get for years” D.E. November 
5, 2013. 
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context both legally (due to the necessity to sign an arbitration agreement, among other aspects) 
and hashkafically (due to the beit din’s disapproval of the premise) significantly in chapter two. 
The gap is nonetheless important to reiterate here. While in New York (and in Israel) the 
prenuptial agreement is slowly becoming normative, in Toronto, prenuptial agreements are not 
yet a part of the normative communal discourse, thereby acting as a contrasting factor between 
the two centres (as I explained in chapter two). 
A further inconsistency exists between Toronto and New York regarding their divergent 
reactions to the state regulation employing get laws. The approach taken by the Toronto Beit Din 
subsequent to the state intervention aides in the perpetuation of get refusal in Toronto and 
significantly diverges from approaches taken in New York subsequent to the state intervention. 
Interestingly, in both locales, the enactment of the get laws did not achieve its intended goals 
which were to all but eradicate get refusal. There instead emerged other, perhaps unforeseen 
effects, as I have discussed elsewhere throughout this study. What I want to stress here is that 
while both sets of laws were to some degree unfulfilled, in Toronto there remains a harmful 
impression that the laws were successful, that the Toronto Beit Din does endorse them, and thus 
there are virtually no more agunot; while in New York, there is widespread acknowledgement 
that the laws were flawed and that get refusal persists. These contradictory views have had 
significant impact on the nature of get refusal in each locale.  
In Toronto, silence has been the principal characteristic of the beit din’s retracting their 
initial support. The community at large is unaware and still believes the get laws are an effective 
remedy. This has not been the case in New York. On the contrary, in New York it seems the 
difficulties surrounding the legislation were widely debated, are publicly known, and to some 
extent, are acknowledged. Thus, the transparent dialogue in New York, while still eliminating 
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one avenue of alleviation for many women, has at least prompted some rabbis to attempt 
alternative remedies, such as prenuptial agreements. Whereas, in Toronto due to the fact that 
there exists the perception that the regulation was so successful it ‘solved the aguna problem’775, 
rabbis have absolved themselves for alternative remedies, and the rabbinic (and even communal) 
dialogue has by and large been stagnant. 
 
 
There are also inconsistencies regarding available services for women refused a get in 
Toronto and New York. For example, while there are numerous Jewish organizations dedicated 
to helping Jewish women who experience domestic abuse, and in particular who are refused a get 
in New York, no such organization exists in Toronto. I acknowledge that the proliferation of 
these services in New York from across all denominations (with a increasing number of Jewish 
women’s domestic abuse organizations being Ultra Orthodox or Hasidic)776 may well be due in 
part to the demographics discussed at the outset of this chapter, nonetheless, the lack of support 
for Jewish women in Toronto requires an explanation beyond numbers or population size. In 
other words, it seems natural that New York should have a greater variety of support 
organizations for women simply due to the fact that there are over two million Jews in the 
greater New York area. However, it seems odd that with over two hundred thousand Jews in the 
greater Toronto area, there are no Jewish organizations dedicated specifically to Jewish women, 
and none that acknowledge the persistence of get refusal or its manifestation as a type of 
domestic abuse especially being that my research illustrates that get refusal in particular, and 
domestic abuse more broadly, certainly and significantly do persist in Toronto (in the Jewish, 
and Orthodox communities).  
                                                          
775
 John Syrtash, on numerous occasions. 
776
 In particular I can note Sister to Sister, Project Sarah, Shalom Task Force, The Rachel Coalition, among many, 
many others in the greater New York area, and across denomination. 
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Here specifically we might compare the principle organization which focuses on agunot 
in New York, ORA, and the only organization in Toronto which is funded largely by Jewish 
bodies, but which no longer serves only the Jewish population, Act to End Violence Against 
Women (AEVAW). Although I have discussed both organizations at points throughout the study, 
and in particular in chapter five, I have not yet done a comparative analysis and particularly on 
the approaches they take to get refusal. While AEVAW goes to great lengths to avoid discussing 
get refusal publicly thus all but denying that agunot exist in Toronto,
777
 ORA’s entire mandate is 
to resolve instances of agunot. Their purpose is even in their name, the Organization for the 
Resolution of Agunot; they reflect their mandate proudly. In fact, in a bold move, (being that 
AEVAW “rebranded” and changed their name from Jewish Women International Canada “to 
more accurately reflect our work in the VAW sector”778 and because they service few Orthodox 
women
779
) AEVAW held a series of events in synagogues across Toronto and across 
denominations during November 2016 to discuss domestic violence in the Jewish community. 
This was a bold move because the organization had until this point rarely (if ever) publicly 
acknowledged domestic violence in Orthodox communities despite the fact that while there is 
more shame and fewer resources in religious communities (not only Jewish ones), the rate of 
violence is actually the same as in non-religious communities
780
. The challenge arose however 
when get refusal went unmentioned by AEVAW at each of these events, despite detailed 
descriptions of diverse types of domestic violence. This is in stark contrast to ORA, whose 
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policy frames get refusal as a form of domestic abuse; “ORA believes that the protracted refusal 
to issue or receive a get is a form of domestic abuse which must never be tolerated. ORA seeks 
to foster a Jewish community in which a get is never used as a weapon”781. This divergence is 
significant being that my own primary data reflects that every case of get refusal in New York 
and in Toronto was precipitated by some form of domestic abuse ranging from controlling 
behaviours to rape in marriage, with the refusal of the get acting as the final blow. Being that get 
refusal and domestic violence are intrinsically connected, as I discussed at greater length in the 
previous chapters, it is troubling that the only support organization which (in part) is directed 
toward Jewish women avoids discussing get refusal altogether. Troubled by this gap, I spoke 
with Miriam Navy, National Office Administrator and Legal Support Worker at AEVAW who 
explained the organization’s direct intent in avoiding the issue of get refusal. She explained that 
AEVAW had recently re-established a positive working relationship with the Toronto Beit Din 
and they could not ‘rock the boat’ or upset the fragile connection782. The Beit Din had recently 
begun to refer women to the support group and if they were perceived as being disturbing the 
détente they may sever the new positive status quo. Thus, similar to the beit din avoiding issuing 
seruvim which most callously impacts women, it seems AEVAW too follows the will of the beit 
din, and at the steep price of helping perhaps the most vulnerable women. By not acknowledging 
get refusal so they will not rattle the beit din, where does the loyalty of the organization lie and 
who is impacted most significantly? Again, in fall 2017, AEVAW held a few evenings of 
workshops about abuse in the Jewish community and again get refusal was raised, this time by a 
son of a panel member who had experienced abuse. Penny Krowitz, Executive Director, again 
sadly missed the opportunity to frame get refusal as a form of domestic abuse and went on to 
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praise the Toronto beit din as a wonderful partner
783
.  While ORA’s strategy has been to 
approach get refusal as a form of domestic abuse (perhaps the first organization to do so), 
AEVAW seems to be taking the opposite approach, refusing to define get refusal as a form of 
domestic abuse (publicly at least) and women refused a get are most adversely affected by this 
contrast, seemingly with nowhere to turn for help in Toronto when faced with the abuse of get 
refusal. AEVAW does not (yet) engage in activities such as those ORA is preoccupied with such 
as rallying or picketing recalcitrant spouses and educating communities and high school students 
about the abuse of get refusal. 
An additional area where there are inconsistencies between New York and Toronto is 
media representation of get refusal such as the use of media in educating and shaming. Again 
although I have addressed media representations in earlier chapters, I have not done so by way of 
comparison. While major news media publications in New York do publicize the list of seruvim 
or orders of contempt, in Toronto (and across the nation), The Canadian Jewish News does not 
do so. Moreover, the issue of get refusal is often covered in Jewish papers in New York across 
denomination. To name but one example, I recently saw an article in the Hasidic enclave of Boro 
Park in Brooklyn that had an in-depth feature in The Boro Park Buzz
784
. By contrast, The 
Canadian Jewish News, the primary Jewish paper across Canada publishes stories on get refusal 
only on occasion
785
. While the press is independent and beyond the influence of outside factors, 
their intermittent coverage of get refusal may also perhaps be attributed at least in part to the 
Toronto Beit Din. I would argue that if seruvim would be issued, the paper would be enabled to 
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take a more forthright approach, engaging in shaming and more regular coverage of this 
persistent issue. 
In addition to differences regarding batei din’s approaches to get refusal remedies, 
differences regarding support organizations, and differences regarding media representations, 
perhaps the most salient and yet most intangible and amorphous difference between Toronto and 
New York emerges when considering the differences between the communal characters of 
Jewish communities of New York and Toronto at large. I argue that inconsistent community 
characters (generally speaking) contribute to the contrasts that emerge on the issue of get refusal 
between the largest and most diverse Jewish centres in North America. My primary data and 
personal experience as a community member in both locations indicate that while the broader 
New York Jewish community tends to have a more transparent, open-minded and tolerant nature, 
the broader Toronto Jewish community tends to have a more opaque, narrow-minded, and 
insular nature; there exist diverging customs and cultures. These are, of course, generalizations, 
and not representative of every sub-community in each locale, but they do encapsulate the wide-
ranging characters of communities-at-large. The reasons and significance of these nebulous 
characterizations are likely plural and complex. Rather than attempting to offer comprehensive 
approaches, I will offer salient ones pertinent to this case study on get refusal.   
To elaborate on the matter of Toronto being close-knit and insular, in Toronto 
particularly (compared to New York), there is a ‘small-town’ feel where often many people 
know each other despite different synagogue affiliation, school or camp attendance, and in some 
cases, level of observance. There are many overlapping networks which intersect. 
Simultaneously, there is also a strong culture of avoiding or denying discussing ‘bad’ things 
(within the Orthodox segments of the community in particular) such as divorce, domestic abuse, 
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mental health problems, addictions, suicide, and to some extent, homosexuality, among other 
matters
786
. Compounding all this, there is also a strong and dominant rabbinic authority in the 
Vaad Harabonim of Toronto who have gone so far as to publicly berate more mainstream or 
open-minded Orthodox rabbis for their tolerance or permissiveness on certain matters. A mild 
example would include the Vaad’s treatment of Rabbi Daniel Korobkin of the BAYT, the largest 
Modern Orthodox Synagogue in Canada when they reprimanded him for permitting quinoa on 
Passover a few years ago
787
. A more serious example would include Rabbis from the Toronto 
Beit Din writing a letter to The Jewish Tribune in January 2014, critiquing Rabbi Jay Kelman 
and his educational organization, Torah in Motion, (which often attempts to openly discuss some 
of the unspoken issues mentioned above), when they held a panel on agunot. Yet, now that I 
have described one example of the insular nature that characterizes the community it becomes all 
the more important to understand how this temperament developed. 
Perhaps the most significant reason for the differences in the characters of the Jewish 
communities in Toronto and New York can be explained by looking again at the historical make-
up of each Jewish population. The Jewish population in Toronto from the time of the turn of the 
century through post World War II was “much more homogeneously Eastern European in 
background and with many more recent arrivals from Europe”788 when compared with New 
York which may be one reason for the discrepancy in the nature of communities. While New 
York actually received many more immigrants from Eastern Europe than Toronto, the rate of 
immigrants proportionately was greater in Toronto
789
. As well, the immigrants to Toronto were 
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more numerous than those to New York “relative to the already settled Jewish population, 
reinforcing the more traditional, Eastern European orientation of Canadian Jewry”790. Moreover, 
because Jewish immigration began many decades prior in New York, they already had an 
established Reform Judaism that might influence the new, Orthodox arrivals whereas in Toronto, 
that did not yet exist to the same extent at the time of the mass immigration and thus the 
“identification with the Orthodox tradition is stronger” 791 and more recent in communal 
memory. The fact that the Toronto Jewish community was shaped so significantly by the Eastern 
European (mostly Orthodox) immigration and which is still not so far off in its group 
consciousness may explain the more insular and rigid nature of the community (and perhaps 
even its lack of resistance to the Toronto Beit Din) when compared to the nature of the broader 
Jewish community of New York. Coupled with that, there was a slower growth pattern and “rate 
of allegiance” in both Reform and Conservative Judaism in the community’s formative years792 
and the Reform Movement is more prevalent in the United States than in Canada still today. This 
history contributes to a shared “symbolic sociology” wherein a community-at-large may develop 
a “collective consciousness of the past” based on shared historical knowledge and/or “common 
referents”, as was elaborated in Carol Greenhouse’s study of the nature of religion and disputing 
in Hopewell
793
. Being that many Torontonian Jews are first or second generation Canadians post 
Holocaust whereas in New York, you might find fifth or eighth generation American Jews, their 
collective consciousnesses of the past might diverge in significant ways.  In Toronto, “the greater 
identification with Orthodoxy reflects the relatively homogenous origins of its Jews and the 
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proportionately greater number of post World War II immigrants from Eastern Europe”794. 
Bolstering this collective consciousness of the past and in line with ‘the importance of place in 
culture’, as Greenhouse notes795, might be the Canadian policy of multiculturalism which is said 
to embrace a ‘mosaic’, allowing immigrants to hold on to their cultural heritage, whereas the 
American policy embraces the ‘melting pot’ where immigrants are expected to shed their cultural 
heritage and assume a primarily American identity
796
. Perhaps this begins to explain why and 
how the discrepancies regarding the nature of the communities developed. Stemming from 
Greenhouse’s study, I argue that consciousness of the past may be indicative of present 
narratives and approaches and indeed this resonates deeply with the divergent attitudes toward 
get refusal taken in Toronto and New York today
797
. 
More recently, and what ultimately makes the legal landscape distinct from New York 
(and other locales) is the removal of religious arbitration in Ontario in 2005. Although I 
elaborated on the significance of this policy shift in chapter three, and to some extent throughout 
these pages, here I argue that the removal of religious arbitration was a significant factor that 
made Toronto divergent on the issue of get refusal and its approaches to the phenomenon. The 
removal of the power to arbitrate from the hands of the beit din was a deep blow to the 
confidence of the court and a threat to their authority within the community. The reason I ague 
this is because since this development, the beit din has acted desperate to hold on to whatever 
remaining power they wield, most often on the backs of the mesuravot get themselves, as I 
illustrated earlier. In fact, the beit din has such a deep desire to retain control of Jewish divorce 
that it has all but ‘gone underground’ in its mediation by actually continuing to recommend 
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highly that couples sign an agreement to determine all issues in beit din, much like the 
arbitration powers of which they were stripped
798
. In other words, much like the fear regarding 
Sharia tribunals going rogue with their decisions after the removal of religious arbitration, the 
Toronto Beit Din has in some sense gone into hiding, secretly arbitrating all matters emerging in 
divorce and compelling couples to sign an agreement to that effect. This power play may also be 
one of the factors contributing to the beit din’s retraction of their support of the Divorce Act as a 
viable remedy to get refusal- to ensure that women (and men) will have fewer avenues for 
redress and will be at the mercy of the powerful beit din
799
. In this way, although the precedent 
of the Divorce Act is significant, it remains largely unfulfilled because women who concern 
themselves with halakha or its ramifications on their children, will not avail themselves of the 
pluralist option when the beit din has precluded it. The fact that the Toronto Beit Din no longer 
supports a pluralist remedy it initially was a party to and yet does not publicly correct the record 
before the community thereby allowing the myth that the law has solved the problem of agunot 
to persist, speaks to the nature of the beit din, and perhaps even the community at large- it is 
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opaque and insular to its own detriment. This stagnation also has the damaging effect of blocking 
every other remedy available to women- both pluralist and halakhic. 
 
So What? - Or Why We Should Care That Toronto and New York Are Different 
I offer here some potential factors emerging from conversations between scholars. 
What is very surprising about the current state of affairs regarding get refusal in Toronto 
is that the Toronto Beit Din continues to wield unchecked power without any transparency or 
accountability, but also without any resistance or challenges. In Toronto, silences persist despite 
sharp critique of the beit din from a diverse set of stakeholders, not only mesuravot get, and 
including a number of Orthodox rabbis who requested anonymity while expressing their 
exasperation in one-on-one meetings. In other contexts, a stalemate like the one on get refusal in 
Toronto might lead to grassroots efforts and yet, the status quo, which gives mesuravot get no 
support and gives more power to individual abusive men than to the beit din itself, persists. That 
the Toronto community is not resisting and that silences persist both about the lack of legal 
pluralist remedies despite their notable existence and the lack of halakhic remedies may be 
viewed by some as dysfunctional (Indeed, what does this say about how deeply the nature of the 
community runs through it). Furthermore, another surprising element is that the Toronto Beit Din 
is not seeking (religious) remedies to problems arising around get refusal’s persistence which is 
what might be expected when legal challenges arise in religious communities and yet, the beit 
din has not only precluded the pluralist remedies by not promoting state law to solve a religious 
problem, but I would argue, they have precluded halakhic remedies as well by not promoting 
religious law to solve the problem. This fact- that a religious body is not interested in solving a 
problem in its midst, helping its own community- not with its own laws or with others’ is rather 
surprising. As Sharon Shore, partner at Epstein Cole (one of Toronto’s largest family law firms) 
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has said, “the rule when working with the Toronto Beit Din is that there are no rules when 
working with the Toronto Beit Din...there are no rules of evidence, no transparency, no training, 
no consistency, no rules of appointment...”800. Consequently, and based on my primary data, I 
would argue that the beit din is contributing to the persistence of get refusal in this context which 
can also be read as the beit din is contributing to the persistence of domestic abuse. 
Torontonian women are at risk- this is social justice concern for us all. Consistency and 
legitimacy of the Beit Din, and halakhic interpretations are all delegitimizing entire system. 
Individual abusive men have become more powerful than entire communities and women 
refused a get have become, by default, the least powerful of all, unable to forum shop- without 
help from legal pluralist remedies, without help from community, and without help from beit din. 
Moreover, in this silent vacuum, and without the ability to forum shop or turn to grassroots 
community movements, domestic abuse is given fertile ground to persist allowing men to 
manipulate religion to bolster their maltreatment. Again, and as this study began, remember that 
what happens in Toronto, the largest and most diverse Jewish centre in Canada has potentially 
wide and deep ramifications and influence . 
On the other hand, it is also important to note that the state must not assume that 
problems emerging in religious contexts can not necessarily be solved by regulating religion. The 
lesson that remains is that women must have choice- with religion as viable and state pluralist 
remedies as equally viable. All types of women may find themselves agunot and so it is 
important for the state to acknowledge, despite common assumptions about who might go to 
religious forum, such as batei din, that diverse women must have diverse options.  
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In the Shadows of Legal Pluralism - Some Thoughts 
 
Reflecting on this project, there are some conclusions which I anticipated at the outset, 
before any data was collected, before any stories were shared. There are also some conclusions I 
have reached that have come as a surprise: some which I should have perhaps foreseen and that 
in hindsight are obvious; and there are yet other conclusions which still continue to surprise me 
every time I consider them. 
 For example: I anticipated that despite the legal pluralist remedies for get refusal, 
normative religious behaviours would endure, and indeed the gap between legal and social 
realities persists albeit perhaps in previously unforeseen ways, such as strategically using one 
venue or one’s voice to exact the desired outcome, the get (embracing critical legal pluralism, 
though women do not frame it or name it as such). I did not anticipate that I would find such a 
glaring correlation between domestic abuse and get refusal, although now in retrospect, I think, 
of course, the link is palpable. Finally, I am surprised and amazed, even today, after spending so 
much time with my participants, my data, and these pages, by the strength, conviction and 
diversity of the women refused a get. Although they go through something exceptional, they are 
far from monolithic or homogenous. As a consequence, women’s wants and needs are diverse, 
and yet quite often, their religious convictions and their spiritual connections are fierce, and as 
such, there are times when neither the rabbinic institutions, nor the state institutions, nor the 
feminist ones really capture the best interests of mesuravot get. In a sense, it is only the women 
themselves, through their narratives, who are really able to enlighten us with their nuanced 
complexities, harnessing transformative social and legal change by way of storytelling (and thus 
also in the tradition of critical legal pluralism). 
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Conclusions 
 
My doctoral research was driven by these interrelated and nuanced set of questions, 
among others: Have changes to state legal systems elicited changes to religious/Jewish legal 
orders? Have they impacted changes to religious (or ritual) social norms or behaviours? What 
have been the consequences of this, if any? Why have there been gaps between law reform and 
social behaviour in Toronto regarding get refusal different from similar legally plural 
communities (such as New York)? What have been the socio-legal impacts of those differences? 
How have these messy entanglements been experienced and navigated by women from within 
the religious culture and how have they been perceived by the culture and communities, and have 
there been distinctions between Toronto and New York?  
At its most fundamental level, this study has explored get refusal in Toronto and New 
York. I argued that there is a gap between legal regulation and social behaviour regarding get 
refusal and despite state regulation or civil legal remedies to solve get refusal, the phenomenon 
persists, and in Toronto particularly, there have been further unintended consequences. Perhaps 
unexpectedly, culture continues to be a dominant force in the lives of women and they insist on a 
get even when they do not observe other religious aspects of the culture and rabbis often resist 
foreign legal remedies to internal problems, although they supported certain foreign remedies 
initially. Thus, while legal pluralist solutions are the most promising, to date, and while there is a 
long history of commensurability or reciprocity between state and Jewish legal orders, they have 
not had their intended result
801
. Concentrating on the narratives of women in the tradition of 
feminist legal research and critical legal pluralism, and using elements of oral history and 
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ethnography to achieve a ‘thick description’802 of the realities of get refusal along with fresh 
analyses of existing theoretical contributions, I explored this and the other multiple layers of 
analysis weaving the plural threads of the goals and objectives together, making this study 
distinctive. Some of these threads run deeper than others, are more complex and entwined.   
I have concluded that legal remedies -both religious/halakhic and state- are not working 
as intended, including the get laws. In addition, and particularly in Toronto, batei din do not 
work for women. I have also found that pre-nuptial agreements have great potential to remedy 
get refusal and change the social consciousness around get refusal as abuse and extortion 
(although they will never be an exhaustive solution), but they too have some problems, 
particularly in Toronto (both legal/external and social/internal). Community reactions and 
activism can work and has worked in many cases, particularly when adapted to include ‘e-
shaming’, and this remedy is the most traditional and least controversial but there is a void in 
Toronto (perhaps ironically since this is a remedy that would be very effective). The narratives of 
women refused a get not only lead to the aforementioned findings regarding the existing 
remedies, they also highlighted a number of findings regarding the women themselves. In 
particular, the women illustrated that get refusal impacts all types of Jewish women, and at all 
levels of observance, not just Orthodox. Coupled with that, all types of women want a halakhic 
divorce- a get- and not alternatives thus there must be an understanding that alternative solutions 
will never be the viable solution. They may work for some, but will never work for all
803
. 
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Another finding is the centrality of domestic violence in the lives of mesuravot get. Get refusal is 
symptomatic of other abuse.  
Thus, my research illuminates a number of broad and theoretical insights for the nexus of 
law and religion, gender and religion, women’s storytelling and critical legal pluralism. This 
study instinctively responds to the initial claim that the phenomenon of get refusal no longer 
exists and discredits that misconception, but the persistence of get refusal in and of itself is not 
really that which is surprising. Thus my research takes the next steps: revealing interactions, 
experiences and narratives from the most central characters, the mesuravot get themselves
804
. 
And it is based on their narratives that I make the following summative contentions: 
As the narratives illustrated, along with a critical legal pluralist approach, women’s 
relationship to faith and thus also their relationship to law is complex and multifaceted. Each 
plays a role in seeking a particular solution to get refusal over another for each individual 
woman. There is no one relationship, and so to, there is no one solution. In fact, to some, the 
tensions between women’s relationships to faith and their relationships to law might seem to be 
knotted or tangled. However, I argue, based on my interviews with women refused a get, that 
women can be non-religious and want or demand a get while other women can be ultra religious\ 
kharedi and demand equality in divorce. Although these women’s desires may seem 
diametrically opposed and not necessarily able to coincide, in reality, the feminist principle of 
choice, the innate human desire for freedom and agency, and the liberal democratic principle of 
respect for differences (and in Canada, the policy of multiculturalism) should actually enable 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
obtaining a get is important, but for some, a valid Conservative get does the job. Similarly, for some Reform 
women, a civil divorce may suffice being that in 1869 the Reform movement voted to accept civil divorce alone as 
dissolving a marriage, though this was not reflected in my study which illustrated that women across all 
denominations demanded a get.  
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appreciation and facilitation of both these strands. Religious observance or piety and equality in 
divorce are threads that are able to, and may in fact, run parallel to one another without tensions 
of necessary entanglement
805
. In chapter five I shared narratives from women who highlighted 
these enmeshments through a critical legal pluralist approach which illustrates women’s roles as 
diverse legal agents influenced by and influencing law- both state and religious. For example, 
one haredi woman felt going to the United Nations was a great idea, whereas one unaffiliated 
woman found it to be highly inappropriate to publicize her husband’s recalcitrance in public and 
yet felt she needed a get - the Jewish divorce- to have closure and move on with her secular life. 
I also included narratives from women who indicated that along with their decreased respect for 
individual rabbis and/or rabbinic institutions, such as batei din, their faith in G-d and desire for 
spirituality actually increased. 
Nonetheless, despite articulating stronger relationships to G-d and faith, and despite the 
insistence that a get (rather than an alternative remedy) is their right and that the get will serve to 
sever spiritual, legal, and/or personal ties with a spouse to whom they want no connection, that 
does not necessarily mean women are going to accept rabbis’, dayanim’s or beit din’s 
approaches, as the narratives demonstrate.  To reiterate, rights and religion are not necessarily 
entwined; they can function in tandem as important concerns for women, contrary to what may 
be popular belief- that they are dysfunctionally bound and that women must choose one over the 
other. Women have a simultaneous entitlement both to the right to divorce and the right to 
religion. Furthermore, women’s relationship with their faith, or women’s Orthodox observance 
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itself are not determinative; there are plural factors converging which may result in the outcome 
of get refusal- gender, place, class, among others as I elaborated at various points throughout this 
analysis. 
There exists the reality that divorce is on the rise both in the general population, and 
within Jewish communities as well, including in the Orthodox and ultra Orthodox communities.  
Furthermore, there has been a gradual shift in normative ideologies even within religious 
communities that divorce is better than bad marriage. Simultaneously, there are instances where 
the beit din may work against women’s agency, options, and ability to forum shop in order to 
achieve her best and most equal divorce by supplying only one option- or even no options in 
(smaller) communities. These elements set the stage for abusive men to refuse a get to their 
wives, enabling recalcitrance and get extortion
806
. For example, this study illustrated that the 
Toronto Beit Din has precluded the possibility of women employing the civil legal amendments 
for their benefit, and as was intended, to prevent the abuse of get refusal. Moreover, the Toronto 
beit din is not functioning legitimately or transparently and in so doing, is preventing women 
from forum shopping while concurrently anchoring women not only to their abusive recalcitrant 
spouse refusing the get, but also to the intransigent beit din, refusing not only to look outside 
itself for remedies, but which refuses to look inside itself for remedies, thereby enabling an 
injustice in its midst to endure. In a sense, it is not the persistence of the abuse of get refusal 
which is in and of itself noteworthy. Abuse, after all, is a normative characteristic of conjugal 
relationships; power and violence in intimate relationships will be deployed, just as in all 
relationships, Jewish or not. Rather what is noteworthy is the leadership’s reluctance to mend the 
gash in the fabric of its society.  
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These contentions are some of the theoretical contributions I make in these pages about 
faith and law as well as rights and religion as a result of this study investigating women’s 
experiences of get refusal in New York and Toronto. In these ways, I am contributing to broader 
discussions about law and religion. 
 
 
From ‘In the Shadows of the Law’ to ‘In the Shadows of Legal Pluralism’ 
 
In their celebrated work, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce”, 
Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser argue that divorcing couples are influenced by the mere 
existence of law and its potential power even when they bargain using “private ordering”, 
outside the court room and without a judge
807
 (an argument echoed in the works of both Carol 
Greenhouse and Sally Engle Merry
808
). In essence, they examine how the law on the books 
impacts the law in action or put another way, the gap between law (in the ‘official’ legal sphere) 
and reality or the experiences of people who are influenced by the existence of law outside the 
courts but are not affected by the letter of the law in direct reach of the courts. I argue that there 
are important contributions emerging from Mnookin and Kornhauser’s study that may be 
adapted and appropriately applied here, to my investigation of women’s experiences of get 
refusal which has them navigating between plural legal systems. Similar to my arguments 
regarding the impact of legal regulation on normative religious behavior, Mnookin and 
Kornhauser argue that the law itself, while not directly at play in a particular, private negotiation, 
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may nonetheless take on a significant, albeit clandestine role. In other words, although laws may 
not have their intended impacts, they may indeed have impacts on and in negotiations that were 
unexpected and which may result in favourable or unfavourable outcomes, even when not 
officially invoked. Of course, and unlike Mnookin and Kornhauser argue, custom – or religion – 
and social and communal pressures also play a role as I illustrate below.   
Thus, the role of law, or I would argue more accurately for this study, the potential 
positive role of legal pluralism is in the shadows, often lurking behind the scenes. We should 
stretch Mnookin and Kornhauser’s analogy, to an ‘in the shadows of legal pluralism’ model, 
beyond simply an ‘in the shadows of the law’ model. This does not mean that individual laws, 
particular legal remedies, and/or entire legal systems are not important. On the contrary, they are 
“inescapably relevant”809. In a sense, legal pluralism or pluralist remedies are silently impacting 
actions and attitudes of individuals (both in Toronto and New York, both men and women). Thus 
the mere existence of law or legal pluralism (approaches and/or solutions) may affect peoples’ 
actions or attitudes even when there’s no direct invocation of legal pluralist solutions. It is simply 
the threat or looming imposition (of get laws, or prenuptial agreements, etcetera) that elicits 
particular actions or reactions. I argue that all this, then, occurs in ‘the shadows of legal 
pluralism’. 
While Mnookin and Kornhauser argue that, “divorcing parents do not bargain in a 
vacuum… they bargain in the shadow of the law”810, I would contend in this context that women 
seeking a get are similarly not bargaining in a vacuum. They are bargaining in the shadow of 
legal pluralism. And, although women are not always able to successfully invoke a pluralist 
remedy when negotiating a get, often the threat of the remedy might positively achieve the 
                                                          
809
 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law,” Yale Law Journal 88, 
(1978-1979): 951. 
810
 Ibid, 968. 
342 
 
desired result, that is, might exact a get. There are also instances, however, where women remain 
in the dark, unable to step out of the shadow. For example, attorneys I interviewed noted cases 
where simply the threat of invoking the get laws, the Divorce Act, (against the beit din’s will) in 
the Toronto context was enough to induce an otherwise recalcitrant husband to begin get 
negotiations even when the attorney had no intention of actually invoking the get laws because 
they were aware that the Toronto Beit Din would nullify a get executed as a result of the civil 
law. Others in the New York context described instances where the prenuptial agreement was 
either incorrectly executed or where the second page with the signatures and notarization was 
missing altogether, but nonetheless, they pressured husbands or their representation on the issue 
of the get with, “well I have a prenup in front of me that I am prepared to take to a judge if your 
client doesn’t give her a get”811. These are but two examples of women strategically navigating 
plural legal systems in the shadow of legal pluralism and examples of women as legal agents 
with transformative capacity and legal knowledge (in line with critical legal pluralism).  
Similarly, for Mnookin and Kornhauser, bargaining upon divorce breakdown is strategic; 
it is about balancing risks and probabilities, about trying to anticipate where one will have a 
more favourable outcome: in private ordering, or in court. When playing in the shadow of the 
law, you play a game of ‘what if’. Much like women navigating legal systems in search for a get. 
For women seeking a get, bargaining is far more complex because, at the outset, they must 
leverage their freedom simply in order to level the deck. In other words, women refused a get, 
while bargaining in the shadow of legal pluralism are not necessarily always able to choose 
which venue suits their civil interests, or where they might have better odds regarding custody or 
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access. Rather, they are already at a detriment, having to negotiate something that should be 
separate from, prior to, and without the conditions of regular divorce negotiations- the get. 
That said, as the narratives illustrate through a lens of critical legal pluralism, examining 
how individuals or groups treat law, some women are strategically choosing their venues 
(though there may be added stakes and pressures for religious women seeking a get); they are 
forum shopping quite deliberately at times, and this is in-line with Mnookin and Kornhauser’s 
findings. The article argues that people take their chances in private ordering, hedging their bets 
about what the law would do if one used it. Thus it informs one’s strategic moves when 
functioning in the shadows, before actually invoking the law itself. In this ‘shadow of the law’ 
model, the law does not directly determine the outcome with its reach, because it is not 
necessarily being used yet (like get laws) and yet, it still may significantly impact the achieved 
results. In fact, as Mnookin and Kornhauser argue, “…how people bargain in the shadow of the 
law provides us with a rich understanding of how the legal system affects behavior and allows 
for a more realistic appraisal of the consequences…”812 but I would push even further and 
contend that in the shadows of legal pluralism we also get a rich understanding of how individual 
women effect legal knowledge and legal changes reciprocally and in line with critical legal 
pluralism). 
In the Toronto context, the Divorce Act and Family Law Act reforms were legal pluralist 
remedies to the phenomenon of get refusal. The Arbitration Act reform was another response to 
the fact of religion in the public sphere needing regulation. In the New York context the 
amendments to the Domestic Relations Law and the adoption of halakhic prenuptial agreements 
further serve as pluralist remedies to get refusal in that jurisdiction. In both cases, I use legal 
pluralism as i) a socio-legal method, ii) a description of reality, and iii) a policy approach (in 
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other words I view legal pluralism simultaneously as descriptive, prescriptive, and normative). 
That said, although there is a pluralist reality with laws and remedies available ‘on the books’, 
are they actually being implemented and employed? I have argued, and the narratives have 
bolstered this argument and shown that in fact, there seems to be a gap between the legal realities 
and social realities, between the law’s intentions and individuals’ and/or communal normative 
behaviours that persist (which takes me back to my initial questions at the outset of this study). I 
argue here that this reality too places us ‘in the shadows of legal pluralism’. 
It is not only individuals who are in the shadows of legal pluralism due to the gap 
between the law’s intentions and the normative behaviours and realities that persist. 
Communities at large, including organizations are also ‘in the dark’ at times, and in particular in 
the Canadian context. At times, they are acting as though the get laws expunged any trace of get 
refusal and that there is no need for support organizations or mechanisms to aide women being 
abused by the refusal of a get or the extortionate demands made in exchange for a get, in the 
name of religion or piety. 
 Moreover, it is not only individuals and communities in the shadow of legal pluralism, 
batei din as well are either functioning or dysfunctioning in the shadows of legal pluralism. In 
the Toronto context in particular, the Toronto Beit Din is not using any of the mechanisms at 
their disposal whereas in the New York context, despite the challenges with the New York get 
laws, the Beth Din of America has attempted to circumvent those challenges by endorsing 
another pluralist option and mandating it as widely as possible, and that is the halakhic 
prenuptial agreement. This powerful remedy serves to tie individuals, rabbis, attorneys, and batei 
din inextricably to both civil and halakhic mechanisms, the archetype of a legal pluralist 
approach. 
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 In conclusion, this research, with the voices of women refused a get, has illustrated that 
the convergence of legal systems or the reality of legal pluralism has the power to shape 
perceptions and behaviours even when not being directly invoked. While this chapter has 
developed a number of conclusions, weaving the multiple threads of analysis together, the 
coming chapter goes one step further, incorporating these enmeshments into policy 
recommendations and final calls to action. 
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Chapter Eight/ Conclusion - Policy for Piety 
It has not been a perfect marriage in general. There was some abuse, but I weakened… 
Eventually, it got out of control with the abuse- of both me and the three kids. The house went 
into foreclosure and we were on food stamps. 
I went to the Beit Din of America and spoke to Rabbi W a few times. Rabbi W sent three 
hazmanot but no seruv because my husband’s not a part of a community. 
But, my husband is in denial and wants to get back together even though I have a restraining 
order that is still in effect til this day against him. 
Rabbi W’s advice was to get the civil divorce first in order to threaten my husband and send him 
the message that I am serious and that there is no hope for reconciliation. 
Let’s be honest here-guys have all the power- women have nothing. Now I have my civil divorce 
and a restraining order but even so, it’s all up to him. I did what they wanted- I got my civil but 
I’m... I have no leverage in my demand for a get. It’s very frustrating. It’s hard, there should be 
some sort of rule that if you have a restraining order in place it should guarantee a get... 
We separated in February 2012, I got my civil divorce April 23
rd
 of this year (2014) but I’ve been 
asking for my get for years and there’s no sign of it. 
Are the rabbis helpful? Not really- I’ll be honest with you. First thing they asked me about was a 
prenuptial agreement – ridiculous! Because in 1989, when I got married, there were no 
prenuptial agreements! 
The truth of the matter is- it’s all in his hands. He emails me all the time. 
I did it all myself, without a lawyer and I’m proud of myself. I got the restraining order, I went to 
a $399 “do your own divorce” and then in the middle I filed all kinds of motions- but he filed for 
bankruptcy which is a federal case and supersedes all civil matters and so I’ve definitely been 
my own best advocate. Beit din doesn’t do anything alone- on its own. ORA is better but their 
hands are tied much of the time. 
It’s horrible to be a woman. Basically, you are being held hostage. 
In my situation a prenuptial agreement would have done nothing-because he has no money to 
pay maintenance even if a civil court would have enforced the contract. What can they do if he’s 
broke? 
I shouldn’t say this, but the best solution would be if my husband would just die. 
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He thinks he’s the martyr. I think he sincerely believes he’s been wronged. I don’t believe he’s 
just pretending to play role of martyr. I think he really believes everyone is against him like the 
rabbis, etcetra. He thinks he’s being wronged by this situation. 
I think a get tied to secular law is fantastic because secular law is more powerful. Otherwise, it 
can be ineffective, outdated, and unfair to women. A woman is tied and the only person that can 
undo you is your husband so you can wait until he decides to untie you or you can wait until he 
dies- whichever comes first. 
There is no solution- everything is in the men’s hands but you (women) are screwed and there’s 
no point to annulment if you can’t move on within the community. 
Rabbis are just human. I’m indifferent to them now. I have no opinion of them. I’m still a 
believer; this hasn’t turned me off of religion, not at all. I send my kids to yeshiva day school.  
It’s about my husband, not about religion. 
~~~ 
 
I’m sitting in my office, February 26, 2007.  At the appointed time, I put on my coat, walk down 
six flights of stairs and out into a beautiful winter day. I get into my car and drive five minutes to 
the appointed place.  I arrive alone, It didn't occur to me to bring anyone with me, and I'm glad I 
didn't.  
Walking through deep snow, I enter the white building. The shul has a timelessness about it, as 
though suspended in the first half of the 20
th
 century. I am enveloped in dim but warm wood 
tones, and am directed into the Beit Midrash, where I take a seat by a long table.  I am 
surrounded by thousands of years’ worth of books, of teachings, of life.   
I am here to close off 18 years of marriage, to walk out of the bonds I myself built, beginning 
with my encircling, carefully, deliberately, seven times, my chuppa. My new place in the world.  I 
feel my ancestors here, watching. I feel wisps of my marriage swirling about, with the dust 
motes. I’m not sure what I feel; sad but also determined as I recognize the forward direction I 
am taking. Certainly, this is one of those moments I’ll remember for the rest of my life. The three 
rabbis of the Bet Din come in, take their seats opposite me. One older, one middle-aged, one 
younger. All in black robes, black hats. Two others, the witnesses, stand behind them.  Rabbi O., 
with the sad eyes and benevolent face, begins the age-old protocol, reading carefully but quickly 
in a tired mumble.  I hear, repeatedly, my name, and those of my father, my imminently-ex 
husband, his father. I am bade stand, and I do. I stand straight and strong, ready to be given 
back the reins of my life. As I do not understand most of the words – other than the names – I can 
only contemplate their historic weight, and the direction they now turn me.  Only the word 
‘grusha’ – divorced – makes me flinch.   
The word literally means ‘thrown out, expelled’, and is brutal.  I stiffen and stand taller.  I may 
be that, but after all, I have come here specifically to acquire it, and will carry that word on my 
back as I walk my own path, and create a new place in the world. I look past the shelves of 
books, through the windows. The sky is clear and blue, snow is falling.  
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As directed, I extend my hands – oh, remove my rings:  the simple gold and moonstone I bought 
myself as a teenager on one hand, and my engagement diamond set in Bubby’s engagement ring 
on the other. As I do every day, I connect to their significances, and remind myself of Bubby’s 
life, of how she came to have this ring altogether, of all it represents. This awareness is always 
there, conscious. These are the touchstones. 
I cup my hands to receive the parchment being dropped by the proxy. The rabbi said my husband 
felt uncomfortable being in the room with me. A fact about which I was previously unaware. A 
man of my parents’ generation, round-faced, beardless; he looks like he lives here in the Bet 
Midrash.  His open white shirt is threadbare and grey. His suit is dull, as is his old hat. He looks 
very tired, bored really, certainly not mindful that I will remember him and his momentary 
significance for the rest of my life. He does what he is here to do, speaks my name as though he 
knows what it means, and the parchment falls into my outstretched palms. I close my hands as 
instructed, then tuck the parchment, this blueprint for the rest of my life, under my arm and stride 
away from the assembled rabbis. I turn, come back to them and hand the Get to Rabbi O. More 
words, more reiteration of my name and the others……….and it is done.  
Rabbi O hands me a paper representing the parchment he will now slice and file, and gently tells 
me I am now a divorced woman in the eyes of the Bet Din, and all Judaism. He wishes me Mazal.  
Somewhat dazed, I leave this place and step outside, into the bright day with soft snow falling 
silently. I contemplate my wings, then get into my car, drive five minutes up Bathurst Street, 
climb six flights of stairs, and slide back into my office chair by the computer. 
An hour has elapsed. 
~~~  
The Agunah (A Poem) 
C. K. 
 
She sits alone in the back of the shul, 
Preferring to daven, not talk, 
For all she has left is her faith, 
Her belief in HaShem is her Rock. 
 
She has tried to obtain her freedom, 
Years of abuse have made her mind set, 
Her marriage has become like a cancer, 
To survive, she must obtain a get. 
 
Her husband refuses to release her, 
Control was always his game, 
He will not let her get on with living, 
He will try to put her to shame. 
 
Although she has turned to his Rabbayim, 
They refuse to get involved, 
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“Try harder to make him happy”, they say, 
“And your problems will all be resolved!” 
 
They say for shalom bayis, 
That she should bear it, not react, 
That for the sake of her young children, 
Her marriage should remain intact. 
 
He says that I’m stupid and lazy, 
When things fail, it’s always my fault, 
He smacks me when he’s angry, 
Should I just shrug off the assault? 
 
My son heard it all ad he watches, 
The next day I get a call from his school, 
“Your son hit one of this playmates, 
And he called his Rebbi a fool”! 
 
My daughter had become very quiet, 
She no longer invites friends to our house, 
She looks at me with angry pity, 
To her I am a spineless mouse. 
 
The rabbis shrug their shoulders, 
The answer is not a divorce, 
Her husband is a respected baal bais, 
They are saving her from a life of remorse. 
 
The weeks have turned into months, 
The months have evolved into years, 
Trapped by her community’s indifference, 
She’s left with nothing but tears. 
 
The Agunah sits alone in the back of her shul, 
Preferring to daven, not talk, 
For all she has left is her faith, 
Her trust in HaShem is her rock. 
 
 
The narratives here, and throughout this study are not identical or consistent, and yet, 
they are all alike in their conviction. Sometimes women illustrate their conviction in bold ways, 
but sometimes in subtle, unconventional ways. Both types of narratives contribute to (at times 
incremental) transformations from within (reflecting a critical legal pluralist approach). All the 
narratives also reflect what I conclude here: that women refused a get are diverse. What unites 
them is their demanding a get as a right, and at times, some have to navigate that with their right 
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to religion (or to be free from religion, while still making a religious legal claim). The narratives 
also collectively reflect that just like there exists tremendous diversity amongst the identities of 
mesuravot get, so too there is diversity amongst the preferred best solutions of mesuravot get. 
Their relationships both with faith and with law are multifaceted 
 
 
Policy for Piety 
In Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject
813
, Saba Mahmood 
conducts a study of women/piety movement in Egypt that focuses on listening to the ‘other’, the 
religious women, in order to shatter stereotypes that liberals and feminists impose on the Muslim 
world
814
. The study cuts across typical identity markers such as age and class, and finds that all 
types of women are embracing piety, also known as the mosque movement. The study further 
demonstrates that although these women, in a sense are not radically shattering the patriarchy 
other’s see in their lives, they are nonetheless making bold (and even feminist) changes from 
within (although the women themselves may not accept or embrace such conceptualizations). 
Thus, Mahmood also argues for broader conception of women’s political and religious agency 
(by those outsiders, reading ideas of freedom, agency and choice onto the women themselves). In 
the context of this study, I would likewise argue for broader conception of women’s legal and 
religious agency (by others including liberals and feminists, as Mahmood does). Extending 
Mahmood’s contributions to align with this study, I would contend that similarly, women 
actively and tactically navigating plural legal systems in their quest for a get, rather than 
accepting alternative remedies is their way of taking bold steps from within (while avoiding 
                                                          
813
 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
814
 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).  
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shattering the totality of the system as some might view as preferred).  It is also in line with 
critical legal pluralism which individuals, in this case, women refused a get, as makers of legal 
norms and as potentially transformative law-makers (even if they do not necessarily read 
themselves this way). 
Rather than reinterpreting and appropriating scripture and traditions to challenge 
discrimination against women that would change the foundation of the religion to which pious 
women ascribe (in our context that could be understood as abolishing halakhic marriage 
altogether, as some feminists suggest), the women of the mosque movement avoid politics 
altogether (to their minds) and focus instead on cultivating an embodied practice of personal 
piety that to others, seems to bow to patriarchal logic of fundamentalist Islam although in reality, 
through their piety and the resurgence of the mosque movement they are in fact changing 
normative roles and ideas from within, (much like the evolution of the prenuptial agreement 
movement within halakha, and particularly like the power of sharing women’s narratives and 
experiences of get refusal). Both the women in Mahmood’s study and in my own, are women 
who in some ways subscribe to cultural and religious norms rather than subverting them and this 
is their form of agency (despite the complexity this poses to liberal understandings of equality, 
multiculturalism, agency, or feminism
815
). Indeed, this nuanced understanding contradicts 
standard assumptions that views religious women as (especially) suppressed and as an 
alternative, argues that women choose their conditions at times. Mahmood illustrates that 
women’s agency does not equate with conscious resistance necessarily. Again, this is in line with 
critical legal pluralism which, in this study, would also see women as active and normative law-
makers through their choices (whether to avail themselves of law, to go public with shaming, 
                                                          
815
 In fact, Mahmood contends that religious women are thus restricted by feminists. Saba Mahmood, Politics of 
Piety, 10. 
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among other choices). Women asserting their agency, even when directed at religious practice 
are not automatically engaging in purposeful political decisions or revolutionary actions and yet 
may still challenge normative ideas about pious Muslim, or in this case, Jewish women
816
 and 
how they view and interact with law. 
In light of Mahmood’s important and sensitive contributions in Politics of Piety and my 
own critical analysis both from ‘outside in’ and ‘inside out’ throughout this study, I would like to 
end this study with a few policy recommendations based on my findings: 
1) Women faced with the abuse of get refusal are diverse and although this study has drawn some 
conclusions based on the women who participated and shared their stories, communities and 
scholars alike must give safe and encouraging space for diverse women to make diverse 
choices and share diverse experiences of get refusal and the remedies they choose to pursue
817
. 
It is important to acknowledge that despite common assumptions about who avails themselves 
of beit din, or religious tribunals in general, that it is not just the pious, or the Orthodox. 
Women must have choice with religion as viable. There must be a grab bag of solutions 
available for women. The factors that lead to get refusal are plural and thus the remedies as 
well ought to be plural. For example, and as I illustrated in chapter six, ‘e-shaming’ may not 
exact a get in all cases, and may not work for all women, but it works for some women, and it 
exacts a get in some cases, so too with any number of remedies. While the women of this study 
by and large demanded a halakhic get, rather than any alternative, where women feel 
alternatives are sufficient or appropriate they must not be made to feel like pariahs within their 
communities
818
.  
                                                          
816
 Ibid, 8, citing Lila Abu-Lughod. 
817
 Certainly there are limitations with this diversity, but ultimately, women will benefit with this approach. 
818
 For example, the recent and well-known case of the aguna from Tzfat/Safed saw a woman attain a get zikui, an 
alternative type of get, elaborated in chapter two, by an innovative ruling of the Tzfat beit din lead by Rabbi Uriel 
353 
 
Ultimately, we must respect and give deference to the voices and experiences of women 
faced with get refusal and take cues from them directly, without imposing upon them ideas 
regarding best solutions. In particular, individual women’s narratives are rich sources for real 
insight and innovative action and, by extension, collective action by women and their 
supporters can have significant impact on individual and institutional behaviour and attitudes 
within religious communities; for example, in their legal demands for their right to religion and 
their right to divorce (picking up on lessons from Mahmood’s study). 
2) As a community, we have settled - perhaps uncomfortably (though not always)- into the reality 
that the aguna problem is one to be managed, not solved. This is not moral nor is it halakhic. 
The Torah teaches us, “tzedek, tzedek tirdof”, “justice, justice you shall pursue”819 and settling 
with the status quo is simply unacceptable. We must challenge the notion that a get is 
negotiable. The get must be given prior to and separate from any and all divorce proceedings 
and negotiations, both in the American and Canadian contexts. This is a vital and perhaps most 
practical policy advice I can give. Alongside that recommendation, batei din must follow 
halakhic protocol, no matter the cost to their personal or collective self-image; they must issue 
hazmanot and then issue and widely publicize seruvim. Communities, schools, support 
organizations, rabbis, and individuals likewise have a responsibility to talk openly about the 
persistence of get refusal, they must educate their children to give and accept the get promptly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lavi. The 34-year-old woman’s husband was in a permanent vegetative after a motorcycle accident nine years ago. 
In 2014, after intense investigation with doctors, the beit din issued the get on behalf of the husband, determining 
that he could not fulfill any of his marital obligations, and because “he would agree and desire to give it himself if he 
could”. The beit din was careful to cite halakhic precedent in making what they knew would be a controversial 
ruling, referring to two of the most authoritative halakhic rabbis and poskim Rabbi Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz 
(Hazon Ish) and Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank. Indeed, the ruling caused outrage among the chief rabbi of Israel and the 
Ultra Orthodox world and in 2016 a third party challenged the ruling at the Central Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem. 
Ultimately, in 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel (civil/secular) ruled against the third-party intervention to challenge 
the Tzfat court’s ruling and it was upheld, opening the door and minds of many, even if just a crack.  
Jeremy Sharon, “Defeat for Chief Rabbi Yosef in High Court Ruling on ‘Agunah from Safed’,” Jerusalem Post, 
March 30, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Defeat-for-Chief-Rabbi-Yosef-in-High-Court-ruling-on-
Agunah-from-Safed-485647.  
819
 Deuteronomy 16:20. 
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and unconditionally, and they must pressure and demand that recalcitrant husbands, rabbis, and 
batei din do the right thing- issue a get, stand up to corrupt courts, and follow halakhic 
protocol. They must also support mesuravot get and their children; they must make them feel 
welcome in the community, at synagogue, and at events, and do the opposite for the recalcitrant 
spouse. So many of the participants in this study simply wanted their child to have someone to 
go to shul with on Shabbat. 
3) The state should not assume that (socio-legal) tensions can be abated by regulating religion. As 
I illustrated throughout the study, with a particular focus on the literature of legal pluralism and 
law and religion in chapter three and discussions around state intervention in religious matters, 
such as the removal of religious arbitration or the enactment of get laws, regulation may not 
always have the intended impact. In other words, get refusal continues as a phenomenon in 
New York and Toronto, and is not easily ‘corrected’ in a straightforward way by legislative 
initiatives. In addition, the dynamic or relationship between state and religious law in a 
particular jurisdiction can be fruitfully examined to understand why religious legal mechanisms 
might resist, or provide a counterweight to, state intervention in religious communities. I also 
want to reiterate that religion or women’s piety is not the cause of the abuse of get refusal (and 
this is a theoretical outcome of this study that can be applied more broadly in other contexts).  
Coupled with this, there must be an ethos of legal pluralism embedded in the approaches 
to get refusal. It is so important for people dealing with aguna issues to not only understand the 
halakha, but to also understand the relationship between the courts- rabbinic and civil- and how 
to navigate them. At a conference at Brandeis University on May 17, 2017, a large delegation 
of family law attorneys from New York, as well as some from Boston and Toronto all 
expressed that both lawyers and judges are not sufficiently familiarized with and proficient in 
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the get laws and the intricacies of Jewish divorce, including use of the get as an extortionate 
tool by recalcitrant husbands by framing it as a negotiable asset (and in the American context 
many are not familiar enough with the halakhic prenuptial agreement). There is a dynamic 
relationship between law and religion. Legal regulation may impact religious social norms and 
religious social norms may impact legal regulations as in the case of Jewish divorce in Toronto 
and New York; it is not one direction. I capture this (often unexpected) dynamic through the 
stories of women. 
4) Perhaps the most critical policy outcome that emerges from my findings is the centrality of 
domestic abuse in the lives of mesuravot get. Moreover, not only is get refusal often 
precipitated by other types of domestic abuse, but (Torontonian) women are often enduring 
these abuses without a network of support. Woman after woman illustrated that get refusal is 
symptomatic of other abuses endured during a marriage. Abuses range from emotional and 
psychological abuses, to financial and spiritual abuses, and even to physical and sexual abuses 
in some cases. Furthermore, along with the gradual shift in normative ideologies, even within 
religious communities, that divorce is better than bad marriage, there has also come the shift 
that communities, even religious ones, may acknowledge the existence of domestic abuse. 
What remains missing is the link (at least in the Toronto context, less so in the New York 
context). I contend that just as communities are hard pressed to ignore domestic abuse, so too 
they should not ignore get refusal. Refusal of a get ought to be purposefully and strategically 
framed and understood as one potential abuse of a number of abuses that individuals may come 
to endure in unhealthy marriages (and support groups must understand this as well). Refusal of 
a get is often the final vestige of control. While I come to this conclusion at points throughout 
this study, it is most palpable in chapter five, where I conduct a close analysis of the narratives, 
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themes and language of mesuravot get. Women expressed that in a sense, get refusal is harder 
to endure than physical violence, because once you are able to remove yourself from the 
environment of physical abuse, it stops; but the abuse of get refusal is more difficult because it 
follows you everywhere. It ties you down and only one person has the ability to release the 
knot. You cannot un-tether yourself. That said, this study demonstrates that in fact, remedying 
the abuse that is get refusal is not going to come about by changing halakha or Jewish law. On 
the contrary, and echoing lessons from Mahmood’s study in light of women for whom religion 
has meaning, the problem of power and violence in intimate relationships will be deployed, just 
as it is in all abusive conjugal relationships, Jewish or not. The problem of abuse cuts across all 
identity markers. There are bad people, some of them are men who happen to be religious, and 
these bad individuals use whatever tools they have at their disposal to bolster them in their 
abuse; sometimes, that includes religion. The best way to combat manipulation or subversion of 
religion is for religious institutions such as schools, synagogues, support groups, and batei din 
as well as individual rabbis and community members to acknowledge both the phenomenon (of 
distorting religion) and its intrinsic connection: refusal of a get is abuse. The intra-marriage 
dynamic of power imbalance and abuse is as important to understanding the persistence of get 
refusal as are the actions of religious authorities and institutions; or in other words, the 
marriage-community-state dynamic, including how community structures may contribute to the 
invisibility and/or persistence of domestic abuse. Refusal of a get is abuse in that it ties one 
down, prevents them from moving on with their lives, impedes them from finding happiness, 
and completely controls their future. Making this link also casts the recalcitrant husband as 
abuser thereby making him unwelcome within the community, and enabling the community to 
rally around the mesurevet get, rather than letting her get lost in the shadows. 
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It is my hope that this study has illuminated the complexity around the persistence of 
siruv get, particularly in today’s modern contexts. Bringing together diverse literatures, 
methodologies, and theoretical contributions for the first time, I built on and extended the 
existing debates, placing the women refused a get centre stage embracing critical legal 
pluralism and developing an innovative religious feminist approach in order to highlight the 
entanglements at the nexus of law, religion, gender, and the power of storytelling. 
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יִמ ךְַר ֵּב ֶׁש תַר ָּתַהְל תוֹנוּגֲע תוֹבְֹרסְמוּ טֵּג  
האֵָּלְו ל ֵּחָר הָקְבִר הָרָש וּני ֵּתוֹמִּאְו ֹבקֲַעיְו קָחְִצי םָהָרְבאַ וּני ֵּתוֹבֲא ךְַר ֵּב ֶׁש יִמ , ל ֵּאָרְִשי תוְֹשנ לָכ ת ֶׁא הָבוֹטְל ֹדקְִפיְו ֹרְכִזי אוּה
טֵּגַה תוֹבְֹרסְמוּ תוֹנוּגֲעָה ,ן ֶׁהָל ַעיִשוֹיְו ןֵָּגיְו ֹרזֲַעיְו ,הֶׁזַה םוֹיַּהְכ ןָתוֹיַּחְל ןָשְַפנ רֵּגְסַמִּמ איִצוֹיְו. 
 
 ֵּאָה-הָרָצ ת ֵּעְב הֶׁנוֹעָה ל ,הָקוּצ תֵּע לָכְב ליִצַמוּ ה ֶׁדוֹפַּה , תוּנְמְלאַ תוֹרוּרְצַה םיִָשנַה ת ֶׁא הֶׁנֲַעי אוּהןָתָקֲעַצ לוֹק עַמְִשיְו תוּיַּח ,
טֵּג ם ֶׁהי ֵּתוְֹשנִל ת ֵּתָל םיִבְרָסְמַּה םיִלָעְבַה תֶׁב ֶׁשֲחַמ ת ֶׁא בוֹטְל הֶׁנַשיִו ל ֵּטַביִו ,  א אוּה יִכ-רָשָב לָכ י ֵּהלֹ ,רָבָד לָכ אֵּלִָפּי וּנ ֶׁמִּמֲה. 
וּ הָרָצַב תוֹנוְּתנַה ל ֵּאָרְִשי תוֹנְב וּני ֵּתוֹיְחאַ ָהיְבִשַב- ן ֶׁהי ֵּלֲע ם ֵּחְַרי םוֹקָמַּה ,הָרוֹאְל הָל ֵּפֲא ֵּמוּ הָחָוְרִל הָרָצִמ ן ֵּאיִצוֹיְו. 
 
 ֵּאָה-תוֹרָשוֹכַב םיִריִסֲא איִצוֹמַּה ל ,ָהניִבוּ הָמְכָח ַחוּר ל ֵּאָרְִשי יֵָּניַּד ב ֵּלְב ן ִֵּתי ,הָרוְּבגוּ הָצ ֵּע ַחוּר ,ה תאְִַריְו תַעַד ַחוּר ' ִתַהְל רי
ן ֶׁהיֵּלְבִכִמ טֵּגַה תוֹבְֹרסְמוּ תוֹנוּגֲעָה םיִָשנַה לָכ ת ֶׁא ,הָּרָפֲע ֵּמ ָהניִכְש םיִקָהְל , תוֹבְרֻח ֵּמ תַחאַ ָהנָב וּלִּאְכ תַחאַ ָהנוּגֲע ריִתַמַּה לָכ ֶׁש
ָהנוֹיְל ֶׁעָה ִםיַלָשוְּרי .בוּתָכ ֶׁש אָרְקִמ ן ֶׁהָב ַםיֻּקיִו" :הֵּנ  ע ֶׁאְו ִינ ֵּאָרְִקיוּה ֵּדְבַכֲאַו וּה ֵּצְלַּחֲא הָרָצְב יִֹכנאָ וֹמִּע וּ." 
 
ָןניִמיִל ֹדמֲַעי םיִכָלְמַּה י ֵּכְלַמ ךְֶׁל ֶׁמ ,ָןנְרַק ת ֶׁא םיִָרי ,אֵּפְּרַמוּ הָכוּרֲא ן ֶׁהָל הֶׁלֲַעי ,רֶׁבָשְו תא ֵּש דוֹע ן ֶׁהָל וּיְִהי אלְֹו . תוֹנְבִל וְּכִזיְו
ל ֵּאָרְִשיְב םִינָמ  אֶׁנ םיִתָב . ַבן ֶׁהי ֵּלֲע ל ֵּלַּפְּתִמ הֶׁזַה שוֹדָקַה לָהָקַה לָכ ֶׁש רוּבֲע ,ביִרָק ןְַמזִבוּ אָלָגֲעַב אָתְשַה ,ן ֵּמאָ רַמֹאנְו. 
 
 
Prayer for Agunot and Mesuravot Get 
 
He Who Blessed our forefathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and our foremothers Sarah, Rebekah, Rachel 
and Leah, may He remember and consider favorably all the women who are agunot and who are denied a 
writ of divorce (mesorvot get), help, shield and save them, and release them from their confinement to 
grant them a new life this day. 
 
God who answers in times of trouble, who redeems and rescues in times of woe, may He answer the 
women who are bound in living widowhood, hear their outcries, and nullify the intentions of those 
husbands who refuse to give their wives a writ of divorce. For He is the God of all flesh, nothing is too 
wondrous for Him Our sisters, the daughters of Israel, who are in distress and bondage, may the 
Omnipresent One have mercy upon them, and deliver them from distress to relief, and from darkness to 
light. 
 
May God who releases prisoners from their chains, place in the hearts of the judges of Israel the 
spirit of wisdom and insight, the spirit of counsel and valor, the spirit of devotion and fear of 
God, that they may free from their fetters all the agunot and women who have been refused a 
writ of divorce by their husbands, so that the Divine Presence will rise from her dust since 
whoever frees one agunah it is as though he built one of the ruins of supernal Jerusalem. And 
may the biblical verse be fulfilled in them, "And call upon Me on a day of distress, I will rescue 
you and you will honor Me” (Psalms 50, 15). 
 
May the King of Kings stand at their side, exalt them, bring them recovery and healing, and may they 
endure no more despair and broken heartedness. And may they merit to establish faithful homes in Israel. 
Because this entire holy congregations praying on their behalf; now, speedily, and at a near time, and let 
us say, Amen. 
 
 
Yael Levine, “’Mi She-Berakh’ Prayer for Agunot”, The Jerusalem Post, March 16, 2016. 
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Yael Levine holds a PhD from the Talmud Department of Bar-Ilan University and is 
known for creating special prayers specifically to mark events in Jewish women’s lives. Along 
with this prayer on behalf of agunot she has composed prayers for women to recite for the 
rebuilding of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem, prayers before and after immersing in the mikvah 
(ritual bath), as well as, a prayer to recite in memory of women murdered by their spouses. It is 
noteworthy that Levine herself intended for the prayers to be recited by women across the 
religious spectrum, not only for the Orthodox. The prayer is based upon biblical, Talmudic, and 
midrashic sources and is recited in some congregations on the Fast of Esther, which marks 
International Agunah Day (being that Esther – related to the word ‘hidden’ in Hebrew- ‘hid her 
words’ or was kept silent and because she was in a marriage against her will).  
 It is fitting to end with a prayer written for women by a woman being that it signals so 
many imperative aspects of this study. Just as Levine shapes liturgy, women refused a get also 
illustrated the power to shape social and legal outcomes by using their voices and sharing their 
stories and experiences. Moreover, just as Levine’s prayers are to be recited by a cross section of 
Jewish women, so too does get refusal impact a cross section of Jewish women- neither are 
solely for the Orthodox. Mi sheberach prayers are said on behalf of those needing healing- 
physical and spiritual and indeed, this is also my prayer for all women who have experienced the 
abuse of get refusal. 
It seems to me that the entire study might be characterized as a socio-legal version of the 
“prayers for agunot”. Socio-legal scholars, particularly those who engage in qualitative research 
such as that embodied by this exploration, are uniquely situated to listen to subjects, translate 
stories into examples of human agency to create and live by norms, and reflect on the dynamic of 
interaction between formal and informal rules and governance. We can adopt a particular goal-
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driven stance (here, to fight get refusal), but in the end our work - similar to a prayer perhaps - is 
by nature suggestive, hopeful and most effective when it encourages individual and collaborative 
action. We aim to look at things in a “different” way, to inspire legal actors to better understand 
actions and consequences, to accept and work with many intersecting bodies of norms.  And we 
understand that there is no set authority with the power to bring about the change we see as 
necessary. The power, and obligation, is within us all. 
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Appendix A: Glossary 
 
Abishter et helfen (Yiddish) - G-d will help 
 
A galeriye of fashfandene mener (Yiddish) - a gallery of vanished or missing men or husbands 
 
Aguna/h, agunot/s, agun/agunim, aginut/iggun - a woman who is chained, bound, or anchored to her 
marriage; agunot is the plural; agun/agunim is a man or men, plural, iggun and/or aginut is the general 
phenomenon 
 
Akkum - courts governed by idolatrous peoples 
 
Aliyot la’Torah - an honourary prayer on the anniversary of the death of a relative or one’s bar mitzvah 
or other happy occasion 
 
Ashkenazi/c - Eastern European 
 
Av beit din - literally 'Father', or head of beit din 
 
Baal bais – literally ‘home owner’, implying respected community member 
 
Ba'al teshuva/h, ba'alei teshuva - literally 'master of repentance'; description of the return of secular 
Jews to religious Judaism. 
 
Bar Kochba/ Kokhba - Son of Kochba; Jewish leader who led revolt against the Romans, approximately 
132 C.E. 
 
Bar Mitzva/h - literally 'son of commandment'; the ceremony celebrating a boy’s transition to manhood, 
often by chanting from the Torah 
 
Barukh Hashem – literally ‘Bless the name of G-d’, but also 'Thank G-d', a common reply when asked 
‘how are you?’ 
 
Bat Mitzva/h - literally 'daughter of commandment'; the ceremony celebrating a girl’s transition to 
womanhood, at times by chanting from the Torah 
 
Bet din, beit din, beis din, batei din - literally ‘house of law’, court of Jewish law or rabbinic court, 
batei din is the plural 
 
Beit Din of the Rabbanut Ha’Rashit - Rabbinic Court of the Central or Chief Rabbinate of Israel   
 
Beit Din L’Inyanei Agunot - Beit Din for Agunah Issues 
 
Beit Midrash - House of learning, Jewish study hall 
 
Biah - sexual connection/intercourse 
 
Bintl briv (Yiddish) - bundle of letters 
 
Bubby (Yiddish) - grandmother 
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Bukhari - from the region of Bukhara, or central Asia, culturally has similarities to Russian/Islamic 
cultures 
 
Chachamim/ hakhamin, chacham/hakham - well-versed Torah scholars or scholar, singular 
 
Chalitza/h , khalitza/h, halitza/h - under the biblical system of levirate marriage known as yibbum, the 
process by which a childless widow and a brother of her deceased husband may avoid the duty to marry. 
The process involves the widow taking off a shoe of the brother (i.e. her brother-in-law) and making a 
declaration. Through this ceremony, the brother and any other brothers are released from the obligation of 
marrying the woman for the purpose of conceiving a child which would be considered the progeny of the 
deceased man. The ceremony of chalitzah makes the widow free to marry whomever she desires 
 
Charedi/haredi/ kharedi, charedim/haredim/kharedim - strictly Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox 
individual or groups 
 
Chasid/hasid/ khasid, chasidim/hasidim/khasidim - literally 'pious or pious ones'; referring to Jewish 
religious individual or sects  
 
Chatan/chasson/ khatan/khasson - groom 
 
Cherem/herem - ostracism, shunning, or excommunication 
 
Chesed/hesed - act of loving-kindness 
 
C/hilul Hashem, c/hillul Hashem - literally, the desecration of the ‘Name’ and refers to the ‘major sin of 
denunciation’. This occurs when one publicly sins, and as a result makes the entire group, their beliefs, 
their G-d be seen in a negative and often shameful light 
 
C/hizuk - strength 
 
chuppa/h, huppa/h - marriage canopy 
 
Cohen - a descendant of the priestly class 
 
Da'at/da'as torah/toyreh - literally 'knowledge of Torah', dictates that well-learned rabbinic leaders 
should be sought out to inform all life-impacting decisions based on their superior knowledge and values 
 
Daven (Yiddish) - pray 
 
Dayan, dayanim - judge; judges 
 
Der forverts (Yiddish) - The Jewish Daily Forward 
 
Dina d'malkhuta dina - ‘the law of the land (kingdom) is the law’; doctrine that was to become the basis 
for defining ‘church-state’ relations in Jewish law 
 
D'oraita (Aramaic) - Biblically ordained or from the Torah 
 
D'rabbanan (Aramaic) - rabbinically ordained or from the rabbis 
 
Ee efshar l'hachriach otta - it is not possible to force her 
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Eid, eidim - witness, witnesses 
 
Eirusin - also known as kiddushin, meaning engagement or betrothal 
 
Emuna/h - faith 
 
Eshet Chayil - literally 'woman of valour'; the ideal Jewish wife, encapsulating the ideal wife and mother 
 
Frum, frumer (Yiddish) - religious, devout or being committed to the observance of Jewish law; more 
religious 
 
Geirim - literally 'foreigners', term for converts to Judaism 
 
Ger - also Gur, Hasidic dynasty originating from Ger, Poland, late 1700s 
 
Get meuseh - forced or tainted get 
 
Get refusal - Jewish divorce refusal 
 
Get/Gett/ghet, gittin - Jewish writ of divorce; gittin is the plural 
 
Get al t’nai - conditional get 
 
Get zikui - annulling the marriage based on what is best for both parties, operating on the premise that 
divorce will benefit both wife and husband, whether he agrees or not 
 
Grusha - divorced woman 
 
Hafka'a, hafka'at kiddushin, hafka'ot - annulment; annulment of kiddushin; annulments-plural 
 
Halacha/halakha, halachot/halakhot - literally ‘the way on which one goes’, or law or legal system; 
halakhot is plural; entire legal framework that, depending on how observant one is, governs every aspect 
of one’s life and behaviour 
 
Halakhic / halkhically; halachic/halachically - Jewish-legal; legally 
 
Harkhakot of Rabbenu Tam - the distancing from the permitted use of force by Rambam/Maimonides, 
which was outlawed by Rabbi Tam 
 
Hashem - literally 'the name', is used to refer to God, when avoiding God's more formal names 
 
Hashkafa/h, hashkafic - religious- halakhic worldview 
 
Hatra'at seruv - a letter of warning of the forthcoming issuance of a contempt order 
 
Hatzlacha/ hatzlakha raba/h - lots of luck 
 
Hazmana, hazmanot - an invitation, or in this context, a letter or summons to appear before beit din; 
summonses 
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Heskem L’Kavod Hadadi - Prenuptial Agreement for Mutual Respect 
 
Heter - permission, approval or rabbinic ‘blessings’  
 
Heter mea rabbanim/rabbonim - literally 'permission by one hundred rabbis'; one hundred Rabbis agree 
with a Beit din that a particular situation warrants an exemption to permit a man to remarry even though 
his wife refuses or is unable to accept a get 
 
IBD - International Beit Din, led by Rabbi Simcha Krauss, which uses halakhic innovations or 
alternatives to ‘solve’ get refusal 
 
Iggun - an anchor; phenomenon of anchoring a spouse to an unwanted marriage by refusing a get  
 
Isura/h - forbidden or religious matters 
 
Kaddish - required prayer said for the deceased 
 
Kalla/h - bride 
 
Kava diyyun l'get - judgement in favour of a get 
 
Kesef - (exchange of) money 
 
Ketuba/h, kesuba/, ketubot - a Jewish legal marriage contract, binding the marriage and ensuring 
maintenance and protection for the woman in case of mistreatment, neglect, or refusal of rights 
 
Kiddush/kiddish - ceremony of prayer and blessing over wine 
 
Kiddushei ta’ut - mistaken or fraudulent marriage which are transactions entered into with a flawed  
understanding/without full disclosure 
 
Kiddushim - celebratory light luncheons after prayers 
 
Kiddushin - also known as eirusin, sanctification or betrothal 
 
Kinyan - formal act expressing (his) acceptance of the commitments; part of marriage Ceremony 
 
Kofin oto ad sheyomar rotzeh ani - refers to whipping the recalcitrant husband until he says “I want to 
[give a get]”, also known as compelling a husband to want to give a get, or to recognize that giving a get 
and ‘doing the right thing’ was in fact deep down, what the husband had always wanted and intended to 
do before his evil impulse took over (Rambam) 
 
Kollel - literally 'gathering' or 'collection'; an institute for (often) full-time, advanced study of the Talmud 
and rabbinic literature 
 
Lashon hara/h - literally 'evil tongue'; halakhic term for derogatory speech or gossip about another 
person 
 
Leitwort (German) - milot manchot in Hebrew, a literary tool describing repeated words that draw 
attention because of their repetition in a narrative cycle 
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Lubavitch/er - one who ascribes to the Orthodox Jewish, Hasidic movement of Lubavitch, originating in 
Belarus, late 1700s 
 
Machatunim/ makhatunim (Yiddish) - in-laws 
 
Mahr (Aramaic/Arabic) - sum of money paid by groom to bride in Muslim marriages 
 
Maimonides - also known as Rambam- Rabbi Moses son of Maimon; Talmudist, Halakhist, physician, 
philosopher and communal leader, 1135-1204 C.E. 
 
Mamona/h - civil and fiscal matters 
 
Mamzer, mazerim, mamzerut - illegitimate offspring, a status which bears severe consequences; 
mamzerim is plural; mamzerut is general phenomenon 
 
Mazal - luck 
 
Mekach/mekakh ta'ut - mistaken or fraudulent marriage which is a transaction entered into with a 
flawed understanding/without full disclosure 
 
Mekubalim - spiritual counsellors 
 
Mesader kiddushin - wedding officient 
 
Mesarev l'din - refusing to submit to judgement (to grant a get) 
 
Mesira/h - to turn over or give up to authorities 
 
Mesurevet get, Mesuravot get - woman refused a get; women refused a get, plural 
 
Meuseh - forced or tainted get 
 
Midrash/ midrashic - genre of rabbinic literature containing early interpretations and commentaries on 
the written and oral Torah as well as on non-legalistic rabbinic literature and occasionally Jewish law 
 
Mikva/h, mikve/h - ritual bath 
 
Milot manchot - leitworts (in German), a literary tool describing repeated words that draw attention 
because of their repetition in a narrative cycle 
 
Minyan - quorum of ten men needed for prayer 
 
Mi Sheberach – literally, ‘One who blesses’; a public prayer or blessing for an individual or group, most 
often recited in synagogue 
 
Mishna/h - from the verb 'shanah'‎, or to study; it is the first major written redaction of the Jewish oral 
traditions known as the Oral Torah. It is also the first major work of Rabbinic literature. Redacted by 
Rabbi Judah around 200 C.E. 
 
Mitzvah - a good deed done from religious duty 
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Nebach/kh - pity 
 
Nes - miracle 
 
Neshama/h – soul 
 
Nidda/h - a woman during menstruation, who has not yet immersed in a mikva 
 
Nisuin - marriage ceremony 
 
ORA - Organization for the Resolution of Agunot, non-profit organization out of NY, advocating for the 
get 
 
Parnasa - a living, livelihood 
 
Petach/kh - small opening  
 
Qadi/khadi (Arabic) - Sharia court judge 
 
Rabbenu Gershom – ‘Our Rabbi, Gershom', Known as ‘light of the exile’, a German Jewish rabbi and 
scholar, 960-1040 C.E. 
 
Rabbi, rebbi, rabbanim/rabbanim/rabbayim - literally 'my master'; a teacher of Torah and/or 
communal leader who passes a test of rabbinic ordination; rabbanim is plural 
 
Rabbanut - rabbinic establishment 
 
Rosh Va’ad Ha’ir - Executive Director of the Jewish Community Council of a city 
 
Sarvan, sarvanim, sarvanut get - recalcitrant husband/ male refuser of a get; recalcitrant husbands/ get 
refusers, plural; general phenomenon of get refusal 
 
Sefer kritut - book of severance, biblical term for get 
 
Seruv, seruvim - a contempt order, that declares the spouse to be (officially) ‘recalcitrant’ and subject to 
public ostracism and condemnation, calling upon the community to take appropriate action; contempt 
orders- plural 
 
Shabbat Shalom or Good Shabbos - wish for a peaceful Sabbath; common Sabbath greeting 
 
Shadchanim/ shadkhanim; shadchan/shadkhan - matchmakers; matchmaker 
 
Shakdu chachamim al takanot bnei yisrael - sages had an urgent sense of concern regarding legal 
enactments or amendments for the daughters of Israel 
 
Shaliakh/shaliach - representative 
 
Shalom/shlom bayit/s - marital home characterized by peaceful and happy relationship between a wife 
and husband 
 
Shana/h Tova/h - wish for a good year, common greeting around Jewish New Year 
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Shanda/h / shande/h (Yiddish) - a shame or disgrace  
 
Sheitel (Yiddish) - wig 
 
Shelo l’halakha - not to be taken seriously as halakha or halakhically permissible at this time 
 
Shiurim - lessons on any Torah topic 
 
Shtar - document 
 
Shtar berurin - verification document; arbitration agreement 
 
Shul (Yiddish) - synagogue 
 
Shulkhan arukh - literally, the 'set table', Code of Jewish Law 
 
Simeon ben Shetakh - Simon son of Shetakh, 120-40 B.C.E. 
 
Siruv get - get or Jewish divorce refusal 
 
Sofer - scribe 
 
Taharat Hamishpacha/h / Hamishpakha/h - laws of family purity 
 
Takana/h - a new legal precedent or amendment 
 
Talmidei chachamim/ hakhamin - well-versed Torah scholars 
 
Talmud; bavli, yerushalmi - instruction, learning from the verb 'lamad', meaning to teach or study; an 
elucidation of the Mishnah and related Tannaitic writings that often ventures onto other subjects and 
expounds broadly on the Hebrew Bible. 
 
Tehillim - psalms 
 
Teshuva/h - literally 'return'; the concept of repentance in Judaism 
 
Tizku l'mitzvot - may you (plural) merit to do more mitzvot or, good deeds 
 
Toen - male rabbinic court advocate 
 
Toenet Halacha/halakha or Toenet Rabbani - female rabbinic court advocate 
 
Tznius/t - modest, or modestly, implying appropriateness in dress, and/or behaviour 
 
Vaad Harabonim of Toronto - Toronto Board of Orthodox Rabbis  
 
Yad Hashem - hand of G-d 
 
Yad L'Isha - an Israeli Legal Aid Center and Hotline providing women imprisoned in hopeless marriages 
with the free legal representation they need to receive a Jewish divorce 
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Yehareg v’al ya’avor - let him be killed rather than transgress 
 
Yeshiva, yeshivot - literally 'sitting'; a Jewish institution that focuses on the study of traditional religious 
texts, primarily the Talmud; yeshivot is the plural, meaning institutions for religious study 
 
Yevama - A woman requiring chalitza/h , khalitza/h, halitza/h (see definition above) 
 
Yiddishe/h mameh - based on the traditional, immigrant Jewish mother who puts husband’s and 
children’s needs before her own 
 
Yosef hatzadik - Joseph the Righteous, one of the Biblical forefathers 
 
Zabla - an acronym for zeh borer lo echad, which means each party is able to choose one of the 
dayyanim from a pool of rabbis with expertise in various fields of Jewish law and then the two together 
choose a third to complete the beit din. When using a zabla both parties must agree to be bound by the 
decision the beit din reaches 
 
Zekukim kesef tzaruf - pure silver coins 
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 hsilgnE yb dewollof ,werbeH -txeT abuteK dradnatS :B xidneppA
 ה"ב
איך ... לבריאת עולם למנין שאנו מנין כאן ... חמשת אלפים ושבע מאות שנת ... לחדש ... בשבת ... 
הוי לי לאנתו כדת משה וישראל ואנא אפלח ואוקיר ואיזון ואפרנס ... בת ... אמר לה להדא ... בן ... 
... יתיכי ליכי כהלכות גוברין יהודאין דפלחין ומוקרין וזנין ומפרנסין לנשיהון בקושטא ויהיבנא ליכי 
... ומזוניכי וכסותיכי וסיפוקיכי ומיעל לותיכי כאורח כל ארעא וצביאת מרת ... דחזי ליכי ... זוזי  כסף
בין בכסף בין בזהב בין בתכשיטין במאני דלבושא ... דא והות ליה לאנתו ודן נדוניא דהנעלת ליה מבי 
חתן דנן ... ף וצבי זקוקים כסף צרו... חתן דנן ב... בשמושי דירה ובשמושא דערסא הכל קבל עליו 
... זקוקים כסף צרוף וכך אמר ... זקוקים כסף צרוף אחרים כנגדן סך הכל ... והוסיף לה מן דיליה עוד 
חתן דנן אחריות שטר כתובתא דא נדוניא דן ותוספתא דא קבלית עלי ועל ירתי בתראי להתפרע מכל 
נא למקני נכסין דאית להון אחריות שפר ארג נכסין וקנינין דאית לי תחות כל שמיא דקנאי ודעתיד א
ודלית להון אחריות כלהון יהון אחראין וערבאין לפרוע מנהון שטר כתובתא דא נדוניא דן ותוספתא 
דא מנאי ואפילו מן גלימא דעל כתפאי בחיי ובתר חיי מן יומא דנן ולעלם ואחריות וחומר שטר 
כחומר כל שטרי כתובות ותוספתות דנהגין חתן דנן ... כתובתא דא נדוניא דן ותוספתא דא קבל עליו 
חתן ... בן ... ל דלא כאסמכתא ודלא כטופסי דשטרי וקנינא מן "בבנת ישראל העשויין כתיקון חכמינו ז
 דא על כל מה דכתוב ומפורש לעיל במנא דכשר למקניא ביה הכל שריר וקים... בת ... דנן למרת 
 ...נאום 
 ...נאום 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
392 
 
On the [...] day of the week, the [...] day of the [Hebrew] month of [...], the year [...] after the creation of 
the world, according to the manner in which we count [dates] here in [...], the bridegroom [...] son of 
[...] said to this [...] daughter of [...], “Be my wife according to the law of Moses and Israel. I will work 
honor, feed and support you in the custom of Jewish men, who work, honor, feed, and support their 
wives faithfully. I will give you the settlement of [...] silver zuzim, which is due you according to [...] law, 
as well as your food, clothing, necessities of life, and conjugal needs, according to the universal custom.” 
Ms. [...] agreed, and became his wife. This dowry that she brought from her father’s house, whether in 
silver, gold, jewelry, clothing, home furnishings, or bedding, Mr. [...], our bridegroom, accepts as being 
worth [...] silver pieces (zekukim). 
Our bridegroom, Mr. [...] agreed, and of his own accord, added an additional [...] silver pieces (zekukim) 
paralleling the above. The entire amount is then [...] silver pieces (zekukim). 
Mr. [...] our bridegroom made this declaration: “The obligation of this marriage contract (ketubah), this 
dowry, and this additional amount, I accept upon myself and upon my heirs after me. It can be paid from 
the entire best part of the property and possessions that I own under all the heavens, whether I own 
[this property] already, or will own it in the future. [It includes] both mortgageable property and non-
mortgageable property. All of it shall be mortgaged and bound as security to pay this marriage contract, 
this dowry, and this additional amount. [it can be taken] from me, even from the shirt on my back, 
during my lifetime, and after my lifetime, from this day and forever.” 
And the surety for all the obligations of this marriage contract (ketubah), dowry and the additional sum 
has been assumed by [...] the said groom, with the full obligation dictated by all documents of ketubot 
and additional sums due every daughter of Israel, executed in accordance with the enactment of our 
Sages, of blessed memory. It is not to be regarded as an indecisive contractual obligation nor as a 
stereotyped form. 
And we have completed the act of acquisition from Mr. [...] son of [...] our bridegroom, to Ms. [...] 
daughter of [...], regarding everything written and stated above, with an article that is fit for such a 
kinyan. And everything is valid and confirmed. 
[...] son of [...] Witness 
[...] son of [...] Witness 
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Appendix C: Standard Get Text- Hebrew, followed by English 
ב _______תבשב ,ב _______ חריל םימי ,_______תנש_______ 
ב ןאכ ןינמ ונאש ןינמל םלוע תאירבל _______ רהנ לע אבתיד אתמ_______ 
תוניעמ ימ לעו , אנא _______ ןב ,_______ב םויה דמועה _______אתמ, 
 רהנ לע אבתיד _______תוניעמ ימ לעו ,צישפנ תוערב יתיב 
אנסינא אלדב ,יתתנא תנא יכיל יכיתי תיכורתו תירטפו תיקבשו 
 _______ תב _______ב םויה תדמועה _______אתמ ,אבתיד 
 רהנ לע_______תוניעמ ימ לעו ,יתתנא תיוהד 
האשר ןיייוהיתיד יכיל יכיתי תיכורתו תיקבשו תירטפ ודכו אנד תמדק ןמ 
אבסנתהל ךהמל יכישפנב האטלשו ןיייבציתיד רבג לכל ,אחמי אל שנאו 
םלעלו ןנד אמוי ןמ יכידיב ,םדא לכל תרתומ תא ירהו, 
ןירוטפ טגו ןיקובש תרגאו ןיכורת רפס יאנמ יכיל יוהי יד ןדו 
לארשיו השמ תדכ. 
דע ינולפ ןב ינולפ 
דע ינולפ ןב ינולפ 
 
On the __________ day of the week, the __________ day of the month of __________ in the year 
__________ after creation of the world, according to the calendaric calculations that we count here, in 
the city __________, which is situated on the__________ river, and situated near springs of water, I, 
__________ the son of __________, who today am present in the city __________, which is situated on 
the__________ river, and situated near springs of water, willingly consent, being under no duress, to 
release, discharge, and divorce you [to be] on your own, you, my wife __________, daughter of 
__________, who are today in the city of __________, which is situated on the__________ river, and 
situated near springs of water, who has hitherto been my wife. And now I do release, discharge, and 
divorce you [to be] on your own, so that you are permitted and have authority over yourself to go and 
marry any man you desire. No person may object against you from this day onward, and you are 
permitted to every man. This shall be for you from me a bill of dismissal, a letter of release, and a 
document of absolution, in accordance with the law of Moses and Israel. 
_________ the son of _________ -- witness 
_________ the son of _________ -- witness. 
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Appendix D: Call for Participants- New York, followed by Toronto 
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Appendix E: Informed Consent Form 
Sounds of Silence Informed Consent Form/ Text for Verbal Consent Form 
Date: Winter, 2014 
 
Working Title: Sounds of Silence: A Comparative Socio-Legal Examination of Get (Jewish divorce) 
Refusal 
 
Researcher:  
Yael Chaya Bracha Machtinger, PhD Candidate 
Division of Social Science, Faculty of Graduate Studies, Graduate Program in Socio-Legal 
Studies,York University yaelmach@yoru. 
 
Purpose of the Research:  
   This research project explores Jewish divorce refusal. It seems to be that refusal by husbands 
persists unacknowledged in Toronto’s Jewish community, while in Montreal and New York the 
problem of get refusal is acknowledged, making Toronto distinct. Consequently, my doctoral 
research is driven by the question: Why is there a unique gap between law reform and social 
behaviour in Toronto regarding get (Jewish divorce) refusal different from other legally plural 
Jewish communities - Montreal and New York? 
   I will comparatively examine a classic socio-legal concern, the gap between law reform and 
law in action, grounded in an atypical case study and yet from a comparative perspective with 
the goal of contributing to women’s historiography of marriage as well as examining the 
overlapping legal norms of Jewish and civil laws. In Canada, and Toronto particularly, society is 
not attuned to the intersection of secular, legal regulation and religious, social norms regarding 
get refusal. Accordingly, I will explore if in fact changes to secular law changed spousal 
behaviour in Toronto, compared to Montreal, and how amendments to the law changed 
behaviour of spouses in New York. 
   I will draw from contributions of both rabbinic and feminist research strands-actively engaging 
with Jewish Law and critically examining get refusal using feminist methods and methodologies 
placing women’s narratives anchored to marriages against their will, at the centre of socio-legal 
analysis, accurately exposing Jewish women as active not chained. It is my hope that the 
project will bring about awareness, openness and conversation about iggun (Jewish divorce 
refusal) within and beyond the communities, allow for the self-narration of women, and 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge both within the field of socio-legal studies 
particularly, but also for intersections of law, culture, gender and religion generally. 
 
What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research: 
You will be asked to engage in a open-ended interview questions used as a guide. The 
research methodology that will be used then is ‘participant interview research design’ which 
allows for greater flexibility because it relies on semi-structured discussion, giving you a voice. 
As such, while the time commitment will not be onerous, it may be flexible; 60-120 minutes. You 
should be aware that interviews may be digitally audio recorded and then transcribed and 
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analyzed by me unless you express otherwise. You should also be aware that the Dissertation 
that I will write, at the end of the research process, will be read and approved by my Dissertation 
committee and may eventually be published. 
 
Risks and Discomforts:  
There are minimal risks to all participants. The subject matter is not taboo or deemed harmful or 
dangerous to discuss openly. On the contrary, you are encouraged to freely, and comfortably 
discuss the subject and create heightened awareness about it. In fact, there are many articles, 
books, and media outlets already discussing the issue openly. 
The minimal risks include: i) talking about personal matters that might be painful; ii) expressing 
unpopular opinions. 
Furthermore, because you have the option to withdraw at any time (and have the supplied data 
destroyed), and because all information participants supply will be secured and kept confidential 
and anonymous, there is minimal risk to privacy and harm, or discomfort. 
Should you experience any emotional distress, I will give you a list of support services 
for you to contact. 
 
Benefits of the Research and Benefits to You: 
The research may give you and/or the community a voice; it may allow you to narrate your own 
remembered past and in that way it may be affirming and beneficial. 
Your participation may also elicit positive change to you personally, and/or to your communities. 
Participating in a project which may bring attention to the issue may also be a benefit to you. 
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal from the Study:  
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may choose not to answer any 
questions, or to stop participating at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. If you decide to 
stop participating, your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, 
will not affect your relationship with the researchers, York University, or any other group 
associated with this project either now, or in the future. Further, upon withdrawal from the study, 
all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed where possible.  
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity: 
Unless you choose otherwise, all information you supply during the research will be held in 
confidence and anonymously, under a pseudonym and unless you specifically indicate your 
consent, your name will not appear in any report or publication of the research. Data will be 
collected through a digital audio recorder and/or handwritten notes. Your data will be safely 
stored in a locked facility and I will have access to this information. Moreover, all electronic data 
will be securely stored on a password protected computer. The data will be destroyed after the 
retention period of ten years. The data (hardcopy and electronic) will be destroyed after the 
retention period either by shredding and/or deleting computer files from computer, recycle bin 
and overwriting them. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
 
Questions About the Research? 
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If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel 
free to contact me, Yael Machtinger, by e-mail testemail, my Dissertation Supervisor, Dr. Annie 
Bunting, either by telephone at 416) 7100 x20500 or by email testemail, or my Graduate Program 
in Socio-Legal Studies either by telephone at 736-2100 x22689 or by email testemail. This 
research has been reviewed by the Human Participants in Research Committee; York 
University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council 
Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights 
as a participant in the study, please contact the Sr. Manager and Policy Advisor for the Office of 
Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York University telephone 416-736-5914 or e-
mail testemail. 
 
Legal Rights and Signatures: 
I, ______________________________, consent to participate in Sounds of Silence conducted 
by Yael Chaya Bracha Machtinger. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to 
participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below 
indicates my consent. 
 
Signature               Date______________2014______ 
Participant 
Signature                          Date_____________  2014_______ 
Researcher 
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Appendix F: Questionnaire 
Working ‘Participant Interview Research Design’ Questions 
A) Biographical Information: 
1. Name: ______________________________  
2. Age, circle one: 18- 20    20-30    30-40    40-50    50-60   60-70   70-80 
3. Gender:________ 
4. Occupation: ____________________ 
5. Where do you currently reside? Circle ONE.    Toronto     Montreal     New York 
6. How would you describe yourself religious affiliation? Circle ONE. 
Hasidic    Ultra Orthodox    Modern Orthodox     Conservadox    Conservative    Reform    
Reconstructionist    Egalitarian  Pluralistic    Other: ___________________ 
B) General Siruv Get Questions: 
1. Do you know of a woman who is/was refused a get by her husband in Toronto/Montreal/ New 
York?   
2. How do you know? Do you think your sources are reliable? Should you know as a member of the 
community? 
3. A person who has been summoned to beit din (Jewish court) several times and fails to appear 
can be held in contempt of court. A seruv is a document that indicates such recalcitrance. Do 
you know if the woman refused a get has had a seruv issued in her case? 
4. How do you know? Do you think your sources are reliable? Should you know as a member of the 
community? 
5. Do you think there should be support of individuals whose spouses are trapping them in 
marriages? What sorts of support are you envisioning?  
6. Would you use a secular/civil legal remedy or protection to ensure receipt of a get upon 
dissolution of marriage? What might some of these include? 
7. How do you feel about secular/civil legal remedies or protections? What is you perception about 
them? Does your community discuss them? How?  
8. To what degree might you say that secular/civil legal remedies or protections have changed 
religious norms or behaviour on the issue of siruv get? Please elaborate. 
9. Do you believe that (secular, civil) legal amendments can change social behaviour? (religious 
behaviour?) Have they? Should they? (Or is there an ongoing gap between law reform and social 
action?) 
10. Does iggun go both ways? (Can a wife refuse a get thereby trapping her husband?) 
11. Let’s take a hypothetical…What would you do if you were in the position of a mesurevet get? 
12. What is your perception of such a woman? Of her husband?  
13. Would you describe your experience as gendered? OR how did it feel to be a woman going 
through the get process? 
 
C) Legislation and Case Law: 
1. Are you aware of iggun protections in Toronto/Montreal/New York? What do they include?  
2. Have you heard of/are you aware of the changes to the Divorce Act? Family Law Act? Domestic 
Law Review? 
3. Have you ever heard of Bruker v. Markowitz, Light v. Light, or similar cases? Have you ever read 
the cases? Were they significant? 
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4. Are you familiar with the pre-nup movement? ORA? Or the recent Mellman Group Study by 
Barbara Zakheim which sought to quantify agunot in North America? Have you heard of Tamar 
Epstein or Gital Dodelson? 
5. Have you/ do you pan to/ do you advise signing pre-nuptial agreements with the ‘Aguna’ clause 
that would be both Halachically and legally binding? Why or why not? 
6. Are you aware of the ‘Aguna Summit’ that took place in New York in June 2013 and of the 
suggestions purposed there (both legal and halachic)? 
7. What do you think the ‘best solution’ to get refusal is? 
 
D) Specific/Detailed Questions for Narratives of Agunot/Mesuravot get (past or present) 
Were issues around siruv get ever addressed or discussed before you got married? (I.E. was the 
phenomenon even acknowledged? Were the civil remedies discussed? Prenups?) What was 
said, when, by whom? (In high school? Seminary? Kallah class? Officiating rabbi? 
 
Were you ever advised, not to agree to a civil divorce before receiving your get?  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Do you have your get? Circle ONE.       YES        NO    If yes, after how long? _______ 
2. Was a siruv issued?      Circle ONE.       YES        NO     If yes, after how long? _______ 
3. Where were you residing? 
4. Who called the Beit Din (rabbinic court) for the first time? 
5. How old were you? How long had you been married? 
6. Who was your first point of contact within the Beit Din? 
7. Were you directed elsewhere upon contacting this individual? 
8. How did you describe your marital / separation situation? 
9. At what point in the separation were you? 
10. Were you asked about therapy / reconciliation? 
11. Did you (have to) go for therapy? 
12. Was the get process explained to you? 
13. What process was outlined? 
14. Where were you for initial contact with Beit Din (administrative meeting)? 
15. Did you fill out any forms? 
16. Did the rabbi/dayan (rabbinic court judge) ask about the details of your case? 
17. What was the seruv process like? 
18. At what point/ did you attain the status of an aguna/mesurevet get? 
19. Did a rabbi/dayan speak with both parties before scheduling the get (divorce)? 
20. How long before the get ceremony could be arranged? 
21. Who were the attending dayanim (rabbinic court judges) at the ceremony? 
22. Where was the ceremony held? 
23. Were you told to bring anything with you? 
24. What were you told to bring? 
25. Were you told to bring anyone with you? 
26. Who did you bring to the ceremony? 
27. What was the process? 
28. How long did it take? 
29. Was it explained to you beforehand that you had to know all your names / nicknames? 
30. Were there any complications by way of names? 
31. Were there any couples having their ceremony performed while you were waiting? Were  
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there couples waiting to be seen after you? 
32. Where did you wait? 
33. With whom did you wait? 
34. Was there financial payments cessation of property requested/required in exchange for 
giving a get? Did the Beit Din (or anyone else) advise you to give it? What did you ultimately decide 
to do?  
35. Was there custody/access requested/required in exchange for giving a get? Did the Beit 
Din (or anyone else) advise you to give it? What did you ultimately decide to do?  
36. Was there financial payments requested/required in exchange for giving a get? Did the 
Beit Din (or anyone else) advise you to give it? What did you ultimately decide to do?  
37. Were (secular, legal) approaches to these types of extortionate demands ever discussed? 
38. Was the ptur (release document) explained to you? 
39. When was the ptur explained to you? 
40. Was the importance of the ptur explained to you? 
41. Did you have any issues obtaining the ptur? 
42. What was the cost of the ceremony? 
43. Who paid? 
44. Was there resistance of payment by either party? 
45. If so, how did the payment resistance affect obtaining the ptur? 
46. Did the Beit Din keep your ketuba (marriage contract)? 
47. If the ketuba was returned, under what circumstances? 
48. What, if anything, were you told about ketuba money? 
49. Did you have to ask about ketuba money? 
50. Did you ask the Beit Din about civil procedure? AT WHAT POINT? 
51. How were you told to go about the civil divorce process? 
52. Were you told about the secular/civil legal amendments in place that may have impacted  
or expedited your get? When? By whom? (Do you know about the amendments? Have you heard of 
Bruker v. Markovits?) 
53. What was the attitude with which the civil procedure was addressed by the beit din/  
dayanim?  
54. Did you ask the Beit Din about prenups or postnups? AT WHAT POINT?   
55. Had you heard of them previously? (Their acceptance/legitimacy by major Orthodox  
rabbis and rabbinic courts in the US and Israel discussed? Their successes like the Light vs. Light 
case? (speaking here of halakhic prenups or prenups with an aguna clause- secular prenups, 
religious in nature or with a religious clause included) 
56. What was the attitude with which prenups were addressed? 
57. Would you describe your experience as gendered? OR how did it feel to be a woman 
going through the get process? 
58. What feelings were you left with toward the rabbinic court/ the get process? 
59. What do you feel toward them now? 
60. What do you think the ‘best solution’ to get refusal is? 
61. Do you believe that (secular, civil) legal amendments can change social behaviour?  
(religious behaviour?) Have they? Should they? (or is there an ongoing gap between law  
reform and social action?) 
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Appendix G: Get Laws- New York, followed by Canada/Ontario 
Domestic Relations Law 253: Removal of barriers to remarriage (New York) 
1. This section applies only to a marriage solemnized in this state or in any other jurisdiction 
by a person specified in subdivision one of section eleven of this chapter. 
2. Any party to a marriage defined in subdivision one of this section who commences a 
proceeding to annul the marriage or for a divorce must allege, in his or her verified 
complaint: (i) that, to the best of his or her knowledge, that he or she has taken or that he or 
she will take, prior to the entry of final judgment, all steps solely within his or her power to 
remove any barrier to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or (ii) 
that the defendant has waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision. 
3. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall thereafter be entered unless the plaintiff 
shall have filed and served a sworn statement: (i) that, to the best of his or her knowledge, he 
or she has, prior to the entry of such final judgment, taken all steps solely within his or her 
power to remove all barriers to the defendant's remarriage following the annulment or 
divorce; or (ii) that the defendant has waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision. 
4. In any action for divorce based on subdivisions five and six of section one hundred 
seventy of this chapter in which the defendant enters a general appearance and does not 
contest the requested relief, no final judgment of annulment or divorce shall be entered 
unless both parties shall have filed and served sworn statements: (i) that he or she has, to the 
best of his or her knowledge, taken all steps solely within his or her power to remove all 
barriers to the other party's remarriage following the annulment or divorce; or (ii) that the 
other party has waived in writing the requirements of this subdivision. 
5. The writing attesting to any waiver of the requirements of subdivision two, three or four of 
this section shall be filed with the court prior to the entry of a final judgment of annulment or 
divorce. 
6. As used in the sworn statements prescribed by this section "barrier to remarriage" 
includes, without limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition, of which 
the party required to make the verified statement is aware, that is imposed on a party to a 
marriage, under the principles held by the clergyman or minister who has solemnized the 
marriage, by reason of the other party's commission or withholding of any voluntary act. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any party to consult with any clergyman 
or minister to determine whether there exists any such religious or conscientious restraint or 
inhibition. It shall not be deemed a "barrier to remarriage" within the meaning of this section 
if the restraint or inhibition cannot be removed by the party's voluntary act. Nor shall it be 
deemed a "barrier to remarriage" if the party must incur expenses in connection with removal 
of the restraint or inhibition and the other party refuses to provide reasonable reimbursement 
for such expenses. "All steps solely within his or her power" shall not be construed to include 
application to a marriage tribunal or other similar organization or agency of a religious 
403 
 
denomination which has authority to annul or dissolve a marriage under the rules of such 
denomination. 
7. No final judgment of annulment or divorce shall be entered, notwithstanding the filing of 
the plaintiff's sworn statement prescribed by this section, if the clergyman or minister who 
has solemnized the marriage certifies, in a sworn statement, that he or she has solemnized the 
marriage and that, to his or her knowledge, the plaintiff has failed to take all steps solely 
within his or her power to remove all barriers to the defendant's remarriage following the 
annulment or divorce, provided that the said clergyman or minister is alive and available and 
competent to testify at the time when final judgment would be entered. 
8. Any person who knowingly submits a false sworn statement under this section shall be 
guilty of making an apparently sworn false statement in the first degree and shall be punished 
in accordance with section 210.40 of the penal law. 
9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any court to inquire into or 
determine any ecclesiastical or religious issue. The truth of any statement submitted pursuant 
to this section shall not be the subject of any judicial inquiry, except as provided in 
subdivision eight of this section. 
 
Domestic Relations Law 236B: Equitable Distribution, Maintenance, Child 
Support  (Special controlling provisions; prior actions or proceedings; new 
actions or proceedings) (New York) 
5. Disposition of property in certain matrimonial actions. 
h. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, 
consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two 
hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph d of this 
subdivision. 
6. Post-divorce maintenance awards. 
o. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, 
consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two 
hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph e of this 
subdivision. 6-a. Law revision commission study. a. The legislature hereby finds and 
declares it to be the policy of the state that it is necessary to achieve equitable outcomes 
when families divorce and it is important to ensure that the economic consequences of a 
divorce are fairly shared by divorcing couples. Serious concerns have been raised that the 
implementation of New York state's maintenance laws have not resulted in equitable results. 
Maintenance is often not granted and where it is granted, the results are inconsistent and 
unpredictable. This raises serious concerns about the ability of our current maintenance laws 
to achieve equitable and fair outcomes. The legislature further finds a comprehensive review 
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of the provisions of our state's maintenance laws should be undertaken. It has been thirty 
years since the legislature significantly reformed our state's divorce laws by enacting 
equitable distribution of marital property and introduced the concept of maintenance to 
replace alimony. Concerns that the implementation of our maintenance laws have not 
resulted in equitable results compel the need for a review of these laws. 
 
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp) (Canada) 
21.1 (1) In this section, spouse has the meaning assigned by subsection 2(1) and includes a 
former spouse. 
Affidavit re removal of barriers to religious remarriage 
(2) In any proceedings under this Act, a spouse (in this section referred to as the “deponent”) 
may serve on the other spouse and file with the court an affidavit indicating 
o (a) that the other spouse is the spouse of the deponent; 
o (b) the date and place of the marriage, and the official character of the person who 
solemnized the marriage; 
o (c) the nature of any barriers to the remarriage of the deponent within the deponent’s religion 
the removal of which is within the other spouse’s control; 
o (d) where there are any barriers to the remarriage of the other spouse within the other 
spouse’s religion the removal of which is within the deponent’s control, that the deponent 
 (i) has removed those barriers, and the date and circumstances of that removal, or 
 (ii) has signified a willingness to remove those barriers, and the date and circumstances 
of that signification; 
o (e) that the deponent has, in writing, requested the other spouse to remove all of the barriers 
to the remarriage of the deponent within the deponent’s religion the removal of which is 
within the other spouse’s control; 
o (f) the date of the request described in paragraph (e); and 
o (g) that the other spouse, despite the request described in paragraph (e), has failed to remove 
all of the barriers referred to in that paragraph. 
Powers of court where barriers not removed 
(3) Where a spouse who has been served with an affidavit under subsection (2) does not 
o (a) within fifteen days after that affidavit is filed with the court or within such longer period 
as the court allows, serve on the deponent and file with the court an affidavit indicating that 
all of the barriers referred to in paragraph (2)(e) have been removed, and 
o (b) satisfy the court, in any additional manner that the court may require, that all of the 
barriers referred to in paragraph (2)(e) have been removed, 
405 
 
the court may, subject to any terms that the court considers appropriate, 
o (c) dismiss any application filed by that spouse under this Act, and 
o (d) strike out any other pleadings and affidavits filed by that spouse under this Act. 
 
Special case 
(4) Without limiting the generality of the court’s discretion under subsection (3), the court may 
refuse to exercise its powers under paragraphs (3)(c) and (d) where a spouse who has been 
served with an affidavit under subsection (2) 
o (a) within fifteen days after that affidavit is filed with the court or within such longer period 
as the court allows, serves on the deponent and files with the court an affidavit indicating 
genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for refusing to remove the barriers 
referred to in paragraph (2)(e); and 
o (b) satisfies the court, in any additional manner that the court may require, that the spouse 
has genuine grounds of a religious or conscientious nature for refusing to remove the barriers 
referred to in paragraph (2)(e). 
Affidavits 
(5) For the purposes of this section, an affidavit filed with the court by a spouse must, in order to 
be valid, indicate the date on which it was served on the other spouse. 
Where section does not apply 
(6) This section does not apply where the power to remove the barrier to religious remarriage lies 
with a religious body or official. 
 
 
Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (Ontario)                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Statement re removal of barriers to remarriage 
(4) A party to an application under section 7 (net family property), 10 (questions of title between 
spouses), 33 (support), 34 (powers of court) or 37 (variation) may serve on the other party and 
file with the court a statement, verified by oath or statutory declaration, indicating that, 
(a) the author of the statement has removed all barriers that are within his or her control and 
that would prevent the other spouse’s remarriage within that spouse’s faith; and 
(b) the other party has not done so, despite a request.  R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 2 (4). 
Idem 
(5) Within ten days after service of the statement, or within such longer period as the court 
allows, the party served with a statement under subsection (4) shall serve on the other party and 
file with the court a statement, verified by oath or statutory declaration, indicating that the author 
of the statement has removed all barriers that are within his or her control and that would prevent 
the other spouse’s remarriage within that spouse’s faith.  R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 2 (5). 
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Dismissal, etc. 
(6) When a party fails to comply with subsection (5), 
(a) if the party is an applicant, the proceeding may be dismissed; 
(b) if the party is a respondent, the defence may be struck out.  R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 2 (6). 
Exception 
(7) Subsections (5) and (6) do not apply to a party who does not claim costs or other relief in the 
proceeding.  R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 2 (7). 
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Appendix H: Prenuptial Agreements- United States, followed by Canada 
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AGREEMENT TO FOSTER MUTUAL RESPECT AND REMOVE BARRIERS TO RELIGIOUS REMARRIAGE 
ENTERED INTO THIS ___ DAY OF __________, 20___, IN THE CITY OF__________________, PROVINCE 
OF _________________, CANADA.  http://www.adathcongregation.org/pdf_doc/HalachicPrenupforCanada1-25-16.pdf  
1. We understand that, according to Jewish law, when a marriage has irrevocably failed, a Get (Jewish 
Bill of Divorce) must be willingly given and received without delay, and without refusal for any reason. 
2. Therefore we, the undersigned Bride and Groom, hereby freely and voluntarily agree, without 
compulsion and without reservation, that in the event that problems arise in continuing our marriage, 
Heaven forbid, we obligate ourselves to appear in person for counsel, at the request of the other, before 
the Beth Din of America (currently located at 305 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1201, New York, New York 
10001, USA; www.bethdin.org), or if the Beth Din of America deems it appropriate, another Beth Din 
authorized in writing by the Beth Din of America, for the purpose of following the direction of that Beth 
Din concerning giving/receiving a Get only. 
3. Should that Beth Din suggest that we remove barriers to religious re-marriage by obtaining a Get, we 
agree to follow that advice without delay, and not refuse to either give or receive a Get. It is our 
intention to address any other issues that at that time may need to be resolved between us, separate 
from the giving and receiving of the Get, outside of the Beth Din proceeding. 
4. If any provision of this agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable by any competent authority, 
that invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect or render invalid or unenforceable any other provision 
of this agreement. 
5. Before signing this agreement, both of us were instructed to seek the advice of our own legal advisors 
and rabbinic advisors, and we were given the opportunity to do so before signing. Each of us 
acknowledges that we are executing and signing this Agreement voluntarily and freely, and that our 
willingness to execute and sign this Agreement did not result from any undue stress, duress, improper 
understanding, undue influence, or false inducements. We further acknowledge that we are entering 
into this Agreement with full knowledge of all the implications, rights, and obligations; that this is in 
accord with, and does not conflict with our religious convictions and principles; and that we consider 
this to be in our own self-interest. 
6. The present document has been written in the English language at the express request of the parties. 
Le présent document a été rédigé en langue anglaise à la demande expresse des parties. 
Scheduled date of marriage ceremony: ____________________________________ 
_____________________________   _____________________________ 
Bride:       Groom: 
_____________________________   _____________________________ 
Witness:      Witness: 
